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1 
  Introduction 
 
Must there be a new model of mission in the Church today? This is the question 
which seems to confront the Christian Church in Uganda today as it grapples with 
the phenomena of multiculturalism and globalisation. These current trends would 
suggest dramatic shift from the traditional interpretation of Christian mission when 
Christians considered mission as the propagation of the faith for the conversion of 
souls and the expansion of the church; to interpretations that call for discovering 
God‘s initiative in the human world, beyond all religious, cultural, social, political 
and economic borders and in the farthest corners of society. And in discovering, 
disclosing and unveiling God‘s initiative, the Church, through its missionary 
concern, renders a service to the human world. In doing this, the church can help 
turn human existence into human coexistence. In a world in which people go their 
own way, mission brings them at crossroads, where, through missionary vehicles of 
encounter and dialogue, they discover the grace of becoming co-travellers.1 These 
insights call for a re-consideration of the mission strategies as the church finds itself 
in the midst of a plurality of cultures and traditions. The advice of Max A.C. 
Warren which is frequently referred to, would apply quite well in such a situation: 
―When we approach the man of another faith than our own it will be in a spirit of 
expectancy to find how God has been speaking to him and what new 
understandings of the grace and love of God we may ourselves discover in the 
encounter. For God has not left himself without witnesses in any nation at any 
time.‖2 Consequently the missionary attitude in approaching another people, 
another culture, and another religion is to take off ones shoes for the place one is 
approaching is holy.3 This understanding gives Christian mission a new dimension 
altogether. Christians would seek to develop relevant mission theories to address 
the shifting times and seek to reach all people as people of God. In the context 
under consideration in this work, that is, a multicultural and globalising context, 
mission must promote a conversation of mankind so that all can narrate the 
wonders of God. 
 
1. Conceptual Design 
 
In the description of the conceptual design we elaborate on the research questions 
and objectives, the theoretical framework and the concepts used. Together they 
describe what we are going to study in this thesis.4 
  
                                                          
1 Peter Nissen, ―Mission is a Must: A missiological profile of Rogier van Rossum,‖ in Mission is a Must: 
Intercultural Theology and the Mission of the Church, ed. Frans Wijsen and Peter Nissen (Amsterdam, New York: 
Rodopi, 2002), 3. 
2 Laurenti Magesa, Rethinking Mission. Evangelization in Africa in a New Era (Eldoret: AMECEA Gaba 
Publications, 2006), 35. See also John V.Taylor, The Primal Vision: Christian Presence amid African Religion, ed. 
Max Warren (London: SCM Press, 1963) 10. 
3 Ibid., 10. 
4 Cf. Piet Verschuren and Hans Doorewaard, Designing a research project (Utrecht: LEMMA, 1999), 25-108. 
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Research questions 
The central belief in Christianity is that God has revealed himself as Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit, that is, as a Trinity. Also Christians believe that God has revealed 
himself as a Saviour and that the fundamental mission of his revelation is the 
salvation of all mankind. Because of this, subsequently, Christians interpret mission 
as having a Trinitarian origin, direction and end. Mission is not primarily an affair 
of men, as the mission of the Church, but rather the mission of God – Missio Dei. 
The mission of the Church and the mission of men in the Churches are 
participations in the mission of God. God‘s mission works through the church‘s 
mission but at the same time it is wider than the church‘s mission. Mission is not a 
church centred activity but rather a God-centred action.5 Mission is understood as 
being derived from the very nature of God. The classic doctrine on the mission Dei 
as God the Father sending the Son, and God the Father and the Son sending the 
Holy Spirit was expanded to include yet another movement: The Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit sending the church into the world.6 As far as missionary 
thinking was concerned, this linking of mission with the doctrine of the Trinity 
constitutes an important innovation or we could say an inspiration. The image of 
mission was mission as participating in the sending of God. The mission of the 
church has no life of its own only in the hands of the sending God can it truly be 
called mission, not least since the missionary initiative comes from God alone. God 
is a missionary God. It is not the church that has a mission of salvation to fulfil in 
the world; it is the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit through the Father that 
includes the Church. Mission is thereby seen as a movement from God to the 
world and the church is viewed as an instrument for that mission not vice versa. To 
participate in mission is to participate in the movement of God‘s love towards 
people, since God is a fountain of sending love. Mission has its origin in the heart 
of God. This is the deepest source of mission. It is impossible to penetrate deeper 
still; there is mission because God loves his people.7 
 
Christians believe that the church right from the moment she was made manifest to 
the world on the day of Pentecost has, by her nature, been identified as a 
missionary church. This conviction is confirmed by the text of Vatican II decree 
Ad Gentes Divinitus which outlines this missionary nature: ―The pilgrim Church is 
missionary by her very nature, since it is from the mission of the Son and the 
mission of the Holy Spirit that she draws her origin, in accordance with the decree 
of God the Father. Missionary activity is nothing else and nothing less than an 
epiphany, or a manifesting of God‘s decree, and its fulfilment in the world and in 
world history, in the course of which God, by means of mission, manifestly works 
out the history of salvation. By the preaching of the word and by the celebration of 
the sacraments, the centre and summit of which is the most Holy Eucharist, He 
                                                          
5 Michael Collins Reilly, Spirituality for Missions: Historical, Theological and Cultural Factors for a Present-Day 
Missionary Spirituality (Quezon City: Ateneo University Publications, 1976), 136-137. 
6 Cf. David Bosch, Transforming Mission (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 389-390. 
7 Ibid., 390. 
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brings about the presence of Christ, the author of salvation.8 This decree proves 
the church‘s self-understanding that by her intrinsic nature is a missionary church 
with a missionary mandate.  
 
As we have seen above the church identifies its mission with the mission of God. 
The Church feels obliged to exercise this mission because the incarnate God gave it 
a mandate in the scriptures: ―But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has 
come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and 
Samaria, and to the ends of the earth‖ (Acts1:8; see also Mark 16:15-16; John 20:2; 
Luke 24:45-49). This missionary command of Jesus is an expression of a deep 
conviction of the early Church that she is a missionary movement. She received the 
commission from her Lord to proclaim the kingdom that he brought about, and to 
make disciples in his name. It is only in this dynamic perspective that the Church 
becomes meaningful.9 From the above Christians believe that the command to 
communicate the message received from Jesus Christ defines the essence of the 
Church. And they interpret the universality of the Christian mission as rooted in 
the biblical texts with the result of this proclamation being discipleship, faith, 
baptism, forgiveness or in a word, salvation. This means that the message of Jesus 
is primarily one to be lived. Belief in Jesus must transform life.10 In a nutshell, 
Christian mission can be understood as demonstrating the universal relevance of 
Christian truth.  
 
From the history of Christian mission, there has been a gradual development in the 
application of the term mission and how it has been used in various ways in 
Christian theology. Until the 16th century it was nearly entirely used in systematic 
theology in a Trinitarian way. This Trinitarian interpretation is based on several key 
texts from the Gospel of Luke, but most of all from Jesus‘ speech at the last supper 
as related in John 13-17. Basic ideas are formulated in texts like John 14:24, ―These 
words you hear are not my own; they belong to the Father who sent me,‖ and John 
15:26 records ―When the Counsellor comes, whom I will send to you from the 
Father, the Spirit of Truth who goes out from the Father, he will testify about me.‖ 
Another application of mission is the liturgical interpretation after the closing 
formula at the end of the Eucharistic celebration, Ite, Missa est. Here Missa stands 
for the dismissal, sending into the world. Diego Lainez (1512-1565), the second 
Superior General of the Jesuits, was probably the first to use the word mission 
exclusively for efforts to preach and baptise the non-Christians. From its very 
beginning this modern word mission was connected with the Counter-reformation 
and early modern colonialism. The formulation of the Code of Canon Law, (Codex 
                                                          
8 Second Vatican Council, Ad Gentes Divinitus. On the Missionary Activity of the Church, 7 December 1965, par. 
2 & 9. 
9 Paul Vadakumpadan, ―Ecclesiological Foundation of Mission‖ in Following Christ in Mission: A 
Foundational Course in Missiology, ed. Sebastian Karotemprel, et al. (Boston, MA: Pauline Books and Media, 
1996), 104. 
10 Ibid., 150. 
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Iuris Canonici, CIC) authorized by the missionary Pope Benedictus XV in 1917 
and valid since 19 May 1918, has very little on mission. But it has a ruling that: 
―according to divine law the churches have the right and authority to preach the 
gospel to all peoples, free from any civil authority.‖11 For the pre-Vatican concept 
of mission the general status of the region was more important than the actual faith 
of the citizens. Here, what is taken into particular account is theological geography, 
when the classical concept of mission is to be understood. The criterion is not the 
individual need for conversion, but the formal status of territories, the division of 
the world in two parts, not along poor and rich, but according to the sole criterion 
of Papal authority, acknowledged in ordinary and not yet in extraordinary regions. 
The section on mission in the 1918 Code of Canon Law ends with a short remark: 
―Nobody can be compelled to accept the Catholic faith against her or his will.‖12 
 
Until the 1950‘s the term mission was never used in a univocal sense; it carried a set 
of meanings. It referred to (i) the sending of missionaries to a designated territory, 
(ii) the activities undertaken by such missionaries, (iii) the geographical area where 
the missionaries were active, (iv) the agency which despatched the missionaries, (v) 
the non-Christian world or mission field, (vi) a local congregation without a 
resident minister and still dependent on the support of an older, established church, 
or (vii) a series of special services intended to deepen or spread the Christian faith, 
usually in a nominally Christian environment.13 In a more theological synopsis, 
however, the concept, mission, has been used traditionally paraphrased as (a) 
propagation of the faith, (b) expansion of the reign of God, (c) conversion of the 
heathen, and (d) the founding of new churches.14 
 
In the history of the church, the pioneering work of both Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries then assumed an absolute objective of saving souls and leading all the 
people in the mission lands to conversion to the Christian faith. This is constant 
with the twofold task for the church as distinguished by Josef Schmidlin: (1) to 
proclaim and spread the Christian faith and the Christian gospel and so, of 
necessity, to propagate itself; and (2) to preserve and strengthen this faith and this 
church.15 In this context, the term conversion is used in its religious sense as the 
―transfer of religious identification and adaptation to a newly adopted religious 
faith.‖16 If we make an in-depth look at the phenomenon of religious conversion, 
we see that it is abundantly discussed in the historical literature of the western 
world. However, what is less well documented, are the motives of the individual 
                                                          
11 cf. Stanslaus Woywod, The New Code of Canon Law: A Summary and Commentary on the New Code of Canon 
Law (New York: Joseph F. Wagner (Inc.) 1918), can. 1165. 
12 cf. The 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 1194. 
13 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Francis Anekwe Oborji, Concepts of Mission: The Evolution of Contemporary Missiology (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 2006), 61. 
16 Natalie Isser and Lita Linzer Schwartz, The History of Conversion and Contemporary Cults (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1988), 18. 
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converts and the sincerity and intensity of their commitment to the new faith. 
Conversion, whatever form it takes, usually remains an exclusively personal 
experience, unnoticed and uncommemorated by outsiders.17 This is so because ―the 
personal aspect of religious conversions, apart from controversy, has never been a 
subject of very deep human interest.‖18 But as for the missionaries, conversion, as a 
dominant mission theory of the time was considered as ―the process by which the 
primary religious identification of a people changes.‖19 The 19th century witnessed 
an unprecedented growth of a fervent missionary movement in the Church with 
missionaries burning in zeal for the conversion of the whole world. However, 
despite their zeal and desire for the conversion of all people, ―some of these 
missionaries were incompetent enough, some were cantankerous, and many 
died.‖20 Adrian Hastings makes a striking description of the missionary character 
and life-style of both the Catholic and Protestant Missionaries and their 
deficiencies. He argues that whereas the Catholic missionaries were well learned, 
disciplined, and systematic and adopted a strategy of adaptation in clothes, 
language, and food, they did not include theological adaptation.21 And he describes 
the personality of a typical Protestant missionary in the 19th century setting thus: 
The normative early nineteenth-century missionary was a working man. To 
describe him as a member of the lower middle class would be to mislead. He was 
an artisan, a worker with a skill, and even such clergy as went were seldom of a very 
different background….many had had little, if any, training and were even 
convinced that training, education, and theology were rather pointless. What was 
needed was a good knowledge of the Bible, a great deal of faith, and a strong 
voice.22 This implies that for the missionaries from the Christian communities, 
mission most often postulated conversion as the dominant model which portrayed 
the other as worse-off and urgently need to be helped with the means of Christian 
spiritual salvation, to help one ascend from darkness to light. 
 
From the above, we can rightly deduce that the job in the missions, as at first they 
saw it, was one emphatically of preaching for ―the conversion of the non-Christian 
individual and at the spreading of the faith among non-Christians.‖23 Again at first 
sight one would imagine that the first mission strategy was to found a Christian 
community or teach trades since the personnel that comprised some missionary 
groups were ―cobblers, tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers and whatever.‖24 
But what is to be noted is that the stress was neither upon ordering a church nor 
upon industrial mission, but rather upon evangelism, and it was assumed that such 
                                                          
17 John W. Eadie, ed., The Conversion of Constantine (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 1. 
18 Lehmann L. H., The Soul of a Priest (Sea Cliff, New York: Christ‘s Missions Inc., 1933), 13. 
19 John David Yeadon Peel, ―Conversion and Tradition in Two African Societies: Ijebu and Buganda,‖ 
Past & Present , No. 77, (November, 1977): 108-141. 
20 Adrian Hastings, The Church in Africa 1450-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 243. 
21 Ibid, 254. 
22 Ibid, 258. 
23 Oborji, Concepts of Mission, 95. 
24 Ibid. 
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people could be excellent evangelists and would win more converts for the church, 
rather for Christ. This supposed that for the missionaries and the sending churches, 
their major emphasis was to, primarily, seek to convert the individual or rather 
individuals, and on the other, to join these individuals together in community, that 
through it the whole people may be renewed in Christ. They believed that 
conversion means the profession of Christian teaching on the one hand, and 
Baptism in the name of the Trinity, on the other. Although conversion and the 
implantation of the church made the church to take root in the Ugandan society 
and also reach the remotest corners of the earth, we have to argue that there have 
been various theories of doing mission corresponding with the different eras of the 
Christian faith.  
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, there have been remarkable features in 
Christian outlook since the first century. With this period, the composition of the 
Christian church ethnically and culturally has changed out of recognition. There has 
been a massive accession to Christian faith. In fact one has to go back many 
centuries for any parallel to the number of new Christian communities. This 
accession has taken place outside Europe, in the southern continents, including 
many areas where before the present epoch, Christians were fewer in number. This 
is believed in the Christian faith that God‘s creative and saving will cannot be 
separated; it is a continuum since salvation is an integral salvation. It is both a 
‗shalom‘ and an invitation to participate in God‘s life. God created human beings 
for community and wills that the scattered children of God become the people of 
God. Regardless of how the church is defined Christianity is not purely a matter of 
individuals who go on their own independently of one another and without the 
protection and support of community, reach God.25 Christian mission then has 
defined the salvation of all mankind as its primordial and ultimate purpose.  
 
Against the background of globalisation and multiculturalism Christianity too, must 
adopt essentially significant models of mission to address the prevailing 
circumstances. In this research project, we are trying to propose a new model of 
doing mission in the context of a multicultural and globalising world. 
 
The main research question is: What is an adequate model for mission for the 
Ugandan Church in the 21st century? And the sub questions are: (i) Why should 
mission adopt a new model in this age? (ii) What would the proposed mission 
model contribute to the theory (theology) of mission? (iii) How will the new 
mission model be implemented in the practice of mission? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Since the end of Vatican II Council proceedings in 1965, the Church has grappled 
with the question of promoting the message of the gospel in the culturally 
                                                          
25 Karl Müller, Mission Theology: An Introduction (Berlin: Steyler Verlag, 1987), 47. 
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pluralistic world of the ensuing period. There was the need to make the basic 
message of Christianity both comprehensible and attractive to the millions of 
people who looked at the assumption that they must adopt the Euro-American 
culture in which Christianity has been wrapped. Pope Paul VI admitted that ―the 
kingdom which the Gospel proclaims is lived by people who are profoundly linked 
to a culture,‖ so that ―the building up of the Kingdom cannot avoid borrowing the 
elements of human culture. Though independent of cultures, the Gospel and 
evangelisation are not necessarily incompatible with them; rather they are capable 
of permeating them all without becoming subject to any one of them.‖26 This 
observation goes against the strategy of imposition which Christian missionaries 
attempted when Christianity was first spread beyond Europe. By imposition we 
mean the enforced use of unmodified Roman forms, an attempt that gave way to 
translation, which is the preservation of Roman forms encoded in the local 
vernaculars.  
 
The above description is a comparable semblance between mission strategies and 
international development programs. Michael V. Angrosino thinks that ―the 
sequence of mission strategies is not unlike that of international development. 
Development agents were no less convinced than religious missionaries that they 
had truth and historical inevitability on their side. At first they presented their 
innovations in undigested form with little cognizance of the differences of 
communication styles, values, or customary practices of the people they contacted. 
Such programs often failed, not because of the insufficiency of the technology in 
which the innovators had such great faith, but because the innovations conflicted 
with local traditions and institutions. At least in part...developers are beginning to 
pay attention to sustainable development that incorporates respect for indigenous 
knowledge.‖27 This lack of respect for indigenous knowledge has drawn a barrage 
of consistent criticism from scholars that the mission of the church all through 
history has always been loaded with a kind of ethnocentrism which has tainted the 
image of the church and hence impairs her mission and nature. The old missionary 
paradigm was at once ―understood to be that of faithfully producing a replica of 
the missionary‘s sending church and culture. The slogan ‗Christianity and 
Civilization‘ captured for that generation the essence of missions.‖28 Such a model 
had as its consequence a clash between the missionary culture loaded with the 
baggage of the sending church and the indigenous cultures which were the 
recipients of the message of salvation. 
 
                                                          
26 Paul VI, Pope, Evangelii Nuntiandi. Apostolic Exhortation on Evangelisation in the Modern World (Rome, 
Vatican: December 8, 1975), 20. 
27 Michael V. Angrosino, ―The Culture Concept and the Mission of the Roman Catholic Church,‖ 
American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 96, No.4, (Dec., 1994), 824-832 at http://www.jstor.org 
/stable/682446 (accessed March 17, 2010). 
28 Wilbert Shenk, ―The Intercultural Learning Process as a New Model of Mission,‖ in Towards an 
Intercultural Theology: Essays in Honour of J.A.B. Jongeneel, ed. Martha Frederiks et. al. (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij 
Meinema, 2003), 78. 
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The Pastoral Strategic Plan of Kampala Archdiocese (2010-2014), which will be 
analysed in detail later in this study, demonstrates that the church has to espouse an 
applicable model of mission for the Gospel message of salvation to remain valid 
and relevant in the prevailing circumstances. In mission history, the missiological 
models that have developed over time have undergone what Bosch describes as a 
paradigm shift. Bosch makes a clear distinction between paradigms in theology and 
in the natural sciences. This term has its origins in the science of Thomas Kuhn 
which Bosch appropriates for the study of theology and understanding of mission 
in particular. To begin with, there are in these respects important differences 
between theology and the natural sciences. In the natural sciences, for instance the 
new paradigm usually replaces the old definitely and irreversibly. After the 
Newtonian revolution it is simply no longer possible to understand the universe in 
Copernican let alone Ptolemaean categories.29 In theology and in the arts old 
paradigms live on. Sometimes one may even have a revival of a former paradigm. 
This is evidenced inter alia in the recovery of Paul‘s letter to the Romans by 
Augustine in the 4th century, Martin Luther in the 16th century and Karl Barth in the 
20th century.30 Scientific and theological paradigms therefore are incomparable 
because they respond to different realities. As we shall see the different models of 
doing mission over the centuries, we shall recognize that the development of a new 
one does not disqualify the other; it only answers the inadequacies that prevail in a 
particular mode, but does not transplant it completely. In this work, we shall 
propose a new paradigm of mission practice in this age of multiculturalism and 
globalization. These ‗signs of the time‘ call for a necessity for a fresh model of 
mission to address the prevailing circumstances. A detailed survey of the dominant 
mission models will serve as the beginning of the exploration of the contemporary 
mission era. We take communication between Christianity, culture and context as a 
selection criterion to describe various mission models. 
 
In systematic missiology, the primary model of mission has been identified with the 
Münster School which considered ‗conversion of individual souls‘ as the ultimate 
design of mission. Brock Kilbourne and James T. Richardson studied Conversion 
from a sociological perspective and conceptualized it in two paradigms. In the old 
paradigm, conversion is generally viewed in passivist and deterministic terms, 
whereas in the new paradigm conversion is generally explained from the standpoint 
of active agency, that is, self-directed behaviour, personal choice, meaning and 
negotiation. The prototype of the old paradigm is the conversion of Saul/Paul on 
the road to Damascus. For many within the Christian tradition and throughout 
Western civilization, the transformation of Paul constitutes what conversion should 
be. The Pauline experience and similar passivist conversions are usually described 
by the following characteristics: 1) sudden and dramatic, 2) irrational or magical in 
nature, 3) involving a powerful, external, and impersonal force, 4) usually a single 
event, 5) the negation of the old self and the affirmation of the new self, 6) change 
                                                          
29 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 186. 
30 Ibid. 
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from one static state to another static state, 7) typically occurs during adolescence 
and is a ―good thing,‖ and 8) behaviour change usually follows belief change. Thus, 
in the old paradigm, the individual is conceptualized as a passive recipient of 
personality changes and life experiences. Whether psychologically predisposed or 
situationally tempered, individuals‘ conversions are considered determined, in large 
part, by impersonal and powerful forces acting upon them, within them, or both.  
 
The prototypes of the new paradigm are seekers, or individuals who actively make 
plans, choices, and decisions, and generate many of their life experiences. Rather 
than pushed around by powerful, unseen, and uncontrollable forces, the seeker is 
an active agent. The seeker is generally characterized by the following: 1) volition, 
2) autonomy, 3) search for meaning and purpose, 4) multiple conversions or 
conversion careers, 5) rational interpretation of experiences, 6) gradual and 
continuous conversion, 7) negotiation between the individual and the potential 
membership group, and 8) belief change that follows behaviour change, as the 
individual learns the role of being a new convert.31 In both instances conversion is 
considered an individualised process and Salzman makes a particular distinction of 
psychopathological conversion, a highly charged emotional experience which is an 
attempt by the individual to solve serious personal problems or to deal with 
disintegrating intrapsychic conflicts. Often it involves the converts‘ attempts to 
channel hatred and hostile feelings arising out of a conflict with some authority 
figure.32 The conversion is regressive and produces defensive changes in the 
convert that are similar to those that occur in individuals with distinct 
psychopathological disorders. Some of the characteristics of psychopathological 
post-conversion behaviour are:1)an exaggerated, irrational belief in new ideas, 2) a 
greater concern with form and doctrine than with the substance, 3) contempt and 
hatred for the prior belief, 4) intolerance for all deviates, 5) crusading zeal to 
convert others, and 6) a need for martyrdom and self-punishment. 
 
Religious conversion is not an occurrence which will happen independently of 
human experience. The process of religious conversion as well as the attribution of 
its causes cannot be understood apart from actor and audience perspectives. 
Converts need the social standards of some reference group against which to 
measure themselves before their privately made or publicly proclaimed self-
attributions of having converted acquire credibility to either themselves or to 
others. They need to know how to talk like a convert, how to behave like a convert, 
and how to look like convert. Social audiences also need the social standards of 
some reference group in order to evaluate a reported conversion experience. 
Conversion can be meaningfully understood, then, only within a social context and 
                                                          
31 Brock Kilbourne and James T. Richardson, ―Paradigm Conflict, Types of Conversions, and Conversion 
Theories‖ Sociological Analysis, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1989): 1-21 online article at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3710915 (accessed on Thursday March 18, 2010).  
32 Salzman, L., ―The Psychology of Religious and Ideological Conversion‖ Psychiatry, Vol. 16 (1953), 177-
187.  
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appears to always involve some choice of perspective by both the convert and the 
observer.  
 
An alternative to the ‗conversion of souls‘ model was developed by the School of 
Louvain which stressed the ‗implantation of the Church.‘ This is also based on the 
concept of conversion, not individually but institutionally. Pierre Charles, a Jesuit 
theologian and a co-founder with, Rene Lange, of the School of Louvain, affirms 
that the goal of mission is not conversion, the salvation of souls, the rebirth as 
children of God; God looks after all of this. They suggest that the aim of mission 
rather is ―to extend the borders of the visible church, to complete this work of 
expansion, to cover the whole world with prayers and adoration, to give back to the 
saviour all of his inheritance,‖33 therefore implanting the visible Church in the 
countries where it still has not been planted.34 In the Louvain model of 
understanding of mission, there is a particular development which is attributed to 
the understanding of the Church as well. The church is understood not only to be a 
means of saving souls, but is also an end, because by being the society of the word 
made fresh, it represents the divine form in the world. Precisely due to this nature 
of the church, Christians have to implant it everywhere. Therefore the goal of 
mission is to implant a new local church, and the priority of missionary activity is 
the formation of an indigenous clergy and episcopate.35 Even Charles and his 
fellow proponents of the Louvain school, above all think about an institutional and 
hierarchical, therefore visible church. The contrast with the conversion model they 
presented here has produced significant discomfort in mission territories where the 
implantation of the church would be resolved in a simple transposition of western 
ecclesiastical organisation lacking testimony, dialogue and the constitution of an 
effective indigenous community of believers. It could even be argued that it‘s a 
model which is deficient in the theological nature of the church, primarily, as 
people of God. 
 
However, Charles‘ thought is that the missions, by their nature are a transitional 
activity. When the church will be visibly implanted throughout the whole world, 
there will no longer be missionaries and missions will no longer be spoken of. The 
most important criterion affirming the church‘s implantation in a territory is that 
the church does not have to be a nomad, but is solidly rooted; it has to be a 
permanent institution of salvation; it has to be able to have its own hierarchy and 
clergy. Mission at that point, can consider itself over, even if the local church will 
have to continue to offer conversion to those people, who, though living in its 
                                                          
33 Guisseppe Buono, Missiology: Theology and Praxis, trans. Marco Bagnarol (Nairobi: Paulines Publications 
Africa, 2002), 62-65. See also A. Semois, ―Vers Une définition de l‘activité missionnaire,‖ in NZM 3 
(1947), 161-178. 
34 Pierre Charles, Missiologie, Etudes, Conférences I, (Louvain, 1939), 59.  
35 Ibid. 
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territory, are not its members. However, this would not be missionary activity in 
the strict sense of the term.36 
 
After the Second World War another mission method developed. It acknowledged 
that conversion in its individual and institutional form did not work. The aim of 
mission remained more or less the same, but the mission method changed. The aim 
was still to bring the non-Christians to Christ or the Church. But the Church could 
meet them half-way by ‗adaptation‘ or ‗accommodating of Christianity‘ to local 
cultures.  
 
Whereas the Second Vatican Council stressed ‗incarnation‘ as foundation for 
mission, ‗inculturation‘ became the dominant mission model after Vatican II 
Council. The Vatican II spirit of openness cleared the way for frank discussion of 
diversity within the global body of the Catholic Church. An Indian theologian D.S. 
Amalorpavadass, who was an enthusiastic advocate of diversity, applied the term 
indigenization to describe the process of conferring on Catholic liturgy, a cultural 
form that is native to the local community. He had an ambitious agenda for the 
liturgy, including the introduction of culturally appropriate gestures, forms of 
homage, scared objects, music, and meditative practices and the incorporation of 
scared Hindu texts, especially the Rig Veda, into the readings of the mass. Vatican 
theologians initially approved the concept of indigenization but were put off by the 
somewhat patronizing tone of the word itself. At the same time, a parallel concept, 
contextualisation, emerged and found favour with liberation theologians, who 
suggested that the life and mission of the church had to be made relevant to 
contemporary society. Because the Vatican distances herself from the political 
connotations of liberation theology, the term contextualisation was dropped by 
other church authors. The concept of inculturation has come to cover both of 
these related ideas.37 
 
Inculturation implies that the church must be both true to her traditions and 
conscious of her universal mission. According to Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, the...―Church can enter into 
communion with different forms of culture, thereby enriching both herself and the 
cultures themselves.‖38 Unlike the anthropological term acculturation, which refers 
to changes that result ―when two or more different groups come into significant 
contact productive of changes in all,‖39 and interculturation which is an interaction 
                                                          
36 Cf. A. Semois, Vers une définition, 161-168; Gianni Colzan, La Missionareta, della Chiesa (Bologna, 1975), 
326. 
37 Angrosino, ―The Culture Concept and the Mission of the Roman Catholic Church,‖ 824-832. 
38 Austin Flannery, ed., ―Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,‖ In Vatican II Conciliar 
and Post-Conciliar Documents, rev. edition (Northport, NY; Costello, 1992), 903-1001. 
39 Jennifer A. Skuza, ―Humanizing the Understanding of the Acculturation Experience with 
Phenomenology,‖ Human Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 2007), 447-465 at, http:// 
www.jstor.org/stable/27642813 (accessed March 22, 2010). 
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among different Christian cultures,40 inculturation carries more meaning and 
significance. Inculturation refers to encounters whose outcome is a convergence 
that does not replace either of the cultures from which it arose. Both parties to the 
inculturative exchange undergo internal transformation, but neither loses its 
autonomous identity. Acculturation may be accidental, but inculturation occurs 
when a dominant culture attempts to make itself accessible to a subdominant 
culture without losing its own particular character. In other words, the Church is 
―is in a stage of welcoming in a profound way those elements that she encounters 
in every culture, to assimilate them and integrate them into Christianity, and to root 
the Christian way in different cultures.‖41 But we to contend that inculturation as a 
complex process demands an integral definition in order to match with the goal of 
the reality at whose service it is, namely mission whose target is salvation in its 
entirety.42 
 
In addition to the above, inculturation as a process involves proclamation of the 
Gospel that calls people to conversion leading to a change of mentality that itself 
leads to cultural change and the response that builds a new community of love of 
God and neighbour. According to Ssettuuma, in this process of inculturation, 
culture and context mediate thrice. God‘s message is interpreted and contextualized 
in a particular culture and situation. The conversion is mediated through cultural 
transformation. Then a new culture, as worldview, attitudes and values systems, 
mediates the life and celebration of the new community. Hence inculturation could 
be understood as the dialogical, liberative and salvific encounter of God in Jesus 
Christ and His Gospel in the power of the Holy Spirit with a given people in its 
cultural and existential context.43 Inculturation is not a definitive term that 
expresses the dialogue and liberating meeting between the Gospel and a given 
people and their existential situation. It is only applied in mission studies at least as 
the best term to express that reality.  
 
Due to an ambiguity in the mission theology of Vatican Two as demonstrated in 
the tension between the mission decree Ad Gentes and the pastoral constitution 
Gaudium et Spes, which was seen by many missionaries and missiologists as the 
‗real‘ mission document of Vatican Two, during the 1970s and 1980s two 
alternatives to the ‗inculturation‘ model emerged. One was the model of 
‗liberation,‘ stressing the ‗question of social justice,‘ more or less in harmony with 
the social teaching of the Church. The other was the model of ‗dialogue,‘ 
addressing mainly the issue of religious pluralism. 
 
                                                          
40 Ssettuuma Benedict, Inculturation: Towards an Integrated Approach for Ownership, Permanence and Relevance of 
Christianity for a People (Kampala: Angel Agencies, 2010), 14.  
41 Cf. ―Working paper for the 1987 Synod of Bishops on Vocation and Mission of the Laity,‖ Origins, 17: 
1-20. 
42 Karl Müller, Mission Theology: An Introduction (Berlin: Steyler Verlag, 1987), 82-83. 
43 Ssettuuma, Inculturation, 10. 
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Dialogue has become a catchword in mission studies and it almost defines 
interreligious relations. It has developed in response to the multicultural 
development of societies in the past few years. Some people commonly understand 
it as aiming to facilitate understanding and tolerance between different religious 
communities or traditions. After the events of 11th September 2001, dialogue 
acquired new meanings. In the world of ―war against terrorism‖, it has become an 
additional instrument to calm the excessive religious sentiment which is suspected 
to be the root of the hostility against the religious others. Furthermore scholars of 
religion, have made it part of the academic activities in several universities.  
 
Among African missiologists it has been acknowledged widely that in the post-Cold 
War and post-Apartheid era the preceding mission models as described above are 
inadequate and a new mission model is needed to address the challenges of the 21st 
century,44 a mission model that rediscovers the Agency of Africans.45 Various 
missiologists have used the notion of ‗conversation‘ to elaborate on this new 
mission model. However, they have used this notion in various ways. Some have 
used the notion of ‗conversation‘ simply as an equivalent to ‗communication‘ or 
‗dialogue‘ to study the object of mission.46 Others have used it from a more 
methodical point of view as an equivalent to discourse,47 or as a label for a new way 
of doing theology in Africa, ―a way of doing theology in a community of dialogue 
partners that evokes elements of traditional African palaver‖.48 Following John 
Comaroff and Jean Comaroff,49 Tinyiko Maluleke argues that ―what happened 
between missionaries and local people was an ‗encounter‘, not a straight-forward 
conquest‖. And for this reason, ―the encounter is branded a ‗long conversation‘ rather 
than one that produced a conversion‖.50 Still following the Comaroffs Maluleke adds 
that ―even in the face of the ‗long conversation‘ ‗a new kind of hegemony‘ 
emerges‖.51 In harmony with a grounded theory approach, the present study uses 
Richard Rorty‘s notion of ‗conversation‘ as a ‗sensitizing concept‘ to study mission 
theory and practice in past and present and to propose a new mission model for 
the future. 
 
  
                                                          
44 Laurenti Magesa, Rethinking Mission. 
45 Tinyiko Maluleke, ―A rediscovery of the agency of Africans,‖ in Marginalised Africa: An International 
Perspective, ed. Peter Kanyandago (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002), 165-188. 
46 Kirsteen Kim, ―Missiology as global conversation of Contextual Theologies,‖ Paper for the IAMS 
assembly in Malaysia (31 July-7 August 2004) at http://missionstudies.org/archive/conference/1papers 
/fp/Kim_Kirsteen_Full_paper.pdf (accessed on 10 May 2010). 
47 Robert Doornenbal, Crossroads: An Exploration of the Emerging-Missional Conversation with a Special Focus on 
'Missional Leadership' and Its Challenges for Theological Education (Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2012). 
48 Cf. Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator, ―Introduction,‖ In Reconciliation, Justice and Peace – the Second African 
Synod, ed. Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator (Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2011), 3, 8. 
49 Cf. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, ―Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa,‖ in American 
Ethnologist, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (February 1986), 1-22.  
50 Tinyiko Maluleke, “A rediscovery of the agency of Africans,‖ 186. 
51 Ibid., 187. 
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Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research work is to develop a contextual theory 
(theology) of mission for the Ugandan Church in the 21st century. There are some 
realities which have come to form a dominant discourse in the age of the 21st 
century. The minor objectives are 1) to acquire insight into the concept 
conversation as used by the philosopher Richard Rorty; 2) to analyse mission 
theories and practices in past and present from this perspective, 3) to develop a 
mission model which is adequate for the future. 
 
Some theorists argue that, ―the fact that there are no privileged vocabularies means 
that it is up to us to take over and reshape current public ways of speaking as we 
see fit...since, new ways of speaking can help us get what we want.52 This is 
intended to tackle ―certain kinds of conversational constraints,‖53 in order to ―solve 
the problem of mutual coexistence in a reasonable way.‖54 Particularly my aim is to 
build on the projects of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue ―that leads us to 
discover, in the Christian and non-Christian religious traditions, diverse forms of 
experiencing the God of Jesus Christ, activating with them a sincere conversation, 
especially about life.‖55 
 
Definition of Concepts 
The mission models described under ‗theoretical framework‘ conceptualize in 
different ways a communication between Christianity, culture and context. ‗Culture‘ 
is a complex term which has been defined in various ways. John Mary Waliggo 
describes culture as ―the sum total of a people‘s way of life, history, religion, beliefs, 
values, identity, philosophy or worldview, their language and other means of 
communication, their institutions, ceremonies, their relationships and education, 
their professions and leaders, their vision of the past, present and future that 
differentiates them from other peoples because of a different locality, history, 
developments and life experiences.‖56 
 
Although culture can be considered to be part of the context, the word context is 
often used in a different way. Whereas ‗culture‘ in the above definition refers 
mainly to the symbol-system or ‗deep structure‘ of the society, the word ‗context‘ is 
used more often to refer to the ‗surface structures‘ of society, or people‘s 
economic, social and political conditions. Both context and culture form the loci in 
which the Gospel is lived. 
 
                                                          
52 Lynne Rudder Baker, ―On the very Idea of a Form of Life,‖ Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Philosophy, Vo. 27, Issue 1-4, (1984): 285.  
53 Seyla Benhabib, ―Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas,‖ 
Habermas and the Public Square ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 81. 
54 Ibid., 82. 
55 Giusseppe Buono, Missiology: Theology and Praxis, 28. 
56 John Mary Waliggo, ―Analysing the Cultural Sector for the Integral Evangelisation,‖ Manuscript (1987) 
10. 
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The last pillar of mission in our consideration is the Gospel. The Gospel in a word, 
is Jesus Christ, Himself, the one who is said to be anointed to proclaim Good 
News to the poor (Luke 4:16-24). Christ is considered to be the very essence and 
substance of Christianity and therefore can never be reduced to formulas or 
doctrines. Jesus Christ is the source, the centre, and the end of what Christianity 
stands for and announces to the world. Therefore Christianity is Christ, as Jacques 
Dupuis observed.57 Using the three concepts described above, mission is often 
defined with ‗inculturation‘ or ‗contextualization‘ of the Gospel.58 
 
We use the term conversation in the way Rorty uses it in epistemology to mean 
implicit inquiry and inquiry in hermeneutics is routine conversation.59 The Rortian 
conversation is linked to the concept of truth. According to Rorty, truth is not 
something objective lying out there waiting to be discovered, but an outcome of an 
open non imposing way of communication to reach a consensus.60 In Christianity, 
truth is the content of mission to be discovered by others. Truth is revealed and 
proclaimed, and is the one they have to live within their existential situation. 
 
For analytic purposes we will link Richard Rorty‘s concept of ‗conversation‘ with 
Michel Foucault‘s concept of ‗discourse‘ as a way to structure and thereby 
constitute knowledge. Just as ‗conversation‘, the concept of ‗discourse‘ expresses 
the notion that there is no objective truth but that truth is constituted in an inter-
subjective way through language use. This notion leads to the use of discourse 
analysis in chapter 3 and 4. 
 
2. Technical Design 
 
In the description of the technical design we elaborate on the research strategy, the 
sources and the methods and the structure of this thesis. Together these issues 
describe how we answer our questions and achieve our objectives.61 
 
Research Strategy 
This study is based on desk research. Periods of working in the office and in the 
library at the Radboud University Nijmegen were alternated by periods of working 
in the archives and the chancery of the Archdiocese of Kampala. But this study has 
also elements of a grounded theory approach as it is oriented towards theory 
development, namely a theory (theology) of mission. As was explained above, it 
uses Richard Rorty‘s notion of ‗conversation‘ as a sensitising concept.62   
                                                          
57 Jacques Dupuis, Who Do You Say I Am? (New York, Orbis Books, 2001), 2. 
58 Cf. John Mary Waliggo et al., Inculturation: Its meaning and urgency (Kampala: St. Paul Publications, 1986). 
59 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 318. 
60 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xxv; 
David Boersema, Pragmatism and Reference (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 124-125. 
61 Cf. Verschuren, Doorewaard, Designing a research project, 109-207. 
62 Ibid., 174. 
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Since Glaser and Strauss developed the grounded theory approach, there has been 
a debate among the advocates of this approach about the question whether 
‗sensitising concepts‘ should be developed as much as possible from the research 
material, thus bottom-up (inductive), or whether they can be inferred from what we 
know already about the research issue from existing theories (deductive).63 The 
present study follows the latter approach. It uses a very specific notion of 
conversation as a sensitising concept, but one that has not been used extensively in 
its field of study and aims at developing what this concept could mean in it, namely 
missiology  
 
In comparison to other missiological studies, distinctive of this thesis is that we do 
not draw primarily on biblical or ecclesial sources but on philosophical texts. This 
is not unusual in missiology. Giancarlo Collet did the same basing his mission 
model on Habermas‘ concept of freedom and non-dominating communication;64 
and David Krieger did it basing his model of dialogue on Wittgenstein‘s language 
games.65 In this sense this study contributes to a ‗philosophy of mission‘.66 
 
Research Sources 
Various books on mission models have been written making broad inventories of 
the history and theology of mission in general,67 in a specific region or country,68 or 
a diocese or society.69 In this thesis we decided to make an in-depth study of a 
corpus of selected texts. It describes and analyses mission journals and pastoral 
letters or plans, coming from one specific territory, the present Archdiocese of 
Kampala, Uganda, and the missionary societies that started to practice mission 
there: the Congregation of Missionaries of St. Joseph, popularly known as Mill Hill 
missionaries; and the Society of Missionaries of Africa, popularly known as White 
Fathers. The thesis also draws on existing (theological) literature on mission models 
and (philosophical) literature on the concept of conversation. 
 
  
                                                          
63 Cf. B. Glaser, A. Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory (Hawthorne N.Y: Aldine Publishing Company, 
1967); A. Strauss, Qualitative analysis for social scientists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); A. 
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65 Cf. David J. Krieger, The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology (Maryknoll – New York: Orbis 
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68 Cf. Magesa, Rethinking Mission; Frederick Tusingire, The evangelization of Uganda. Challenges and Strategies, 
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Research Methods 
For collecting data and texts we reviewed existing literature in libraries and 
consulted the archives of missionaries, for example, the Mill Hill Missionaries in 
Oosterbeek and the White Fathers in Dongen. We also obtained documents from 
the archives of the Generalate of the White Fathers in Rome and the archives and 
the chancery of the Archdiocese of Kampala. Insights into mission as a Christian 
quality require investigative approaches with methods which are constant with the 
same. The research will focus on available texts on mission strategies as a primary 
method of data generation.  
 
Critical discourse analysis is used as a method of data analysis. Unlike content 
analysis which is based on an informative view of language (language reflects 
reality), discourse analysis is based on a performative view of language (language 
constitutes reality). Discourse analysis is concerned with tracing explanatory 
connections between language use and social reality. The method is based on three 
assumptions. First, discourse is a practice just as any other practice; the only 
difference is its linguistic form. Second, there is a dialectic relation between 
language (‗text‘) use and social reality (‗context‘). Third, the relation between 
language and reality is mediated through discursive practices (‗interaction‘). From 
these assumptions follow three instruments: the analysis of the linguistic practice, 
i.e. the linguistic features of the text; the analysis of the discursive practice, i.e. the 
production, distribution and consumption of text; the analysis of the social practice, 
i.e. the effects of the text on mental models, subject positions and social relations.70 
 
For reflecting on the data and developing a theory of mission as conversation we 
will make a critical correlation between the insights acquired through analysing 
texts and insights acquired through review of literature on mission and 
conversation. 
 
Structure 
The research project was conducted between 2006 and 2012 on a part-time basis 
and follows an iterative research design in which collecting and analysing sources 
were repeated in order to get in-depth insight into the shift from mission as 
conversion to mission as conversation. Throughout the research, we shall contend 
with Rorty to try ―to see keeping a conversation going‖71 as a sufficient aim of the 
new mission paradigm and to see mission ―as consisting in the ability to sustain a 
conversation and to see human beings as generators of new descriptions rather 
than beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately.‖72 
 
The thesis has five chapters. First we elaborate on the philosophy of Richard Rorty 
and Rorty‘s concept of conversation (Chapter 1). Next we translate Rorty‘s 
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philosophy into operational terms using critical discourse analysis as method 
(Chapter 2). Thereafter we analyse past (Chapter 3) and present (Chapter 4) mission 
theories, using mission journals, pastoral letters and plans as sources. Last but not 
least we develop conversation as a new mission model, which goes beyond dialogue 
(Chapter 5). We end this thesis by drawing conclusions. 
 
3. Theoretical and societal relevance 
 
With the phenomenon of multiculturalism and pluralism, there is an increasing 
design of intercultural studies which are comparative in nature. Yet most 
importantly the subject of translatability or un-translatability of concepts as a result 
of the various encounters still remains. The issue of translatability has attracted 
attention from the 19th century on. The subject has been studied from, for 
example, linguistic, cultural, and philosophical angles, usually combined with the 
notion of equivalence.73 There are also historical surveys of views on translatability 
and for our purpose here, we shall follow the trend developed by de Pedro.74 De 
Pedro discusses more than twenty views on translatability and applies the 
distinction between monadist and universalist approaches. According to the 
former, translation is impossible, either partially or absolutely. Among the 
adherents of this view, one can mention Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the early stages 
of his studies on the subject matter, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, Andre 
Martinet, and John C. Catford. By invoking such arguments as linguistic 
determinism, the uniqueness of human experience, or the incompatibility of two 
linguistic systems and cultures, they claim that successful translation does not exist. 
The Universalist point of view concerning translatability is represented by scholars 
such as Walter Benjamin, Roman Jakobson, Eugene Nida, and Wolfram Wilss. 
While monadists concentrate on the uniqueness of languages and experience in 
order to support their theses, Jakobson and Nida stress the common features of 
linguistic systems and the logic of experience across languages.75 In his later studies 
on translation, von Humboldt also notes that all ideas can be expressed in any 
human language. Benjamin and Wilss shift attention from the internal elements of 
translation, that is, the linguistic system, to the external ones, such as time and the 
necessity for a given translation to appear, or the translators‘ competence. 
According to Benjamin, a given text which cannot be translated now, might be 
translated in the future if need be,76 while Wilss maintains that it is ―the limited 
ability of the translator in regard to text analysis‖77 that causes translation to fail. De 
Pedro concludes her historical survey of translatability with the observation that 
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according to recent approaches to the issue, (i) absolute linguistic or cultural 
untranslatability does not exist as (ii) most texts are translatable, and (iii) the subject 
is now studied under various headings, such as cross-cultural communication rather 
than in isolation.78 
 
As for the untranslatability, we shall follow Catford‘s definition of untranslatability 
as connected with the notion of equivalence. He postulates that ―untranslatability 
occurs when it is impossible to build functionally relevant features of the situation 
into the contextual meaning of the target language, or text.‖79 These ―functionally 
relevant features‖ are situational features that ―are relevant to the communicative 
function of the text in that situation.‖80 In specific cases, the definition of 
functional relevance depends largely on our own views, though ―the co-text will 
supply information which the translator will use in coming to a decision.‖81 Catford 
distinguishes between linguistic and cultural untranslatability. In the former type, 
―functionally relevant features include some which are in fact formal features of the 
language of the source language text‖ and ―the target language has no formally 
corresponding feature.‖82 This kind of untranslatability is due to ambiguities that 
occur in the source language text and constitute functionally relevant features. Such 
ambiguities result from polysemy or ―shared exponence of two or more source 
language grammatical or lexical items‖, that is, cases ―where two or more distinct 
grammatical or lexical items are expounded in one and the same phonological or 
graphological form‖83 In addition, linguistic untranslatability may occur due to 
oligosemy. Cultural untranslatability, on the other hand, arises ―when a situational 
feature, functionally relevant for the source-language text, is completely absent 
from the culture of which the target language is a part.‖84 Later in his book, Catford 
invalidates this distinction. He stresses the linguistic nature of cultural 
untranslatability, arguing that the latter often appears because the use in the target-
language text of any approximate translation equivalent produces an unusual 
collocation in the target language. 
 
But according to Ke Ping, untranslatability is caused by two factors. First, the total 
meaning of a given sign, which includes the referential, pragmatic, and intralingual 
meanings in the source language, rarely corresponds to that of a sign in the target 
language. Although translators, in theory, could employ commentary or annotation 
in order to make up for such lack of equivalence, this strategy cannot be applied 
indiscriminately; ―for the practical reason that it would make the translation 
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longwinded and cumbersome.‖85 Using the concept of a socio-semiotic spectrum, 
Ke distinguishes between three types of untranslatability: 1. Referential 
untranslatability occurs when a referential element in the source message is not 
known or readily comparable to an item in the target language. 2. Pragmatic 
untranslatability arises where some pragmatic meaning encoded in a source item is 
not encoded likewise in a functionally comparable unit in the target language, or 
where the exact pragmatic meaning carried by the source sign is/are unclear or 
indeterminable due to historical reasons or to the intentional equivocation on the 
part of the author. 3. Interlingual untranslatability ―... is a situation in which the 
source expression is apparently not transferable due to some ... linguistic peculiarity 
it contains. It pertains only to those linguistic features that are fore grounded 
somehow in the context.86 These insights into translatability or untranslatability of 
concepts show possibilities and limitations of intercultural or interreligious 
communication which as a consequence would be an ideal apparatus for 
conversation to emerge as a fresh mission paradigm for the church in the present 
era. 
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  Chapter One: 
  Richard Rorty and the concept Conversation 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the main thrust is to investigate the development of Rorty‘s 
concept of conversation. We shall seek to demonstrate how it is rooted in the 
history of philosophy which preoccupied Rorty in his monumental work, Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature. Firstly, I will introduce Richard Rorty‘s position on the 
history of philosophy. Secondly, I will investigate the intellectual context in which 
he is situated and the influence it has had on the whole philosophical edifice. 
Thirdly, I will discuss his idea of conversation as a philosophical concept which 
originates from Socratic Method of inductive definition of concepts related to 
problems of life ought to replace the dominant confrontational philosophical 
discourse of the modern era. This is in line with the ―end of philosophy‖ strategy 
that describes what a post-philosophical culture might look like, one that rejects 
foundationalism, representationalism and the nostalgic longing for a God‘s eye 
view on the world energised by metaphysics of presence. Instead of starting from a 
universal perspective, a conversation searches for common shared grounds, which 
are themselves always historical/provisional in nature, in making sense of a 
pressing problem of life.87 My aim in this chapter is to illustrate the development of 
the concept conversation as an effect of the critique of Western philosophical 
categories which influenced mission theory and practice in Uganda. This chapter 
will provide the theoretical framework to enable the discussion in the subsequent 
chapters have a firm basis for a proper reading of mission history in the church in 
Uganda from the perspective of conversation as the new mission practice. 
 
Contextualising Richard Rorty in the Philosophical Realm 
 
Richard Rorty is described as an epistemological maverick primarily devoted to 
undermining the foundationalist ambitions of Western philosophy. Rorty‘s most 
influential work has rejected the notion that moral and social progress depends on 
finding the metaphysical bedrock of human existence. For Rorty, such excavations 
are futile and feckless; historical experience goes all the way down. Philosophy is 
unavoidably situated in a historical-cultural framework. The question, then, of how 
we should live is not a methodological puzzle of abstract dimensions, but a 
substantive challenge of historical-linguistic proportions. In pursuing this sceptical 
path, he chooses the historicist anti-heroes of modern philosophy, that is, John 
Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger, as his heroic inspiration. As 
Rorty reads these writers, they hold that there is neither universal Truth nor supra-
historical Knowledge, but only an un-bounded contingency; we treat everything - 
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our language, our conscience, and our community - as a product of time and 
chance.88 As a whole the work of Richard Rorty calls for a ―post-philosophical‖ 
culture that gives up the quest of ―objective truth and values,‖ that abandons the 
pursuit of ―representing the world accurately,‖ and that rejects the philosophical 
distinction between knowing, or representing, subject and object.89 In this Rorty 
rejects the ancient Greek philosophical dualisms: the one and the many, stability 
and change, universal and particular, mind and body.  
 
Rorty also rejected the Archimedean point, or view from nowhere, or God‘s eye 
view. And he recommends that we reject the distinctions between the natural and 
human sciences, the quantitative and qualitative representation, philosophy, 
literature or poetry, whereby those on the left side are hoped to yield privileged 
representations of reality and see the items as different ways we use to cope with 
the world, none more important or more ―true‖ than another.90 
 
Rorty has described himself and been described by others with all kinds of 
imageries. David Hall presents some of these descriptions which characterise the 
thinking of Rorty: He calls himself at various times a nominalist, a historicist, a 
non-reductive physicalist. In more colourful language he claims to be a postmodern 
bourgeois liberal, a lonely provincial, a new fuzzie.91 Again, he is variously 
described as a philosophical nihilist set on dismantling philosophy as such, or at 
least such pivotal areas as epistemology and ontology; a superficial pragmatist, 
misappropriating key figures in the history of philosophy from Plato to Kant with 
the purpose of exchanging the goal of objective truth for that of subjective 
‗usefulness‘; or a postmodern cultural relativist denying all scope for ‗culture 
transcending‘ authority in order to promote his own preferred, self-legitimating set 
of ‗ethnocentric‘ Western values. On still another reading he‘s a rather woolly 
utopian liberal, plaintively calling for the spread of human suffering and an end to 
cruelty, but failing to find an adequate grounding for that project.92 
 
In the introduction to Rorty and his Critics, Bob Brandom also describes Rorty as one 
of the most influential figure beyond the confines of professional academic 
philosophy. But the views that have made him famous as a public intellectual arise 
out of his specifically philosophical reflections on topics that remain central to the 
Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy: the nature and significance of 
objective reality and truth and our knowledge of them.93 He is called a Socratic 
gadfly, the bad boy of American philosophy, stinging the philosophical 
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establishment where it hurts or a slipshod iconoclast, who has done more harm 
than good and there is no getting around the fact that a lot of people from a wide 
variety of disciplines and perspectives have something to say about him.94 Some 
accusations against Rorty are apparently a hoax as Malachowski says that ―even 
Rorty‘s sternest philosophical critics deny his main claims. They think he is wrong 
on just about every front. But they seem unable to state their denial in terms that 
do not beg the question or tacitly assume what Rorty himself denies.‖95 Some 
accusations like of employing the term ―we‖ as little more than a projected ―me‖ 
are considered a misunderstanding because Rorty likes to project the image of 
himself as leading a movement ―we pragmatists‖, and he has generously hailed 
many of the philosophers here, such as Brandom, Davidson, and Putnam, as 
standing alongside him, demolishing the school gates. Also, his use of ―we‖ is one 
of the hinges of his New Pragmatism and it presupposes consensus or invite it.96 
 
His massive body of work has been called an aid for understanding the 
philosophical and intellectual issues that have preoccupied thinkers for the past 
several decades. This is so because Rorty has been a prolific reader with expansive 
interests and an uncanny ability to drop names not only from the entire 
philosophical tradition, but of novelists, poets, literary critics, legal scholars, 
historians and political theorists. He was a consummate collaborator, 
enthusiastically promoting the work of others and always willing to engage even his 
harshest critics in the hope of furthering on-going debate. One historian called 
Rorty ―the embodiment of the contemporary, a barometer, perhaps, of intellectual 
pressures across so many discourses. …Rorty…moving as he does with such ease 
the entire intellectual terrain, expresses some of the arguably most vibrant areas of 
contemporary intellectual life. This tells why there is a suspicion that Rorty‘s work 
has been more influential than understood.‖97 
 
Rorty in the History of Philosophy 
 
Rorty was trained in the analytic tradition and this fits well with the observation 
made of analytic philosophers in regard to the history of philosophy. That 
sometimes their approach to the history of philosophy lacked sufficient self-
consciousness.98 This is presupposed by the way Rorty approached the history of 
philosophy which could be rightly placed in what is called the analytic ideal. This 
ideal has two considerations, (1) Objects of the activity: That the history of 
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philosophy is the study of texts which (a) are either written documents that survive 
from the past, or are derived from past documents by some appropriate form of 
transmission, and (b) address philosophical questions; (2) Aims of the activity: The 
history of philosophy aims (a) to interpret its object-texts in such a way as to 
discern what philosophical questions are addressed in them and what philosophical 
views expressed, (b) to ascertain the truth values of propositions, and the strength 
of arguments, in which these views are expressed, (c) to use what is thus 
ascertained about these propositions and arguments in constructing arguments for 
propositions which are regarded (or plausibly could come to be regarded) as 
contributions to present philosophical debate.99 
 
Rorty read the history of philosophy and he discusses it from his own perspective, 
for the furtherance of his own purposes in philosophy, with total disregard of the 
general principal aims that have been outlined in its historical practice. Linda M. 
Alcoff outlines the principal aims of epistemology as; i) to achieve a general 
understanding of knowledge, belief, justification, truth, and other epistemic terms, 
either through conceptual analysis or through reflection on how they are used in 
practice; ii) to understand what it is to know something, that is, to define the 
difference between knowing and having a true belief; iii) to determine the limits of 
human knowledge and iv) to providing a legitimating explanation for our claims to 
know, and thus refute epistemological scepticism.100 She claims that in all these, 
Michel Foucault contributes to the first three while rejecting the viability and 
necessity of the fourth. Rorty argues otherwise by considering the fourth and he 
reads the history of epistemology as organised almost exclusively around the 
problem of scepticism and he characterises pragmatism as an alternative to 
epistemology on these grounds.101 The discussion here will not dwell too much on 
the epistemological views as expressed by Rorty and other scholars. Neither will an 
evaluation of Rorty‘s conception of epistemology and philosophy as excessively 
narrow, collapsing epistemology to foundationalism and metaphysics to a Kantian 
commitment hence excluding much of analytic philosophy from his definition be 
taken care of at the moment. The central plank is to survey the historical 
development of his ideas and the motivation thereof. 
 
The intellectual context of Rorty 
 
To understand well the ideas that characterise Rorty‘s work, it is appropriate that 
we make a brief survey of the intellectual environment that influenced Rorty and 
left an everlasting imprint on him. Some of Rorty‘s ideas on the traditional 
problems of philosophy, which were labelled spurious, were a perpetuation of the 
philosophical mistakes which have their appropriate characterisation in Dewey. 
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Dewey had claimed that the mistake was to think that we are non-material objects, 
souls or minds quite distinct from our bodies and the rest of the world.102 Rorty 
took up this idea and adds that the mistake is to conceive the mind as a sort of 
mirror or canvas, and knowledge as accurate representation on this canvas.103 But 
his main ideas are rooted in the reading of influential 17th century philosophers 
whom he blames for distorting the history of philosophy and creating instead 
epistemology which is his main concern as a historical deviation from the proper 
development of philosophical ideas. One of the great adversaries of Rorty is Rene 
Descartes whom he blames for distorting the philosophical development by 
creating the idea of the mind which from the beginning of philosophy was not 
considered at all. But the deeper meta-philosophical reason for this negative 
assessment is, as we have seen above, his adherence to Dewey‘s view that problems 
should be evaluated according to their relevance to contemporary life. For Dewey, 
all problems originate in some sort of social need, but they tend to outlive their 
usefulness; this is what he thought had happened with all the traditional problems 
of philosophy. And this is what Rorty thinks has happened with the mind-body 
problem. Ancient Greek philosophers felt the need to connect personhood and 
rationality, seventeenth-century philosophers felt the need to support the new 
science, and the remainder in our hands is a problem with no relevance to twenty-
first century life whatsoever. 
 
In light of the above developments and for the better understanding of Rorty‘s 
ideas, it is appropriate to discuss another indefinable school within the tradition of 
American pragmatism. This is the one that represents the epistemological 
sensibilities of nonfoundationalism to which Rorty is especially identified. Building 
on the work of an older generation that includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William 
James, and John Dewey, Rorty together with other contemporary pragmatists such 
as Wilfrid Sellars, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Richard J. Bernstein share several 
common assumptions that might be described as nonfoundationalist.104 All are 
keenly suspicious of the Cartesian understanding of the philosophical task in which 
thinking is called upon to establish a first philosophy, an architectonic of all 
knowledge grounded on some immediately experienced, self-certain principle that 
serves as ―foundations‖ for the entire edifice of knowledge. All are opposed to 
traditional understandings of the philosophical justification of belief in which 
reasoning is expected to show the validity of claims to knowledge finally by appeal 
to indubitable ―foundations‖ on which such claims rest. All regard the business of 
philosophy, at least at this moment in its history, as the Criticism of Cartesianism 
and the formulation of more adequate accounts of knowing in which claims to 
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knowledge are justified without appeal to foundationalist principles.105 It can 
certainly be affirmed that foundationalism is as old as the Platonic tradition in 
western philosophy, whereas the nonfoundationalists frequently personify the 
foundationalist error by reference to Rene Descartes. 
 
We have to contend that the foundations of knowing appear in such philosophical 
accounts as Plato‘s eternal forms, Descartes‘ clear and distinct ideas, John Locke‘s 
giveness of sense experience, or Kant‘s transcendental categories of 
understanding.106 These foundations are esteemed by their proponents as 
immediately justified beliefs whose certainty justifies more derivative claims in the 
larger body of knowledge. The very purpose of the foundations is to ensure the 
indubitability of knowledge or at the very least the possibility of such unquestioned 
certainty. Foundationalists assign universality to whatever principle they advance as 
the authenticator of truth claims and they seem to assume that epistemic 
foundations permeate the entire system of knowledge and cause whatever truth 
dwells among its mediate claims. Hence, foundations provide a point of departure 
for logical deduction or a foothold for inductive thinking to climb toward valid 
knowledge. 
 
Generally speaking, nonfoundationalist criticism makes its target any variety of 
rationalism or empiricism that expects foundations for knowledge, whether in ideas 
or sense data, to establish the certainty of epistemic claims. They postulate that 
foundationalists could justify claims to knowledge only if there are foundations for 
such claims, otherwise justification for knowledge becomes an infinite spiral of 
scepticism in which even the possibility of certainty in any instance is 
jeopardised.107 Wilfred Sellars has argued that the foundationalist conceptualisation 
of knowledge is energised by the ‗Myth of the Given‘ ―the idea that there are inner 
episodes, whether thoughts or so called immediate experiences to which each of us 
has privileged access, inner episodes furnishing premises on which empirical 
knowledge rests as on a foundation.‖108 For Sellars, there is no evidence that such a 
foundational, unmoved mover of knowledge exists. Quine like Sellars rejects any 
rationalist or traditionally empiricist manner of account for human knowledge. 
 
He makes a few assertions that: One, philosophy provides no apriori propaedeutic 
or groundwork for science; neither does it offer some external vantage point from 
which knowledge can be constructed. Rather philosophy is continuous with science 
and its task is to critically examine the formation of concepts from sensory 
evidence. Two, the process of concept formation is inseparable from the formation 
of meaning in words, sentences, and the entire system of language itself. Meaning is 
not a transcendental quality, a foundation on which sentences must rest in order to 
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possess meaning, it is a function of how sentences are used and through such use 
acquire significance.109 The nonfoundationalist views expressed here consider that 
the task of justification is that what is called knowledge is its justification; itself an 
open-ended process of explaining the beliefs valued in particular meaningful 
contexts. In the absence of ―foundations,‖ arguments are the principal means by 
which basic beliefs are themselves shaped and by which their values gain clarity and 
thus authority. Arguments, then, are indispensable to claims to knowledge in this 
nonfoundationalist perspective for the reasons they provide for beliefs not only 
support, relate, criticise and revise those claims but also are those claims 
themselves. 
 
There was a crisis of legitimacy in the 16th century; reason is instituted as the sole 
guide both in intellectual and moral domains. Philosophers in the modern paradigm 
are alienated from tradition. They do their philosophising, and perceive themselves 
as doing philosophy, in a situation of cultural crisis, a crisis induced by the 
widespread consensus that the European intellectual, moral and religious tradition 
was fractured and that new ‗foundations‘ for knowledge and belief had to be 
discovered. The wisdom of a (supposedly) unified tradition could no longer be 
consulted to resolve one‘s dilemmas. Inescapably, there was on the cultural agenda 
the question ‗how do we go about deciding what to believe?‘, ‗How do we conduct 
our understandings?‘ Those are the questions that arise in the wake of the demise 
of the ‗wisdom of a unified tradition‘. And for some modern philosophers the 
answer is, „Aude Sapere!‟ ‗Let reason be your guide in clarifying intellectual and 
moral topics.‘110 Let the eye of the mind light your path in the attempt to clearly 
understand (representing) reality. In so doing, the modern philosophers make use 
of Ancient Greek strategies to overcome the problem of the one and the many, 
reality and appearance, stability and change. 
 
Representationalism is thus another epistemic tradition which is identified with 
Rorty. It is part of, and/ or originates from the historical conditions of crisis of 
legitimacy of the modern age after the collapse of the central legitimating authority. 
It falls within the scope of the wider end of philosophy strategy. Philosophers since 
Plato have tended to approach all philosophical problems trying to represent 
reality, by an act of intellectual seeing, through the eye of the mind. This metaphor 
underlines the modern assumption that knowledge should aim at an accurate 
representation of the way things are in view of achieving universal, indubitable, 
eternal truths or an Archimedian viewpoint. Knowing, in the wake of a universal 
modern scepticism, is a relation between subject and object, not an intersubjective, 
consensual, discursive, cultural-linguistic affair but a matter of representation. 
These privileged representations, in the wake of the modern crisis of legitimation, 
provide foundations to legitimate the rest of the beliefs. The search for foundations 
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has become an act of faith or a sort of vocation for philosophers. This idea 
occasions the dichotomy between the subject and object, and the according of 
epistemic authority to first person access to the object. True knowledge then comes 
to be seen in the form of a privileged, immediate and private property of the 
enlightened knower. 
 
The Epistemology of Kant 
 
In discussing Kant, the purpose is to broaden the intellectual context which 
influenced Rorty and serves as a background for the development of his ideas 
especially the concept of conversation which is under discussion in this paper. 
Before we delve deeper into the Kantian world, we would start with how Jürgen 
Habermas considers the constitutive elements of the conceptual frame that Kant 
inherited and transformed: (a) The epistemological turn that is connected with 
Descartes starts from the question of how we, thinking subjects, can reassure 
ourselves that we are at all capable of achieving knowledge. This leads to a new 
conceptualization of knowledge in terms of a subject‘s possession of ‗ideas‘ of 
objects. The innovation is indicated by the third term, idea or ‗representation‘ that 
now mediates between the knowing subject and the world. While the subject is one 
who has representations of objects, the world contains everything that can be 
represented by a subject for itself. (b) The knowing subject is identified with a self 
or an ego. This conception of self-reference has major implications; it allows for an 
answer to the epistemological question of how we can acquire second-order 
knowledge of how we gain first-order knowledge of objects. This is possible in 
virtue of self-reflection, reflection on the self as a subject having ideas or 
representations of whatever objects. In representing the representations, the 
thinking-self disclose an internal space, called subjectivity. Thus, the sphere of 
consciousness is intertwined with self-consciousness right from the beginning. (c) 
Self-reflection or apperception is at first taken to be an inconspicuous act that 
could give a clear epistemic meaning to the ancient ethical imperative ‗know 
thyself‘.111 
 
Habermas continues to consider that this epistemological notion of self-reflection 
suggests a dualist paradigm of subject-object relations which can be spelled out in 
three basic assumptions: (i) Via introspection, the knowing subject has privileged 
access to its own more or less transparent and incorrigible ideas which appear in 
the mode of immediate evidence. (ii) This self-reflexive awareness of our own 
representings opens the way to a genetic account of the roots of our mediated 
knowledge of objects. (iii) Since the roots of knowledge in subjectivity can be 
grasped by introspection and since the assessment of knowledge depends on 
tracing its subjective roots, the intended kind of reassurance is based on the 
concept of truth as subjective evidence or certainty. And, (d) he takes these 
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assumptions – the myth of the given, the search for origins, and the idea of truth as 
certainty – articulate the conception of ‗the mental‘ as distinguished from ‗the 
physical‘. There are three intuitive oppositions underlying this distinction. The 
mental is circumscribed by a boundary, drawn from the first-person perspective, 
between what is ‗inside‘ and what is ‗outside‘ of the consciousness of the self, or 
between ego and non-ego. This coincides with two further delimitations: the 
boundary between what is immediately given and what is given in an indirect way, 
the private and the public realm; and the boundary between what is certain and 
what is uncertain, the incorrigibly true and the fallible. 
 
The consequence of the above understanding prompts the separation of the 
knowing subject from the sphere of its objects. This stimulates questions about the 
interaction between one side and the other, in particular the classical 
epistemological questions about the origin of knowledge and the direction of it and 
influence. Empiricism and rationalism answered the question of origin in favour of 
knowledge a posteriori and knowledge a priori respectively. While the answers to 
the question of causal direction developed in the realist and idealist traditions, were 
in favour, respectively, of the receptivity and the spontaneity of the human mind.112 
Some scholars postulate that according to current philosophical methodology and 
current readings of Kant, his key epistemological classifications were either badly 
mistaken or very confused.113 Kant‘s epistemological quest is framed in terms of 
vindicating the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge with the central question 
being ―How are synthetic a priori propositions possible?‖114 This question requires 
an answer to another question ―What are the necessary conditions, if any, of our 
being able to speak intelligibly about the world of our experience?‖ It is this 
requirement which gives Kant‘s question its primary significance. When Kant 
insists that the notion of describing experience presupposes distinctions which are 
prior to any specific descriptive statement, he is arguing transcendentally. When he 
distinguishes two basic kinds of prior conditions, space-time and the categories, he 
is claiming that a conceptual scheme adequate to the requirements of empirical 
knowledge must enable us to do at least two things: to individuate and to attribute. 
It is argued further that some of Kant‘s transcendental arguments deal not merely 
with the conditions of making the empirical claims we do make, but rather with the 
conditions of making any intelligible claim at all about any conceivable kind of 
experience.115 
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Kitcher while continuing with his epistemology claims that by applying the term 
transcendental, Kant makes a number of assertions to strengthen his argument. 
First, he argues that the focus of transcendental epistemology is not individual 
knowledge claims about objects, but the manner in which one is able to know 
objects at all. Second, transcendental epistemology is concerned with the non-
empirical origins of our mental representations of objects. He refers to certain 
concepts as pure, meaning that they are not of empirical origin and notes also that 
they belong to the understanding and not to sensibility. That is their origin is not in 
experience nor in our own sensibility, but in the understanding itself, that is, these 
concepts come from the understanding alone. Third, he posits that transcendental 
knowledge concerns the possibility of experience. This makes the same point twice: 
transcendental proofs proceed by considering the possibility of experience.116 
Transcendental epistemology is concerned with the manner of knowing objects and 
more specifically, it is inextricably linked to the investigation of the possibility that 
some concepts or mental representations are of non-empirical origin and also 
inextricably linked to exploring the necessary conditions for the possibility of 
experience. In all these ventures, Kant intended to open up new philosophical 
territory by exploring the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. All 
in all we could claim that transcendental epistemology is concerned with the 
manner of knowing objects and more specifically, it is inextricably linked to the 
investigation of the possibility that some concepts or mental representations are of 
non-empirical origin and also inextricably linked to exploring the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of experience. Through investigating the possibility of 
experience, one discovers that certain representations that are not of empirical 
origin, but derives from our mental faculties, are necessary for experience. 
Alternatively, the way to demonstrate that one is in possession of certain 
representations that are not of empirical origin is to show that they are necessary 
conditions for the possibility of experience itself.117 
 
Major Philosophical Themes in Rorty’s works 
 
Richard Rorty has been portrayed as one of the most original and influential 
contemporary philosophers but at the same time as one who adopted a distinctive 
and controversial brand of pragmatism. The characteristic idea of this pragmatism 
is that ideas and practices should be judged in terms of their usefulness, workability 
and practicality and that these are the criteria of their truth, rightness and value. It is 
a perspective that stresses the priority of action over principles. This background 
motivated his perceived views on the biggest themes available to a philosopher: 
philosophy itself and truth.118 These two themes are deeply connected within Rorty 
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and he has enough to say about them. Rorty wants to undermine the confidence 
philosophers have in their subject as an autonomous discipline with its subject 
matter and its own methodology for dealing with that subject matter. He compares 
philosophy with history, geology, biology, and a whole host of other standard 
academic subjects and he thinks that philosophy is deeply suspect. He contrasts 
philosophy and the philosopher. Philosophy on the one hand, studies the basic and 
general ways of understanding the world by attempting to overcome perennial 
problems that can arise whenever those ways of understanding are reflected upon. 
The philosopher on the other hand, investigates the nature of the mind, knowledge, 
and time, but does so in full generality, as opposed to investigating minds of 
particular peoples, instances of knowledge, or historical eras.119 For Rorty, 
philosophy should address problems for understanding the world in such terms, 
problems like finding a place for minds alongside physical objects or securing 
human claims to knowledge from sceptical challenges or explaining the elusiveness 
of the temporal present.120 In some instance, this line of argument may be likened 
to Arthur Schopenhauer‘s pessimism where he laments about the meaning of 
human temporal existence. He laments human existence thus: ―We are like lambs 
in a field disporting themselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first 
one and then another for his prey. So it is that in our good days we are all 
unconscious of the evil fate may have presently in store for us – sickness, poverty, 
mutilations, loss of sight or reason. No little part of the torment of existence lies in 
this, that time is continually pressing upon us never letting us take breath, but 
always coming after us, like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment times stays 
his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom.‖121 
 
Philosophers throughout history have developed methods for solving these 
problems or at least in the hope of making progress towards solutions. Rorty 
singles out the method of placing philosophy on the secure path of a science by 
Immanuel Kant. He considers this as the most complex and thorough method ever 
developed. But despite this admiration for the Kantian method, Rorty‘s aim, in 
contrast to Kant, was to keep philosophy well away from the ‗secure path of a 
science.‘122 Rorty is against this sort of technical professionalised philosophy 
because he has some fascinating reasons: First, he thinks that progress in 
philosophy is impossible, and that a scientific approach obscures this. Secondly, 
perennial philosophical problems are a little more than historical aberrations; out-
dated ways of thinking which it is a mistake to perpetuate them. It is better to 
ignore them and be forgotten for they will never be solved as medieval scholars 
never solved the problems that interested them. Thirdly, while philosophy remains 
on the secure path of a science, it will be able to renew itself. The old problems will 
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be forever recycled in new formulations, which will in turn spin off technical side-
issues that only specialists can debate. With the increase in technicality, 
philosophical research becomes increasingly detached from the intuitive problems 
that first attracted its practitioners, and increasingly irrelevant to the rest of culture. 
And the more philosophers are required to specialise to understand the latest 
research, the less likely they are to have the synoptic and historical vision required 
to question their own research programs and recognise old debates resurfacing in 
contemporary jargon.123 So, he wants to break the crust of convention, to disrupt 
normal philosophical activity. 
 
These views of Rorty on the nature of philosophy distinguish his work as being 
primarily meta-philosophical with a purpose that he adopts them to make 
traditional lines of philosophical inquiry appear uninteresting, and thereby to 
persuade conventional philosophers to try something new. These views are 
motivated by views which were negatively evaluated by some philosophers like 
Davidson Donald claiming that ―Rorty sees the history of western philosophy as a 
confused and victor-less battle between unintelligible scepticism and lame attempts 
to answer it.‖124 Surely, it is this view of the history of the subject which lies behind 
Rorty‘s scepticism about normal philosophical research. He thinks that philosophy 
was designed for dubious purposes, and has no success in fulfilling those purposes 
anyway, despite trying for a very long time. Rorty goes much further than just 
trying to inject some historical suspicion into philosophy to keep it off the ‗secure 
path of a science.‘ He has suggested that even philosophers of his disruptive breed 
should aim to work themselves out of a job and he has expressed the hope that his 
brand of ‗antiphilosophy‘ might lead to a post-Philosophical culture. This call has 
some consequences for philosophy: one, the classic works of philosophy like 
Descartes‘ Meditation and Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason for instance, will no 
longer be read in the same spirit, will no longer be taken literally. Philosophy will be 
thought of as a vaguely demarcated genre of literature, and nobody will think of 
this genre as dealing with real and important problems, apart from contributing to 
an on-going quest to unravel the fundamental enigmas of human existence. His 
idea is that the great texts of philosophy be thought of as just great texts. Hence 
philosophy turns into a form of literary study. 
 
Another important theme that Rorty undermines together with philosophy is truth. 
He makes a blatant claim that, ―We cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The 
purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, 
to bring consensus on the end to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve 
those ends. Inquiry that does not achieve co-ordination of behaviour is not inquiry 
but simply wordplay.‖125 There is a connection that Rorty makes between 
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philosophy and truth for he sees philosophy as the last stronghold of a certain 
conception of truth, one which he thinks is holding back progress in intellectual 
life. He thinks that the abandonment of this conception of truth is required for the 
complete secularisation of human thought, and that a transformation in philosophy 
might, in the long run, have a positive role to play in this much wider 
transformation. The conception of truth in question here is that of objective truth, 
in the literal sense of a truth that comes from objects as contrasted with the 
subjective truth which depends as much on the subject as the object.126 The 
traditional way of understanding objective truth is in terms of a relation of 
correspondence between our language and the world.127 The idea of objective truth, 
then, may be summed up as the idea that whether or not the things we say, think, 
or write are true, depends on whether or not they correspond to how the world 
really is. Rorty thinks differently from other philosophers, who take this idea to 
sound like an innocuous piece of common sense, that this idea is anything but 
innocuous. On his view, it is a residue of religious thought hidden deep down 
within ordinary ways of thinking, a residue which philosophy has unwittingly 
helped to perpetuate. Rorty traces the origins of this situation and finds an answer 
in the Enlightenment movement of the 18th century. Kant proposed as a motto for 
this movement: Have courage to make use of your own understanding.‖128 The 
motivating idea was to cast off the authority of the church, the monarchy and 
ancient texts, and to instead rely upon human reason for understanding the world. 
Instead of believing in God, the truth had already been revealed through certain 
institutions, people should instead try to work out for themselves by means of 
science and philosophy. 
 
The above ideas made an unprecedented contribution to the secularisation of 
culture, but did not go far enough. According to Rorty an element of religious 
thought remained that has prevented the secularisation process from reaching 
completion. This is because the notion of objective truth was left untouched. Belief 
in divine guidance was thereby simply displaced rather than discarded, for truth 
continued to be thought of as something forced upon us by a non-human agency. 
Faith in God was gradually transformed into faith in science, because with the 
religious conception of truth intact, the most we could do was progress from 
believing that truth is dictated by God, to believing that the truth is dictated by an 
independent, objective world. In the present age, science is the obvious place to 
look for such a description, and scientifically minded people do indeed often 
assume that the progress of science is bringing us ever closer to the final truth 
about the universe, to what physicists call ‗a theory of everything.‘129 Thinking this 
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way only requires extending the common-sense view of progress in science as 
consisting in the production of ever more accurate descriptions of reality. For 
Rorty the fact that we are so inclined to think this way is the legacy of an age in 
which the world was seen as the creation of a being that had a language of his own 
and he supposes that there must be one privileged description of the world. 
Despite this, however, we still witness to a myriad of descriptions of the world; 
some are much more useful than others, and scientific descriptions have proved 
extremely useful in the development of new technologies. The nagging question is: 
why we should seek to explain differences in usefulness with the notion of 
objective truth? Rorty thinks there is no good reason, only an historical 
explanation.  
 
The striking consequence of this view is that to be consistent atheists, Rorty 
reiterates that people need to give up on realism, that is, on the belief that reality 
has its own intrinsic nature independently of how we describe or experience it, and 
about which there is an objective truth to discover. With this in mind, Rorty has 
strengthened the old atheist conviction that religious belief stems from a longing 
for permanent parental guidance. He thinks that a culture that gives up on realism 
has matured and would realise that what matters is our loyalty to other human 
beings clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right. In 
such a culture, the authority of non-human objectivity would be replaced by human 
solidarity, and forms of description would not be ranked according to their 
supposed ability to correspond to the true nature of reality, but only according to 
their usefulness, something which varies from context to context. Thus liberated, 
people would realise that there may be as much or more reason to believe in 
human rights than fundamental physical particles, since neither sort of belief is 
forced on us.  
 
These two themes, that is, philosophy and objective truth run throughout and 
motivate Rorty‘s many and diverse writings. They are intimately connected. Rorty 
sees philosophy as the guardian of objective truth. He considers Philosophy as the 
academic subject which sets out to determine what objective truth is and under 
which circumstances we can have access to it. Rorty does not think that without 
objective truth and the cluster of ideas which revolve around it, philosophy as 
traditionally conceived makes any sense. So to pursue well his meta-philosophical 
agenda, his views on truth provide a clear motivation for his progress in his work. 
Therefore, for the purpose of assessing well his thoughts, the discussion will 
prioritise his meta-philosophy since his views on truth derive from his reading of 
the history of philosophy and from certain arguments within that history. This will 
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provide a basis for an epistemological background to discuss mission history in the 
Ugandan context which is the central idea of this work. 
 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
 
Rorty‘s major work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is an attempt to do 
philosophy historically. In this work, he challenged a conception of philosophy that 
was almost universally accepted among mainstream Anglo-American philosophers 
in the 1970s. This conception of philosophy, inherited from Descartes and given its 
clearest formulation by Kant, holds that before philosophers begin to speculate 
about what is and what ought to be, they should first get clear about what they can 
know and what they can‘t know. He tried to show that a widely accepted picture is 
deeply problematic and he does so by engaging with historical figures who have 
accepted this picture.130 Rorty wants to convince the reader that a certain 
conception of the mind is problematic and needs to be rethought or abandoned. 
But he makes this point by carefully and selectively drawing on history. Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature undermines the representational picture by engaging 
critically with its famous representatives, and showing that their versions of this 
picture are incoherent, or based on faulty assumptions or something of the sort. He 
suggests that he must proceed in this way, that any attempt to rid ourselves of the 
representational picture or any dubious picture must take that picture‘s history. 
There seems to be four distinct parts to his procedure. First, Rorty selects the 
historical figures with whom he wishes to engage: Locke, Descartes, Kant and 
others. Second, he tries to get the readers to see these figures as proponents of the 
representational picture. As for Kant and Locke who are not totally 
representationalist, he traces little noticed lines of influence among these thinkers, 
pointing out striking similarities in their use of concepts and so on. Third, he 
engages critically with these figures. He not only claims that they embody 
representational picture, he argues that their versions of this picture faces 
insuperable difficulties. Finally, on the basis of these engagements with particular 
figures, one draws the conclusion about the picture as a whole.131 It has been a 
shared belief that as well as being provocative, Rorty‘s work is of singular relevance 
to contemporary concerns as will the subsequent sections indicate.  
 
As it has been noted above, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has its major target as 
the foundationalist project of trying to provide a theory of knowledge based on the 
notion of representation. The publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 
1979 was, in his own words in the preface, an effort to try ―to isolate more of the 
assumptions behind the problematic of modern philosophy, in the hope of 
generalizing and extending Sellars‘ and Quine‘s criticisms of traditional 
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empiricism.‖132 Rorty was forty-seven when this book was published; it was met 
with attacks from some analytic philosophers upon his views of epistemology, 
truth, and representation. This response was countered by a much more 
enthusiastic one from critics of literature, who appreciated that his approach was 
pragmatic rather than analytic and that his models were the American pragmatists 
William James and John Dewey. Rorty‘s approach is to reveal the dubious historical 
motivations which led to the entrenchment of this idea, and to show that recent 
arguments in analytic philosophy make any such project untenable. In this way, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature aims to undermine all philosophical work which 
owes a debt to foundationalism and representationalism, broadly interpreted. He 
goes even much further than this, because he thinks that the very idea of a separate 
and systematic subject called ‗philosophy‘ is inextricably linked to its original 
foundationalist motivations. As a consequence, he also aims to discourage attempts 
to re-start philosophy on a non-foundationalist, non-representationalist basis. His 
position is that... ―All hope for first philosophy should be abandoned; nay, even the 
wish for such a thing should disappear, and that would imply the end of 
epistemology as we know it, and good riddance.‖133 This position is taken on the 
assumption that philosophy is an impossible dream, the dream of philosophy as 
grounding, and sitting in judgement of, science and the rest of the epistemic 
culture, on account of philosophy‘s providing us with apodictic knowledge in a 
very special sphere, namely the foundations of knowledge.  
 
With that in mind the resultant argument is that there is a necessity of replacing this 
vision with a relativistic, fallibilistic, and coherentistic account of knowledge. But 
after setting that task, Rorty states that the aim of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
is therapeutic. It is to cure the reader of the traditional idea of philosophy. Since 
Kant‘s time philosophy has been conceived of as ―...the attempt to underwrite or 
debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion. ...it can do 
so because it understands the foundations of knowledge ...the mental processes or 
the activity of representation which make knowledge possible.‖134 Rorty does not 
offer the reader new theories on these subjects. Rather he makes an attempt to 
relieve us of the very idea of knowledge, mind and representation as things we 
ought to have a theory about. In devising this therapy, Rorty uses the constructive 
efforts of several analytic philosophers like Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Kuhn and 
others and he still hopes ―to convince the reader that the dialectic with analytic 
philosophy needs to be carried a few steps further. These additional steps will, I 
think, put us in a position to criticise the very notion of analytic philosophy, and 
indeed of philosophy itself as it has been understood since the time of Kant.‖135 
This view presents some difficulties in grasping the central argument that Rorty 
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makes in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. It turns out to be a very complex piece 
of literature that demands expert knowledge and skills to comprehend it intelligibly. 
 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is dotted with 
certain obstacles which need to be highlighted before one begins a critical reading 
of it and following the arguments therein. The first and most obvious obstacle is 
that PMN makes unusual demands of the reader by drawing together numerous 
complex positions from throughout the history of philosophy in order to build its 
argument. Rorty‘s range of reference is notoriously vast and daunting, and his 
presupposition of familiarity with all of these philosophical positions has excluded 
many interested parties from first-hand acquaintance with his work. Secondly, 
readers are unduly sceptical about Rorty‘s history; as it is a well-known fact that his 
interpretations are very controversial. There are scores of articles by Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger and even Dewey scholars all disputing Rorty‘s interpretations, and that 
two figures in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Quine and Thomas Kuhn, 
personally disowned Rorty‘s use of their work. But Rorty‘s interpretations actually 
tend to be fairly conventional much as he clearly admires appropriation and strong 
misreading136 and this is not obviously how he does this. What he does is purify 
philosophers, leave out the bits he does not like, those which can be intensely 
annoying but is no great cause for concern. Thirdly, is the combination of Rorty‘s 
distinctive writing style and large-scale subject matter which can come across as 
exciting and dramatic, making it easy to be uncritically carried along by Rorty‘s 
narrative, or else imprecise and evasive, making it just as easy to be uncritically 
dismissive of what can seem like endless sweeping generalisations. An early review 
which took the latter perspective described Philosophy and Mirror of Nature as long on 
claims and polemic, but short on argument.137 The fourth obstacle is that Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature is designed to provide relief from philosophical puzzlement 
and this can be of little interest to those who are not puzzled especially those 
readers without any background education in philosophy.138 To appreciate Rorty‘s 
attempt at debunking the traditional philosophical picture, one must have seen its 
power to grasp the claims that Rorty puts forward. 
 
Rorty’s Critique of Philosophy in his work Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature 
 
Rorty‘s book is divided into three parts and consists of eight chapters. Part 1, Our 
Glassy Essence, comprises two chapters, ‗The Invention of the Mind‘ and ‗Persons 
Without Minds‘; part 2, Mirroring, which is the central part of the book, contains 
four chapters, ‗The Idea of a Theory of Knowledge‘, ‗Privileged Representations‘, 
Epistemology and Empirical Psychology‘, and Epistemology and Philosophy of 
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Language‘; and part 3, Philosophy, concludes with two chapters, ‗From 
Epistemology to Hermeneutics‘, and ‗Philosophy Without Mirrors.‘ We have to 
contend that historically, epistemology has been linked to the idea of a first 
philosophy and with this Rorty present a real challenge to epistemologists. In this 
work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty wants to do away with the problems 
of the past as associated with Kant and Descartes. He argues that the roots of the 
fundamental errors of traditional philosophy go far back beyond Kant, back to the 
choice of metaphor made by the ancient Greeks. They chose to describe our 
capacity to grasp universals, with reason, by the metaphor of looking at. Just as one 
acquires knowledge of material objects by perceiving them with the eye of the 
body, one acquires knowledge of universals by perceiving them with the inner eye – 
the mind‘s eye. Mind identified with reason, the possession of which is what 
separates Man from beasts, was thought to be identical with the Soul, an essential 
part of Man that leaves the body at death.  
 
Thus we have inherited from the Ancient Greeks a conception of a Mind‘s Eye 
which lets the concepts of reason and personhood get intertwined. This 
entanglement has managed to linger on even though our conception of mind has 
changed. It is claimed in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that it was Descartes who 
executed the most radical change by expanding the mind. The Greeks thought of 
sensations as being taken care of by the body rather than by the Nous. For 
Descartes, not only contemplation of universals, but every kind of thought and 
every type of sensation or feeling in the Mind, were included, that is given to the 
Mind. This opened the way for and was related to another innovation by Descartes, 
one which in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is seen as another part of the 
problem of traditional philosophy, the idea of the Mind as mirroring the world. 
The thoughts and perceptions given to the mind‘s eye were mere representations, 
and what they represented, the World, was not itself given.  
 
Rorty devotes Part One to a critical examination of some current and traditional 
controversies in the philosophy of mind. One contemporary quarrel to which Rorty 
pays special attention concerns the viability of a ‗materialist theory of mind.‘ Some 
philosophers, whom Rorty calls neo-dualists, contend that ‗how something feels,‘ 
such as a particular pain, tickle, itch, or other sensation, or ‗what it is like to be 
something‘ such as a man or a bat, ‗cannot be identical with any physical property, 
or at least any physical property which we know anything about.‘139 It is claimed in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that what made Descartes pack thought and 
sensations together to form the modern conception of the mind was their shared 
property of indubitability. Starting from him this indubitability was given a 
metaphysical explanation, namely ―....nothing is closer to the mind than itself‖140 
what we knew with certainty were the representations themselves, not what they 
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represented. Mind became with Shakespeare‘s words, Our Glassy Essence,141 
transparent to itself. This provides a new kind of scepticism, one concerned with 
the possibility of knowing anything outside the mind. This ‗veil of ideas‘, scepticism 
has been a companion to philosophers ever since. It also provided the basis for 
epistemology, the activity of inspecting and improving mind‘s mirror in order to get 
accurate representations, which is truth. The question posed is, ‗if one is not happy 
with Descartes‘ criterion of indubitability, what can be used in its stead to separate 
the mental and the physical? Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature states that 
‗...Kant and Strawson have given convincing arguments for the claim that we can 
only identify mental states as states of spatially located persons.‘142 If that is correct, 
non-spatiality cannot be used as a criterion ...health is a non-spatial state of a 
person too. 
 
There is a contention raised whether intentionality and phenomenality are criteria 
of the mental? As for intentionality, PMN accepts Wittgenstein‘s and Sellars‘ 
functionalistic account with ‗the answer to the question ―Why is the intentional non 
material?‖ is ―because any functional state, any state which can only be grasped by 
relating what is observed to a larger context, is in a trivial sense, non-material.‖143 
Moreover using phenomenality as a criterion turns out to be the same as using 
Descartes‘ criterion because the only thing that is special about the phenomenal 
properties is that they allow no appearance-reality distinction. One cannot be 
mistaken about one‘s own mental states. He makes an interesting statement that 
feelings just are appearances. Their reality is exhausted in how they seem. They are 
pure seemings.144 This thinking, however, gets one into trouble with Kant and 
Strawson. This is because one has then stopped talking about pains as states of 
people or properties predicated of people and started talking about pains as 
particulars, a special sort of particular whose nature is exhausted by a single 
property.145 
 
Rorty thinks that to identify the mental with the phenomenal, thus limiting the 
content of mind to mental images, raw feels and the like, is to drift far from the 
ancient conception of mind. The problems about reason and personhood have 
been replaced by these rather dusty little questions about the possible identity of 
pains and neurons.‘146 Treating pains and the like as particulars reopens the 
possibility of making non-locatedness the criterion of the mental. Rorty in PMN 
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does not think much of that strategy he claims that ‗....contemporary philosophers, 
having updated Descartes, can be dualists without their dualism making the 
slightest difference to any human interest or concern, without interfering with 
science or lending any support to religion. For insofar as dualism reduces to the 
bare insistence that pains and thoughts have no places, nothing whatever hangs on 
the distinction between mind and body.‘147 In all these endeavours, Rorty wants to 
do away with the conception of the mind, but it could be recognised that the 
therapeutic argumentation he makes in PMN does not halt by accusing the modern 
conception of mind of being uninteresting. 
 
In Chapter Two ―Persons without Minds,‖ it is devoted to an attack on an idea that 
is central to the modern philosophical conception of the mental, namely the idea of 
metaphysically based indubitability. The Chapter also spells out an anti-Cartesian, 
Wittgensteinian view of the nature of ―our privileged access to the mental.‖148 The 
primary target of the attack is what Rorty calls Principle P‘. With principle P he 
meant that ‗whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state of ourselves, there 
must be a property we are presented with which induces us to make the report.‘149 
This principle relates the epistemological notions of incorrigibility and 
indubitability to the metaphysical idea of entities completely given to Mind‘s Eye. It 
is one of Rorty‘s principal theses in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that the 
conception of the ‗mind‘ as a separate substance, in which mental processes are 
located, far from being a concept based on direct experience, is an ‗invention‘ of 
Descartes, which has misled philosophers since his time. That there is no need for 
us to refer to experience in ‗mentalese‘ language he supports in part by his own 
invention of the science-fiction tale of some Antipodeans who live on the opposite 
side of the galaxy to ours and who get on perfectly well without language that 
requires mentalist predicates.  
 
He postulates Antipodea as a distant planet inhabited by featherless bipeds. 
Physiologically these Antipodeans were almost identical to humans, and their 
culture was also about the same as ours, humans, but with two exceptions. First, 
‗they had notions like ‗wanting to‘ and ‗intending to‘ and ‗believing that‘ and 
‗feeling terrible‘ and ‗feeling marvellous.‘ But they had no notion that these 
signified mental states, states of a peculiar and distinct sort, quite different from 
sitting down, having a cold and being sexually aroused. The Antipodeans did not 
explain the difference between persons and non-persons by such notions as mind, 
consciousness, spirit.150 Second, neurology and biochemistry were enormously 
advanced on Antipodea, and the result of this penetrated deeply into ordinary life. 
When their infants veered towards hot stoves, mothers cried out, ‗He‘ll stimulate 
his C-fibres‘. Sometimes they would say things like ‗It looked like an elephant, but 
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then it struck me that elephants don‘t occur on this continent, so I realised that it 
must be a mastodon.‘ But they would also sometimes say, in just the same 
circumstances things like ‗I had G-412 together with F-11, but then I had S-147, so 
I realised that it must be a mastodon.‘151 Philosophers from earth came to 
Antipodea and naturally they asked themselves: Do Antipodeans have minds, that 
is, do they have mental sensations? Some facts were easily established: the 
Antipodeans were able to offer direct, non-inferential reports both on how they felt 
and on their neurological states, and their language contained expressions 
corresponding to our ‗seem like/to‘ and ‗feels like.‘ So, thinking about the 
Antipodeans makes one realise that one could easily have lacked a mind-body 
problem, that if there were no mind-body problem it would make no difference in 
human life and that consequently could be easily forgotten.  
 
However, they talked about ‗seeming‘ to be in neurological states as well as seeming 
to see P, in both cases mistakes were impossible, and when it came to knowing 
whether one really was in a certain neurological state or not, the Antipodeans 
admitted that a mistake was always possible, even if the state was for example, T-
435, the neurological state corresponded to utterances of ―my C-fibres seem to be 
stimulated.‖ There seemed to be nothing which the Antipodeans were incorrigible 
about except how things seemed to them was a matter of what raw feels they had, 
as opposed to what they were inclined to say.‘152 To the Antipodeans the whole 
question seemed to be based on confusion. ―All Antipodeans are familiar with the 
states of their nerves and all Terrans with their raw feels. For the Antipodeans do 
not have notions of entities known incorrigibly but only of reports (seems-
statements) which are incorrigible and which may be about any sort of entity. They 
understand that the Terrans do have the former notion, but they are baffled why 
they think they need it although they can see how, in ignorance of neurology, a lot 
of strange notions might have become current.153 The whole Terran vocabulary of 
‗acts of apprehension‘, ‗cognitive states‘, ‗feelings‘, and others strikes them as an 
unfortunate turn for a language to have taken. They see no way of getting us out of 
it except by proposing that we raise some of our children to speak Antipodean and 
see whether they don‘t do as well as a control group. The Antipodean materialists, 
in other words, see our notion of mind and matter as a reflection of an unfortunate 
linguistic development.154 Instead of invoking principle P, one can account for the 
incorrigibility of ‗seems-statements‘ and the like by claiming that it is a fact of 
language. The fact that ‗seems to seem‘ ―...is an expression without a use is a fact 
about the notion of ―appearance,‖ not a tip-off to the presence of phenomenal 
properties.‖  
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If we stick to principle P, ―then we must admit either (a) that the Antipodean 
language, just by virtue of containing some incorrigible reports, is about raw feels, 
or (b) that we shall never know whether the Antipodeans speak a language just 
because we shall never know whether they have raw feels, or (c) that the whole 
issue about raw feels is a fake because the example of the Antipodeans shows that 
we never had any raw feels ourselves. These three possibilities correspond roughly 
to three positions in the philosophy of mind: behaviourism, scepticism about other 
minds, and materialism.155 The solution Rorty recommends in PMN is to abandon 
principle P as being just another off-shoot of the ‗Myth of the Given‘, while 
remembering that there is some truth to be found in each of the three standard 
positions. Here also, the main argument of the Antipodeans story ―is that since 
there is no way in which earthly philosophers can show anything to be missing 
from their way of speaking, then, presumably, we too could just as well be talking 
Antipodean, and a materialist theory of behaviour thereby receives support.‖156 
 
But what would be sound in behaviourism since the only example given in PMN of 
a behaviourist is that of Ryle? It is reported that Gilbert Ryle, in the 1940s launched 
a powerful attack on dualism with his dogma of the ‗Ghost in the Machine‘ arguing 
instead for a behaviourist understanding of the mind according to which concepts 
of the mental states are concepts of behaviour. With that understanding it would be 
absurd to say of the Antipodeans that they have no minds, thus no language, and 
therefore simply are not persons, just because they lack raw feels. But the 
Antipodeans having no notion of the mind whatsoever just talk about their brain 
states. Instead of saying, I love you; they just say ‗Give me brain state X-835. With 
this example of the Antipodeans, he articulates one of the problems of 
behaviourism that it has not freed itself from the Cartesian idea that there is a 
‗ground floor‘ of entities which are somehow naturally known first hand, naturally 
knowable directly and therefore in some sense more real, though to the 
behaviourist it is states of physical objects, not mental states, that have this status. 
Rorty in PMN claims that direct knowledge....―is simply knowledge which is had 
without its possessor having gone through any conscious inference. But there is no 
suggestion that some entities are especially well suited to be known in this way. 
What we know noninferentially is a matter of what we happen to be familiar 
with.‖157 Some people make non inferential reports of electrons, some of Dutch 
elm disease, some of their blood pressure. Antipodeans on the other hand make it 
of their neurological states.  
 
As for scepticism about other minds, Rorty makes claims that the sound intuition is 
just that raw feels are as good particulars as tables or archangels or electrons, as 
good inhabitants of the world, as good candidates for ontological status. He states 
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further that we do indeed have a special, superior way of knowing about our own 
raw feels, that we have privileged access to private entities.158 This privileged access 
is, of course only a species of the direct knowledge just mentioned. To explain it 
one needs not to resort to anything like the ‗givenness‘ to Mind‘s eye, which would 
imply confining the objects of this knowledge to a hermetically non-social sphere. 
Of traditional Cartesian scepticism about other minds Rorty makes claims in PMN 
that ...‘it is not impossible, it is just pointless, unless some further reason for doubt 
is given other than that certainty cannot be had.159 
 
The materialist starts from what Rorty in PMN considered to be a plausible 
prediction, namely, that reference to neurological microstructures and processes 
may replace reference to short-term mental states (sensations, thoughts, and mental 
images) in the explanation of human behaviour.160 The materialist gets into trouble 
when he tries to draw a metaphysical conclusion and states that mental states are 
nothing but neural states. This sounds excessively paradoxical. Rorty thinks that the 
materialist ―should stop reacting to stories such as that about the Antipodeans by 
saying metaphysical things, and confine himself to such claims as ‗No distinctive or 
descriptive power would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all our lives.‖161 But 
if this is correct would it not imply that materialism has won? The correct response 
is to say No. Saying that presupposes that the ontological categorization into 
mental versus physical is eternally valid and not an historical contingency that 
might lose, or perhaps already has lost, all importance. For the same reason, if it 
should turn out that neurophysiology is incapable of predicting behaviour, ‗even if 
neurons turn out to swerve, - to be buffeted by forces as yet unknown to science, 
Descartes would be vindicated.‘162 In a nutshell, what we have been following in 
Part I is Rorty‘s therapeutic argumentation against the traditional idea of ‗Man‘s 
Glassy Essence in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. This is relevant to Rorty‘s 
approach to epistemology but in PMN, he claims that no descriptive power would 
be lost if we all started speaking Antipodean.  
 
Historically, the notion of reason has been linked to the idea of knowledge as Mind 
Mirroring World. Part II of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ‗attempts to dissolve 
the modern version of the problem of reason, the notion that there is a problem 
about the possibility or extent of accurate representation which is the concern of a 
discipline called epistemology.‘163 Part II begins with an attempt to trace the 
historical roots of modern epistemology. The foundation is, once again, the ancient 
perceptual metaphor, the attempt to model knowledge on perception, viewing 
knowledge as confrontation with the objects of knowledge. This metaphor easily 
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leads one to accept the ‗Platonic principle,‘ that differences in certainty must 
correspond to differences in the objects known‘164 and corresponding differences in 
the faculties with which we perceive/confront objects of knowledge. This implies 
that knowing with certainty is a matter of proper causation. The object which the 
proposition is about imposes the proposition‘s truth. The idea of necessary truth is 
just the idea of a proposition which is believed because the ‗grip‘ of the object 
upon us is ineluctable.165. Descartes‘ invention of the mind gave philosophy a field 
that could be known with certainty. This is not enough, however, to produce 
modern epistemology by giving a causal account of how the mind works. This was 
made possible because Locke ‗thought, as had Aristotle of ‗knowledge of‘ as prior 
to ‗knowledge that,‘ and thus of knowledge as a relation between persons and 
objects rather than persons and propositions.166 Locke also regarded ideas as 
‗immediate objects‘ of the mind or understanding and asserts that ideas are present 
to the mind instead of things, which are not present to the mind.167 This mean that 
one could ground knowledge, that is, justify it by something other than coherence, 
namely by an account of how the mind receives sense data. Kant attacked Locke‘s 
confusion of the possession of sense data with judgement; most vigorously 
expressed in his criticism of the confusion of ―a succession of apprehensions with 
an apprehension of succession,‖168 yet with Kant the modern notion of 
epistemology fully, and explicitly, emerged.  
 
Lockean descriptions of the mechanics of mind were not necessarily something 
distinguished from and above the rest of science. Following the epistemological 
turn that Descartes brought to philosophy, Locke with his own empiricist version 
of foundationalism prefaced by a rejection of God-given innate ideas, since despite 
his belief that the existence of God was the most obvious Truth that Reason 
discovers,169 he thought that there was good empirical evidence to deny that there 
is anything which everybody knows, and hence good reason to deny there is 
anything we are all born knowing. The central tenet of his theory was that all 
knowledge derives from experience, experience dividing into the ideas we derive 
from the five senses such as yellow, sweet, loud and others and the ideas we derive 
from the operations of our minds, such as thinking, wanting. These simple ideas 
are the building blocks of all human knowledge.170 Kant contributed what was 
needed, that is, the distinction between form, the part of experience we supply 
ourselves, and content, what is given to us from the outside. Science is concerned 
with what experience, the synthesis of form and content could tell us; philosophy 
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studies the form-side of experience, what is necessarily true of all experience. 
Though Kant was aware of its conceptual/judgmental character, to him knowledge 
still remained something inner, and grounding it was still a matter of giving a 
‗mechanical account‘ of explaining how experiences are manufactured; and 
Continental, twentieth century epistemology (the Husserlians) stuck to this notion 
of constitution. Starting with Russell, Anglo-Saxon epistemology, that is, analytic 
philosophy, rejected this Kantian invention, but, while viewing the content of 
consciousness as Lockean sense data, still made use of the form-content distinction 
in performing the linguistic turn.  
 
Logical form was the subject matter that made analytic epistemology possible. One 
could see statements about sense data as basic and say that philosophy was to study 
the evidential relations between basic and non-basic propositions, or one could 
study other logical or conceptual relations. In either case one was studying truths 
necessary by virtue or meaning.171 Analytic epistemology is based on the notion of 
two kinds of privileged representations: intuitions, sense data, and concepts, logical 
forms. Both of these came under attack within the tradition of analytic philosophy 
itself. Quine challenged the distinction between the logically/conceptually 
necessary and the contingent, between being true by virtue of meaning and being 
true by virtue of experience. Sellars blew up ‗the Myth of the Given‘ by pointing 
out that epistemic justification takes place in the logical space of reasons, that it is a 
matter of giving arguments. Anything non-epistemic, like having sense data, might 
be helpful in explaining a belief causally, but not in justifying it. Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature claims that if Sellars and Quine are right there is nothing left of the 
traditional analytic philosophical program. ―If there are no intuitions into which to 
resolve concepts (in the manner of the Aufbau) or any internal relations among 
concepts to make possible ‗grammatical discoveries‘ (in the manner of Oxford 
Philosophy), then indeed it is hard to imagine what an analysis might be.‖172 The 
upshot of the first half of part II of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is that if one 
accepts the criticism made there one has to abandon any hope for epistemology. In 
the last two chapters of this part of PMN two attempts to preserve at least part of 
the epistemological project of analytic philosophy – while accepting Sellars and 
Quine – are attacked, namely the attempts to associate epistemology to psychology 
and the philosophy of language. Both attempts fail. Nothing can supply the kind of 
foundation that the epistemological project needs, namely, something above and 
independent of knowledge.  
 
If one takes a closer look at what is central to the concerns of this argument, that 
is, the description of epistemological behaviourism, it is necessary to go beyond 
mere summary to interpretation and analysis. Epistemological behaviourism is 
claimed to be the basic conception of knowledge present in the writings of Quine 
and Sellars, the two figures widely regarded as the greatest philosophers of the last 
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century. Rorty‘s idea is that the combination of Sellars‘ attack on the ‗Myth of the 
Given‘ and Quine‘s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction collapsed the two 
Kantian distinctions which analytic philosophy depended upon. Moreover they did 
not realise it, Sellars and Quine were using the same argument on which weighs 
equally against representationalism, objective truth, and any conception of 
philosophy as what Dewey called the quest for certainty.173 It is clear that it is at 
least part of the conception of knowledge in PMN. Epistemological behaviourism 
is not a claim that necessary and sufficient behavioural conditions can be given for 
example ‗S knows that P‘. Rather it is a claim that philosophy will have no more to 
offer than common sense (supplemented by biology and history ...) about 
knowledge and truth.174 Epistemological behaviourism is also a denial that ‗once we 
understand, as historians of knowledge do, when and why various beliefs have been 
adopted or discarded, there is something called ―the relation of knowledge to 
reality‖ left over to be understood.‘175 Epistemological behaviourism refuses to 
attempt a certain kind of explanation, namely, justification/grounding of 
knowledge by inner entities. ‗It amounts to a protest against archetypical 
philosophical problem of how to reduce norms, rules and justification to facts, 
generalisations, and explanations.‘176 When it comes to a positive characterisation, 
epistemological behaviourism clearly implies holism, fallibilism and the idea that 
warranted assertability should replace truth as correspondence. But beyond that, 
PMN displays a strong ambivalence about epistemological behaviourism.  
 
One version is what is called ―epistemological-behaviourism-as-coherence‖, 
expressed in passages like...‗nothing counts as justification unless by reference to 
what is already acceptable, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and 
our language so as to find some test other than coherence.‘177 This is a well-known 
line of thought and perhaps may not be uncontroversial. The version of 
epistemological behaviourism that dominates PMN is different and more 
provocative. It is argued in PMN that we need a change of metaphor for 
understanding knowledge. Instead of using the traditional metaphor of 
confrontation (visual perception), we should turn to the metaphor of Conversation. 
This dominating version may be called ―epistemological-behaviourism-as-
conversation‖. This version puts the emphasis on the group. It comes to something 
like this saying: ―S knows that P‖ is a remark about the status of S‘s reports among 
his peers.  
 
If one thinks of ‗rational certainty‘ as a matter of victory in argument rather than of 
relation to an object known, we shall look toward our interlocutors rather than to 
our faculties for the explanation of phenomenon. Our certainty will be a matter of 
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conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with nonhuman 
reality. So we shall not see a difference in kind between ―necessary‖ and 
―contingent‖ truths. At most, we shall see differences in degree of ease in objecting 
to our beliefs.178 Thus for Quine, a necessary truth is just a statement such that 
nobody has given us any interesting alternatives which would lead us to question 
it.179 These two versions of epistemological behaviourism are not compatible with 
each other, at least at first glance. Epistemological-behaviourism-as-coherence puts 
the emphasis on beliefs; we have to look for the basis of epistemic acceptability 
among the rest of our beliefs. Epistemological-behaviourism-as-conversation does 
not look to beliefs. Instead it focuses on the other participants and their reactions, 
whether, the subject‘s position is accepted or not. We have to look for a 
compromise to these two positions. We can move the idea of coherence closer to 
this notion of conversation by pointing to PMN‘s emphasis on the social nature of 
coherence. For Rorty ―....justification is not a matter of a special relation between 
ideas (or words) and objects, but of conversation, of social practice. Conversational 
justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification 
embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and atomistic. The crucial 
premise of this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the 
social justification of belief,180 Sellars‘ psychological nominalism is not a theory of 
how the mind works, nor of how knowledge is born in the infant breast, nor of the 
―nature of concepts,‖ nor of any other matter of fact. It is a remark about the 
difference between facts and rules, a remark to the effect that we can only come 
under epistemic rules when we have entered the community where the game 
governed by these rules is played.181 Language and coherence, and thereby 
knowledge – are not private but social. It is the community that decides the 
epistemic rules. Sellars‘ psychological nominalism as Rorty in PMN construes it, 
indicates that it is no more surprising that the community is the criterion for who 
knows than it is that it is the criterion for whether or not 18 year olds are allowed 
to drive cars.  
 
As far as this could be seen, this does not bridge the gap between centring on 
coherence among beliefs and centring on actual acceptance in a group. We can add 
a social dimension to the coherence approach by looking to the coherence among 
the beliefs of the community rather than the individual, and by emphasising such 
aspects as the dependency on authority and the epistemic division of labour; it is 
still vastly different from centring on actual acceptance. Another way to bridge the 
gap is perhaps by pointing to the difference between being inside and outside a 
language game. Inside a language game it is coherence that counts. But outside any 
established language game, any trial to introduce a new language game, what 
matters is the acceptance by the group. Inside an established language game one 
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can rely on the implicit or explicit rules of the game, but the establishment of these 
rules can only be a matter of whether they are accepted by the community or not. 
This is what Rorty means but cannot say it in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature for 
the simple reason that he cannot surely say it. Using this compromise implies using 
the notion of implicit rules of a language game; the explicit rules of each known 
language game are too few to control the game. One of the more important tenets 
of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is that there are no such things as implicit, 
hidden, rules. It cannot therefore make sense of the notion of established, but 
hidden rules. The only thing that remains, apart from a few explicit rules, is a 
matter of fact acceptance.  
 
Parts I and II are mostly an attack on traditional philosophy. Part III contains some 
criticism too, but it also presents an alternative to epistemology: hermeneutics and 
edifying philosophy. This alternative agrees with the epistemological behaviourism 
presented in part II. To explain Rorty‘s conception of hermeneutics in Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature, the notion of commensuration is crucial. To be 
commensurable means to be ‗able to be brought under a set of rules which tell us 
how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on the very 
point where statements seem to conflict.‘182 Epistemology is based on the 
assumption that all serious-minded contributions to a given discourse are 
commensurable. The dominating notion of epistemology is that to be rational 
―....we need to be able to find agreement with other human beings. ....The 
assumption that an epistemology can be constructed is the assumption that such 
common ground exists.183 Of course, with this common ground, the nature of 
knowledge might be concealed. But hermeneutics, on the other hand, accepts 
incommensurability.  
 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature makes a distinction between normal and abnormal 
discourse, parallel to Kuhn‘s normal science – revolutionary science distinction and 
with Michel Foucault‘s distinction between madness and civilisation.184 This is so 
because normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of 
conventions. It is about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as 
answering the question, what counts as having a good argument.185 Whereas 
abnormal discourse happens when no or too few conventions are adhered to by the 
parties involved. And hermeneutics is presented as the study of an abnormal 
discourse from the point of view of some normal discourse. It becomes an attempt 
to make sense of what is going on at a stage where we are still too unsure about it 
to describe it.186 It is assumed that one can be epistemological about normal 
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discourse and could codify the conventions shared within, and well-known to the 
group. Epistemology hence is normal discourse about normal discourse. Rorty 
characterises hermeneutics as a kind of study, or calls it ―discourse about as-yet-
commensurable discourses.‖187 This is considered as misleading because 
hermeneutics is neither the discipline of studying abnormal discourse, nor meant as 
a successor subject to epistemology. ―Hermeneutics is not the name for a 
discipline, or for a method of achieving the sort of results which epistemology 
failed to achieve, nor a program of research. On the contrary, hermeneutics is an 
expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will 
not be filled, that our culture should become one in which the demand for 
constraint and confrontation is no longer felt.‖188 
 
Hermeneutics is considered as an attitude rather than a particular type of discipline 
or even discourse. This attitude is not a matter of trying, when one encounters an 
as-yet-incommensurable discourse, to bridge the gap between it and one‘s normal 
discourse by finding a common ground. This would be an epistemological attitude, 
not a hermeneutical one. The hermeneutics of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has 
nothing to do with finding the middle ground, thus making a Horizontverschmelzung 
between two discourses possible. From a hermeneutic point of view one should, 
and must, approach alien discourses ‗non-reductively and in the hope of picking up 
a new angle on things.‘189 Rorty‘s hermeneutics is further illustrated by what is said 
of Galileo versus Cardinal Bellarmine conflict. He thinks that ‗to suggest that there 
is room for rational disagreement here and not simply for a black-and-white 
struggle between reason and superstition is to endanger the very notion of 
philosophy.‘190 
 
It is presumed that according to PMN, the epistemological way of explaining the 
irrationality of Bellarmine is to say that he and Galileo shared a common ground, a 
Nature of Human Rationality, which was violated by his, but not by Galileo‘s way 
of looking at science. According to Rorty in PMN, Galileo‘s concept of science was 
an ‗invention‘ and not the making explicit of something pre-existing. He says that 
―no conceivable epistemology, no study of the nature of human knowledge, could 
have discovered it before it was hammered out.‘191 The upshot of this seems to be 
that the account of rationality that makes Bellarmine appear irrational is ‗a post 
factum and Whiggish one, on which constructed an epistemology on the basis of 
the vocabulary or assumptions of the winning side in a scientific dispute.‘192 The 
change in the conception of science from Medieval to modern time ‗was not 
brought about by ―rational arguments‖ in some sense of ―rational‖ in which for 
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example, the changes lately brought about in regard to society‘s attitude toward 
slavery, abstract art, homosexuals, or endangered species, would not count as 
―rational.‖193 He argues further that, traditionally hermeneutics has been associated 
with the idea of spirit/the mental by being the method of the Geisteswissenschaften. 
PMN‘s notion of hermeneutics has no intrinsic relation to any of these. Abnormal 
discourse is possible on any subject. 
 
The realm of normal discourse and epistemology is ‗whatever is so routine and 
familiar and manageable that we trust our own language implicitly.194 Those subject 
matters that are ‗unfamiliar and unmanageable that we begin to wonder whether 
our ‗language‘ is adequate to them‘195 are the point where abnormal discourse and 
hermeneutics become relevant. This division corresponds to that ―...between that 
portion of the field of inquiry where we feel rather uncertain that we have the right 
vocabulary at hand and that portion where we feel rather certain that we do. This 
does, at the moment, roughly coincide with the distinction between the fields of the 
Geistes- and the Naturwissenschaften. But this coincidence may be mere 
coincidence.‖196 There is no metaphysical reason why human beings should be 
capable of saying incommensurable things, nor do any guarantee that they will 
continue to do so.197 Rorty thinks that human beings might become completely 
predictable and the non-human world might start to squirm out of any scientific, 
conceptual net.  
 
According to Rorty in PMN hermeneutics is the only one part to replace 
traditional, epistemology-dominated philosophy, namely edification and edifying 
philosophy. Edification is ‗the project of finding new, better, more interesting, 
more fruitful ways of speaking‘198 of finding a new and more interesting way of 
expressing ourselves, and thus of coping with the world.‘199 The basic strategy 
behind the alternative presented in PMN is that edification is to replace knowledge 
and certainty as the goal of thinking. Edification can be achieved by practicing 
hermeneutics. ‗But it may instead consist in the poetic activity of thinking up such 
new aims, new words, or new disciplines.200 Science, the quest for truth, is in no 
way privileged. From an edificational point of view one can see ―...the descriptions 
of ourselves we find in....the Naturwissenschaften as on a par with the various 
alternative descriptions offered by poets, novelists, depth psychologists, sculptors, 
anthropologists, and mystics. The former are not privileged representations in 
virtue of the fact that at the moment there is more consensuses in the sciences than 
in the arts. They are simply among the repertoire of self-descriptions at our 
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disposal.‖201 Taking some hints from Sartre, it is implied in PMN that edification is 
closely related to what it is to be a human. If all discourses were commensurable, a 
person would only be en-soi; it would be possible to ascribe to him a universally 
valid essence. But, as abnormal discourse is always possible, no objective facts, that 
is, objective as related to some normal discourse can ever tell us unconditionally 
how to live our lives. This does not mean that PMN accepts the positivistic fact-
value distinction; the trouble with the fact-value distinction is that it is contrived 
precisely to blur the fact that alternative descriptions are possible. ...It distinguishes 
the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to 
choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is 
to adopt a contrary attitude.202 
 
Edification is part of what results from PMN‘s viewing knowledge, in fact all 
culture, as conversation rather confrontation. The question posed here is that what 
is the role of philosophy in the conversation of mankind? PMN outlines three tasks 
for philosophy, or for philosophers. First, philosophers can take part in the 
edificatory, poetic activity that is, inventing new words and new disciplines. The 
second is related to hermeneutics. It is the role of the informed dilettante, the 
polypragmatic, Socratic intermediary between various discourses. In his salon, so to 
speak, hermetic thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed practices. 
Disagreements between disciplines and discourses are compromised or transcended 
in the course of the conversation.203 The third is to do what PMN called ‗edifying 
philosophy‘ as opposed to systematic philosophy. The systematic philosopher is 
impressed by the success of some theory or activity (like Galilean Mechanics, or 
Darwin, or mathematical logic), and therefore wants us to reshape all inquiry, and 
all of culture, on its model, thereby permitting objectivity and rationality to prevail 
in areas previously obscured by convention and superstition,204 that is, make 
everything commensurable, turn it all into one normal discourse. This would 
endanger the free flow of abnormal discourse in edificatory conversation. Edifying 
philosophers, the paradigmatic examples being late Heidegger, late Witggenstein, 
late Dewey, attack the endeavours of the systematic philosophers of their time. 
Great systematic philosophers, like great scientists, build for eternity. Great edifying 
philosophers destroy for the sake of their own generation.205 
 
He admires edifying philosophers that they do not put forward theories about how 
things are. They ―...have to decry the very notion of having a view, while avoiding 
having a view about having views.....We might just be saying something, 
participating in a conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry. Perhaps 
saying things is not just always saying how things are. Perhaps saying that is itself 
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not a case of saying how things are.... To see edifying philosophers as 
conversational partners is an alternative to seeing them as holding views on 
subjects of common concern. One way of thinking of wisdom as something of 
which the love is not the same as that of argument, and of which the achievement 
does not consist in finding the correct vocabulary for representing essence, is to 
think of it as the practical wisdom necessary to participate in a conversation. One 
way to see edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is to see it as the attempt to 
prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of views. 
Edifying philosophers can never end philosophy, but they can help prevent it from 
attaining the secure path of a science.206 
 
Rorty’s Edification, Conversation, Hermeneutics and Redescription 
 
The arguments that Rorty put forward in his work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
prompt one to pose a fundamental question: ‗what Rorty is really trying to achieve 
throughout his work‘? And in providing answers to this question, a barrage of 
hostility and stinging criticism has targeted him and his ideas which Malachowski 
dismisses claiming that generally, as a philosopher Rorty has been hyper-criticised 
while also being misunderstood. He considers the accusations as precisely the kind 
of anti-Rortian stereotypes which overlook three key points: First, the 
incommensurability of Rorty‘s project with the traditional projects of philosophy 
from Plato to Kant or even to Quine; second, the legitimacy of this 
incommensurability; third, the relevance of Rorty‘s project which seeks to indicate 
the way forward by showing that it is possible, and advisable, to break new 
philosophical ground, stimulate new ways of thinking and thereby generate more 
productive results.207 Rorty wants to change the subject of philosophy from both 
the outside, on a meta-philosophical level, and from the inside, via a re-
philosophising of the whole range of issues of modern philosophy. On a meta-
philosophical level he challenges the ground for viewing philosophy as an 
ahistorical discipline, a science, whose aim is to discover the most fundamental 
truths about the nature of reality as it is in itself. For him, philosophical problems 
and their solutions are historical, contingent and optional rather than necessary or 
eternal. On an intra-disciplinary level, he urges philosophers to leave three main 
things behind. Firstly, Platonism‘s set of philosophical dualisms like appearance-
reality, matter-mind, made-found, sensible intellectual and others along with 
kindred Socratic-Platonic manoeuvres as replacing passion with reason, equating 
virtue with knowledge, sacrificing pleasure for truth, and searching for stable, 
objective, neutral foundations of thought. Secondly, dropping Cartesianism, this is 
the view that the mind represents the essence of man as well as the mirror of 
nature. And thirdly, Kantianisn, as a doctrine based on dualisms between intuition 
and concept, the given and the constructed, the contingent and the necessary, and 
the idea that philosophy-as-a theory-of-knowledge grounds and justifies all other 
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fields of knowledge and culture.208 Through all of this Rorty wants to redirect the 
whole business of philosophy from epistemological to social, cultural, ethical, 
political and aesthetic issues, and to create a vocabulary for what he calls a ‗post-
philosophic culture.‘ It‘s a sweeping agenda, an attempt to reshape the self-image of 
human beings, to re-describe it, to start to think of human life in different ways 
from those bequeathed to him by modern philosophy and culture.  
 
Rorty has been described as ‗anti-philosopher, anti-essentialist, anti-
representationalist, and anti-foundationalist. He is as well, variously described: a 
philosophical nihilist set on dismantling philosophy as such, or at least such pivotal 
areas as epistemology and ontology; a superficial pragmatist, misappropriating key 
figures in the history of philosophy from Plato to Kant with the purpose of 
exchanging the goal of objective truth for that of subjective ‗usefulness‘; or a 
postmodern cultural relativist denying all scope for ‗culture transcending‘ authority 
in order to promote his own preferred, self-legitimating set of ‗ethnocentric‘ 
Western values. On still another reading he‘s a rather woolly utopian liberal, 
plaintively calling for the spread of human suffering and an end to cruelty, but 
failing to find an adequate grounding for that project. Thus when Rorty has sought 
to ‗go political‘ with his thinking, the charge has often been made that the key 
defining features of his own project make it unable to make any practical 
contribution to the resolution of the kinds of social problem he himself is most 
exercised by (for instance, that ‗the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting 
richer‘).209 
 
But this sort of caricature did not deter Rorty to purse his agenda with such single-
mindedness to the extent of realising his set schema, which is to replace pure 
epistemological concerns with a model in which claims to knowledge are justified 
as a matter of social practice with changes in the rules of which are fostered not by 
rational argumentation but by metaphors, images and historical contingencies. This 
is motivated by his consistent pragmatic conviction that the traditional 
philosophical agenda of epistemology and metaphysics arose out of historical 
developments and so, philosophers willing, is legitimately replaceable by some 
other agenda. The central idea is that everything in human life is the product of 
time and chance as opposed to necessity, essence, reality, truth and obligation.210 In 
all these endeavours he positions himself as a valuable far-sighted thinker who 
throws up new ideas, puts an interesting spin on some old ones, and helps broaden 
the philosophical canon and redefine the course of philosophical history. For him, 
there is not any one ultimate context of the sort required to make sense of the 
assertion that one way of describing a thing is more fundamental or essential to it 
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than all others. There are only limited contexts set by changing circumstances and 
purposes. 
 
Rorty’s Liberating Historicism versus a demonising and patronising 
Historicism 
 
The approach that Rorty applied to turn against the whole system of western 
philosophy and undermine it to the extent of relegating it to the periphery of 
intellectual discourse carries some dire consequences to the European epistemic 
systems which for centuries have dominated university faculties. It as well poses 
some challenges to those areas of human life which have, for centuries, been 
informed and formed by this philosophical tradition. That‘s why Richard Bernstein 
commented on the reception of Rorty‘s book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and 
claimed that ―some will find it a deeply disturbing book while others will find it 
liberating and exhilarating.‖211 On reading Rorty‘s book, one notices its difference 
in approach to history of philosophy and its liberating effect from a warped 
historicism as the one which we find in Hegel and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Rorty‘s 
historicism points to a way in which philosophy can play a much more vital and 
central role in liberating us from stale metaphors and fundamental misconceptions 
about what philosophy can achieve. This is completely different from the 
historicism of Hegel which Francis Fukuyama describes in a sombre style: ―For 
better or worse, much of Hegel‘s historicism has become part of our contemporary 
intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of 
primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages 
corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave owning, 
theocratic, and finally democratic egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from 
the modern understanding of man.‖212 Rorty strips the European epistemic system 
of its mantle of comfort and puts into question its patronising influence over other 
epistemic systems. It had been observed approvingly of the power that Hegel‘s 
historicism gave a sense of how there might be genuine novelty in the development 
of thought and society. 
 
This influence on Hegel was rendered possible by Kant who perfected and codified 
the two distinction that are necessary to develop the notion of alternative 
conceptual framework, the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity and the 
distinction between necessary and contingent truth. Since it is almost impossible 
not to think of the mind as divided into active and passive faculties, the former 
using concepts to interpret what the world imposes on the latter.213 These Kantian 
                                                          
211 Richard J. Bernstein, ―Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind‖ The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 33, 
No. 4, June 1980, 745-775 published by Philosophy Education Society Inc. at http://www.jstor.org 
/stable/20127425 (accessed on April 26, 2010). 
212 Francis Fukuyama, ―The End of History?‖ in Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader, 2nd edition, ed. 
Stephen Eric Bronner (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006) 422. 
213 Richard Rorty, ―The World Well Lost,‖ The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 19, Sixty-Ninth Annual 
Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (October 26, 1972): 649-665 
55 
assertions might have motivated Hegel in his work the Philosophy of History to claim 
that ―The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely 
the end of History, Asia the beginning.‖214 Europe is the end of History in at least 
two senses: 1) it is the end, as in the terminus, the point beyond which there is no 
other, the culmination of all that came prior to it and 2), it is the end, as in the goal, 
the purpose, the final product to the achievement of which all earlier efforts were 
tending. On either interpretation, the triumphalism and import of Hegel‘s 
assertions are unmistakable. And the object of the Philosophy of History is to bring to 
―the completion of History ... the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the 
Sovereign of the World that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a 
rational process.‖215 Hegel goes on to make outrageous claims that History is a 
rational process, that it tends towards an end, and that it is the object of philosophy 
to apprehend this movement in its various stages.  
 
The ultimate subject of History is Spirit and the essence, to which it tends, towards 
the realization of which its movement is directed, is Freedom. But to make this 
journey, Spirit gets itself embodied in Peoples, Nations, Volk, and peoples are to be 
judged by how much and in what way they have apprehended this essence of Spirit 
in them. For Hegel, only a few peoples are what he calls ―world-historical peoples.‖ 
These are peoples who may rightly be adjudged to belong in History and to 
participate in its march towards that attainment of its final end. The ―Orientals‖ 
caught a glimpse of Spirit and therefore made history only through the despot. The 
Greeks and the Romans saw it some more but missed out on the works. As it turns 
out, thanks to Christianity, only the Germans or northern Europeans saw Spirit in 
its full glory and secured a patent on Freedom as a result. To that extent, we must 
as part of the Philosophy of History be interested in its Geographical Basis. He 
continues to assert that, ―It is not our concern to become acquainted with the land 
occupied by nations as an external locale, but with the natural type of the locality, 
as intimately connected with the type and character of the people which is the 
offspring of such soil. This character is not nothing more nor less than the mode of 
and form in which nations make their appearance in History, and take place and 
position in it.‖216 On this point he concludes by suggesting that ―the true theatre of 
History is therefore the temperate zone; or rather its northern half, because the 
earth there presents itself in a continental form, and has a broad breast, as the 
Greeks say.‖217 
 
However, it is believed that it is Lucien Lévy-Bruhl who systematically constructed 
in detail what is understood to be the fundamental differences between ―primitive‖ 
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and ―modern‖ mentalities.218 He received his first degree in philosophy in 1879 and 
a doctorate in the same field in 1884 from the École Normale Supérieure and he 
focused much of his intellectual efforts on studies in the history of philosophy and 
moral philosophy before finally turning to what would become his highly 
controversial studies of primitive mentality.219 Levy-Bruhl is discussed in this paper 
because his ideas are influenced by Kant and the representationalist tradition of 
which Rorty is critical in his work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Also, it must be 
affirmed that Lévy-Bruhl was a philosopher, rather than an anthropologist he is 
often interpreted as being so. As a philosopher he based his theory on a priori 
philosophical categories which he maintained from beginning to end and that he 
imposed these categories on ethnography. It could be argued that he was 
philosopher involved in the epistemology of metaphysics.220 In Lévy-Bruhl we see a 
perpetuation of that stock of dichotomies like realism/antirealism, 
objectivism/relativism, and fact/value, cognitive/expressive that have defined 
continental philosophy for centuries.221 This dichotomy was of course well 
established in epistemology and it is this same dichotomy which is the key to the 
structure of Lévy-Bruhl‘s theory, for he translated it into scientific mentality on the 
one hand and primitive mentality on the other.  
 
In his theory, he postulated that scientific mentality adhered to the rules of logical 
discourse and empirical investigation as established in rhetoric and in contemporary 
science. According to these rules, categories were mutually exclusive, so that 
nothing could be two things at once, nor could they be in two places at once. 
However, avoiding philosophy and theology, he drew his examples from the open 
fields of anthropology or more precisely from ethnography, from the customs and 
sentiments of non-Western primitives. But it is argued that in actual sense, he was 
engaged in a philosophical debate regarding epistemology of metaphysics in 
Europe.222 The main motivation for his work was the question about how many 
anthropologists were schooled in philosophy or theology to a degree sufficient to 
perceive underlying issues? And among these underlying issues, he drew two major 
categories which came to characterise his works, that is, scientific mentality and 
primitive mentality. 
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In his works he made an array of arguments and alleged facts where he endeavours 
to draw a line of demarcation between the non-Western and Western peoples,223 
where the latter were held to be organized according to logical modes of thought 
that are primarily grounded upon cognitive functioning, the former were thought to 
be fundamentally pre-logical, infused with imaginal and emotional currents that 
often served to distort the stability and coherence of the world as first given to the 
senses.224 He described primitive mentality primarily by two aspects, that is, it was 
mystical and pre-logical. He explained that these were not two distinct 
characteristics, but instead two aspects of the same fundamental quality. Mystical 
signified the content of thought, pre-logical indicated the connections between 
thoughts. Mystical signified the content of collective representations in primitive 
mentality. Representations were a social reality, they were common to the members 
of a given social group, had existence beyond individual members, and were 
transmitted from one generation to another. The transmission occurred through 
customs, through myths, and supremely through group rituals. He then made sharp 
contrasts that while for the modern mind, mental representations are cognitive 
phenomena that are precise and differentiated, for primitive mentality, mental 
representations are far more complex, undifferentiated, and infused with emotion, 
feeling, and passion.225 Furthermore, he asserted that in addition to being suffused 
with such emotional and motor currents, primitive mentality is almost exclusively 
directed by culturally constituted collective representations and as such is bound up 
with pre-perceptions, pre-conceptions, pre-connections, and we might almost say 
with prejudgments, which serve to alter the functioning of such mental capacities as 
reason, logic, and inference.226 
 
Another aspect of primitive mentality focused on the connections within the 
collective representations. This aspect was the pre-logic and for Lévy-Bruhl the 
prefix had two meanings. The first was obvious; the mentality was antecedent to 
logic. The second meaning of the prefix in prelogical meant that the logical rules 
were no way involved, even to be suspended or to be opposed as it is, respectively 
in alogical or antilogical. Again, driven by an alternative logic, Lévy-Bruhl held that 
primitive mentality operates such that an individual confronts a world constituted 
by collective representations that are largely impervious to experience. As he put it, 
primitives see with eyes like ours, but they do not perceive with the same minds. 
We might almost say that their perceptions are made up of a nucleus surrounded by 
a layer of varying density of representations which are social in their origin.‖227 For 
Lévy-Bruhl, it was precisely this collectively generated representational saturation 
                                                          
223 Messay Kebede, Africa‟s Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonisation (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2004), 1. 
224 Jason C. Thropp, ―Minding Experience: An Exploration of the Concept of ‗Experience‘ in the Early 
French Anthropology of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, and Levi Strauss,‖ The Journal of the History of the 
Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Fall 2003): 365-382 published online in Wiley Interscience 
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI 10.1002/JHBS.10131 (accessed on May 25, 2010).  
225 Lucien Lévy Bruhl, How Natives Think (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926/1910), 36. 
226 Ibid., 5. 
227 Ibid., 44. 
58 
that accounted for the differential functioning of primitive logic that operates 
without regard to the law of contradiction.228 Because the primitives‘ collective 
representations serve to direct their perception beyond immediate sensory data to 
the occult forces and the imperceptible elements thought to operate beyond the 
purview of our various sensory modalities, the primitive mind was understood by 
Lévy-Bruhl to be driven to see connections between otherwise ―logically‖ disparate 
phenomena, for instance, between a man and his totem animal. In his estimation, 
therefore, categorical thinking and instances of mutual exclusivity, which are the 
putative hallmarks of logical thought, are abandoned in primitive mentality, which 
instead operates upon a law of participation whereby the mind is not merely 
presented with an object, but ―communes with it and participates in it, not only in 
the ideological, but also in the physical and mystic sense of the word.‖229 
 
In referring to one of Lévy-Bruhl‘s works ‗Primitive Mentality,‘ Jasop Thropp 
discussed this bipartite model of ―primitive experience‖ when he argued that, ―Our 
modern experience is the sum-total of a comparatively small number of data and 
infinitude of inferences. That of the primitive mind on the other hand contains but 
a small proportion of inferences; but it contains many direct data to which we deny 
objectively.‖230 The analyses he makes are all impregnated with the same type of 
evaluation. Primitives are peoples dominated by passions; their body occupies the 
central place in their thinking to the extent of stifling rational thinking. He argues 
that reason has not yet established its power over the body so that emotion 
dominates even in operations that are supposedly intellectual. According to 
Kebede, this western canon of evaluation, that is, this preponderance of the body 
denotes a lower rank in the hierarchy of being. To call primitives pre-logical is the 
same thing as saying that they are sensuous. Their inability to control sensuousness 
explains their failure at disassociating the intellectual from the emotional.231 As his 
theory became known, the dichotomy attracted intense criticism especially from 
anthropologists who had lived with the so-called primitive peoples. Critics included 
Bronislaw Malinowski in a lecture in 1925 published in 1948, Robert Lowie and 
Paul Radin.232 They recognised Lévy-Bruhl‘s fundamental dichotomy and rightly 
rejected it so. But despite some intellectual efforts to rehabilitate Lévy-Bruhl and 
rebut the propositions that he forwarded, there has been a lingering attachment, for 
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generations, to his ideas and they have come to be ossified and institutionalised in 
the global discourse. The explanation to this phenomenon could only be adequately 
explained by Rorty and not only does he give an account of it, but he takes practical 
steps to erase it completely from the intellectual consciousness and start off with 
new working and usable theories and concepts instead. 
 
How Rorty crafts the end of philosophy strategy? 
 
In order to figure out well the strategy of Rorty in his end-of-philosophy ploy, one 
has to situate him in the general modernist philosophical thought as delineated in 
the three principal phases. First, Counter-Philosophy: This is the position in the 
nineteenth century which saw the advent of various doctrines that had as their 
common distinctive theme the dethronement of the spiritual-speculative outlook of 
the western tradition and its replacement with distinctly counter-speculative forms 
of world explanation. Second, meta-philosophy: This arose at the turn of the 20th 
century in the new schools of philosophical inquiry which appeared and made it 
their business to disclose and correct, from a second-order, critical standpoint, 
what are alleged as the fatal fallacies of all western philosophy. Finally, post-
philosophy: This is the limit of ultra-philosophy which, in post-modernism, 
declares both the dogmatic and the critical forms of the opposition to philosophy 
self-defeating, and proposes instead to expose the whole legacy of reasoned 
discourse as spurious and annulled in itself. Each successive shape of the ultra-
modernist thesis has its own distinctive approach to how the end of philosophy is 
properly to be thought; each has its unique interpretation, and indeed 
misinterpretation, of what it is in the speculative tradition that must be rejected; 
and each, in its own way runs afoul of an ineradicable paradox that plagues every 
step of the way.  
 
It seems like Rorty was well versed in all these phases and this could be noticed 
how he begins his last Chapter in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and the 
subsequent propositions that come forth. From the outset of this part, he makes a 
suggestion that it is essentialism which is the overarching prejudice we need to 
overcome for the sake of cultural progress and the Mirror of Nature was just a 
subservient idea. Rorty wants to demolish this philosophical edifice that is 
enslaving because of its dichotomies and put in place a liberating corpus of 
knowledge that promotes human wellness and solidarity. He follows a historical 
path by going back from the ancient Greek philosophy to the modern Cartesian 
idea. He describes it that according to essentialism which is common to 
Democritus and Descartes, it is of the essence of human beings to seek to acquire 
knowledge by discovering essences, as for instance in the search for fundamental 
particles in Physics or first principles in philosophy. This picture of ―man-as-
essentially-knower-of-essences‖233 generates a conception of inquiry as the search 
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for truth, where to know the truth about something is to know its essence. Rorty‘s 
plan is to sketch an alternative by combining Gadamer‘s hermeneutics with some 
themes drawn from Existentialism. The main importance Rorty sees in Gadamer‘s 
hermeneutics is that it offers an alternative conception of inquiry which allows one 
to distance234 oneself from essentialism by placing the search for truth within a 
wider context. This is a context in which edification rather than knowledge is the 
goal of thinking235 and the search for truth is just one among many ways in which 
one might be edified.236 Rorty provides Gadamer‘s conception of edification with 
an Existentialist twist by saying that ―redescribing ourselves is the most important 
thing we can do.237 Thus Rorty wants people to stop worrying about the truth and 
start worrying about edification, where edification is a project of self-creation and 
unceasing development, accomplished by finding ever new and more interesting 
ways to describe ourselves, others, and the world around us. Unlike the search for 
objective truth, this project has no terminating point, it is an infinite striving238 in 
which the way is to keep finding new descriptions to expand our horizons and 
incorporate new points of view. The success is not by reading or even approaching 
a goal, but rather by never allowing oneself to settle upon one view of the world or 
ourselves, and instead always looking to expand or change that view. He argues that 
fact accumulation is only one among many ingredients with this process of 
edification, but it was blown out of proportion by the essentialist tradition. 
 
While discussing edification, he proposes two main ways in which it is to proceed: 
First, through hermeneutically engaging with the incommensurable discourses 
employed by different academic disciplines, different cultures, different historical 
periods or any combination thereof; even imaginary aliens can have their uses as we 
have seen. Second, is the poetic activity of devising new incommensurable 
discourses. The aim in both cases is to take us out of our old selves by the power of 
strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings.239 Rorty wants this to be the new 
impetus for inquiry after the demise of objective truth, one which is self-
consciously internal to inquiry, rather than provided by an imaginary external goal. 
This impetus is required to prevent culture from freezing over, and is to be 
achieved by continually throwing spanners into the works to interrupt normal 
discourses. Richard Bernstein has suggested that ―Rorty is calling for the invention 
of incommensurable vocabularies over new forms of dissensus, not epistemological 
consensus.‖240 So the drive to progress becomes the drive against intellectual 
complacency, since progress will grind to a halt if we assume we already 
understand, or even that we are already on the right track.  
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In arguing for edifying philosophy what Rorty actually says is just that philosophy 
needs to abandon all vestiges of the Mirror of Nature paradigm which Kant used to 
create an autonomous academic subject with a professional self-image. This means 
that philosophers can no longer adjudicate areas of culture, praising physics and 
maligning homeopathy, for instance, on the pretence of knowing something about 
knowing which nobody else knows so well.241 Without the Mirror of Nature, 
philosophy has no special subject matter, no special method, and not even a unique 
point of view. Rorty nevertheless rejects the claims that there can or should be no 
such profession. But he contends that the profession will go on because people will 
continue to read the great dead philosophers and universities will need people to 
teach them. Philosophers can also contribute some useful kibitzing between 
subjects, though the only reason Rorty can think of, for why philosophers should 
be better suited to this role than any other sort of academic, is that the professional 
philosopher‘s background in the history of philosophy allows them to spot ‗stale 
philosophical clichés which the other participants have stumbled across in their 
reading, but about which professional philosophers know the pros and cons by 
heart.‘242 
 
The conclusion that he makes on this point, takes on a more positive aspect, 
however, in light of his anti-essentialism and historicism. He said in his classic 
paper „Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida:‘ ―All that philosophy as a 
name for a sector of culture means is ‗talk about Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, 
Hegel, Frege, Russell...and all that lot. Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. 
It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition – a 
family romance involving for example Parmenides, Honest old Uncle Kant, and 
bad brother Derrida.‖243 If we think of philosophy in this way, namely as a tradition 
of writing woven around a certain family tree, then we can see Rorty‘s conclusion 
in a new light. He wants a radically new plot development. This needs to be an 
almost clear break, since traditional philosophy had little going for it, but Rorty 
does not want to rule out the possibility of the great philosophy texts becoming the 
basis for something useful in the future if interpreted in novel enough ways. In this, 
he seems to suggest that the works of philosophers should rather be treated as 
literary works most suitable in the literature and language departments, but not as 
unique texts offering novelty or anything special.  
 
Finally, Rorty makes an interesting, witty and sharp conclusion which would 
provide good insights in this study towards a new concept of mission theory and 
practice. He makes an historical review of philosophy with sharp brevity and 
assertion that from the beginning, philosophy has worried about the relation 
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between thought and its object, representation and represented. The old problem 
about reference to the inexistent, for example, has been handled in various 
unsatisfactory ways because of a failure to distinguish properly philosophical 
questions about meaning and reference from extraneous questions motivated by 
scientific, ethical, and religious concerns. Once these questions are properly 
isolated, however, we can see philosophy as a field which has its centre in a series 
of questions about the relations between words and the world. The recent purifying 
move from talk of ideas to talk of meanings had dissipated the epistemological 
scepticism which motivated much of past philosophy. This has left philosophy a 
more limited, but more self-conscious, rigorous, and coherent area of inquiry.  
 
He however immediately adds on what might be the final blow to the existence of 
philosophy by arguing that philosophy started off as a confused combination of the 
love of wisdom and the love of argument. It began with Plato‘s notion that the 
rigour of mathematical argumentation exposed, and could be used to correct, the 
pretensions of the politicians and the poets. As philosophical thought changed and 
grew, inseminated by this ambivalent eros, it produced shoots which took root on 
their own. Both wisdom and argumentation became far more various than Plato 
dreamed. Given such nineteenth century complications as the Bildungsroman,244 
non-Euclidean geometries, ideological historiography, the literary dandy, and the 
political anarchist, there is no way in which one can isolate philosophy as occupying 
a distinctive place in culture or concerned with a distinctive subject or proceeding 
by some distinctive method. One cannot even seek an essence for philosophy as an 
academic Fach245 because one would first have to choose the country in whose 
universities‘ catalogues one was to look.246 
 
According to this Rortian argumentation, it would appear that philosophy as has 
been known for centuries is not anymore a privileged subject of study with a 
significant existence in the plethora of academic subjects in institutions of learning. 
And any enthusiastic pessimist would immediately announce the death and 
definitive end of philosophy and call for the immediate installation of its successor 
in the university faculties. Yet again those scholars who specialised in philosophy 
would be asked to abdicate their positions and fit themselves in the scheme of 
other subjects which have taken over the privileged position of philosophy. The 
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students of philosophy would be requested to take other courses or just switch to 
the successors of philosophy just installed. In this apparent confusion and 
philosophical lacuna, Rorty pronounces the end of philosophy and proposes 
conversation as what he thinks would successfully replace philosophy. He 
considers that, that is what should constitute the post-philosophical culture and 
form the basis for human knowledge and inform other systems of human life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have followed the developments of Rorty‘s ideas as he set 
himself the task to deconstruct the whole continental philosophical tradition as 
previously known. We have seen that he crafted this project with such ingenuity by 
drawing together numerous complex positions from throughout the history of 
philosophy in order to build his argument. In many instances he admires 
appropriation and strong misreading with the claim that what he does is to purify 
philosophy, leave out the bits he does not like and those which can be intensely 
annoying. In doing all this, he renders philosophy scrawny and the understanding 
and explication of Truth is left without any foundations. The two are considered 
together, because for him, philosophy is the guardian of objective truth. It has to 
be realised that the concept of Truth and especially objective truth has occupied an 
essential position in the history of philosophy. And he considers that this pre-
occupation with truth does not make any meaning if people are stranded with their 
existential questions without any considerable answer. So, he does not approve any 
philosophical inquiry which does not impact people‘s concrete circumstances. As a 
result of this strategy, he ushers in what is characterized as the post-philosophical 
culture, a culture without foundations, but which is built on the ideal of keeping the 
conversation going. Rorty‘s project has strident consequences for mission history in 
the Christian tradition especially if we consider the philosophia ancilla theologiae motif 
that has informed much of western Christian and philosophical thought. Another 
intriguing scenario is that all through history, theology has always developed its 
epistemology in interaction with philosophy.247 Now that the foundations upon 
which Christian theology has depended to articulate her claim for universal truth 
have been cracked, there is a need to address the new mission situation with a 
relevant and related mission strategy. In short, we are going to venture into the 
quest for mission in a non-foundationalist perspective. 
 
In the next chapter, we are going to develop the implications of this meta-
philosophical culture on the understanding and articulation of the concept of truth. 
But above all we shall explore the philosophical meaning of conversation in the 
explication of truth and its affinity to mission history in this age of multiculturalism 
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and a globalising world. And finally make attempts to develop it as a viable mission 
concept in the Church‘s missionary endeavour. 
 
  
65 
  Chapter Two: 
  Conversation, pragmatism and discourse 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter it has become evident that philosophy as traditionally 
understood is a thinking which is no longer relevant for a post-modern 
consciousness and world. If it might still have a role it can only be in some radically 
attenuated sense, that is, as writing its own obituary, clearing away of the rubble of 
its own ruined foundations, speculating as to what it might now mean to live and 
think post-philosophically.248 One of Richard Rorty‘s most famous and 
controversial philosophical positions has been his replacement of knowledge with 
conversation, whereby the old goals of progress, truth, and consensus under ideal 
conditions are replaced with his ideal of ―keeping the conversation going.‖249 Part 
of Rorty‘s point in giving historical accounts of philosophy is to urge listeners to 
realize that traditional epistemological projects have failed. In light of this, there is 
no need for asking questions motivated by such projects, and get back to vital 
questions. It is enough to embrace a more pragmatist view along the lines of John 
Dewey to philosophy and accept the social dimensions of inquiry, thought, and 
action. In doing this, Rorty believes it is helpful to speak in terms of conversations 
and vocabularies rather than truth, representation, and foundations of knowledge. 
And this is part of his overall rejection of grounding as transcendental or universal. 
Rather people make normative claims that are always situated within particular 
social contexts and always bear the stamp of some chosen values and practices. So, 
when Rorty makes his own normative claims to keep the conversation going, he 
does not mean for conversation to yield truth, or consensus, final answers, or final 
norms. On the other hand, Rorty still makes normative claims meant to persuade 
and influence. And exactly what is meant by and what is required for Rorty‘s norm, 
that is, to keep the conversation going is not entirely clear.250 Indeed the very idea 
of conversational maintenance requires some philosophical unpacking. In 
particular, a distinction needs to be made between genuine conversations and 
simply talking or going through the motions of conversation if one is to make the 
most of this recommendation. 
 
Harsh criticisms have been directed against Rorty‘s ideas; the details of which go 
beyond the scope of this study and therefore we do not intend to venture into 
them. But following Malachowski, we cannot brush aside Rorty‘s ideas as if they 
carry no value and meaning for human solidarity.251 If studied in depth, evaluated 
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and refined for their realistic utility and significance, they can enrich civilisation and 
promote human wellbeing and fairness. The whole treatise on Rorty, which we 
have been following up to this point, was to establish how his idea of conversation 
came about. In this chapter we explore how we can employ this idea as a sensitising 
concept in analysing mission theory in the past (chapter 3) and the present (chapter 
4), in view of the future (chapter 5). The particular goal that was set in the general 
objectives right from the beginning was to bring Rorty‘s concept of conversation in 
a meaningful relation to the Christian concept of mission. Hence the title of this 
thesis is: Mission from Conversion to Conversation. 
 
Conversation, Pragmatism and Religion 
 
The use of the concept conversation is located in pragmatism, a tradition in which 
Rorty is rooted which carry that particular intellectual respectability of religion as a 
human endeavour. This represents some of pragmatism‘s most controversial claims 
and positions since in certain circles, the view persists that pragmatism is in fact 
indifferent and even inhospitable to religion. But in its defence of religion, some 
commentators hail the pragmatist evaluation of religion as exactly indicative of the 
openness and tolerance that a pragmatist life orientation facilitates in both societal 
and intellectual circles. Giles Gunn in his article dealing with religion and the recent 
revival of pragmatism, remarks that ―…philosophers like John E. Smith, Richard J. 
Bernstein and John McDermott view pragmatism not only as a philosophical 
theory in need of defence but also as an intellectual method capable of keeping 
open the lines of communication between philosophy and some of the other 
departments of the intellectual life.‖252 The fundamental presupposition of 
pragmatism as a philosophy is that all ideas including beliefs, propositions, 
convictions and theories are instruments that human beings design and use in order 
to so organise their environment that the latter can adapt to their practical and 
existential needs. They argue that ideas function in human lives for the sake of the 
removal of difficulties or the solution of problems or disconcerting puzzles. Ideas 
or beliefs consequently are true when they work, that is, when they meet with 
success in pursuing the goal for which they were invented. This implies a distinct 
rejection of the age-old correspondence theory of truth, in terms of which a 
knowledge claim is true when it corresponds with how things actually are in the 
world. In other words, truth is the correspondence between a thing in the world 
and the intellect. Rorty claims that the founding proposition of pragmatism is that 
there is no difference of any real consequence, that is, ―no difference that makes a 
difference between the statements‘ it works because it is true, and it is true because 
it works.‖253 
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Religion played a not inconsiderable, if not always obvious, role in the thinking of 
the founding generation of pragmatism. The ideas developed by Charles Sanders 
Peirce are of significant role in this section. He developed the idea that the sole 
motive, idea and function of thought is to produce belief. He ascribes three 
properties to a belief: first, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases 
the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a 
rule of action, or say for short, a habit. Beliefs therefore are habits of action. His 
point is that there exists the closest possible relationship between what we think or 
believe, and some action that is precipitated by that belief. Belief always and 
necessarily arises and functions within the ambit of some practical goal that we seek 
through concerted action. For Peirce, as for all the pragmatists, the idea that belief 
is divorced from action and arrived at purely for its own sake or for the sake of 
inherent intellectual insight or gratification is inconceivable.254  
 
William James applied Peirce‘s idea of beliefs as ―habits of action‖ directly to 
religious beliefs. James made his known pragmatic view of religion in his essay ―The 
Will to Believe.‖ This title seems to suggest the implausibility of thinking about 
beliefs as ―habits of action.‖ But while defending the claim that religious beliefs are 
habits of action, the relationship between beliefs and actions need to be specified 
more closely. For this purpose, he introduces a threefold distinction that needs to 
be applied to beliefs in order to attain the status of justifiable religious beliefs. 
Beliefs can according to these distinctions be regarded as hypotheses that we accept 
or reject according to three sets of options presented us. These options are living or 
dead, forced or avoidable and momentous or trivial.255 Following Peirce‘s idea of 
beliefs as ―habits of action‖ that are always motivated by some social or practical 
project within which they function, he insists that we disbelieve all facts and 
theories for which we find no use.256 Our non-intellectual nature does influence our 
convictions. For James pure insights and logic are not the only things that produce 
that which we believe. His central thesis in ―The Will to Believe‖ is stated as: Our 
passional nature not only lawfully, may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided 
on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, ―Do not decide, but 
leave the question open‖ is itself a passional257 decision, just like deciding yes or no, 
and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.258 He again, on this point, 
makes a good juxtaposition between belief and truth. He thinks ―Beliefs are 
themselves parts of the sum total of the world‘s experience, and become matter, 
therefore, for the next day‘s funding operations. In the realm of truth-processes 
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facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs 
make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new 
facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, 
as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from facts; but 
they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or 
reveal new truths and so on indefinitely. The ‗facts‘ themselves meanwhile are not 
true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate 
among them. What we say about reality thus depends on the perspective into which 
we throw it‖259 We need truth, that is, we need to believe in order to act. Before 
knowing, there is the need to know, which an absolutely vital need is.  
 
Any belief, in conclusion, has a fideistic component that ignites it and enables its 
perpetration. And this faith, or will to believe, is pragmatically will to act. A 
hypothesis that is not made alive by an active, favourite, passional, inherently 
prejudiced, we could say, choice is a dead hypothesis, and consequently it has to be 
admitted that the emotional sphere is not at all extraneous to intellectual 
knowledge. It actually nourishes it and it enables it to hold, in many cases, those 
aspects of ‗objectivity‘ and rigour that, as we have already noticed, are nothing else 
than specific emotive tonalities. Intellectual knowledge is not ―what remains after 
wish and will and sentimental preference have taken wing,‖260 but, lived as a belief 
in truth, it answers to a deep need of our being.  
 
Another pragmatist, John Dewey, made an assessment of the intellectual 
respectability of the ideas and practice of religion in a more radical form than 
James. Dewey as is James and Peirce shares that pragmatist strategy of apportioning 
belief to human needs. His discussions and appraisal of religion occur much rather 
in the context of his sustained concerns about human practice, particularly in the 
broader contexts of civil life, education, politics and the theory and praxis of 
democracy. His pragmatism, both as a philosophy and a political disposition is born 
from a fundamental scepticism of authority. Pragmatism as a philosophy is born 
from a deep seated distrust of traditional sources of authority. He appreciates 
democracy as a theory and practice of self-reliance and therefore has little patience 
with religion in respect of religion‘s tendency to promote dependence on super-
human powers. Central to Dewey‘s thought is also his emphasis on contingency, 
humility, and his rejection of the possibility of certainty. As a pragmatist, Dewey‘s 
thinking always remains oriented to the domain of practical action. Philosophy, for 
him, only makes sense to the extent that it impinges on human praxis. His 
philosophy of religion can in essence be understood as a conversation between 
religious experience and the political life, a conversation that is necessary since 
religion is prima facie threatens democratic practice.  
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However, it was in „A Common Faith‟ Dewey‘s best known work on religion, which 
embodies his suggestion that religious faith, if it is to be taken seriously, must be 
―common‖ not in the sense of ordinary or ―not extraordinary,‖ but in the sense of 
shared and open to intersubjective scrutiny. It should be common in the way that 
resembles values and beliefs that are put to test in the sustained critical 
conversation that a democratic society essentially is. The main task in the book is to 
develop another conception of the nature of the religious phase of experience, one 
that separates it from the supernatural. He hopes that the upshot of his analysis will 
be that ―…what is genuinely religious will undergo emancipation when it is relieved 
from the supernatural, that then, for the first time, the religious aspect of 
experience will be free to develop freely on its own account.‖261 Dewey‘s position 
on religion hinges on a fundamental distinction that dominates the argument in the 
book, the distinction between a religion and the religious.262 He claims that the 
trouble in which religion generally finds itself in the modern world might well be 
the effect of the way in which religions prevent the religious quality from coming to 
consciousness and finding an appropriate moral and intellectual expression.  
 
In the above book, he makes a distinction between religion and religious. Religion 
always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of 
institutional organisation, loose or tight. In contrast, the adjective religious, denotes 
nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a system of 
beliefs …it does not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be 
organised into a particular and distinctive form of existence. It denotes attitudes 
that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal. To clarify 
what he means by the religious, he describes existential attitudes closely associated 
with religion such as ―adaptation‖ ―orientation‖ and ―accommodation‖ and claims 
that people often think that these attitudes are brought about by embracing 
particular religions. He, however, prefers to turn the statement around. His counter 
claim is that whenever the changes in human attitudes designated by these 
phenomena occur, there is a religious attitude. It is not a religion that brings it 
about, when it, adaptation, orientation and accommodation occur, from whatever 
cause and by whatever means, there is a religious outlook and function.‖ The 
religious also has to do with an imaginative process bent on the harmonising of the 
self, in a way that is akin to Santayana‘s observations about poetry. ―The 
implication is that faith is a kind of anticipatory vision of things that are now 
invisible because of the limitations of our finite and erring nature.‖263 In this 
process, morality is also involved: ―The religious is ‗morality touched by emotion‘ 
only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense 
but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self.‖264 For 
Dewey, the value of religion is not embedded in a set of beliefs in some 
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supernatural power, but a discernment springing from a certain type of experience. 
Religions do not bring about this experience; the experience has a certain nature 
that might be called the religious. The experience emanates from our efforts to 
imaginatively harmonise and unify our inner selves, to ―to introduce perspective 
into the piecemeal and shifting episodes of existence. What must be understood is 
that whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious, not that a religion is 
something that introduces it.‖265 
 
For Dewey, the religious is that which connects us, in wonder and humility, with 
our environment and with nature. Dewey abhors the fact that religions are so often 
born out of fear and a sense of hopelessness that can only be alleviated by 
committing to a supernatural force that can safeguard us against ―the powers of 
dark.‖ That notion of a religion tends to isolate people from the world of physical 
nature and one‘s fellow beings. Such isolation is something that Dewey describes as 
distinctly unreligious. Again, it must be clearly distinguished from what he calls the 
religious: ―Our successes are dependent upon the cooperation of nature. The sense 
of dignity of human nature is as religious as is the sense of awe and reverence when 
it rests upon a sense of human nature as a cooperating part of a larger whole.‖266 In 
concluding this part on Dewey‘s articulation of his ideas on religion, he expresses 
the religious as exactly that quality of experience that acknowledges our personal 
incompleteness and our dependence upon the solidarity of fellow human beings to 
realise the values that bind us together. The concluding passage of ‗A Common 
Faith‘ reads: ―We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the 
remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things of civilisation 
we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings 
of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the 
responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of 
values we have received, so that those who come after us may receive it more solid 
and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we received it. 
Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class 
or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It 
remains to make it explicit and militant.‖267 
 
We conclude Dewey‘s explication of religion with his suggestion that this religious 
ideal of the unification of the self, facilitated by imagination, is not conceived 
outside the interactions of a dynamic human community. And that the religious is 
exactly that quality of experience that acknowledges our personal incompleteness 
and our dependence upon the solidarity of fellow human beings to realise the 
values that bind us together. This is motivated by the fact that knowledge as a 
human accomplishment is a product of the cooperative and communicative 
operations of human beings living together. Its communal origin is an indication of 
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its rightful communal use.268 In this conclusion, we recognise that the ideas of 
Dewey on religion highlight an important fact that this sector cannot be dispensed 
with in the human endeavour. And also that in the pragmatic tradition, knowledge 
is a product of conversation as a communal interactive apparatus. The community 
therefore pursues its existential goals once it maintains the ideal of keeping the 
conversation going. 
 
The meaning of Conversation 
 
Currently an increasing number of fields of thought, especially in the social 
sciences, are adopting conversation as a basic metaphor.269 The concept 
―Conversation‖ in Rorty is not so pronounced as his account of liberal irony which 
is one of the most prominent but also most controversial treatments of irony in 
contemporary philosophy.270 But Rortian conversation is best understood if we 
position it in pragmatism, the philosophical tradition in which Rorty was rooted 
and, which shaped his ideas. In a preface to his book, „Meaning and Modernity: Social 
Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude,‘ Eugene Halton assumed that ―…conversation is a 
central concept of pragmatism, but the conversation is one ultimately rooted within 
a generalised conception of nature, a conception in which nature itself is a 
bioscosmic emergent dialogue.‖271 Conversation in the form of written dialogue has 
been used in philosophy and epistemology from the time of the ancient Greeks. 
One of Socrates‘ distinctive contributions is the use of dialogue as a means to 
uncover the truth. Some of the best known philosophers and scientists used 
dialogue in their work, including, Plato, Boethius, Nietzsche, Renyi, Heyting and 
Lakatos. Over and above mere use, conversation has been explicitly adopted as a 
central epistemological concept by many philosophers and theorists including: 
Bakhtin, Collingwood, Gadamer, Gergen, Habermas, Harre, Lakatos, Lorenzen, 
Mead, Oakshott, Peters, Rorty, Shotter, Volosinov, Vygotsky and Wittgenstein. For 
example, the philosophy of Collingwood proposes a dialogical logic of question 
and answer instead of the mono-logic of propositions. Shotter argues for a 
rhetorical-response (conversational) view of interpersonal relations and 
knowledge.272 Here conversation is identified as an epistemological concept used by 
a generations of philosophers stretching from the ancient period to the 
contemporary times. This is indicative that this concept is convertible with human 
experience and consequently inseparable from human pursuits. In this way, it is 
truly regarded as a human endeavour. 
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Rorty adopts conversation explicitly as his philosophical basis for epistemological 
and mathematical knowledge. He argues that it is the human reality underpinning 
and supporting knowing. He claims that: ―If, however, we think of rational 
certainty as a matter of victory in argument rather than of relation to an object 
known, we shall look toward our interlocutors rather than to our faculties for the 
explanation of the phenomenon. If we think of our certainty about the 
Pythagorean Theorem as our confidence, based on experience with arguments on 
such matters, that nobody will find an objection to the premises from which we 
infer it, then we shall not seek to explain it by the relation of reason to triangularity. 
Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a 
matter of interaction with non-human reality.‖273 He goes on further to assert that 
―conversation is the ultimate context in which knowledge is to be understood‖274 
and that conversational justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the 
notion of justification embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and 
atomistic.275 If it is to be adopted on an epistemological basis, clarification of the 
nature of conversation is needed. The interpretation to be offered here will shed 
more light on the Rortyan conversation and make it more intelligible and 
operational in this research.  
 
There are three levels on which this concept is to be understood: First, 
conversation originates at the interpersonal level where persons on one or more 
shared forms of life engage in direct conversations, based in one or more shared 
language games, adopting a late-Wittgensteinian perspective. At this level, 
conversation is one of the basic modes of interpersonal human interactions, 
perhaps the most basic one. Mediated forms of conversation involving written 
texts, understood broadly to include all forms of notations, diagram and materially 
embodied complexes of signs, represent an important extension of this notion. 
Gadamer adds that ―The primacy of conversation can also be seen in derivative 
forms in which the correspondence between the question and the answer is 
obscured. Letters for example are an interesting transitional phenomenon, a kind of 
written conversation that, as it were, stretches out the movement of talking at cross 
purposes before each other‘s point.‖276 Therefore the transition from spoken to 
written textual forms of conversation is a crucial one. It creates a different relation-
ship between author and utterance, and allows the utterance to be objectified and 
preserved beyond the moment of the illocutionary act. It allows mathematical texts 
and arguments, proofs in particular, to be construed as monological, with all 
answers anticipated and incorporated in the text.  
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Second, there is conversation at the cultural level. This could be well articulated 
with Michael Oakshott who argues that humanity inhabits a world of ideas and 
whose growth and development is the conversation of humankind.277 This larger 
scale conversation is the direct sum of oral conversations in oral cultures. However 
the rich, complex, symbolic culture of the history of mathematics as we know it is 
only possible through extended conversation, based on the production and use of 
texts in permanent form 
 
Third, there is internalized private conversation. Many theorists including Plato, 
Gergen, Harré, Mead, Shotter, and Vygotsky argue that thought itself is internalized 
conversation, and that socially situated conversation between persons plays a 
crucial role in the formation of mind. Consequently it is also a central underlying 
feature of the subsequent use of mind. Even the private and individual functions of 
mind are socially constructed, although once formed they can take on a life of their 
own and operate a long way removed from any collective or public conversation. 
An example is given of mathematicians who can operate in isolation for extended 
periods of time, having internalised some of the conversational roles and 
procedures they learnt through conversation of the first and second kinds. These 
include, most notably, the role of proponent, in which a line of thinking or thought 
experiment is followed through sympathetically, for understanding, and the role of 
critic, in which it is examined for weaknesses and flaws.278 
 
Rorty’s Conversation 
 
Rorty‘s idea of conversation is drawn on his own notion of language and thought. 
But as he himself states, the notion of conversation that he discusses is an allusion 
to Oakshott‘s famous work, ―The Voice of Poetry in the conversation of Mankind.‖ 
Michael Oakshott dedicated the whole of his work to discuss the concept 
conversation as a human activity. He was prompted to write this treatise by the 
philosophical mode of the time which recognised that all human utterance is in one 
mode279 and that all utterances are regarded as contributions to an inquiry, or a 
debate among inquirers, about ourselves and the world we inhabit. Oakshott is not 
satisfied with this position for he considers this ―understanding of human activity 
and intercourse as an inquiry, while appearing to accommodate a variety of voices, 
in fact recognises only one, namely, the voice of argumentative discourse, the voice 
of science, and all others are acknowledged merely in respect of their aptitude to 
imitate this voice.‖280 But Oakshott recognises that the diverse idioms of utterance 
which make up current human intercourse have some meeting place and compose 
a manifold of some sort and he asserts that this meeting place is not an inquiry or 
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an argument, but a conversation.281 His understanding of conversation is that 
participants are not engaged in an inquiry or a debate; there is no ‗truth‘ to be 
discovered, no proposition to be proved, no conclusion sought. They are not 
concerned to inform, to persuade, or to refute one another and therefore the 
cogency of their utterances does not depend upon their all speaking in the same 
idiom. They may differ without disagreeing. A conversation may have passages of 
argument and a speaker is not forbidden to be demonstrative, but reasoning is 
neither sovereign nor alone, and the conversation itself does not compose an 
argument.  
 
Oakshott‘s conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a 
contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is rather an 
unrehearsed intellectual adventure. He makes an unfamiliar comparison between 
conversation and gambling claiming that its significance lies neither in winning nor 
in losing, but in wagering.282 He makes an important remark that ―properly 
speaking, conversation is impossible in the absence of a diversity of voices, because 
in it difference universes of discourse meet, acknowledge each other and enjoy an 
oblique relationship which neither requires nor forecasts their being assimilated to 
one another.‖283 
 
Oakshott makes very remarkable contributions in this treatise on conversation 
which will find their fulfilment in Rorty and this prompts us to dwell on it for an 
extra paragraph. He argues that conversation is the appropriate image of human 
intercourse; appropriate because it recognises the qualities, the diversities, and the 
proper relationships of human utterances. Although he admits that in a 
conversation ―there is argument and inquiry and information, but wherever these 
are profitable they are to be recognised as passages in this conversation, and 
perhaps they are not the most captivating of the passages.‖ He values the ―ability to 
participate in this conversation, and not the ability to reason cogently, to make 
discoveries about the world, or to contrive a better world, which distinguishes the 
human being from the animal.‖284 Each voice in the conversation is the reflection 
of a human activity and this conversation is not only the greatest but also the most 
hardly sustained of all the accomplishments of mankind. Again each voice is at 
once a manner of speaking and a determinate utterance. As a manner of speaking, 
each is wholly conversable and each voice represents a serious engagement and 
without this seriousness the conversation would lack impetus. But in its 
participation in the conversation each voice learns to be playful, learns to 
understand itself conversationally and recognise itself as a voice among voices.  
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Additionally, he expresses a pernickety development in the seventeenth century 
when the tones of the voice of science together in modulation with the voice of 
practical activity called politics became the masters of conversation and asserted 
themselves more and more unmistakably. He notes that ―But for the conversation 
to be appropriated by one or two voices is an insidious vice because in the passage 
of time it takes on the appearance of a virtue. All utterance should be relevant; but 
relevance in conversation is determined by the course of the conversation itself, it 
owes nothing to an external standard. Consequently an established monopoly will 
not only make it difficult for another voice to be heard, it is convicted in advance 
of irrelevance.‖285 Oakshott believes that there is no easy escape from this impasse. 
An excluded voice may take wing against the wind, but it will do so at the risk of 
turning the conversation into a dispute. Or it may gain a hearing by imitating the 
voices of the monopolists; but it will be a hearing for only a counterfeit 
utterance.286 He makes a proposal that, ―To rescue the conversation from the bog 
into which it has fallen and to restore to it some of its lost freedom of movement 
would require a philosophy more profound than anything I have to offer.‖287 
 
In Rorty, we could notice that profound philosophy required for the better 
appreciation of conversation as Oakshott had suggested above. Rorty makes a 
brilliant contribution in the development of, and he holds high hopes for, 
conversation and indeed, he stakes his whole philosophy on it. He observes that: 
―If we see knowing not as having an essence, but rather as a right, by current 
standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the 
ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts 
from the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry to the 
relation between alternative standards of justification, and from there to the actual 
changes in those standards which make up intellectual history.‖288 He maintains 
that for social life and for private self-creation, the ideal is conversation, dialogue, 
narrative, and vocabularies. In his social philosophy the ideal of conversation is that 
the goals for society are derived from democratic conversation. He explains that all 
that matters for liberal politics is ―the widely shared conviction that...we shall call 
true or good whatever is the outcome of free discussion that if we take care of 
political freedom, truth and goodness will take care of themselves.‖289 But again he 
quickly adds on that ―Free discussion here does not mean ‗free from ideology,‘ but 
simply the sort which goes on when the press, the judiciary, the elections, and the 
universities are free, social mobility is frequent and rapid, literacy is universal, 
higher education is common, and peace and wealth have made possible the leisure 
necessary to listen to lots of different people and think about what they say. I share 
with Habermas the Peircelike claim that the only general account to be given of our 
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criteria for truth is one which refers to ‗undistorted communication,‘ but I do not 
think there is much to be said about what counts as ‗undistorted‘ except ‗the sort 
you get when you have democratic political institutions and the conditions for 
making these institutions function.290 
 
The notion of truth in Rorty is discussed in contradistinction to the angle of truth 
in science whereby science as the paradigmatic human activity discovers truth 
rather than makes it.291 Rorty nudges those philosophers who regard ‗making truth‘ 
as a merely metaphorical and thoroughly misleading phrase. He argues that ―we 
need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the 
claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our 
creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the 
effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not 
out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that 
sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human 
creation.‖292 Rorty therefore states affirmatively that ―truth cannot be out there – 
cannot exist independently of the human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, 
or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. The 
world on its own, unaided by the describing activities of human beings, cannot.‖293 
This, therefore, suggests that human language is essential in making the world 
intelligible to the knowing subject.  
 
Rorty goes on to attach the notion of ‗truth making‘ to human capacity for 
language or communication at that. He says that the world does not speak. Only we 
do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us 
to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human 
beings can do that. The realisation that the world does not tell us what language 
games to play should not, however, lead us to say that a decision about which to 
play is arbitrary, nor to say that it is the expression of something deep within us.294 
In brief, we could articulate that Rorty‘s conversation disdains the western tradition 
which centres on the notion of the search for Truth for its own sake, that is, not 
because it will be good for oneself or for one‘s real or imaginary community, but 
because such a notion attempts to give sense to one‘s existence by turning away 
from solidarity to objectivity.295  
 
The above understandings imply that the Rortian conception of conversation is 
related to the concept of truth. Here is a link between Rorty‘s concept of 
conversation and the Christian concept of mission. As we noted in our general 
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overview of concepts of mission (see the theoretical framework in the general 
introduction), until the Second Vatican Council, more particularly the Declaration 
on the attitude of the Church toward non-Christian religions Nostra Aetate (Nr. 2), 
Christian mission was interpreted as propagating the Christian revelation which was 
considered to be true to the followers of non-Christian religions which were 
perceived as false.296 The difference between Rorty‘s concept of conversation and 
the Christian concept of mission lies in the interpretation of truth. As we have seen 
above, for Rorty ‗truth is made‘ by the human capacity for language. In Christianity, 
truth is ‗out there‘ and waits to be found. A distinctive feature of Christian mission 
is that it has made universal and absolute truth-claims from its very beginning, 
rooted in classist culture and Aristotle‘s logic.297 The foundations of western 
culture, from which most of the missionaries who came to Uganda were formed, 
were steeped in an epistemological tradition that carried sharp distinctions between 
a knowing subject and a known object which Rorty blames on the Cartesian 
distinction between mind and matter.298 This distinction is in way related to the 
Law of Contradiction which postulates that ―...a thing cannot have opposite 
attributes at the same time.‖299 We saw in Chapter One, that Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, 
who was a well-trained philosopher but only most known in anthropology, 
interpreted these philosophical categories and he imposed them on ethnography. It 
was also noted that in Lévy-Bruhl, we see a perpetuation of that stock of 
dichotomies like realism/antirealism, objectivism/relativism and fact/value, 
cognitive/expressive that defined continental philosophy for centuries. This 
dichotomy was of course well established in epistemology and it is this same 
dichotomy which is the key to the structure of Lévy-Bruhl‘s theory, for he 
translated it into scientific mentality on the one hand and primitive mentality on the 
other.300 Western culture had all along considered autonomous reason as the central 
point of reference in the rationalist tradition. This fact prompts Mike Goheen to 
argue that: When autonomous reason, the light of the classical tradition, is the 
arbiter of truth, the gospel cannot be propagated as truth but is reduced to the 
category of values, private opinion, and subjective taste.‖301 The Church, in a way, 
adopted Descartes‘ position and could be faulted of relegating the gospel truth to 
the margins of mission.  
 
This is so because one set of beliefs, which is the gospel as truth is domesticated 
within the assumptions of modern thought. This can be explained with one of the 
four typologies of religious encounter as enumerated by Daniel Migliore: First, 
complete or partial replacement of the other religion (Evangelical); second, 
fulfilment of the other religions (Vat. II Roman Catholic Church); third, mutuality 
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of the religions (liberal protestant and liberal Roman Catholic); fourth, acceptance 
of the particularity and incommensurability of religions (liberal). Traditional 
mission models have been identified with the first typology which declares that 
Jesus Christ alone is the Saviour and Lord of all and that salvation is possible only 
through explicit faith in him. Since Jesus Christ is the only saviour of the world, 
―the way, the truth and the life‖ (Jn.14:6), and since the other religions do not 
know or proclaim the grace of God in Jesus Christ, there is neither revelation nor 
salvation in religions other than Christianity.302 For Christians Truth becomes the 
content of mission to be discovered by others. Truth is given and proclaimed, and 
the one they have to live within their existential situation. To speak of truth in this 
sense appears on the face of it to invoke, a claim to some kind of universality or 
publicness, though this view of truth as universal requires claims to truth to be 
submitted to testing through accepted modes of rational public discussion. The key 
question to pose at this juncture is: In what way is Christian truth considered to be 
universal? Is it universal in modernity‘s sense, as being accessible or at least 
defendable and capable of articulation through public-universal forms of 
rationality? Or is it bound so tightly to the community and tradition of faith that it 
is incapable of attaining any external public form? Further, does the universality of 
Christian truth mean that its public form is univocal, constant across all changes in 
time, place and culture, because the Christian community in which this Truth has 
been placed is in some sense also universal; therefore, that which makes it Christian 
endures unchanged, no matter what external changes there might be?  
 
In attempting to respond to this difficulty we shall basically rely on Alistair 
McFadyen, who boldly and clearly holds the view that Christianity is true (indeed, is 
the Truth) and that its truth is in some sense universal.303 He bases his arguments 
on the facts that Christian truth claims depend on certain events having taken place 
in history. However, these might be understood, but by the implications of its 
monotheism, even though its monotheism takes a Trinitarian form, something 
which makes a decisive difference to its conception of truth and publicness. 
Monotheism commits one to the view that the one God is the basic fact about the 
world; that in God‘s singularity and universality the world‘s plurality does achieve a 
unity, though not necessarily a uniformity. Even if that unity is an eschatological 
reality which allows pluralism the last word now, that turns out after all to be only 
the next-to-last word. The eschatological nature of Christian Truth does not mean 
that there is nothing universal; it merely postpones the dawning of the universal. 
Christianity has a more specific reason for conceiving of itself in terms of 
universality, and this on the basis of its most basic content, Jesus Christ. For 
however Jesus‘ relationship to redemption might be understood, any recognisably 
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Christian account of it will be based on the assumption that Jesus effects a 
universalisation of the conditions of redemption; that is, with Jesus redemption is 
no longer restricted by the particularity of membership of the tribe of Israel. A 
specifically Christian comprehension of the universality of its truth and of the 
appropriate form of its publicness is likely to be based on that which makes 
Christianity materially different from all other forms of monotheism – Jesus. He is 
the Truth and the foundation of all truth. 
 
In accordance with the above, perhaps the relevant question would be: How does 
Christian truth come about? Or, why is Christ the Truth for Christians? There are a 
number of assertions in response to this question. Christ is considered the truth 
because he referred everything back to God, perceived things and acted in the 
context of a proper relation to God. Christian truth therefore is not primarily 
propositional, it is relational. It concerns the proper relationship of humanity, 
creation and God, a relationship which is promised as the future fulfilment of the 
whole of reality before God. And Christ, in Orthodox understanding, is this Truth, 
this relationship, in incarnate and anticipatory form. Jesus is the truth, since it is in 
him that God makes a Godself available to and for human beings and in him that 
there is a correspondence of this double-availability for God. As a consequence of 
this double-availability, the future liberation of all things in the kingdom is not 
merely proclaimed but, through this proclamation, becomes anticipatory.  
 
Christianity and the Enlightenment share the proposition that there is a single 
account of truth and a single form of rationality.304 Christendom entailed a 
supposition that Christian faith was (or at least should be) part of a single, univocal 
public world. Christendom was based on the assumption that Christian Truth could 
and should be extended throughout a culture within which it should play a central 
public-institutional role by regulating all public life. It is tempting to define 
Christendom as a monoculture, but such singularity and uniformity were never, in 
fact achieved. The public sphere, even in Christendom, was pluralist, containing a 
variety of interpretations of Christian, counter-Christian and other truths as the 
history of ‗heretical,‘ counter-Christian and politically revolutionary groups 
attests.305 Christendom was the achievement of political power which attempted to 
silence alternative truths, interests and voices in Europe with the more or less 
realised imposition of the single voice, the monolithic truth, and which exported 
this truth abroad through the subjugation of primitive interests, truths and voices. 
Christendom was a project undertaken on the assumption that the Truth was 
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known and was to be coordinated with every public and every sphere of the public 
in a particular way. This means that the content of the Christian story, of its Truth, 
does sit well in alliance between institutionalised Christianity and the imperial 
power which levels the public sphere to a single voice. The cross is a form of 
execution which was reserved for those who did not enjoy the rights and 
responsibilities of Roman citizenship, it might even be considered a tool to silence 
those excluded from normal practical life on the basis of their class, caste or 
nationhood. As such it was a tool for silencing plurality. There are other, more 
formal reasons for resisting the idea that there is a single account of truth and a 
single form of rationality which may be pressed on the public sphere. As far as 
Christian faith is concerned, this idea would mean that there is a single, unequivocal 
account of Christian Truth which is known outside of any particular situation, and 
which is to be imposed upon, or defended within, that situation in a uniform and 
imperialistic way.  
 
The truth that accompanied traditional mission theories and practices had a deep 
foundation in the enlightenment tradition haunted by the Cartesian legacy that 
―there is available a kind of truth which certain in the sense that it cannot be 
disbelieved, objective truth, scientific truth, truth that is achieved by the 
employment of a hermeneutical method.‖306 This form of Cartesian truth advocates 
the priority of doubt over faith in the knowing process. Doubt, not faith, was to be 
the path to knowledge. By relentless scepticism, the famous critical principle, every 
claim to truth was to be put through the critical sieve in which only the indubitable 
would be retained.307 
 
The alternative understanding of truth poses a challenge to the traditional model of 
communication. According to Frans Wijsen, ―the relationship between mission 
(missiology) and communication (communication science) is neither a new nor an 
accidental one.‖308 Wijsen discusses this subject by recalling the work of two well-
known Dutch missiologists who had a great impact on the world-wide discussion 
on this topic within the circles of the World Council of Churches in the 1950s.  
 
According to Hendrik Kraemer mission is ―communication of the Christian faith.‖ 
He distinguished between two closely interrelated aspects: communication of and 
communication between.309 Kraemer develops this subject further by arguing that 
―human beings are created towards communication with God. This is the basis for 
communication between people. But communication between people fails because 
the primordial break of communication with God. This mode of communication, 
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that is, communication of and communication between could perfectly reconcile 
the polarised Rortian terms; objectivity and solidarity310 and hence cater for both 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions of human communication. The 
presupposition is that communion within God‘s self, one-in-three and three-in-one, 
is the icon of the communion of God with humans and the communion of humans 
with one another. That is to say, from God‘s inner unity two directional 
relationships are actualised in the faith community: a vertical koinonia between 
God and humankind and a horizontal koinonia among humans. The former takes 
its bidding from understanding God as transcendental and the other; the latter 
from seeing God as immanent and incarnate.311 This form of communication 
presupposes the existence of God as the source and origin of all human 
communication; this is a truth which confronts man from without, a truth that 
―will make you free‖ (Jn.8:32) if without qualification you submit to it.312 
 
Frans Wijsen discusses the mission model proposed by Johannes Hoekendijk as 
―communicating with a fellow traveller‖ and he argues that Hoekendijk introduced 
a new understanding of mission.313 He adds that, ―To Hoekendijk mission is not in 
the first place winning people for the Church, but demonstrating the Kingdom of 
God‖ and that the aim of evangelisation is not so much the conversion of the 
individual souls but the humanisation of the world.314 This is the same 
understanding of mission as the one of Max Warren and John Taylor whom we 
quoted in the general introduction. This resonates with the New Testament 
description where it gives the impression that mission begins with a kind of 
explosion of joy. The news that the rejected and crucified Jesus is alive is 
something that cannot possibly be suppressed. It must be told. The mission of the 
Church in the pages of the New Testament is more like the fallout from a vast 
explosion, radioactive fallout which is not lethal, but life giving. In the letters of St. 
Paul, it is difficult to find any suggestion that he anywhere lays it on the conscience 
of readers that they ought to be active in mission. For himself, it is inconceivable 
that he should keep silent. ―Woe to me if I do not preach the gospel‖ (1Cor. 9:16). 
Wijsen would argue with this view in the background that, there is a need to do 
away with an understanding of Christ that hinders communication and promote an 
understanding of Christ that makes possible a ‗communication without domination‘ 
because the uniqueness of Christ is relational rather than exclusive, dialectical or 
inclusive.315 Wijsen reiterates that Christ is necessary for salvation and for the 
fullness of salvation, but he fails to mention the incarnation, as an important event 
                                                          
310 Richard Rorty, ―Solidarity or Objectivity?‖ Knowledge and Inquiry Readings in Epistemology, 422-437. 
311 Lorelei Fuchs F., SA, Koinonia and the Quest for an Ecumenical Ecclesiology: From Foundations through Dialogue 
to Symbolic Competence for Communionality (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2008), 
29. 
312 Peter A. Schouls, Descartes and the Enlightenment (Quebec: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 1989), 37. 
313 Wijsen, There is Only One God, 243. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid, 244; See also, Paul Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World 
Religions (Mary Knoll N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985), 171. 
82 
that would give meaning in all this argumentation. The incarnation is an utterly new 
event in which God moves toward human beings in love and enables human love 
of God and neighbour. This movement in the incarnation is the direct movement 
of God mediated only through the incarnate Word himself.316 The Epistles of St. 
Paul317 dissipates the gloom of darkness by the light of Christ‘s Incarnation. He 
teaches the doctrine of universal fellow-membership, and of universal brotherhood, 
consequent on the incarnation of Christ which offset a new global conversation.  
 
This brings us finally to two considerations. The first consideration is that Christian 
mission followed the enlightenment spirit with its dichotomous dimension of truth. 
This was noticeable in mission practices where it is still maintained that religious 
dichotomies still haunt the nature of the church. Adorno and Horkheimer would 
comment that Truth in the enlightenment is rejected as historical and rather 
considered as an unchanging constant to be set against the movement of history.318 
This kind of truth, usually, is applauded as absolute in the sense that it cannot be 
questioned on the basis of external evidence or arguments. It is plain in the sense 
that it requires little if any interpretation. It is unchangeable in the sense that it need 
not be adapted to contemporary circumstances.319 Frans Wijsen is very categorical 
when he explicitly points out that: ―In our European understanding of truth, truth 
is defined by exclusion.‖320 The understanding of truth expressed here could be 
regarded as the basis of Christian exclusivism where the central claims of Christian 
faith are incompatible with those of other religious traditions which are rejected as 
false. One of the major charges brought against exclusivism is that it is dependent 
upon notions of faith and truth which, while perhaps legitimate in other domains, 
are inappropriate in religion. Christian exclusivists, it is claimed, assume that the 
most important aspect of religion is religious belief and that the various religions 
advance beliefs about reality which are mutually incompatible. However, this 
assumption is said to be problematic on at least two counts. First, it unduly 
emphasises the propositional element in religions. And second, it adopts an 
exclusivist view of truth that is out of place in religion.321 Even if there is a sense in 
ordinary life or science in which truth can be regarded as propositional and 
exclusive, to think of religious truth in these terms is to indicate that one really does 
not understand what religious faith and truth are all about. For religious truth is not 
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like ordinary truth, it is unique and thus not necessarily subject to the limitations 
inherent in ordinary truth; because the notion of propositional truth and exclusive 
truth is misleading and inappropriate when applied to religion.  
 
This could be better understood if a proper response to these criticisms will involve 
defending the legitimacy of the concepts of propositional and exclusive truth in 
religion. It would be fitting to first take a consideration of what is meant by a 
propositional truth. Most philosophers make a fundamental distinction between 
sentences and statements or propositions. The distinction is essentially between 
―what is said (or written)‖ and ―what is used to say what is said.‖ What is said is 
said through a sentence or by means of a sentence, but it is not identical with the 
sentence. Sentences are always in a given language such as English, German, Dutch 
or Swahili...whereas what is expressed by the sentence is not. Significantly, the same 
statement can be expressed in many different sentences in the same language. For 
this and other reasons philosophers make a distinction between sentences and 
statements or propositions. Here we can regard ―statements‖ and ―propositions‖ as 
virtually synonymous. Roughly, a proposition is the meaning expressed by a 
declarative sentence or as ―what is conveyed‖ by a sentence which makes an 
implicit or explicit assertion. It should be emphasised that propositions cannot be 
identified with mental acts such as believing, judging, asserting and many others. 
Strictly speaking, propositions are not in the mind, although the mind does 
apprehend them. To assert that truth is propositional, then, is to recognise that 
although ―true‖ and ―false‖ can be used in a variety of ways, in the logically basic 
sense truth is a quality or property of propositions. That truth is a property of 
propositions such that a proposition is true if and only if the state of affairs to 
which it refers is as the proposition asserts it to be, otherwise it is false. All 
propositions are either true or false and, strictly speaking, only propositions are 
either true or false. Propositions can thus be thought of as the minimal vehicle of 
truth. Although this understanding of truth is widely accepted in contemporary 
philosophy there are many religious circles that reject it as inadequate and even 
misleading in religion. 
 
Hence, religious truth is not propositional but personal. Human behaviour, in word 
or deed, is the nexus between man‘s inner life and the surrounding world. Truth at 
the personalistic level is that quality by which both halves of that relationship are 
chaste and appropriate, are true; what is intended is that the locus of truth is not 
propositions, statements, or beliefs, but rather is in persons. Religious truth does 
not reflect correspondence with reality so much as it signifies integrity, sincerity, 
faithfulness, authenticity of life, and existentially appropriating certain beliefs in 
one‘s life and conduct. The religious traditions can be seen as more or less in the 
sense of enabling those who look at life and the universe through their patterns to 
perceive smaller or larger, less important or more important areas of reality, to 
formulate and to ponder less or more significant issues to act less or more truly, 
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less or more truly to be.322 Truth is not a static property of propositions or 
doctrines but rather a dynamic product of human involvement with what is said to 
be true. Personal truth is not something detached from actual life, it demands 
existential appropriation. No statement might be accepted as true that has not been 
inwardly appropriated by its author. Here Ludwig Wittgenstein is referred to as 
having had an enormous influence upon recent analytic philosophy. It is argued 
that although he was primarily interested in problems in the philosophy of mind, 
language, and mathematics, his views had had significant impact upon discussions 
of religious language. He emphasised the importance of understanding the relevant 
―form of life‖ and ―language game‖ in which particular kind of discourse occurs if 
we are to understand the discourse in question. There are many kinds of discourse, 
and one must be sensitive to the context and circumstance in which each kind of 
discourse occurs if one is to understand what is said.323 The situation in the 17th and 
18th centuries could well articulate this, for while ordinary church goers continued 
to live in the world of the bible, intellectuals and theologians were more and more 
controlled by the humanist tradition. The consequences were that even those who 
sought to defend Christian faith did so, on the basis that it was reasonable, that is 
to say, it did not contradict the fundamental humanist assumptions.324 
 
The second consideration is that truth is the outcome of open-ended and non-
dominating communication, that is, conversation. According to Rorty, truth is not 
something objective lying out there waiting to be discovered, but an outcome of an 
open non imposing way of communication to reach a consensus.325 This Rortian 
distinction corresponds to religious truths as different from propositional truth 
because religious truth, it is supposed, is not propositional truth about God but 
consists rather in the existential encounter with God himself.326 The great Swiss 
theologian Emil Brunner in his influential work, ―Truth as Encounter,‖ drew a 
sharp contrast between scientific or philosophical truth and truth in the Christian 
faith. Whereas the former kinds of truth are concerned with propositions, truth in 
the Biblical sense should be understood as ―personal encounter.‖ He states that 
―Truth as encounter is not truth about something, not even truth about something 
mental, about ideas. Rather, it is that truth which breaks in pieces the impersonal 
concept of truth and mind, truth that can be expressed only in the ―I – Thou‖ 
form. All use of impersonal terms to describe it, the divine, the transcendent, the 
absolute, is indeed the inadequate way invented by the thinking of the solitary self 
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to speak of it, or more correctly, of Him.‖327 Truth as encounter is thus something 
utterly unique to religion and is not to be found in science or philosophy. Brunner 
continued to claim that the ―truth‖ in God‘s revelation is the truth which may be 
described as the encounter of the human ―I‖ with God‘s ―Thou‖ in Jesus Christ. 
Many theologians accept this contention that religious truth is not to be construed 
in terms of propositional truth but rather in terms of the dynamic relation of 
personal encounter between the human and the divine. 
 
Conversation as discourse 
 
So far, we have followed the philosophical development of Rorty‘s concept of 
conversation and it‘s affinity to mission theory especially in the understanding and 
interpretation of the concept of truth. In this section we link Rorty‘s concept of 
conversation with the concept of discourse as it is developed by Michel Foucault 
and critical discourse analysts.328 Both concepts, conversation and discourse, are 
concerned with language and truth, more particularly with the rejection of objective 
truth and with inter-subjective truth as constituted through discourse. According to 
Foucault, people do not have access to absolute truth as they cannot speak from a 
position outside discourse. Thus, truth is not something that exists outside 
conversation or discourse. 
 
There is a close affinity between Rortian conversation (not to be confused with the 
notion of conversation as is used in conversation analysis) and Foucauldian 
discourse in the sense that both philosophers lost their faith in universal or 
absolute truth. But we saw in Chapter One that Rorty‘s discourse is understood in 
binary forms, that is, normal and abnormal discourse. Rorty asserts that normal 
discourse allows us to apply foundational reasoning when it is useful to do so. In a 
sense, it is the starting point for intellectual activity, for abnormal discourse is 
possible and meaningful only when it occurs with a consciousness of how it departs 
from a well understood norm. Abnormal discourse always presents itself as an 
alternative, for instance, to tradition, to a dominant view. As a consequence, it ―is 
always parasitic upon normal discourse‖329 However, both Rorty and Foucault 
assume that truth is constituted inter-subjectively through language use. Foucault‘s 
‗The Archeology of Knowledge‟ has become the main inspiration for most discourse 
analysts although many do not follow him uncritically. Foucault provides more a 
theory than a method for doing discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysts go 
with Foucault beyond Foucault in the sense that the influence of language use on 
social reality is not deterministic but dialectic.330 
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From a Foucauldian inspiration there have been a number of analyses of mission 
practices in the past by Mudimbe,331 Stenger,332 Nehring,333 Asad,334 Chidester.335 
Using a methodology developed from the ideas of Michel Foucault, Mudimbe 
proceeds to examine ―discourses‖ about Africa by Europeans and Africans with a 
focus on evaluation of African traditional thought. He examines the intellectual 
―invention‖ of a primitive African and its relationship to the changing paradigms of 
modern European social sciences. Following Foucault he attempts to construct as 
―Archaeology‖ of thought about Africa with special focus on the discipline of 
anthropology. Archaeology enables the researcher to treat every human discourse 
as a ―moment‖ and thus discover meanings not consciously intended by the 
authors of the discourses. This frame work enables Foucault to trace the change in 
the western discourses on ―non-western‖ societies from those projecting the 
―achievements of the civilized world against the primitiveness of non-literate 
societies, to those which allow for the possibility of decolonialization of the social 
sciences.‖336 This is the context in which Mudimbe examines the development of 
European evaluation of African traditional thought from the missionaries through 
the several generations of anthropologists. From that base Mudimbe addresses the 
African responses with special emphasis on the ―Négritude‖ and post-Négritude 
generations. Stenger, who analyzes the missionary discourse of the White Fathers in 
Central Africa, uses a form of discourse analysis that is inspired by Foucault.337 
 
In the present study critical discourse analysis as is developed by Norman 
Fairclough is applied to historical documents of the missionaries in order to acquire 
insight into the mode of transmission of truth the missionaries used in their work 
during primary evangelization, using conversation as a sensitising concept that 
guides our analysis. Whereas in the old-style grounded theory approach the 
meaning of the guiding concepts must be left open as much as possible at the start 
of the research project, since the aim of the project is to make the meaning more 
concrete in the course of the research, in the newer forms of the grounded theory 
approach the sensitising concepts are more theoretically informed. In stressing the 
importance of key terms and phrases, Norman Farclough‘s first stage of analysis 
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called ‗description‘ comes close to the grounded theory approach and interpretivist 
tradition.338 
 
By applying the method of Critical Discourse Analysis as will be implemented here, 
we shall follow the description of Norman Fairclough who asserts that, ―it 
systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination 
between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural 
structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and 
texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggle of 
power.‖339 Given that many authors have written abundantly on the chronological 
history and skilfully narrated how events happened in the Ugandan mission history 
with such depth and precision,340 the major pre-occupation here will be reading 
particular concrete texts of missionaries like mission Chronicles, diaries, historical 
accounts and missionary reports of the missionary orders. The texts under 
consideration will be analysed combining the three analytic perspectives and three 
analytic methods. The main contention is that by applying Critical Discourse 
Analysis the dominant mission theory will be easily acknowledged and the 
dichotomy between mission theory and practice would be made evident. 
 
Critical discourse analysis 
 
Critical discourse analysis is a contemporary approach to the study of language use 
and discourses in social institutions. It builds from three broad theoretical 
orientations. First, it draws from poststructuralists discourse theory and critical 
linguistics which focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge and power 
are constructed through written and spoken texts in human and social settings. 
According to Foucault and Derrida, language and discourse are not transparent or 
neutral means for describing or analysing the social and biological world. Rather 
they effectively construct, regulate and control knowledge, social relations and 
institutions, and indeed, such analytic and exegetic practices as scholarship and 
research. Second, it draws from Bourdieu‘s sociology the assumption that actual 
textual practices and interactions with texts become embodied forms of cultural 
capital with exchange value in particular social fields. Third, it draws from Neo-
Marxist cultural theory the assumption that these discourses are produced and used 
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within political economies, and that they thus produce the articulate broader 
ideological interests, social formations and movements within those fields.341 The 
practical techniques of critical discourse analysis are derived from various 
disciplinary fields. Work in pragmatics, narratology and speech act theory argues 
that texts are forms of social action that occur in complex social contexts. Research 
and theory in systemic functional linguistics shows how linguistic forms can be 
systematically related to social and ideological functions. Critical discourse analysis 
uses analytic tools from these fields to address persistent questions about larger, 
systemic relations of class, gender and culture. In this research, this work has been 
turned to the examination of how identity and class are constructed across a range 
of texts in the Ugandan mission fields. 
 
A fundamental principle of CDA is the idea that discourse situates participants 
according to roles determined by relations of power.342 It is argued that discourse 
and language in everyday life may function ideologically. They may be used to make 
asymmetrical relations of power and particular textual portrayals of social and 
biological worlds appear given, commonsensical and natural. Accordingly the task 
of critical discourse analysis is both deconstructive and constructive.343 In its 
deconstructive moment it aims to disrupt and render problematic the themes and 
power relations of everyday talk and writing. In its constructive moment, it has 
been applied to the development of critical literary curriculum that aims towards an 
expansion of students‘ capacities to critique and analyse discourse and social 
relations, and towards a more equitable distribution of discourse resources.344 The 
principal unit of analysis for critical discourse analysis is the text. Texts are taken to 
be social actions, meaningful and coherent instances of spoken and written 
language use. Yet their shape and form is not random or arbitrary. There are 
specific text types or genres that serve conventional social uses and functions. That 
implies that particular kinds of texts attempt to do things in social institutions with 
predictable ideational and material effects. These include functional written texts, 
for instance business letters, forms, policies, textbooks, spoken face-to-face 
interactions, for instances clinical exchanges, service exchanges classroom lectures, 
and multimodal visual, electronic and gestural texts, for instance, internet home 
pages. Taken as historically and culturally specific social actions, genres are dynamic 
and continually subject to innovation and re-invention. They remain affiliated 
nonetheless with particular conventionalised discourses. For example business 
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letters are likely to feature discourses of finance and business; tabloid news reports 
would be sites for discourses of romance and sexuality. As conventional forms, 
then, genres and sub-genres thus both constrain and enable meanings and social 
relations between speakers and listeners, writers and readers. 
 
In applying the term discourse, I am proposing to regard language use as a form of 
social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational 
variables. This has various implications. Principally, it implies that discourse is a 
mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world and especially 
and especially upon each other; as well as a mode of representation. This is a mode 
of language use which has been made familiar, though often in individualistic 
terms, by linguistic philosophy and linguistic pragmatics. In Discourse analysis, all 
genres can be analysed in terms of their sequenced structures of propositions, their 
textual macrostructures. The structures of spoken and written narratives have 
identifiable segments, movements or chunks. The study of narrative structures has 
been used to study the representation of gender relations, cultures and cultural 
groups, wars and other major historical events, and civic and political structures in 
textbooks. However, the major concern against critical discourse analysis and its 
post-structural roots is that ―...it seems to represent just one more manifestation of 
logo-centrism, one more attempt to totalise, to close the unity of an absolute 
truth.‖345 And this may raise some objections as to its capacity in reading mission 
history and practice in Uganda.  
 
It may be argued disparagingly that Critical Discourse Analysis could not apply in 
the reading of mission history. And that it is not of any worth in interpreting the 
prevailing mission theories and practice in the Church in Uganda. And of course 
there are many concerns raised against the state of Critical Discourse Analysis 
which may lead many to fail to appreciate its efficacy: What are we to make of a 
field that ties itself in word and deed, theory and method, to a normative, explicitly 
political inquiry into social, economic and cultural power? How do we appraise 
research that sets out to disrupt and interrupt ideological common sense, everyday 
language use, and the codification of discourse power by dominant groups of 
interests?346 But if these apparent aberrations against CDA are considered, then to 
do so would be to ignore a distinguished if incomplete history of attempts at a 
normative political linguistics from the Voloshnov/ Bakhtin circle to the more 
recent work of Michel Pecheux, Jacob Mey, and others. It would also fail to engage 
with the late-twentieth century acknowledgement among social scientists of the 
constitutive force of language and discourse in social formation and discipline, 
economic exploitation and power. It may not be surprising to affirm that CDA 
stands in this sustainable counter-tradition in linguistics and overtly sceptical of the 
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claims of those post-war interactional and sociolinguistic approaches to the social 
that are premised on liberal and neoliberal theories of the individual and society.347 
The foremost consideration is that Critical Discourse Analysis is more akin to a 
repertoire of political, epistemic stances, that is, principled reading positions and 
practices for the critical analysis of the place and force of language, discourse, text, 
and image in changing contemporary social, economic, and cultural conditions.348 A 
more constructive approach might be to treat it as a discourse itself, contingent 
upon particular historical conditions, agents and possibilities. It is a field of force, 
power, and relations in formation. 
 
The task set for the next two chapters is to read the original texts of missionaries 
and Critical Discourse Analysis appears as a viable instrument in this undertaking 
because it: (a) views a prevailing social order as historically situated and therefore 
relative, socially constructed and changeable; (b) views a prevailing social order and 
social processes as constituted and sustained less by the will of individuals than by 
the pervasiveness of particular constructions or versions of reality, often referred to 
as discourses; (c) views discourse as coloured by and productive of ideology; (d) 
views power in society not so much as imposed on individual subjects as an 
inevitable effect of a way particular discursive configurations or arrangements 
privilege the status and positions of some people over others; (e) views human 
subjectivity as at least in part constructed or inscribed by discourse, and discourse 
as manifested in the various ways people are and enact the sorts of people they are; 
(f) views reality as textually and intertextually mediated via verbal and non-verbal 
language systems, and texts as sites for both the inculcation and the contestation of 
discourses; (g) views the systematic analysis and interpretation of texts as 
potentially revelatory of ways in which discourse consolidate power and colonise 
human subjects through often covert position calls.349 Yet again it is argued that 
CDA sees discourse or language use in speech and writing, as a form of social 
practice. And to describe discourse as social practice implies a dialectical 
relationship between a particular discursive event and the situations, institutions 
and social structures which frame it; the discursive event is shaped by them, but it 
also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially 
conditioned; it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities 
of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in 
the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the 
sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially 
consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may 
have major ideological effects, that is, they can help produce and reproduce 
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unequal power relations between, for instance, social classes, women and men, and 
ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent 
things and position people.350 
 
It is important to take the consideration of Teun van Dijk who assumes that ―one 
crucial presupposition of adequate critical discourse analysis is to understand the 
nature of social power and dominance.351 He argues that once we have such an 
insight, we may begin to formulate ideas about how discourse contributes to their 
production. Social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, 
such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or 
knowledge. All special access to various genres, forms or contexts of discourse and 
communication is also an important power resource. Power involves control, 
namely by members of one group over those of other groups. Such control may 
pertain to action and cognition. This implies that the powerful group may limit the 
freedom of action of others, but influence their minds. Besides the elementary 
recourse to force to directly control action, modern and often more effective power 
is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, 
among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one‘s own interest. 
CDA looks at managing the minds of others are essentially a function of text and 
talk and is interested in power abuse.  
 
It is argued that beyond the level of the individual identity lies that of the group, 
which can be defined in terms of social cognition. This is formed and developed in 
ways cognate with the construction of individual subjectivity. Van Dijk portrays 
this process as mind management at a social level in his definition of social 
cognition: Socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and 
relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, 
inferencing and learning, among others, together define what we understand by 
social cognition…Although embodied in the minds of individuals, social cognitions 
are social because they are shared and presupposed by group members, monitor 
social actions and interaction, and because they underlie the social and cultural 
organization of society as a whole…352 Underlyingly, as van Dijk points out, the 
maintenance of social cognition is usually associated with the exercise of power. 
People singly or in groups, who have privileged access to a situation where they can 
influence others‘ thinking may well be able to initiate and maintain opinions which 
reflect their models of how things are or should be. The term hegemony is used to 
qualify such a situation where, as a consequence of conditioning, mind-sets are so 
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altered that they are changed to a state where they freely support the point of view 
of the dominant.353 
 
The concept of hegemony, and its associated concepts of consensus, acceptance 
and the management of the mind, also suggests that a critical analysis of discourse 
and dominance is far from straightforward, and does not always imply a clear 
picture of villains and victims. It is suggested that many forms of dominance 
appear to be jointly produced through intricate forms of social interaction, 
communication and discourse. Power and dominance are usually organised and 
institutionalised. The social dominance of groups is thus not merely enacted, 
individually, but by its group members.  
 
These texts will be approached from two related standpoints, which are reading 
and analysing. As pertaining to reading the texts, the main motivation is drawn 
from Shapiro who evokes this idea that any text can be read as a tissue of codes. 
This implies that in keeping with the textual practices derived from the above idea, 
the meanings a reader derives from a text are provoked in part by the recognisable 
codes, or terms or expressions invoking specific interpretative practices which the 
text contains. The signifying effects of these codes operate to the extent that the 
readers of a text operate within the same signifying practices as the writer. The idea 
of the code therefore implies that a text is not locked in a set of stable referents to 
which it refers and from which it derives its meaning, but is rather unstable, taking 
meanings from the interaction of the writing practices it represents with the reading 
practices it encounters.354 
 
As regards, analysing these texts, the basic assumption is that language is at the 
heart of critical discourse analysis. The emphasis placed on language in discourse 
analysis calls for the premise that no language is totally devoid of meaning. That 
language use calls for intelligibility and language use is distinct from other kinds of 
noise making. This is better illustrated by Clegg who assumes that ...―Language is 
the central focus of all post-structuralism. In the broadest terms, language defines 
the possibilities of meaningful existence at the same time as it limits them. Through 
language, our sense of ourselves as distinct subjectivities is constituted. Subjectivity 
is constituted through a myriad of what post-structuralists term ‗discursive 
practices,‘ that is, practices of talk, text, writing, cognition, argumentation, and 
representation generally.‖355 This understanding was ushered in by the 
developments that came with the linguistic turn in the twentieth century thought, 
which changed language from being thought of as a medium for expressing 
meanings that pre-exist linguistic formulation to a system that constitutes 
meaningfulness in its own terms.356 This development is in lieu with the two major 
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theoretical insights which Norman Fairclough adopts from Foucault about 
discourse analysis and incorporates them in the textually oriented discourse 
analysis. The first is a constitutive view of discourse, which involves seeing 
discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various dimensions; 
that is discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms of 
self, social relationships, and the conceptual frameworks. In analysing this text, 
there is a recurring feature that corresponds to the second insight where there is an 
emphasis on the interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or 
institutions; texts always draw upon and transform other contemporary and 
historically prior texts – intertextuality – and any given type of discourse practice is 
generated out of combinations of others, and is defined by its relationship to 
others.357 
 
Critical Discourse Analysts use various methods of analysis. These methods are 
given different names. We shall follow the method and scheme that Frans Wijsen, 
following Fairclough, applies in his approach to discourse analysis in religious 
studies.358 Wijsen as is Fairclough starts from the following assumptions. First, 
discourse is a practice just as any other practice. Secondly, there is a dialectic 
relation between discourse (discursive) and reality (the non-discursive). Thirdly, the 
relation between discourse and reality is mediated through discursive practice. As 
Wijsen, we too, shall first explain three analytic perspectives, thereafter explain 
three analytic methods, and last but not least design a model for analysis.359 
 
Perspectives of analysis 
 
With other qualitative approaches, for instance, content analysis or conversation 
analysis, discourse analysts are interested in participants‘ perspectives. But unlike 
these other qualitative approaches, critical discourse analysts are not interested in 
participants‘ perspectives as such. They are interested in how participants‘ 
perspectives are related to the social positions of the participants and more 
particularly, to their interests to reproduce or to transform the societal order.360 
Although Wijsen uses the term ‗participant‘ in discourse analysis in religious 
studies, Fairclough does not approve of that term. He prefers the term subject to 
participant because it has the double sense of agent, like the ‗subjects of history,‘ 
and affected, as in ‗Queen‘s subjects‘; this captures the concept of the subject as 
qualified to act through being constrained – subjected – to an institutional frame.361 
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Wijsen goes on to discuss what Critical Discourse Analysts distinguish as different 
dimensions of one and the same practice and how they look at them from different 
perspectives: the individual dimension or micro perspective, the institutional 
dimension or mesoperspective, and the societal dimension or macro perspective. 
Examples given include the interactions between teachers and pupils, doctors and 
patients, or parent and children and these are not only related to views of what 
specific institutions such as school, hospital, and family are, but also to processes of 
in the wider society such as democratisation or commercialisation. These examples 
show that the ideational and interpersonal, or social identity and social relations, 
dimensions go together. The same applies to interactions between husband and 
wife, employer and employees, shop attendants and customers, politicians and 
electorate, civil servants and citizens. It should be noted that whereas radical post-
structuralists tend to assume that discourse positions the speakers, and the 
discursive psychologists tend to assume that speakers position themselves through 
discourse, Fairclough and other critical discourse analysts assume that it is both. 
Speakers position themselves but they are also positioned by the discourse. It is 
assumed that the relation between the discursive and non-discursive is a dialectical 
one. This is an important analytic insight that will keep appear in the discussion and 
conclusion. If the above is placed in the perspective of the textually oriented 
discourse analysis we could distinguish the dimensions of the author as an 
individual with a historical social location and his identification with the social 
institution, and the societal context in which he is located. 
 
Discourse analysis as a method of analysis for mission practice in Uganda 
 
Right from the beginning, we have to establish the similarities and differences in 
the use of critical discourse analysis in mission studies. Like Friz Stenger, we make 
use of critical discourse analysis in reading and analysing mission practice in 
Uganda. However, unlike him, although he claims that he uses discourse analysis, 
he does not use discourse analysis in a methodical and technical way as we do in 
this work. In the traditional understanding of mission, mission is concerned with 
senders and receivers. In analysing Mission practice in Uganda with the tools of 
Discourse Analysis in the background of the concept conversation, the major 
consideration would be the understanding of mission as concerned with senders 
and receivers. These social identities are derived from the Christian conception of 
the nature of God as the author of mission. The classical doctrine of the Missio Dei 
as God the Father sending the Son, and God the Father and the Son sending the 
Holy Spirit is expanded to include yet another movement: Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit sending the Church into the world. In this sense mission is not primarily an 
activity of the Church, but an attribute of a sending God. Mission is thereby seen as 
a movement from God to the world.362 This understanding would lead us to the 
fact that mission is constituted of senders and receivers as its major social identities. 
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Also these two social identities constitute the fundamental relationship that exists 
in mission and the analysis will go in establishing the language and vocabulary that 
is used in their communication. In our analysis, we shall read and analyse the texts 
and how the same texts speak about these social identities as well as the language 
that describes them. The major thrust will be to discover the social identities, for 
instance clergy – laity, the social relations such as egalitarian, hierarchical, 
monological or dialogical. Using communication science referred to above, the 
alternative understanding of mission is not about senders and receivers but 
participants in a communication process, and the message is not fixed but fluid. 
 
Identity, that is, how we perceive and make sense of each other, is fundamental to 
all social interaction and to the construction of society and culture. People seek to 
know about others‘ beliefs, affiliations, and the intentions in order to interpret their 
words and actions and to predict their future behaviour. These qualities are not 
directly observable; instead, others see external manifestations, or signals, of one‘s 
internal state. With identity, the process does not build up impressions of another 
trait by trait. Instead there is an interpretation of a number of pre-existing 
prototypes and the observations made of people lead others to categorise them as 
being like one or another of these prototypes. Thus, from a limited set of inter-
actions and observations we can create a richly detailed impression of another. 
Understanding how these prototypes are created and modified, how they are shared 
across a culture, and how we use them to categorise people is an essential part of 
understanding identity. In talking about social identity, ―...is codified as the part of 
the self which refers to cognitions ensuing from social ecological positions.‖363 
Others consider social identity as ―our way of thinking about ourselves and others 
based on social groupings.‖364 However, the feeling of belonging to a group and the 
phenomena of identification are only possible in connection with groups or 
categories one does not belong to. Thus social identity refers to the fact that the 
individual perceives himself/herself as similar to others of the same background 
(the we) but social identity also refers to a difference, to a specificity of that we in 
connection with members of other groups or categories (the them).365 
 
Critical Discourse Analysts use various methods of analysis. These methods are 
given different names. Like Fairclough, Wijsen also speaks about the analysis of 
linguistic practice, the analysis of discursive practice, and the analysis of social 
practice. Alternative names are the analysis of text, of interaction, and of context; 
or simply description, interpretation, and explanation.366 
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In analysing the missionary texts, the focus will be on sample texts picked from the 
number of texts as described. And the first method for consideration is analysis of 
the linguistic practice, or the formal features of a text. Language analysis is a 
complex and sometimes quite technical sphere in its own right which incorporates 
many types and techniques of analysis and is presumed to be the opening to the 
obscure details of society. This explains why language is a form of social practice 
with three consequential implications: first, that language is a part of society, and 
not somehow external to it. Second, that language is a social process and third, that 
language is a socially conditioned process, conditioned that is, by other non-
linguistic parts of society.367 For this stage, Fairclough suggests various analytic 
tools. Here the focus is laid principally on vocabulary, where vocabulary deals 
mainly with individual words, without getting into the details of grammar that deals 
with words combined into clauses and sentences, cohesion deals with how clauses 
and sentences are linked together, and text structure deals with large scale 
organisational properties of texts.368 Words are not neutral. There is always a 
political and an ideological significance behind their use.369 As it has been argued in 
this text, according to critical discourse analysts, discourse is a practice as any other 
practice. In the perspective of the pragmatic turn, language use is not only a way of 
saying things (informative); it is a way of doing things (performative), or exercising 
power as Pierre Bourdieu puts it that ―Language is not only an instrument of 
communication or even of knowledge, but also an instrument of power. One seeks 
not only to be understood but also to be believed, obeyed, respected, and 
distinguished.‖370 The only difference discourse has from other practices is its 
linguistic form.  
 
In the analysis, for instance, the main analytic questions are: How does the author 
speak about mission? What words does he use? And how does he describe the 
people in the missions? These questions presuppose that a ―text can be seen as a 
product and as a process. Texts as a product can be stored, retrieved, bought and 
sold, cited and summarised and so forth. Texts as processes can be grasped 
through regarding what might be called texturing, the making of texts, as specific 
modality of social action, of social production or making of meanings, under-
standings, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, social relations, social and personal 
entities.371 
 
The second method for consideration is the analysis of the discursive practice. This 
involves three processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the 
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nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to 
social factors.372 In the course of text production, Fairclough makes a distinction 
between, the animator, the person who actually makes the sounds, or the marks on 
paper, the ‗author‘, the one who puts the words together and is responsible for the 
wording, and the ‗principal‘, the one whose position is represented by the words.373 
As for text consumption, it is understood that ―texts are consumed differently in 
different social contexts.‖374 This is partly attributed to the sort of interpretative 
work which is applied to them, and partly of the modes of interpretation which are 
available. Furthermore as for the consumption of texts like their production, it may 
be either individual or collective. In the same understanding, Irma Taavitsainen 
apply the term ‗appropriation‘ as used by Roger Chartier to describe the process by 
which meaning in a text is produced, the ways in which discourses affect the reader 
and lead to a new form of comprehension of oneself and the world.375 It is 
contended that ―texts have plural and even contrasted uses, and audiences 
understand them in diverse ways.‖376 And lastly on this point is text distribution, 
whereby some texts have a simple distribution whereas others have complex 
distribution. The main raison d'être behind this is that in discourse analysis there is 
an assumption that there is a dialectic relationship between language use and social 
structures, where we assume that what participants say is shaped by and shapes 
social structures, either by reproducing them or transforming them.377 In other 
words, critical discourse analysts are interested in the socio-cognitive effects of 
language use that is the ideational and interpersonal effects.  
 
The third method of analysis for our consideration is social practice, that is, the 
ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a feature. For 
Fairclough, hegemony concerns power that is achieved through constructing 
alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent, so that ―the 
articulation and re-articulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake 
in hegemonic struggle.‖378 It is from this third dimension that Fairclough constructs 
his approach to change. Hegemonies change, and this can be witnessed in 
discursive change, when the latter is viewed from the angle of intertextuality. The 
way in which discourse is being represented, respoken, or rewritten sheds light on 
the emergence of new orders of discourse, struggles over normativity, attempts at 
control, and resistance against regimes of power. 
 
Fairclough is explicit with regard to his ambitions. The model of discourse he 
develops is framed in a theory of ideological processes in society, for discourse is 
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seen in terms of processes of hegemony and changes in hegemony. Fairclough 
successfully identifies large-scale hegemonic processes such as democratization, 
commodification, and technologization on the basis of heteroglossic constructions 
of text genres and styles. He also identifies the multiple ways in which individuals 
move through such institutionalized discursive regimes, constructing themselves, 
social categories, and social realities. At the same time, the general direction is one 
in which social theory is used to provide a linguistic metadiscourse and in which 
the target is a refined and more powerful technique of text analysis.379 According to 
critical discourse analysts, linguistic practice and socio-practice are mediated 
through discursive practice. The discursive practice is crucial as the dialectic 
relation between linguistic practice – text – and social practice – context – based on 
it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have made Rorty‘s concept of conversation more operational for 
studying mission. We have also established a link between Rorty‘s notion of 
conversation and the Christian notion of mission showing that truth is central in 
both concepts. There are divergent interpretations of truth but it remains a concern 
that pre-occupies Christian mission and it was at the centre of Rorty‘s quest. The 
questions about truth are perennial questions and they keep popping up in every 
age seeking sufficient answers. We have also noted that language was a major 
concern for Rorty especially in his emphasis on redescription, vocabulary and 
metaphors and we could notice the position of language in mission practice 
because of proclamation as its principal activity. When we talk of language, we refer 
to a carrier of meaning and a site of ideology. This brings us to the application of 
critical discourse analysis in the reading and analysis of mission and pastoral texts 
to decipher how the concept of truth has been talked about in the past and the 
present mission practice.  
 
We have developed critical discourse analysis as a tool and method for reading and 
analysing mission history in Uganda to help us find out the method of mission 
practice in the past and pastoral practice in the present. This is intended to make 
conversation as a sensitising concept more concrete and to come up with a theory 
of mission as conversation. Since Critical Discourse Analysis is concerned with 
opaque relations of discourse in a text, we want to find out how missionaries 
constituted themselves and how they constituted the identity of the people in 
Uganda. Discourse analysis will also enable us to discover the discourses that shape 
mission and pastoral practice in Uganda and the methods employed in these 
endeavours. It is also intended to generate data for developing conversation as the 
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new mission paradigm in the church in Uganda in this age characterised by 
multiculturalism, globalisation and migration. 
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  Chapter Three: 
  Mission Concepts in the past: A Discourse Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
Uganda is one of the African countries with a high percentage of Christians. While 
describing Uganda‘s religious landscape, Philip Jenkins, states that ―In religious 
terms, Uganda represents one of the triumphs of the missionary movement, in a 
country where Christianity was newly planted in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Today, about 40 percent of the population is Protestant, 35 percent Catholic, and 
10 percent Muslim, while the remainder follow traditional African religions.‖380 On 
the Catholic side, this could be explained by strategies of the three Catholic 
missionary institutes which were involved in most of the pioneer work of the 
evangelization of Uganda: The Missionaries of Africa (or White Fathers), Mill Hill 
Missionaries and the Comboni Missionaries (or Verona Fathers). It is claimed that 
they all had a common advantage of suitability for the work they had to do in 
Uganda since they had been founded purposely for that kind of work. Relying on 
historical sources, Frederick Tusingire assumes that both Cardinal Lavigerie the 
founder of the White Fathers and Daniel Comboni the founder of the Comboni 
Missionaries are among the best missionary strategists of the 19th century.381 For 
our purpose here, we could schematise the missionary period in two phases: The 
early missionary period: this marks the arrival of missionaries from Europe in 1879 
to the end of Vatican II in 1965; and the contemporary missionary period which 
marks the re-organisation of dioceses in Uganda in 1966 to-date. This schema is 
proposed for methodical purposes only in this research to corroborate the data in 
the writings of the missionaries in each phase and the shifts in discourse and their 
correlation to the shifts in the social context to align it with the mission paradigms 
under study. As it has been indicated above, we shall apply the method of critical 
discourse analysis in this task of reading, describing and analysing texts from 
Uganda‘s mission history. 
 
1. Description of Missionary Documents 
 
In order to achieve our objective in this section, we shall make a summary of some 
selected documents from the missionary period.382 The choice of these texts is 
based on the view that language use differs in the description of social identities 
and social relations and contexts according to the shifting periods of encounter and 
the perception of the author. There are four documents for our consideration here 
drawn from the writings of and about the White Fathers and the writings of the 
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Mill Hill Missionaries, the two missionary societies that had the earliest contact 
with the people of Uganda in the late 19th century. The writings for our 
consideration in this chapter are the following: (1) A Short History of the Vicariate of 
the Upper Nile, Uganda, by Rt. Rev. J. Biermans, MHM, (2) Planting the Faith in 
Darkest Africa: The life story of Father Simeon Lourdel, by Sr. Frances Alice Monica 
Forbes, RSCJ, (3) Leaves from a White Father‟s Diary, by Fr. A. E. Howell, WF and (4) 
Les Chroniques Trimestrielles (1879-1909) of the Apostolic Vicariate of Northern 
Nyanza. 
 
A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda383 
This text was written by, Right Rev. Bishop John Biermans, Bishop of Gargara and 
Vicar Apostolic of the Upper Nile, Nsambya, Kampala, Uganda, in 1920. It is 39 
pages long and divided into eleven Chapters. It was written to coincide with the 25 
years of the Mill Hill Missionary work in Uganda. Bishop Biermans states the 
purpose as ―...to give an account of the establishment of the Mill Hill Mission in 
Uganda and the origin of the Upper Nile Vicariate and to mark the progress that 
has been made during the first twenty five years.‖ He discusses in detail the events 
that characterised the journey from Mombasa to Uganda like walking in the 
wilderness of Africa, managing the porters and negotiating their way through the 
various territories in which they passed and other challenges like fatigue, wild 
animals, hostile peoples, sickness and wounds or swollen feet as a result of walking 
long distances. He claims that since he was not part of that caravan, he expresses 
inadequacy in giving the full account of the details of the journey and hence he 
refers to the letters and personal accounts of the pioneer missionaries who were in 
that caravan and how they narrate that journey in their own style.384 
 
It is generally a story of progress and missionary triumph. In the text he observes 
that: ―The Vicariate had now been in existence seventeen years, during which time 
it had made such wonderful progress in Uganda and Usoga that the priests could 
no longer cope with the work – they were too few in number. The numbers of 
Christians had swelled to such an extent, that the Churches were packed and 
crowds had to assist at mass outside. ....And each station had the same story: huge 
numbers, crowded churches, no accommodation or food for those who came from 
far. Even at the present, with more churches and priests, so great are the numbers 
of Christians who wish to receive the Sacraments at Christmas and Easter, that for 
three whole days before these two feasts, the Fathers in the Mission do no other 
work but hearing confessions from early morn to late night.‖385 
 
Despite the above glowing progress account of the mission, he also notes some 
challenges that the missionaries had to endure in their work. He states that: ―To 
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people unacquainted with conditions in Africa, the above account of what has been 
done during the twenty-five years of the existence of the Upper Nile Vicariate may 
not seem extraordinary. But let them bear in mind that we are in a country, where 
one has always to be most careful of his health, even under the best conditions of 
housing, food, etc., where the fierce rays of a blazing sun beat down on one all day 
long and all the year round, where fever-bearing mosquitoes, and other biting and 
stinging insects seek their sustenance in human blood, where swamps and marshes 
charge the air with poisonous damps, where long and tiring journeys up and down 
hill, have constantly to be made to visit the distant sick and dying, where single 
priests are working a parish as big as a home diocese, where building, carpentry, 
brick-making, surveying and other professionals, fall under the heading of ordinary 
parish duties. And it must not be forgotten, that in addition to the natural 
difficulties of the country, the work of the Vicariate had to weather the troubled 
times of King Mwanga‘s revolt, of the Sudanese Rebellion, of the devastating 
Famine in Usoga, of that destroying angel, called sleeping sickness, of the late 
European War, of famine again last year all over the Vicariate, when thirty two 
thousand people died of starvation in the countries of Usoga and Bukedi alone, and 
of annual outbreaks of Plague and Small-pox.......‖386 It ends with an invocation to 
God to call favoured souls, to go out of their father‘s house and come into the land 
that he will show them, so long will the stream of charity flow steadily to the 
countries where ―Souls sit in darkness and alienation from their Supreme Good.‖ 
 
Planting the Faith in Darkest Africa: The life story of Father Simeon 
Lourdel387 
This is a book written about the history of the most interesting, adventurous and 
successful of modern African mission fields and the life of Fr. Simeon Lourdel, 
WF, and the pioneer Catholic missionary to Uganda. It is divided into eleven 
chapters each describing an event in the establishment of the Ugandan mission. It 
covers the period of 1879-1895. 
 
Chapter one is a profile of Fr. Simeon Lourdel and how he was shaped into a 
missionary. It gives the details about his personal natural qualities and his resolve to 
be a missionary. It goes into the details of the formation programs in the seminary 
in France, joining the White Fathers‘ Novitiate at the Maison Caree, Algiers and his 
first appointment as a missionary in the Arab villages in Algeria. These experiences 
formed him into a formidable character that would give shape to the White 
Fathers‘ missions in Uganda.  
 
                                                          
386 Ibid., 37-38. 
387 This book was written by Mother Frances Alice Monica Forbes, RSCJ, and a religious sister of the 
Sacred Heart. She was born in Scotland in 1869, and at the age of 31 in 1900 she converted to Catholicism 
and joined the contemplative order of the Society of the Sacred Heart. She wrote a series of short lives of 
saints that were published as the Standard bearers of faith. The book was originally published by Sands 
and Co. and Robbie Dempsey transcribed the text used here from the book.  
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Chapters Two and Three describe Central Africa the place where the White Fathers 
came to establish their first mission field. It discusses Cardinal Lavigerie, whose 
vision shaped the Central African mission. Also these chapters detail the problems 
and difficulties which partially were met within the missions. Chief among is the 
lack of roads and the wilderness in which the missionaries had to trek hundreds of 
kilometres. He lists some difficulties in the region as paganism with its foul rites, its 
witchdoctors and polygamy; the tropical jungle with malaria, the scourge of the 
Whites; sleeping sickness, the scourge of the natives; the compendium of all evils, 
slave trade; the hostility of Mohammedan and Protestants, the political and 
commercial intrigue of European countries, civil war with its battles, sieges, flights, 
returns, burnings.  
 
Chapter four and five describe the first impression that the missionaries had of the 
people of Uganda and the progress of their work. It portrays the people as decently 
clothed and their society as well stratified with different classes of people ranging 
from the lowest to the King. It illustrates the approach of the missionaries to the 
local political establishment and their first challenges in winning converts. It also 
highlights the first painful experiences and confrontations between the new faith 
and the beliefs of the people which resulted in calumny. But despite the challenges 
that the missionaries attained some progress when they baptised their first 
catechumens on 27th of March, 1880. There is a series of baptisms and enquiries 
from young restless Ugandans who wanted to embrace the new faith. The progress 
ends on a sad note that this early period of success was short-lived as it was 
immediately followed by persecutions. 
 
Chapter six describes the suspicion that the work of the missionaries elicited which 
resulted in their exile. The events that lead to the exile of the missionaries started 
with the animosity that the Arabs had of the missionaries. They had a great 
influence over the King and wanted him to declare Islam the religion of the 
country. The missionaries protested such a measure and Fr. Lourdel proposed to 
the King to have Mohamedans and Christians enter separate grass huts and be set 
on fire. The one that will not catch fire would be the winner. The Mohamedans 
refused such a thing and the Christian missionaries won the show. But for fear of 
persecutions, still they went into exile to Tanganyika. 
 
Chapter‘s seven to eleven narrate the events which unfolded in Uganda at the 
absence of the missionaries. The King, Muteesa, who had forced them into exile 
was dead and was succeeded by his son Mwanga who sent boats to Tanganyika to 
bring back the missionaries. But no sooner had they come back than a terrible 
persecution rose again and this resulted in the Nnamugongo martyrdom. The rest 
of the book is about the intrigues between Protestant and Catholic missionaries and 
between the Christians and Mohamedans. But it ends in a triumphalism as it 
indicates the growth of the church and the erection of a new vicariate of Upper 
Nile.  
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Leaves from a White Father’s Diary 
This diary by Fr. A. E. Howell, WF, was written between the years 1934-1938. It is 
divided into 15 chapters with an appendix. Each chapter is concerned with a 
specific mission station where the author stopped. It is a personal account of 
events of a European missionary priest in the mission areas where the White 
Fathers were working. It recounts the experiences and first impression of a 
missionary who is making a journey across East and Central Africa for the first 
time.  
 
Since Uganda is a landlocked country, all the trips to Uganda in early times started 
at Mombasa. The author starts his journey at Mombasa as in the olden times. 
Unlike his earlier confreres who had to organise caravans and took 90 days to walk 
on foot, his journey in a train from Mombasa to Kampala, would only take him 48 
hours. He narrates his experience from Mombasa with amazement as he had 
experiences beyond his imagination. He praises the meals which would shame the 
food on some British trains; the waiters are all well dressed with white socks and he 
carries only a small suitcase, because he would buy everything he needs in Uganda 
itself.  
 
Chapters one to six cover his journey from Mombasa to Kampala. This involves 
his experiences of the journey and places that he saw and the sense wonder that 
characterised his trip. In towns like Nairobi where he found broad boulevards like 
Paris, and drinking an iced beer and best ice cream doughnuts and other personal 
experiences, leads him to mantralike conclusion...still nothing of ―darkest Africa.‖ 
His impression of Uganda and the people and the mission stations run by the 
White Fathers is impressive. He describes the people as mostly aristocratic, clean, 
happy and prosperous and the country as spellbound by the bright beauty of the 
scene. He narrates the work of the missionaries as a success for in one mission 
station the Missionaries had ten thousand souls, an elementary school for boys and 
girls, a hospital and dispensary, an enormous technical school fully equipped, cars 
and bicycles being repaired and iron-work in full swing.  
 
Furthermore, in a visit to another mission station he describes his experience as 
breath-taking. For in Villa Maria station in Masaka, there are native priests caring 
for some sixteen thousand Christians living over an area of perhaps seven hundred 
and fifty square miles. There is also a junior seminary in the neighbourhood with a 
brass band and the boys speak Latin so thoroughly well. The White Sisters too are 
working in co-operation with the native priests. The native sisters are in charge of 
girls‘ schools and a first class hospital. In these chapters the author describes 
Uganda, the people and work of the missionaries with such catch-words as ―a 
surprise of my life,‖ ―very good and impressive‖ and there is nothing like ―darkest 
Africa.‖ 
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Chapters seven to fifteen cover his journey across the White Fathers‘ Missions in 
Rwanda, Urundi (Burundi) and Tanganyika. And for the purposes of delineating 
this study we cannot go into the details of his accounts in these territories. But 
there is a consistent pattern of praise and aura of excitement at the way the 
missionaries have transformed the image of Africa with their missionary work that 
covered the spiritual and material needs of the people. However, despite the 
glorious picture that he paints of the missions, he takes time to highlight some 
painful experiences in the history of the missions in Central Africa. Many 
missionaries were massacred and others succumbed to what he describes as the 
hostile climate of Africa. But he justifies this with the centuries old saying 
attributed to Tertullian: “Sanguis Martyrum semen Ecclesiae.” This is translated as...the 
blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.‖ This diary is a great resource in this 
study as it gives the first-hand accounts of the second-generation missionaries to 
Africa. 
 
Les Chroniques Trimestrielles (1879-1909) 
The Quarterly Chronicles known by their French name (Les Chroniques Trimestrielles) 
were periodicals printed for limited circulation among the missionaries of the 
Society of the White Fathers. These documents contain a printed selection of the 
most significant extracts from the White Fathers dairies and correspondences, fairly 
full in respect of certain periods and episodes, and reports of the society‘s houses. 
In this research, the documents for reading and analysis are those that concern with 
the Apostolic Vicariate of Northern Nyanza and cover the period of 1879-1909. 
They were written in French the official language of the White Fathers Society.  
 
In section I the document describes the nature, size and changes of the mission of 
Apostolic Northern Nyanza. It narrates its history, how it was created, along with 
that of Tanganyika, by a rescript of Pope Leo XIII on 24th February 1878, 
following a petition presented to Pius IX. It was erected into a Provicariat by a 
decree of 27th September 1888 and into an Apostolic Vicariate on 31st May 1883. 
The southern boundary of the Vicariate of Nyanza was fixed by decree of 10th 
December 1886 and this lead to the creation of the mission of Tanganyika. A 
decree of 15th January 1894 attached to the Vicariate of Central Africa which was 
assigned to the Verona Fathers, the northern part of the Vicariate of Nyanza that is 
from Lake Albert up to Bahr el Ghazal. In the same year, the Decree of 13th July 
1894 Propaganda divided the Vicariate of Nyanza into three parts: Upper Nile, 
Southern Nyanza and Northern Nyanza. Upper Nile Vicariate was ceded to the 
Congregation of Missionaries of St. Joseph of Mill Hill, founded by Cardinal 
Vaugham, and its first Vicar Apostolic is Msgr. Hanlon. The text gives a catalogue 
of persecutions that the mission of Nyanza faced: Pagan persecution, under King 
Mwanga, which gave the Martyrs of Uganda (1885-1886); The Muslim persecution 
(1888) and the Protestant persecution (1892 -1893).  
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In section II the text goes on to mention the superiors who served in the mission 
of Northern Nyanza and the dates of their tenure. First is Bishop Livinhac who 
was Superior of the Mission of Nyanza between 1st. February 1878 - 12th. October 
1880. He was Pro-Vicar Apostolic between 12th. October 1880 - 15th. June 1883. He 
was Vicar Apostolic and given canonical nomination 15th June 1883 and ordained 
at Carthage by Msgr. Lavigerie, on 14th September 1884, elected Superior General 
of the Society of the White Fathers on 23rd September 1889. He went to Europe on 
6th June 1890 after ordaining Bishop Hirth at Kamoga. Second, is Msgr. Hirth who 
got the canonical nomination on 14th December 1889, consecrated by Bishop 
Livinhac on 25th May 1890. He was Vicar Apostolic of Nyanza until 13th July 1894 
the time during which the Vicariate was partitioned into three parts. Bishop Hirth 
then became Vicar Apostolic of Southern Nyanza, but he was still Apostolic 
Administrator of the Northern Nyanza Vicariate until the appointment of Bishop 
Guillermain on 12th January 1895. Third, was Msgr. Guillermain who got the 
canonical nomination on 12th January 1895, ordained at Lubaga by Msgr. Hanlon 
on 28th October 1895, and he died on 14th July 1896 at Villa Maria, Buddu. Fourth, 
was Bishop Streicher who was nominated Bishop on 1st February 1897, ordained at 
Kamoga by Bishop Hirth on 15th August 1897. 
 
Section III gives the details of the mission stations which were suppressed and the 
attempts to found others. In December 1879, there were attempts to create some 
mission stations along the Nile route. Uaya (Bukoba) from 18th July to 3rd 
September 1880 is currently in Southern Nyanza Vicariate. Sacred Heart Mranda 
station (South of the Lake) founded in late October 1880 to 14th November 1881 is 
currently in Southern Nyanza Vicariate. St. Joseph Mdaburu (Ugogo) from 5th 
March 1881 to 15th June 1882 is in Zanzibar central. St. Joseph Tabora - Kipalapala; 
at Tabora from 2nd September 1881 to 17th September 1883; at Kipalapala until 9th 
July 1889 currently in Unyanyembe. The station was reopened in 1900 in the 
Vicariate of Unyanyembe. Djiwe-La Singa St. Mary of Ukune from 15th April 1884 
to 13th March 1885, currently in Unyanyembe. Niegesi Our Lady of Exile from end 
of January 1889 to March 1891 and currently in Southern Nyanza. Our Lady of 
Hope (Usoga) from mid-March to Mid-October 1891 is currently in the Vicariate 
of Upper Nile. Our Lady of the Equator in late May 1892 to January 1893 currently 
in Northern Nyanza. 
 
Section IV recounts the foundation of the mission stations in the Vicariate by late 
1906 and the developments that took place in each station. Rubaga under the 
patronage of St. Mary was founded on 17th February 1879 and the Sisters Houses 
were established in September 1899. The Chronicle gives further details that Fr. 
Lourdel arrived alone on 17th February 1879; Bishop Livinhac and Fr. Girault 
arrived on 25th June 1879. The station had to be closed three times: From 8th 
November 1882 to 14th July 1885 because of the pagan persecution; from 18th 
October 1888 to 5th October 1889 because of the Muslim persecution and from 
24th January to 29th March 1892 because of the Protestant persecution. Kisubi 
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mission station under the patronage of Our Lady founded on 8th December 1895 
and the house of the sisters was established on 28th December 1905. The seminary 
was established at Kisubi since 8th December 1895 and was transferred to Bukalasa 
because of sleeping sickness which had affected the students. The premises were 
converted into a hospital for the sleeping sickness patients. Entebbe Mission 
station under the patronage of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary was founded in 
1902. Nandere, Our Lady of Grace in Bulemezi County was founded in January 
1900. Bukumi, Our Lady of the Guard in Bugangadzi was founded on 13th May 
1894. Bujuni, Our Lady of Help of Christians in Bugangadzi was founded on 11th 
November 1899. Before the final establishment, there had been a mobile mission 
from October 1896 to May 1897. Hoima, Our Lady of Lourdes in Unyoro was 
founded in January 1900. The Chronicle mentions it once that in 1897 Fr. Moullec 
had founded in Unyoro the station, Our Lady of the Guard. Virika, Our Lady of 
the Snows, Toro was founded on 17th November 1895. Butiti, Our Lady of 
Salvation, Mwenge was founded in 1904. Mbarara, Our Lady of Perpetual Help in 
Ankole was founded on 16th October 1902.  
 
The Chronicles give more details of the foundation of various mission stations and 
the challenges that were faced as well as the developments. Kasozi mission station 
of Our Lady of Peace, Koki was founded on 8th October 1895. This Mission 
station of Koki suffered during the revolt of Mwanga and was abandoned from 11th 
July 1897 to 13th August 1897 and later again in late December 1897. It was burned 
and looted in January 1898 and was revived on 12th December 1898. Kanabulemu 
Our Lady of Nazareth in Buddu was founded on 1st November 1902. Bikira 
Mariya, Our Lady of Victories in Buddu was founded on 15th July 1892. It was 
suppressed on 20th October 1902, because of the bubonic plague. It was revived on 
1st January 1904. Father Van put there the pupils of the school of catechists which 
had been founded on 1st January 1903 at Rubaga and had to leave for the lack of 
space. Since the Christmas of 1905 the mission itself was revived at Bikira. 
Narozari, Our Lady of the Rosary, in Buddu was founded on 7th October 1900. It 
was a mobile mission since April 1900. Villa Maria, Immaculate Conception, Buddu 
was founded on 15th May 1892 and the house for the Sisters was established in 
1900. The station was established first at Kasozi in Mid-March 1891 and was 
abandoned in February 1892 because of the Protestant persecution. It was revived 
on 2nd April 1892 and transferred to Villa Mariya on 15th May 1892. Bukalasa in 
Buddu was founded on 6th December 1903. The seminary was started at Villa 
Mariya on 1st February 1893 and in late December of that year it was transferred to 
Rubaga, where it remained until when it moved to Kisubi on 8th December 1895. 
Sleeping sickness in Kisubi forced it again to change: while the minor seminary was 
at Bukalasa by 6th December 1903, the major seminarians were going to Bikira 
Mariya, on 10th February 1904. In 1905 major and minor seminaries were located 
together in Bukalasa near Villa Mariya. Mitala-Mariya, Our Lady of the Mountains, 
in Mawokota County was founded on 25th October 1899. Bumangi, Our Lady of 
Good Help, Ssese Islands was founded on 21st November 1893. The mission of 
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Ssese, begun by Bishop Livinhac at Bugoma between January and April 1890 was 
revived on 8th September 1891. A second abandonment was caused by the 
Protestant persecution (January - October 1892) and finally the station was 
transferred to Bumangi on 21st November 1893 where she remained ever since. 
Busubizi, Our Lady of Mt. Carmel in Singo County was founded on 11th November 
1899.  
 
In the subsequent sections the Chronicles give in detail the work done at particular 
mission stations. However, not all the mission stations in the Vicariate are included 
in this detailed description of their work. It is only a few that are listed and the 
criterion for the choice of these ones is not given. The first station is Rubaga 
Mission. It reports that the mission of Rubaga has received blessings from the Lord 
with the missionary Fathers, Brothers and Sisters all having strength and health and 
they were responding to the benevolence of the good Master with hard work. The 
missionaries are reported as being overworked and hence had little time to write. 
But then some few comments are given on the development of this mission 
station. 
 
The text reports the growth of the mission of Rubaga and as a consequence it gave 
birth to several daughters who form a beautiful crown around her. These are the 
missions of Kisubi, Entebbe, Mawokota, Singo and Bulemezi. And because of the 
extraordinary developments of these missions, the Vicar Apostolic was forced to 
overhaul the district by attaching to the mission station Christian centres too far 
from one another. In this arrangement, the mission of Rubaga ceded to the mission 
of Bulemezi three towns and three Catechists and to the mission of Entebbe six 
towns and six catechists. On the other hand, the mission of Mawokota ceded to 
that of Rubaga the whole northern part of this province, that is thirteen towns and 
as many Catechists. Because this part of Mawokota has many people, the 
population of the mission of Rubaga has been increased by several thousands. The 
text gives the areas which form the mission of Rubaga: Kyadondo in the north, 
Busiro in the northwest, Mawokota in the west and Buwaya in the South.  
 
Another important element reported about the mission of Rubaga is preaching of 
the fathers. The text speaks about preaching in the first person plural. ―We preach 
several times a day: the neophytes, catechumens, children who are preparing for 
First Communion. Every Sunday, in addition to the homily in Church, we also 
preach to novices who are preparing themselves at the Sisters place to become 
catechists, and also to the sponsored children who are divided into two groups, one 
for girls and another for boys.‖ The text makes a positive remark that many 
Baganda can read and reading of the Gospel is a real treat for them, giving their 
souls substantial food. 
 
The text goes into the details of how the missionaries did apostolic tours in the 
mission territory. They describe their visits and how they make on the Baganda the 
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best impression. The text uses the term Baganda, natives and men in rugged 
character as a description of the people. The visits of the missionaries are reported 
with such glowing style that when the missionaries go to the villages all adults and 
small children want to attend the events and that the talk for a long time in the 
evenings about these around the family hearth which cause many conversions. It 
talks of the patronage of the boys with 262 members and the girls being 421 and 
how all these listen to a special talk every Sunday and receive Holy Communion 
every first Friday of the month.  
 
In reporting about sleeping sickness, the text reports that it continues to decimate 
the Baganda. He adds on in a rather ironic mood that ―when Providence punishes 
people in this world, it always has a merciful plan for them, that is, to strike the 
body and heal the soul.‖ The text argues that those who may have died of sleeping 
sickness are now in paradise next to the good thief, who during their lives had only 
the appetite for crimes. He lists what he describes as another good from sleeping 
sickness. He mentions that what the good Lord has taken out of this scourge is to 
present to the Baganda an opportunity to meditate on and to understand the 
serious words of our Lord Jesus Christ as quoted in Latin: Attendite a falsis prophetis 
... Ex fructibus cognoscetis eorum eos. Bonus Pastor animam suam dat pro ovibus suis; 
mercenarius autem videt lupum venientem et dimittit oves et fugit…. He describes a visit to 
one of the people suffering from sleeping sickness, being abandoned by his 
Protestant sisters in a banana plantation that was in the bush. He describes this 
person as an unfortunate man who shed tears and responded to the consoling 
words with stifling sobs: ―I was helpless; I was dying of hunger and thirst and 
disease, but the Saviour whom you preach to me brought you in this deserted place. 
I will be relieved.‖ He compares this man, whom he describes as unfortunate to the 
leper of the city of Aosta, who hugged the trees of the forest, praying to God to 
give them life for him and to give him a friend.  
 
When writing about schools, he refers to the chapter in the 1900 Buganda 
Agreement which desired that some young indigenous Catholics be chosen 
carefully to study the language of the European Conqueror. He gives as the reasons 
for this, ―that we do not get cases of influential functions or employment being 
given exclusively to Protestants or Moslems, to the great detriment of our work.‖ 
He mentions the initiative taken in this regards that ―despite the limited resources 
at disposal, a school of this kind be established.‖ However, the text contends that 
despite several attempts that had been made, but due to lack of premises and staff, 
we had not obtained any serious results.‖ But immediately with reference to 
Providence, he mentions that the required place was provided in the large brick 
house that the Catholic regent had previously built on the territory of the mission 
of Rubaga and the class was created in the space that was available in the building.  
 
The courses offered in this school were: First English course which was regularly 
attended by sixteen young adult people of 15 to 18 years carefully selected from 
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among the most intelligent and above all the most pious. The knowledge of 
English would enable them to perform the duties of interpreters in the 
administration of the Protectorate and promote the good of the Catholic religion. 
He gives details of other progress of this course. The second English course for 
younger children is intended to take the place of those whom we have just talked 
about. This course is paid for; every week each of the twenty children who attends 
must bring an English coin, the equivalent of French coins. The third course is 
regular school for those who learn to write, and the most advanced of which are 
taught the four rules of arithmetic. And finally, a writing and arithmetic course for 
the chiefs. The reasons given for this course is to educate them because they must 
have enough frequent relations with these gentlemen of Administration, officers, 
geographers, and others whom he describes as caring little to learn Luganda speak 
embryonic Kiswahili or correspond, at least or some, by letters written in English. 
He mentions that the rules of arithmetic are necessary for leaders because of their 
jobs, since they must count the tax; divide the pay of workers and others. Though 
he reports that they have great difficulty in memorising the multiplication tables, 
but there is no despair seeing them achieve satisfactory results. The report about 
Lubaga mission ends with a prayer-like statement: ―May the Divine Master bless 
our poor efforts in the way which, however dangerous it may be, cannot fail to lead 
to a noble and comforting end.‖ 
 
In writing about Kisubi Mission station, the text opens with the havoc that sleeping 
sickness has done to this mission territory. It goes into the details of how whole 
villages on the banks of the lake or in the peninsulas are almost deserted and those 
at some distance from the lake or on high hills have known only isolated cases of 
the disease. It gives the statistics as examples to show the brunt of the disease on 
the population. In Bugiri peninsula where there were 150 plantations representing a 
population of 700 to 800 people, there remain not more than 2 banana plantations 
with about 12 people. But the text reports that some areas have suffered less from 
the terrible disease. An example is given where only twenty cases of sleeping 
sickness out of the population of about 500 inhabitants are affected. It mentions 
that the mission territory of Kisubi is the smallest in the Vicariate that starting in 
the morning one can go to one or the other of its ends and return in the evening. 
However, the population of this territory is given as 5000 inhabitants described as 
devout Christians who frequently receive the sacraments and practice their religion 
well. He makes a consoling statement that Our Christianity has not suffered too 
much from being near Entebbe. There are many children. 
 
As for the report about St. Anthony hospital, the text says that it was founded to 
bring together patients of sleeping sickness. It describes a certain Father Varangot 
as a good father who loves his dear sick people that he visits them every day. It 
gives the pastoral activities that the father does in the hospital. That every morning 
he goes to say Mass, once a week he hears the confession of all those who wish and 
there are many who receive their weekly Holy Communion. It reports that the 
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Father takes care of the sick and for their spiritual and material needs. That he 
dresses them, feeds them, and gets their wounds dressed. The text places the father 
at the helm of almost everything in the hospital. The two White sisters are 
considered as responsible for only the cleanliness of various types of patients, and 
to teach catechism to those who have not yet been baptised. The text considers the 
five native nurses as dedicated through a spirit of religion to the service of these 
unfortunate people. In describing the patients, they are called these poor people 
suffering from an incurable disease. They are considered resigned but also happy, a 
thing that surprises European visitors who question whether these people they are 
going to die. The text explains that their joy comes from especially the faith they 
have in the heart, and the hope of reward that they wait for after leaving this life. 
 
Other piece of information about Kisubi concerns the coming of the White Sisters 
who arrived on 28th December 1905 and got settled at the mission. Two are 
assigned to work in the hospital, another teaches girls in a school and Catechism to 
children preparing for First Communion. Other details are about the constructions 
taking place. It reports that the house of the sisters with some extensions was built 
and the new house of the fathers is not yet completed. It reports of the rains that 
disturbed the work of making bricks. Another important report is about the 
cultivation of rubber and coffee with already 400 trees of ceara rubber and 200 of 
Funtumia elastic. As for coffee a certain species called Nyana is being planted.  
 
There are other mission stations which are reported in this document and the 
progress of the work of missionaries. Each station is talked about in its own unique 
context and how the missionaries adapt to such a setting. In the subsequent 
sections are the mission stations of Entebbe which had not only native blacks, but 
also many European Catholic parishioners and hundreds of Goans. The foreigners 
reported as residing in Entebbe are: Europeans, Arabs, Indians, Waswahili from the 
coast and between 5,000 and 4,000 Baganda. As for Sunday mass, the homily is 
given in Kiganda for the natives and English for the Goans.  
 
Another mission station that is reported in the Chronicles is Nandere, Our Lady of 
Grace. This mission station is located in what is described as the province where all 
the heads are heretics and which was formerly called the Boulevard of 
Protestantism. In giving the history of this mission station, it was founded at the 
beginning of 1900 and that Protestant teachers did their best to prevent their 
followers to go to Catholicism by employing mostly slander and bitter disputes. 
That failure for slander and bitter disputes to yield any meaningful results, the 
Protestants used another method when they considered both religions as the same 
and having the same Lord Jesus Christ. With all the bickering between Catholics 
and Protestants the text claims that the lives of the Protestants are hardly different 
from that of the pagans. The same conflict goes to impact the relationship between 
the leaders of the area and the priests for fear to be rated poorly by the Reverends. 
Even the County Chief, Kangawo avoids as much as possible to meet the priests 
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but it is different with the regent Kisingiri who never fails to visit the priests. The 
section on Nandere ends with a prayer-like statement against Protestants: ―When 
the grace of God will have brought us all those of good faith who are in heresy, 
there will not be much Protestantism except two memories: the empty temples and 
the ministers always well paid though pastors without flocks.‖  
 
The Chronicles then mention Bukumi mission station under the patronage of Our 
Lady of Guard. The text opens with an issue related to missionaries how the years 
1905-1906 were not good since the Superior Fr. Lesbros and Fr. Gore left the 
station with health related matters. But that the missionaries were comforted by the 
loyalty of Christians to the Sacraments and the celebration of Easter and Christmas 
brought a lot of people which made them proud for being so many. However some 
individuals are particularly mentioned. One of them is a man named Kasatu, 
portrayed as a lost sheep for a long time also appeared on these occasions. The text 
takes a particular interest in this man because he refused to defend the position of 
the missionaries from whom he received baptism and went to join Mwanga and 
strengthened the lines of rebels. After disappearing in the bush where he developed 
very long hair and wild eyes, he is described as a bandit of Calabria. Another 
individual that is personally talked about is Sseddu, described as the old pagan who 
prayed with his wives and the whole village. The Chronicles indicate that the work 
of the schools is difficult and students have never been many. There is no valid 
explanation for this state of affairs. But the text only talks about the hope in the 
youth who must be prepared as future generations who will be entirely Christians. 
Other strategies mentioned for a Christian society are establishing among the 
Christian children and catechumens the society of young workers. The text already 
records some of the profit from such an arrangement: The young workers helped 
to build a new house for the fathers, the restoration of the cemetery chapel, that of 
the Blessed Virgin and for plastering the Church. The young women workers, 
fewer in numbers were employed in the cotton gin, clean the fields and take care of 
the crops. The main motivation is that because work supported by religion is 
eminently civilising and a lazy Christian will never be a good Christian.  
 
The Chronicles give the details of the mission station of Bujuni whose numbers of 
Christians rose to 2848. This is considered a modest figure but also a cause of great 
consolation as all with faithfulness and devotion receive the Sacraments of Penance 
and the Eucharist. The number of baptisms for one year was put at 266 though 
lower than the previous year of 367. The number of marriages fellow from 69 to 
49. There are two reasons given. One, the state of health of the two fathers at 
Bujuni explains partly. But the first and main reason is given thus in the Chronicles: 
―The change of spirit among blacks; they have the spirit of their age, and today this 
spirit is a dream of well-being, of wealth and pre-mature civilisation. There are slow 
in getting instructed, they marry with difficult, because they see in religion and 
marriage obstacles to get this ideal of well-being and of that wealth which is always 
elusive.‖ Other factors cited for the failure of religious enthusiasm in this mission 
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station is the people‘s anxiety for becoming rich and how they have become 
traffickers of goat skins, others drive herds of goats and sheep on the Nile route 
hoping to get large profits and others go to Congo to trade in ivory and rubber. 
Such behaviour makes Catechists feel their zeal slow down and the text concludes 
here that these seem to be the causes which have brought down the number of 
neophytes. 
 
The report about schools is that the Banyoro are happy to learn to read and write 
and they follow the classes of writing with much assiduity. Reading is compulsory 
and the motivation for this is that they all know that they will not be baptised if 
they do not know how to read correctly. They do their best to learn first the 
alphabet and then to read well. Talking about sickness, the text makes a 
comparison between the Banyoro and the Baganda. It claims that for the Banyoro 
people have repulsive sores which are sometimes caused by dirt and carelessness 
and that they sometimes lead to death. Other bewildering remarks attributed to the 
Banyoro are that syphilis is not even an evil and that they think they can make 
wonders by passing it on to new-borns because they say, syphilis rarely kills a child. 
The vast majority of the patients are people with syphilis, gnawed cancer or eaten 
by scabies. He claims that giving the people the knowledge of hygiene is a lost 
cause as they leave flies the task of drying the pus that flows from these wounds. It 
claims that the dispensary is besieged by crowds of unfortunate patients who have a 
boundless faith in the science of charitable nurse.  
 
The Chronicles lastly talk about the mission station of Mitala Mariya under the 
patronage of Our Lady of the Mountains. The text in summary here in talking 
about Mitala Mariya begins with the arrival of the new Superior whose coming 
brought the number to five of missionary priests serving this territory. The 
apostolic tours are made in three provinces that depend on Mitala Mariya: 
Mawokota, Kitunzi, Butambala. The catechists are described as the most valuable 
auxiliaries of the missionaries and their number totals 77. Through the catechists 
the missionaries recruit the catechumens already educated in the great truths of the 
religion, informed of the trial of Christians and that the sick are visited and baptised 
in articulo mortis. The catechists are glowingly appreciated as being very helpful 
and especially those living in areas contaminated by sleeping sickness show 
admirable dedication. They do not abandon their patients; they expose themselves 
each day to this terrible scourge. The texts mention that two have already died, four 
are affected and would die soon and it ends with prayer committing them to 
eternity: May God reward them! The text reports unfortunate happenings among 
catechists. Because of finances, their number was reduced, others left on their own, 
and others temporarily left their work to get enough to meet the most pressing 
needs and the texts claims that the future is bleak.  
 
About the new converts or Neophytes, the text goes into the details of the 
transformation this station has experienced. A portion of the population that was 
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close to Rubaga was assigned to Rubaga mission territory another portion to 
Busubizi for the same reasons and this explained the figures given that the Catholic 
population fell from 13200 to 13150. The nagging question posed was whether all 
these are saints and the response is no, as everywhere, there are some who are very 
good and others bad. The missionaries are impressed by the docility of the 
Christians in receiving the sacraments with staggering figures: 66,750 for 
confessions and 68,000 for Holy Communion and the Apostolic Vicar 
administered the sacrament of confirmation to 1, 269 neophytes. About the 
catechumens there are some facts recorded: those who agree to come and pray at 
the station are becoming increasingly rare. About sickness, the most reported 
disease is sleeping sickness which devastated the fastest growing part of the mission 
territory. The four islands of Bunjako, Buyiga, Zzinga and Bussi and all the sides of 
the lake are decimated. The Chronicles report the work of missionaries in such 
situation ―...as assisting these poor people, visit them, administer last rites to the 
Christians and baptism as well as baptising the pagans who consented in articulo 
mortis.‖ On the issue of material things, it reports that because of lack of resources 
the construction of the house for the community had to be abandoned. The chapel 
of Our Lady is coming up and the Christians have made a collection of 200 rupees 
that has allowed starting moulding bricks. It ends with an important note: While 
waiting that the thousands of vines of rubber planted this year..., we continue to 
cultivate cotton, coffee and pepper but unfortunately it is not a remunerative crop.‖ 
The text ends with a prayer: Let us rely on Providence who will never abandon his 
people. 
 
2. Analysis of Missionary Documents 
 
After the description of the missionary documents we now make an in depth 
analysis of one of them using the three tools proposed by Norman Fairclough388: 
the analysis of linguistic practice, or the formal features of the text; the analysis of 
discursive practice, or the production, distribution and consumption of text; and 
the analysis of the social practice, or the social conditions and social effects of the 
text. 
 
Analysis of Linguistic Practice 
In this section we make an in-depth analysis of A Short History of the Vicariate of the 
Upper Nile, Uganda, written by Bishop John Biermans, MHM; the other missionary 
documents are used in analysing the discursive practice. The choice of this text is 
motivated by two reasons. First, it was written by one of the early missionaries to 
arrive in Uganda, who became a Vicar Apostolic and so he wrote with first-hand 
experience. Second, it was written in English as its original language without 
succumbing to change of meaning which happen in translations. It was observed in 
the general introduction that translations have some complications especially that 
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meaning in the source language, rarely corresponds to that of a sign in the target 
language. In the same way Fairclough admits that one source of difficulty for 
textual analysis is the use of translated data. He thinks that to include textual 
analysis of translated data as part of the analysis of a discursive event, is a 
procedure which is open to serious objections.389 This follows the view that, ―In 
order to be communicatively effective, translations have to be modified at the level 
of content or the intention so that the recipients of translated messages can be 
addressed as primary readers wherever possible.‖390 
 
The author is a Bishop, a member of the Mill Hill religious missionary Society and 
a spiritual leader at that. As noted in the summary above, this text is 39 A5 pages 
long and divided into eleven chapters. It follows a chronological development of 
events in the Vicariate of Upper Nile from July 6th, 1894 the date when it was 
created, up to 1920 when this text was written. It is, therefore, a text that narrates 
the events of one of the earlier missionary movements in Uganda and is 
representative of the history of the last part of the 19th century and first part of the 
20th century Ugandan Church. Another important feature of this text is that it was 
originally written in English which makes the word meanings and language use to 
retain their original form. This reality could provide us with the insights into the 
mental models, subject positions and social relations that characterised the earlier 
missionary endeavour and how they were used and applied in the apostolate. 
Following Fairclough‘s three-dimensional conception of analysis, the first aspect of 
analysis is the analysis of the linguistic features of the text taking into account the 
vocabulary and grammar of the text. This will be done within the background of 
conversation as the sensitizing concept that we are developing in this research.  
 
Right from the beginning, this text was written in English and it has not been 
translated into any other language. The title page opens with the abbreviation: 
A.M.D.G followed by the title of the book written in cursive form: A Short History 
of The Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda. The title of this book starts with 
article ―A‖ in the upper case followed by the adjective ―Short‖ written in the lower 
case and it qualifies the noun ―history‖ to form a compound noun ‗Short History.‘ 
This is followed by the preposition ‗of‘ and article ‗the‘ attached to the noun 
‗Vicariate‘ again followed by the preposition ‗of‘ and article ‗the‘ and adjective 
‗upper‘ which qualifies the nouns ‗Nile, Uganda.‘ The compound noun ‗short 
history‘ is used in the possessive form of another noun ‗The Vicariate‘ which as 
well is used as a possessive of another compound noun ‗The Upper Nile, Uganda.‘ 
The adjective ‗short‘ is not easily understood in its use to mean either ‗short in 
content‘ or ‗short in timeframe‘ or ‗short in details‘ or short in information‘ 
presented in the text. The use of the preposition ‗by‘ on the title page shows the 
author ‗The Right Reverend J. Biermans, D.D, Bishop of Gargara and Vicar 
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Apostolic of the Upper Nile. At the end of the title page is the noun Nsambya and 
Kampala with two abbreviated letters P.O and then it ends with the noun, Uganda 
written in the uppercase. However, in a nutshell the cover title gives the limits of 
this text as the history of the Vicariate of Upper Nile, Uganda as presented 
exclusively by The Right Reverend J. Biermans. This could explain the diminutive 
use of the adjective ‗short‘ (which we questioned above) to qualify the noun history 
since it the work of a sole author who may miss out some information and data. 
 
In the introduction, the first sentence opens with a period of time that has elapsed: 
‗Twenty-five years have now passed....‘ and it goes on to indicate the major event 
related to these twenty-five years ‗....since the first priests of St. Joseph‘s Foreign 
Mission Society to enter Africa, left the Mother-house at Mill-Hill, London.‘ In 
talking about the ‗first priests‘ of the St. Joseph‘s Foreign Mission Society, he uses 
the official name of the society and this is the only instance that it is used. And Mill 
Hill is used only as a location where the Mother house is found. But in the 
following pages, he uses Mill Hill as the de-facto name of the missionaries. To 
describe the first priests‘ journey to Africa, he uses two verbs in two tenses, that is, 
an infinitive verb ‗to enter‘ and the past tense of the verb leave, ‗...left.‘ The primary 
social identity in this sentence is the noun ‗Priests‘ qualified by the adjective ‗first‘ 
with the noun ‗Africa‘ as the object. The use of the infinitive ‗...to enter‘ can be 
understood in the structure of the general properties of infinitives that they do not 
have tense, aspect, moods, and/or voice, or they are limited in the range of tenses, 
aspects, moods, and/or voices that they can use. And the use of the past tense 
expresses the idea that an action started and finished at a specific time in the past. 
So whereas the first priests left the Mother House in London once and for all, the 
text suggests their journey to Africa is an uncertain process. The text goes back into 
history and gives a particular date ...On July 6th, 1894 of which two events that 
followed that date are reported in the passive and one is reported in the active 
voice. It is recorded in text that, ―...the Holy See had created a new Vicariate in 
Uganda,‖ ―...and it was to take charge of this new field...‖ ―...that the Mill Hill 
priests went forth in the Month of May, 1895.‖391 There is use of the pluperfect or 
past perfect tense ‗had created...‘ In that same sentence the noun ‗Vicariate‘ 
qualified by the adjective ‗new‘ is used, with its alternative, the noun ‗field‘ also 
qualified with the same adjective new.  
 
The text introduces a number of subject positions that characterised the social 
relations in the Ugandan social setup. This is brought about by using the adjective 
‗....previous‘ when the text stretches back into history to report the work of the 
Protestant missionaries. The text reports thus: ―Previous to their arrival in the 
country Protestant missionaries of the Church Missionary Society had already been 
at work among the Baganda for seventeen years.‖392 In the text the use of the 
compound noun ‗Protestant Missionaries‘ is related to the noun Church Missionary 
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Society in a possessive form. The use of the prepositions ‗at‘ and ‗among‘ describes 
the work of these Protestant missionaries. And another important linguistic feature 
that the use of these prepositions suggests is that the work of the Protestant 
Missionaries is limited to the Baganda, a noun that suggests an ethnic group. But in 
reporting about the arrival of the Catholic Missionaries, the text uses the noun 
Uganda, a geographical entity with an active voice in the past tense: ―...Uganda 
witnessed the advent of Catholic Missionaries.‖ The text uses the noun ‗...priests‘ 
who is a person who has the authority to lead or perform ceremonies in some 
religions and especially in some Christian religions, to specifically describe the 
Catholic missionaries. The text uses the phrase ‗...the advance guard‘ to describe the 
first Catholic missionaries to come to Uganda who were of a French Society called 
Missionaries of Africa‘ more commonly known as the White Fathers. The use of 
the noun ‗guard‘ qualified by the adjective ‗advanced‘ is not explained and so is the 
use of the adjective ‗French‘ in this sentence is as well unclear. The use of the 
adjective ‗certain‘ in this sentence: ―Both the Church Missionary Society and the 
White Fathers then had well established stations in certain districts of Uganda....‖393 
suggests a gap in the missionary field that the Mill Hill Missionaries required to fill. 
And this scenario introduces the establishment of the Mill Hill missionaries in 
Uganda of which the use of the noun establishment denotes their coming and 
subsequent work of evangelisation in Uganda.  
 
In Chapter One, by describing Uganda the text uses a passive voice of which its use 
presents it as vulnerable ―...Uganda has long claimed the interest of countries which 
have spheres of influence...‖394 He uses the compound noun ‗pagan hordes‘ to 
describe the people of Uganda both leaders and dependents alike. The reference 
made to the people of Uganda as pagan hordes which are an ambiguous collective 
grouping that he gives to a mass of people without a proper descriptive category. It 
should be noted here that in this collective grouping the noun ‗hordes‘ qualifies the 
noun ‗pagan.‘ The text uses the noun ‗hordes‘ that signifies a people without proper 
identity and a name to be characterised with. The use of this noun implies a 
faceless group, an insignificant gang without any distinctive features to describe 
them. In other related instances, the noun ‗paganism‘ is used to illustrate the work 
of the missionary in a self-questioning tone: ―...and what good can one man do 
among so many thousands, and what effect can the labour of one short life, have 
on a paganism thousands of years old?395 Whereas in other illustrations it is used 
with the qualification of the noun vortex as the author notes, ―...and this was 
necessary for souls, drawn from the vortex of paganism in a country...‖396 
 
On the one hand, the text uses the phrase ‗...the power of a despot king‘ and other 
adjectives such as vicious, cruel, cowardly, cunning deceit to describe the King of 
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Buganda (....) and on the other hand, the phrase ‗...abject servility of his subjects‘ is 
used to describe the people and their relationship to the King. The use of the noun 
missionaries in the text as understood according to nationality is qualified by the 
adjectives ‗English‘ in reference to the Protestant Missionaries and the adjective 
French is used in reference to the Catholic Missionaries. The text presents 
Protestant English and Catholic French Missionaries as having a common purpose 
by claiming in this phrase ―...both striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant 
the Standard of Christianity.‖397 In another instance, the nouns ‗traders‘ and 
‗religious teachers‘ are both used to describe the Arabs through whom some 
knowledge of Islamism had been introduced. The use of the adjective ‗some‘ in this 
diminutive phrase ―...some knowledge of Islamism...‖ contrasts Islam to the more 
elaborate use of the noun ‗Standard‘ in the phrase ―the standard of 
Christianity....‖398 which makes Christianity to stand opposed to Islam.399 There are 
many proper nouns used as names of individuals. Mwanga is the name of the King 
of Buganda. The name of the uncle of the King ‗Mbogo‘ is prefixed with the vowel 
‗E‘ and hence written as ‗Embogo,‘ Kiwewa is Mwanga‘s brother and Karema is the 
brother of Kiwewa, Hanlon is Vicar Apostolic of Upper Nile.  
 
The text uses a variety of nouns and terms in reference to different categories of 
people whom the missionaries interacted with. These stand to represent the social 
identities that are predominant within the text. In more general terms, the common 
noun ‗natives‘ in the plural is used to refer to the people of Uganda.400 It evokes 
stereotypes of primitiveness or cultural backwardness as it used in many instances 
to form compound nouns to refer to whatever is specific to the people: ‗native 
mind,‘ ‗native solders,‘ ‗native bridge,‘ ‗native dug-outs,‘ ‗native workmanship,‘ 
‗native-made-beds‘ ‗untrained natives,‘ ‗Kavirondo natives,‘ ‗native artisans,‘ 
‗Catholic natives,‘ ‗native nuns or native sisterhood,‘ and ‗native priests.‘401 
 
However in some specific instances, the text uses proper nouns, that is, the 
people‘s ethnic names to describe them as in when it talks about, ‗the Baganda (the 
people of Buganda), The Basoga (the people of Busoga), the Bavuma, (People from 
the island of Buvuma in Lake Victoria), The Wanandi (an ethnic group in Kenya)402 
whom he repeatedly portray as ―wild or truculent.‖403 This applies as well to the use 
of the noun Christians to refer to the adherents of the Christian faith and the 
Mohamedans as the noun used to refer to the followers of the Islamic faith.404 
There are other nouns constructed by the author and used to describe the people in 
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the text. A possessive noun ‗a man-of-war‘405 is used to describe a colonial army 
Commander and ‗The Great Unclad‘ is used to describe the people whom the 
author referred to as kilted tribes in the ‗undress uniform.‘406 
 
There are a number of other subject positions noticed within the text and these are 
ranked in such a way as to determine social position and the social relations that 
exist between these identities. First in this sequence is the ‗porter‘ which is a noun 
denoting people. In this text it is used to indicate a person employed to carry 
luggage and supplies. The text records ―one hundred and twenty five porters and 
fourteen armed askaris...with one reliable headman.‖407 The texts describes the 
general weight requirement that could be carried by a porter: ―...a general supply of 
everything necessary for the long journey had to be packed in cases weighing not 
more than 65 lbs. the ‗load‘ consigned to each porter.‖408 The texts portrays porters 
in many ways: ―...some of the porters were hiding in the bushes (....) if our porters 
and followers gave us so much trouble (....) if our porters and followers were so 
sulky and indifferent at the coast where they were well-fed and well-clothed (....) 
where shall we engage other porters in unpeopled places (....) and in other 
instances, he applies nominalisations when recounting some incidents that involved 
the porters: ―Our ranks were thinned by the unfaithful ones who had thrown down 
their loads and run away, or had taken the loads with them, or had left us in the 
darkness of night.409 The use of the noun ‗ranks‘ here indicates that there was a 
power structure in which people were ranked accordingly with different 
responsibilities. 
 
Related to the above, this noticeable power structure that the text brings to light 
starts in the ascending order with the porters at the periphery. It could be realised 
that there is a social identity of ―the armed askaris‖ related to the porters but higher 
in rank and position who are described as ―...the native soldiers...natives of Africa 
who have formerly been porters...‖410 In this text, the noun askaris in plural is 
qualified by the adjective armed. They are armed because they have to provide 
security. The text indicates that, ―These askaris carry rifles and some ammunition, 
and their duties are to keep guard in the camps at night and on the march to keep 
the right path, to see that porters do not stray.‖411 Another social position noted in 
this sequence is that of the headman qualified with the adjective ‗reliable‘ for he is 
―to over-see the former.‖412 The adjective former is used to indicate the previously 
listed identities, that is, the porters and askaris. That explains why in other instances 
the noun head-man is qualified with the superlative verb ‗highly-recommended‘ 
                                                          
405 Ibid., 4. 
406 Ibid., 10. 
407 Ibid., 4. 
408 Ibid., 4. 
409 Ibid., 4, 5, 6, 8. 
410 Ibid., 5. 
411 Ibid., 7. 
412 Ibid., 4. 
120 
used to show the priority of this social position and also define its relationship with 
the rest in the caravan. However, in this apparently constructed power structure, 
the topmost authority appears to rest elsewhere. The text uses the common noun 
‗man‘ qualified with the adjective ‗white‘ to form a compound noun ‗white-man‘ 
which is used unflatteringly as the centre of all authority and power. In the text it is 
recorded that ―It required all the authority of the white man to insist that his way 
was to have the caravan proceed...‖413 
 
Although the author gives two purposes of this text, first, ―...to describe the actual 
work done by the early pioneers,‖ and two, ―...the gradual progress of the work as 
more men came in after years...‖414 he gives substantial space to describe the 
context and uses such rich metaphors and imagery. The author describes the 
missionary encounter with the African terrain in rich striking language ―...the long 
and trying match would not be less than ten weeks through the wilds of Africa, 
where absolutely no sign of civilisation was to be met with and where the only 
human guides along that unknown way were strange native men, who scarcely 
knew any word of English or French.‖415 The country and the people through 
which the caravan passed were described in the same way: ―...a wild and varying 
country, peopled with hostile tribes who lived in the most primitive fashion and 
affording in nothing the safety, protection or resources so desirable on the long 
journey...‖416 In narrating the joy at their arrival, he uses such images as to elicit a 
sense of wonder: ―...we were received by the Catholic natives who all wore small 
crucifixes and long gracefully falling white robes; they knelt to welcome us, and 
their beaming faces were good to see. They accompanied us until were joined by 
the next crowd and then they broke out into joyous shoutings, running to shake 
one another by the hand, while saying ‗We are healed; we are cured.‘ To see their 
state of childish excitement made one wonder, that adults could be so truly child-
like and simple and sincere.‖417 
But he immediately contradicts that observation in this sentence: ―...the rejoicing 
600 native Catholics pressed us much in their enthusiastic greeting, yet we noticed 
the absence of wildness, which one might be led to expect from an isolated race in 
the heart of equatorial Africa. They manifested intelligence and composure even in 
the enthusiasm of their welcome.‖418 The author describes the King‘s palace as 
follows: ―The state room resembles a barn, open in the front with three reed walls, 
and a thatched roof, supported on two rows of rough palm tree posts(....) and 
details about the King are interesting as well ―....the king sat on his throne with 
uncovered feet‖ 419 In talking about his work, he applies the common Christian 
metaphors as he states: ―...I turned then to dark and cloudy background and saw in 
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the fancy, the outstretched arms of ignorant and little known tribes pleading with 
me to lead them out of the darkness in which they groped, into the light of God‘s 
love.‖420 In other instances, he used military language to describe the work of the 
missionaries: ―They were men of the old brigade – of the first few caravans to 
arrive in the country. They had taken trench by trench of their spiritual enemy‘s line 
on the Ugandan front.‖421 He uses more military images, as ―...an army of 
catechumenates (....) a regiment of catechists....‖422 He uses metaphors from 
agricultural, spiritual and geographical settings to describe the transformation that 
missionaries have ushered in Africa. ―The long dry grass of the African veldt has 
given place to acres of gardens and native cultivation, and prayers and hymns of 
praise are offered God daily, where formerly the only sounds were the barking of 
jackals and leopards and the crying of hyenas as they moved noiselessly through the 
grass.‖423 
 
In some instances, the text uses some nouns as verbs in what is referred to as the 
‗verbing of nouns. This is in such sentences as ―...Churches, houses and schools 
now ‗clothe‘ the crests of the prominent mission-hills, while villages of Christian 
families and Catechumens ‗people‘ the slopes, ...the Bishop piloted the Vicariate 
safely...‖424 In some sentences the text uses diminutive forms to describe realities as 
in such sentences: ―An elderly catechumen, a convert from paganism and a small 
chief in his way, had erected a small shed of reeds....‖425 The comparative common 
noun in plural ―....more men‖426 is used as an alternative noun to the noun 
missionaries or the fathers. And in describing the Sudanese soldiers who had 
revolted against the government such labels as ―...mutineers..., rebels...., or rebel 
army...‖427 are used. In some instances, the text disguises the author and renders 
him impersonal and faceless in order to deal directly with some facts. And since the 
first person pronouns are arguably the most visible manifestation of a writer‘s 
presence in a text, in these sentences, the author‘s making use of other lexical and 
syntactic choices instead of using the first person pronoun makes him to abdicate 
the responsibility from the text. ―But the pioneer missionary does not look for 
quick results. He knows that a thousand years are but as one day in the sight of 
God, and the thought that he is at least doing something for the salvation of the 
immortal souls of these poor creatures, encourages him to continue in his solitary 
efforts. He may be tempted at times to ask himself, what good can one man do 
among so many thousands, what effect can the labour of one short life, have on a 
paganism thousands of years old.‖428 In these sentences, there is an impersonal use 
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of the pronouns for the passivisation of the social identity of the missionary 
qualified with the adjective pioneer. 
 
The noun ‗vicariate‘ appears a number of times throughout the text429 whereas the 
noun ‗vicar- apostolic‘430 which is suggested by the presence of the former is less 
pronounced. This dense concentration of the noun ‗vicariate‘ is what Fairclough 
refers to as ‗overwording‘ which is an intense preoccupation pointing to 
peculiarities in the ideology of the group responsible for it. And the equivalent term 
for Halliday is ‗overlexicalisation‘ for the dense wording of a domain.431 The 
recurrence of the noun vicariate in this text is associated with the purpose of the 
text which is to narrate the history and progress of the ‗vicariate of Upper Nile, 
Uganda.‘ And since the text is about the history of the vicariate, it follows that the 
whole textual structure is meant to qualify this noun vicariate. Examples could be 
drawn from sentences with the noun ‗vicariate‘ being qualified in various forms. 
―...the Holy See had created a new vicariate.....a new vicariate had been in 
existence......with the establishing of second Catholic vicariate....the newly ordained 
priest leave Mill Hill for his African Vicariate...the vicariate was now eating up 
more and more ground...‖432 The noun ‗Vicar Apostolic‘ is used in relation to the 
noun vicariate. Since a vicariate is an administrative territory, its creation suggests 
appointing an administrator of such a territory. In the text this development is 
suggested in the sentence ―....the founding of a Vicariate naturally leads to the 
question of appointing a new Vicar- Apostolic.‖433 So the noun Vicar Apostolic is 
relative to the noun Vicariate and they both qualify each other.  
 
One of the subject positions described in the text is that of the catechist. The noun 
catechist appears in the text four times and is used differently in each case. In the 
first instance, they are positioned in second place as helpers of the fathers for the 
text says: ―Helping these fathers is a regiment of native catechists…‖434 As that 
sentence indicates, the plural noun ‗catechists‘ is qualified with the adjective ‗native‘ 
to form an unclear compound noun ―native catechists.‖435 The use of this category 
is neither explained nor contrasted with any other group of catechists either 
professional or expert within missionary ranks. In another use of the noun 
catechist, it is qualified with the adjective ―some‖ and creates an undetermined, 
unknown or anonymous noun ―…some catechist.‖436 In another instance, it is used 
in plural and in universalistic terms as representative of the institution: ―Catechists 
are at work in all the countries between Nsambya, the capital and Fovera, the most 
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northerly point of the vicariate and in many an isolated village…‖437 And lastly, it is 
used in the singular qualified with article ―a‖ to characterize an individual: 
―…children are gathered round a catechist.‖438 The use of this noun is varies in the 
text as it represents an institution of catechists or individual catechists. 
 
Another subject position described in the text is that of the nuns. In its first use, 
the noun nuns are referring to the ―…first community of nuns.‖439 The text gives 
the original number of nuns to arrive, ―These nuns were six in number…..‖ It also 
gives the present number at the writing of this text as ―…there are fourteen of 
these sisters.‖440 The religious noun nun and the social noun sister are used 
interchangeably to refer to the other. The text is specific with the identity of the 
nuns: ―…belonged to the Franciscan community of St. Mary‘s Abbey, Mill Hill.‖441 
Since the author was a Mill Hill missionary, he implicitly indicates that the two 
communities are familiar because the community of sisters is ―…quite close to the 
missionary college.‖442 In describing their work, the text uses the possessive 
adjective ―their‖ and the pronoun ―they‖ ….the good they accomplished….,‖ ―they 
take complete charge of the hospitals in the missions….,‖ ―they are attached….,‖ 
―they have their own convent schools…,‖ ―…they visit regularly, villages and 
catechumenates….‖443 In another instance the noun nuns is presented in the plural 
qualified with the adjective native to form a compound noun ‗native nuns.‘444 In 
reporting about the native nuns, the text uses a superlative to introduce this rather 
new event: ―The most recent development in the Uganda District was the 
introduction of the native nuns.‖445 In another sentence he uses the numerical noun 
‗four‘ and the adjective ‗these‘ to qualify the noun nuns as a special and distinct 
group: ―Four of these nuns have been at work in the Nkokonjeru mission…‖446 
Whereas the foreign missionary nuns had their congregation named, there is silence 
on the name of the religious society to which these native sisters belong. The text 
only talks of the ―…members of the native sisterhood.‖447 The anonymous noun 
sisterhood is used instead of the actual name of the sisterhood. 
 
In the text, the noun ‗Father‘ is used interchangeably with the other related nouns 
‗missionary‘ and priest. But there is a more emphasised use of the noun ‗father‘ 
than missionary or priests. The frequent use of the noun ‗father‘ can be explained 
by the fact that it is used as a title. For example, the text speaks about ―Father 
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Gaudibert..., Father Prendergast.....‖448 In other instances the noun ‗father is used 
to qualify some other nouns to form compound nouns. This is evident in the text 
as used in such nouns as ―...White Fathers....Mill Hill Fathers...‖449 In some 
instances the noun ‗father‘ is used in a possessive majestic plural as in ―...our 
fathers.... their father.‖450 In other appearances in the text, the noun ‗father‘ is used 
with either article ‗the‘ as in ―...the Fathers,‖451 or used with numerals as in ―...one 
father, two fathers, seven fathers,‖452 or used with comparative adjectives as in 
―...the older Fathers,‖453 In this text, the noun priest is used in reference to what the 
noun father represents. Its use in such phrases as these is similar in reference to the 
noun father, ―...the arrival of six new priests‖ ―....eight newly ordained priest....as 
many priests as possible were selected from the annual ordination groups‖..... ―I 
heard them cry for priests‖....‖there were thirty-six priests at work‖....―the number 
of my priests had increased....‖454 It is used in the same way but the emphasis and 
frequency of use differ.  
 
The text uses the noun ‗tribe‘ as a social identity and qualifies it with different 
adjectives and phrases. The noun tribe is a sociological, cultural and linguistic 
entity. It is used in many sentences and phrases like ―....a country peopled with 
hostile tribes,‖ where we have the adjective hostile, which means having or 
showing unfriendly feelings or having an intimidating, antagonistic, and offensive 
nature, qualifying the noun tribe. This sets the precedence where the whole text is 
littered with a generalised qualification of this noun, described in a variety of ways 
using diverse adjectives and such phrases as: ―...the scores of distinct tribes....‖ 
―....the numerous tribes to be met with...‖ ―....any other tribe of Central Africa...‖ 
―...the kilted tribes...‖ ―...seeing in imagination the hundreds of distinct tribes, - 
pastoral, agricultural, and hunting tribes...‖ ―.....primitive and ignorant tribes...‖ 
―....this truculent tribe...‖ ―...illiteracy had held in bondage these newly discovered 
tribes...‖ ―...the outstretched arms of ignorant and little known tribes...,‖ ―...a 
greater work among the more abandoned tribes...‖ ―....catechists are brought from 
Uganda and are sent among the natives, until such time as the Mission has 
sufficient boys taken from the tribe itself and trained as teachers.‖455 In this 
context, the use of the term tribe remains confusing. In a solitary isolated 
incidence, the term tribe is replaced with another noun race: ―...we noticed the 
absence of wildness which one might be led to expect from an isolated race in the 
heart of equatorial Africa.‖456 The choice of using one and other is not explained 
                                                          
448 Ibid., 14, 19. 
449 Ibid., 1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 27. 
450 Ibid., 16, 30. 
451 Ibid., 21, 23, 24. 
452 Ibid., 15, 20, 21, 24. 
453 Ibid., 22. 
454 Ibid., 25, 27, 31, 32. 
455 Ibid., 4, 10, 11, 15, 18, 32, 34. 
456 Ibid., 13. 
125 
since the definition of race as a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the 
same stock implies tribe as well.  
 
Summarising the findings thus far we note that the text uses binary oppositions to 
classify ―pagan hordes‖ and ―Catholic natives‖, including ―native catechists‖ and 
the ―first community of nuns.‖457 The pagan hordes are described as ―wild‖, hostile 
and primitive and they show ―absolutely no sign of civilisation‖, but the Catholic 
natives ―manifested intelligence‖ and ―their beaming faces were good to see‖. 
Among them there was ―absence of wildness‖. And the Christian missionaries 
―who were striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant the Standard of 
Christianity‖ are sharply contrasted with the Arabs ―who entered the country as 
traders and by whom some knowledge of Islamism had been introduced.‖ There is 
a heavy use of the noun ―native‖ both in singular and plural form to refer to the 
people of Uganda. We have noted that the use of this noun in this particular text 
evokes stereotypes of primitiveness or cultural backwardness as it is used to qualify 
almost everything local: ―native mind,‖ ―native soldiers,‖ ―native bridge,‖ ―native 
dug-outs,‖ ―native workmanship,‖ ―untrained natives,‖ ―Catholic natives,‖ ―native 
nuns,‖ ―native priests.‖ Except with the native Catholics, nuns and catechists, who 
are described as ―helpers of the fathers‖ (not yet ―agents‖ or ―initiators‖ of change) 
to some extent, there is no social relation with the natives, certainly not in the sense 
of conversation. 
 
Analysis of Discursive Practice 
The second level is the analysis of the discursive practice. Analytical questions here 
are: how is this text/discourse refers to other texts/discourses? Is there an order of 
discourse? The underlying assumption is that in producing and consuming texts, 
speakers depend heavily on other texts/discourses. In this section the task is to 
relate the discourses that are referred to within the text. According to Fairclough 
the discursive practice mediates between linguistic practice (text) and social practice 
(context).  
 
The text was written to give the account of the origin and growth of the vicariate of 
Upper Nile, Uganda which was entrusted to the Mill Hill Missionaries. This forms 
the dominant discourse in the text on which other related discourse revolve as on a 
fulcrum. In the introduction, the text indicates that the first priests were of ―...St. 
Joseph‘s Foreign Mission Society‖ which is the official name of that missionary 
congregation and Mill Hill, London is identified only as the location where the 
Mother-house of the Society is found. Since this society was of British origin its 
official name, St. Joseph‘s Foreign Mission Society, carry references to the then 
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prevailing non-Catholic Missionary societies. Being a British founded society, it was 
built on the model of such British mission societies as the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the 
London Missionary Society (LMS)458 which in a way explains the continuity 
between them all as mission societies. The text talks of them as active and working 
along with the Catholic missionaries. It says: ―Previous to their arrival in the 
country Protestant Missionaries of the Church Missionary Society had already been 
at work among the Baganda‖ (....) ―...both the Church Missionary Society and the 
White Fathers then had well-established stations in certain district of Uganda.‖459 
Yet, in the text, the Missionaries and their mission work are generally identified 
more with the place of their foundation than with their official name. Such 
instances in the text testify to this reality: ―...Mill Hill Priests, Mill Hill Fathers, Mill 
Hill Missionaries and at times Mill Hill Men, or Mill Hill Mission...‖460 There is a 
particular identification with the place of origin than with the official name of the 
society.  
 
In the text the author claims that ―Uganda has long claimed the interest of 
countries which have spheres of influence on the great Continent of Africa.‖461 
This claim draws upon some important discourses that characterised Africa and its 
position in the 19th century geopolitics of the world. This interest and greatness 
could be implied, interpreted and understood in geographical, historical, political or 
even imaginary terms. Geographically, Africa is bigger than Europe by its landmass. 
This indicates that it could be a source of raw-materials, markets and research 
activities of European scholars, explorers, researchers and travellers. The European 
scramble and partition of Africa which was the focal point of the Berlin 
Conference of 1884 is a clear case in point. Historically, Africa has been described 
as the cradle of humanity and human civilization and has contributed to the growth 
of human culture. Africa has had strong bonds with the Middle East which is the 
cradle of the three Monotheisms: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All these 
religions have a universal perspective and in their infancy each took time off in 
Africa as in an incubator.462 The civilisation in the Nile Valley predates any other 
civilisation in the world. And Uganda as the country with the source of the Nile 
surely has claimed the interest of many countries which sought to control the Nile 
waters. Egypt wanted to control the source of the Nile as it is its livelihood. That is 
the reason that prompted the Egyptians to have direct control of Uganda. The 
Germans too fought with the English in the struggle for the control of this land. 
Imaginary, Africa held a spectacular potential as it was not yet surveyed or explored 
well and it carried the hope for the earth. Africa has a lot to offer in terms of the 
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potential for missionary work. His choice of words hence has interrelatedness with 
other dominant discourses prevailing at the time especially missionary work.  
 
There are other discourses that the text implicitly makes reference to, which came 
to influence the production of this text and the mission discourse in which it was 
written. It could be noted that Uganda became a reflection of the European 
religious discourse when the political and religious differences transplanted from 
Europe found a rich ground to blossom in Uganda and resulted in conflict. In 
European Church history it is reckoned that earlier in 1648, the treaty of 
Westphalia had affirmed the working compromise reached at the Diet of Speyer in 
1526 which had been translated into the formula contained in the Religious Peace 
of Augsburg which stipulated that ―The Prince would determine the religion of his 
subjects‖ (cuius regio, eius religio).463 That is why the Protestant English 
missionaries originally considered Uganda as their area of influence and saw the 
French Catholic White Fathers as encroaching on their land. This explains why the 
text makes this reference that ―the earliest pages of its history show religious and 
political differences which many are familiar with.‖464 This was the case in Europe 
as well so he was just reminding his audience that what is happening in Europe is 
exactly the same as in Uganda.  
 
He meticulously makes leave of the details of the conflicting spheres of influence 
both political and religious and begins to discuss the people in Uganda with such 
categorical descriptions. He considers the Ugandan people as spectators of the 
unfolding drama before them with such passivity and incomprehension. The text 
highlights that, ―to the pagan hordes – both leaders and dependents – these 
differences among Europeans proved unaccountable in a land, which had only 
known the power of a despot king and the abject servility of his subjects.‖465 The 
text presents the apparent confusion and conflicts between the parties in the power 
theatre and creates a hierarchy of sorts. There is a despot King, Protestant English 
and Catholic French Missionaries and the Arabs and at the margins are the pagan 
hordes. The pagan hordes represent a vulnerable group because it cannot make of 
the differences among Europeans who are squabbling among themselves. And the 
whole subject is of less interest to them given that they have only known the power 
of a despot king. They would still follow the European missionaries for they offer 
an alternative power base although they too are not settled among themselves.  
 
The term pagan is used in the text to refer to uncivilized, wild, primitive, illiterate 
or even unchristian. Its use in this text signified all people in Uganda as contrasted 
to missionaries. The people are referred to as: ―...the pagan hordes – both leaders 
and dependents...‖466 And the term hordes as an attribute of pagan signified the 
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collective labelling of all non-Christians. It is a determining relationship between 
the missionaries who are senders of mission messages and the people who are 
receivers of the mission message. The author heavily drew upon the vocabulary 
that was common at the time in European scholarly communities as evidently 
attested in many European historical and anthropological accounts. By speaking 
about ―pagan‖, ―wild‖ and ―primitive‖ natives the author uses words that we 
referred to in chapter one where we introduced the philosophy and anthropology 
of Lévy-Bruhl. He considered primitive mentality as almost exclusively directed by 
culturally constituted collective representations and as such is bound up with pre-
perceptions, pre-connections, and he maintained that we might almost say with 
prejudgments, which serve to alter the functioning of such mental capacities as 
reason, logic, and inference.467 
 
The text makes a distinctive description of missionaries calling them Protestant 
English and Catholic French missionaries.468 Here the text follows a popular 
discourse in the general consciousness of the people of Uganda who made these 
sharp categories of the missionaries relating them to their countries of origin. So in 
order that the text reflects that popular discourse, it too, followed exactly the 
prevailing classification that the people had created among the missionary groups 
and among themselves. For the people of Uganda, the Protestant Christians were 
referred to as English and the Catholic Christians were French. But despite these 
delineations as rooted in the text, their work is described as both striving to teach 
and preach the gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity.469  
 
The reference made in the phrase ―Standard of Christianity‖ is related to many 
discourses in history. First of all, Christianity and Christian missionaries are sharply 
contrasted to Islam and Islamic teachers as described in the text ―...Protestant 
English and Catholic French Missionaries, both striving to teach and preach the 
Gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity as opposed to the teaching of Arabs, 
who entered the country as traders and by whom some knowledge of Islamism had 
been introduced.‖470 Second, despite the apparent divisions that Christians manifest 
in their various traditions and confessions, they retain the basic teachings of Jesus 
Christ who is considered the principle and foundation of their faith. So in the text 
there was an attempt to address these differences and present Christianity as 
basically one but with manifold expressions. ―It was necessary to rectify the idea 
that the differences between the Christian religions depended on nationality, a false 
idea which had led the natives to believe that a Catholic European was necessarily 
French and that Protestantism exclusively was the religion of the English.‖471 
Thirdly, there is a Christian ethnocentrism which proclaims Jesus as the Saviour of 
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all mankind and hence it follows that his teaching and all Christianity must be the 
Standard for regulating human life.  
 
The use of the biblical theme of the Jubilee places the text in both the ancient 
biblical and Christian traditions although the connections between the 
understandings may be different. The biblical jubilee is understood as a time of 
liberty in the community. The biblical text that stipulates the observance of the 
Jubilee state: ―In this Year of Jubilee, each of you shall return to his possession. 
And if you sell anything to your neighbour or buy from your neighbour‘s hand, you 
shall not oppress one another . . . If one of your brethren becomes poor, and falls 
into poverty among you, and then you shall help him, like a stranger or a sojourner 
that he may live with you. Take no usury or interest from him; but fear your God, 
that your brother may live with you. You shall not lend him your money for usury, 
nor lend him your food at a profit. I am the Lord your God, who brought you out 
of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan and to be your God. ―And if 
one of your brethren who dwells by you becomes poor, and sells himself to you, 
you shall not compel him to serve as a slave. As a hired servant and a sojourner he 
shall be with you, and shall serve you until the Year of Jubilee. And then he shall 
depart from you — he and his children with him — and shall return to his own 
family. He shall return to the possession of his fathers.‖ (Leviticus 25:8-14, 35-41). 
The Jubilee year was to begin on the Day of Atonement and was a period of 
emancipation in which in addition to the usual sabbatical observance, all alienated 
property was returned to the owner. Thus the central tenets of the Jubilee year are 
related to the practice in the community especially to support the most vulnerable. 
The major elements of the Jubilee year are: Restoration, Liberty, Respect for the 
poor and Solidarity.472 But its use here is related to the Latin derivative jubilo 
meaning shout, as well as Middle Irish ‗ilach‘ victory cry, or from the Proto-Indo-
European root *yu- that stands for shout for joy. That explains why the text talks 
of the ―...the year of its jubilee‖473 in other words, the year of joy with its 
concomitant attitudes of celebration, of joy.  
 
The text is fairly interdiscursive as it makes use of extracts from the letters and 
diaries of missionaries of the pioneer caravan, passages from the bible, the British 
colonial administration and Church history. There are three extracts from the 
original letters of the missionaries of the pioneer caravan which written on their 
way from Mombasa to Kampala. The first extract was drawn from a letter written 
at Endoma Ravine on 5th August, 1895, the second is drawn from a letter on 
September 1st, 1895 on the occasion of crossing from Busoga into Buganda and the 
third extract is drawn from a letter on arrival at Mengo on September 10th, 1895.474 
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There are other extracts from the diaries of the missionaries describing their 
experience in Uganda.  
 
In their descriptions as reported from the diaries, they talk about the difficulties of 
travelling from the coast to Uganda: ―The party of seven Missionaries from Mill 
Hill who left the Coast for Uganda towards the close of 1896, has had, we regret to 
say, a very trying journey. They took the southern route through the German 
territory and not only had many misadventures along their road, but also suffered 
very severely from sickness....‖475 The text of Alice Monica Forbes details the 
problems and difficulties which partially were met within the mission. Chief among 
them is the lack of roads and the wilderness in which missionaries had to trek 
hundreds of kilometres.476 The biblical discourse is used in passages that compare 
labour and pain and the work of the missionaries and the ones comparing the 
mission work in Uganda to the text about the Kingdom of heaven as a mustard 
seed.477 The text draws heavily on the anthropological and geographical discourse 
as it describes some African tribes as hostile, wild, primitive, truculent and having 
no natural civilisation.478 And it gives the heights and length and size of the 
geographical features in measurable terms. ―....the equatorial line, exactly 35.48‖ 
east, just beyond a stream known as the Besoi River, 6, 650 feet above sea 
level....The Eldoma station is 7.000 ft above sea level,.....Eldoma Ravine is 300 feet 
deep and ....and the Mau Mountains lie at a height of 8,275 feet; and there are 
examples scattered in the text.479 It as well applies the colonial discourse by 
referring to the Imperial British East African Company as the ruling power in 
Uganda.480 
 
The text follows a narrative genre as a medium for the representation of historical 
facts and processes related with the Mill Hill Mission in Uganda. By narrative 
discourse we mean a discourse that gives an account of events, usually in the past, 
that employs verbs of speech, motion, and action to describe a series of events that 
are contingent one on another, and that typically focuses on one or more 
performers of actions. It is argued that what makes narrative unique among text 
types is its chronologic, it‘s doubly temporal logic.481 In the introduction of the text, 
here in analysis, therefore gives the outline and the confines within which this 
discourse is located. It opens with a time frame and the major subjects of this 
narrative: Twenty-five years have now since passed the first priests of St. Joseph‘s 
Foreign Mission Society to enter Africa left the Mother House at Mill Hill London‖ 
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...and it ends the introduction with an invitation.... ―It is opportune, therefore, to 
give an account of the origin of the Upper Nile Vicariate, in the year of its jubilee, 
and to mark the progress that has been made during these twenty-five years.‖482 In 
the conclusion the text talks of another twenty five years as a future event 
connected to the last twenty years: ―But wailing and wriggling of hands will not 
avail us much, so we shall begin another term of twenty five years with a perfect 
trust in the guidance of God, and in the never-failing charity of our benefactors and 
friends. And in another instance, the text talks of twenty five as a past event that 
could be evaluated of its merits and successes and an expression of inadequacy in 
what have been achieved as it claims that much more needs to be done: Much has 
been done during the past twenty five years, much more remains to be done....‖483 
 
The text is scattered with various descriptions of African ‗tribes‘ which carry some 
surreptitious references to the combined efforts in the fields of linguistics, 
archaeology, conventional history, physical anthropology and other social sciences 
where such a theme is more developed. It has been presumed by Greenberg that 
the major discourse to describe the traditional African way of life may be called the 
tribal way. In spite of the vast diversity of custom, language and race, the basic 
outlines of the tribal manner of living show everywhere a certain general similarity 
particularly when contrasted with the institutions of modern industrialism and 
nationalism. The tribe as a group of people inhabiting a common territory, speaking 
a common dialect or language, practicing similar customs and bound by ties of real 
or fictitious common descent from a single ancestor is very characteristic of 
African societies.484 The texts describes the ―...the caravan route of eight or nine 
hundred miles passed through a wild and varying country, peopled with hostile 
tribes who lived in the most primitive fashion....‖ and it talks of ―...Not one single 
catholic priest at work among the scores of distinct tribes peopling that country...‖ 
And it uses various other representations like ―...the treacherous wild tribes...‖ 
―...settling among the numerous tribes to be met with between the coast and the 
lake,‖ ―....the countries inhabited by these peoples are scornfully referred to by the 
kilted tribes as the countries of the Great Unclad‖ ―....open up a station among the 
more primitive and ignorant tribes.....‖ ―....when this truculent tribe will witness the 
coming of priests....‖ ―Many tribes differing from one another in every respect...‖ 
―....since illiteracy had held in bondage these newly discovered tribes.‖ ―....the 
beginning of a greater work among the abandoned tribes.‖485 In the above 
references to the use of the term tribe, there are a number of discourses in the text 
which are not adequately accounted for but make themselves apparent in the 
phrases in which it is used.   
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The discourses within the text are testimony that its production and distribution 
was not meant to be consumed by a Ugandan audience This is attested to the 
description of Uganda and language medium used in the text which was unfamiliar 
in Uganda since in the text the missionaries themselves had the task of learning the 
local language. It is articulated in the text that ―The language was for a long while 
an important study, as without knowledge of it, the missionaries could not order, 
nor instruct the natives.....and so ...setting themselves diligently to study Luganda 
was no mean task.‖486 The text shifts from Ugandan discourses and talks in 
generalised terms on Africa in a mood more likely to be for another audience: ―But 
the wattle-and daub buildings will be a familiar sight in Africa for centuries to 
come, for there are regions still untrod by missionary feet, and generations of 
missionaries in a still unreckoned future will come and open up new stations....‖487 
In other instances, the author of the text positions himself in the middle of the 
discussion by describing one community for the other: ―I am talking now, of 
course, of practical results, after thirteen years work among these people. I reality, 
the tribes in Bukedi and Kavirondo were so very primitive and were ridiculed to 
such an extent by natives of more advanced tribes, that work was begun among 
them as an experiment.‖488  
 
And in other discourses, the text addresses an anonymous audience with such 
authority on the facts about Africa: ―To people unacquainted with conditions in 
Africa, the above account of what has been done during the twenty-five years of 
the existence of the Upper Nile Vicariate may not seem extraordinary. But let them 
bear in mind that we are in a country, where one has always to be most careful of 
his health, where the fierce rays of a blazing sun beat down on one all day long and 
all the stinging insects seek their sustenance in human blood, where swamps and 
marshes charge the air with poisonous damps, where singles priests are working a 
parish as big as a home diocese, where building, carpentry, brick-making, surveying 
and other professions fall under the heading of ordinary parish duties....‖489 
 
The discourses on Episcopal power and Church Unity are referred to implicitly and 
with less emphasis. In the text, these discourses are presented as a normal 
consequence of the founding of the Vicariate but carry deep historical and 
theological nuances. The text hypothesizes that, ―The founding of a new Vicariate 
naturally led to the question of appointing a new Vicar-Apostolic.‖490 But this 
seemingly insignificant question of the Vicar-Apostolic is meant to satisfy the 
principle of Unity, one of the characteristics of the Catholic Church. That the 
Church is one, there is needed to guarantee that unity which in another way 
suggests the fact that the Church is hierarchical. This, therefore, resonates with the 
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phrase ―ubi episcopus, ibi ecclesia” (where the bishop is, there is the Church), which 
sums up Catholic teaching on this point. It is this principle which guarantees the 
validity of the sacraments and other liturgical actions in an ecclesiastical territory. It 
is further postulated that Church communion, in its perfection, takes shape as the 
existential common or social life of believers gathered round the altar and the 
Bishops, in virtue of their sacramental status, have an authority which has partial 
expression in juridical terms.491 This Episcopal authority and centrality in the 
Church is referred to in the text that after his consecration in Rome, ―...His 
Lordship left Mill Hill with Fathers Matthews, Kerstens, Plunkett and 
Prendergast...‖492 who are described as ―...his Associates in the great work.‖493 
However, the Ubi Episcopus phrase is challenged with arguments which favour what 
they assert as a more deeply true phrase that: Ubi Eucharistia, Ibi Ecclesia which 
means that the local church centred in the Eucharist which can only be celebrated 
as a space-time event, is, as has been said, one of a number of cells of which 
contains the whole living mystery of the one body of Christ. That it is at the local 
level of Eucharistic fellowship that the people of God actually live and that Christ 
is made present through that people.494 
 
In speaking about catechists this text refers to a social position that is also 
mentioned in Les Chroniques Trimestrielles but not in the other texts that were 
described in the previous subsection. The work of the catechists was considered to 
be very essential and was greatly acknowledged by the missionaries as the text that 
is analysed here clarifies that: ―Catechists are at work in all the countries between 
Nsambya, the capital, and Fovera, the most northerly point of the vicariate, and in 
many an isolated village of the beaten track between Fovera and the ‗German‘ 
border, a continual droning may be heard where children are gathered round a 
catechist, who is teaching them their prayers and the words of the catechism.‖495 In 
Les Chroniques it is said that the catechists are the most valuable auxiliaries of the 
missionaries, that their number at one time totalled 77, that through the Catechists 
the missionaries recruit catechumens already educated in the great truth of the 
religion, informed of the trials of Christians, and that the sick are visited and 
baptised in articulo mortis.496 Biermans considers that the catechists were accordingly 
fundamental in the success of the missionary undertaking and his text recounts 
their contribution thus: ―Helping these fathers is a regiment of native catechists, 
through whom the work is spread further afield.‖497 The work of the catechists is 
applauded highly in the Chronicles thus: ―The Catechists are very helpful and 
especially those living in areas contaminated by sleeping sickness show admirable 
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dedication. They do not abandon their patients; they expose themselves each day to 
this terrible scourge.‖498 But the Chronicles also say that various obstacles to the 
faith ―make Catechists feel their zeal slow down‖. And due to lack of finances, their 
number reduced, others were left on their own, or temporarily left their work to 
meet their most pressing needs. 
 
As hinted on above, the missionary enterprise in Uganda had a fruitful 
collaboration between the missionaries and the local agents especially the catechists 
and the native sisters. In the narrative of the work of the native sisters, the text 
outlines it with glowing admiration: ―They do the school-work, visit the nearest 
catechumenates and villages, to find out the children of school age, visit those who 
are inclined to be slack, etc... Being themselves Baganda, they have a marked 
influence on the people, who really respect them, and their quiet control over the 
noisy groups of school children is wonderful.‖499 In contrast to the Les Chroniques 
Trimestrielles, there is scant mention of the work of the native sisters. It is mainly the 
work of the White Sisters that is mostly commended. The text says: ―The White 
Sisters are responsible for the cleanliness of various types of patients, and teach 
catechism to those who have not yet been baptised.‖500 
 
Summarizing the findings in this subsection we note that in speaking about 
―pagan‖, ―primitive‖ and ―wild‖ natives this missionary text is heavily influenced by 
theories and their vocabularies in philosophy and anthropology as we have seen in 
chapter two in reference to Lévy-Bruhl. The catechists performed auxiliary roles to 
the missionaries. But they were perceives as ―helpers‖ and in no way equals to the 
missionaries. The differences and sharp categories used to portray the people 
surpassed any common ground to have meaningful conversation between the two 
categories of people. But despite all these discourses, the texts are rooted in a 
strong Christian foundation that informs their production because they end in a 
prayer like mantra: ―Let us rely on Providence who will never abandon his 
people.‖501 
 
Analysis of Social Practice 
The third level of analysis is of social practice or the analysis of the socio-cognitive 
effects of the text. Again Fairclough mentions a variety of tools for doing this.502 
Here the main focus is on ideology and hegemony. The guiding questions are: 
What is the link between language use and social reality in terms of belief systems, 
social identities and social relations? Are they simply reproduced or transformed by 
the way they speak about them? 
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In describing the social structure of the Vicariate of Upper Nile, the text looks at 
each group of people as a distinct cluster that inhabits the whole vicariate. There is 
no uniform characteristic for the whole vicariate. Each group is considered 
separately and the language used is representative of the hegemonic struggles 
between races. According Teun van Dijk, ―these various mental strategies and 
representations of individual speakers in positions of power are of course premised 
on the condition that white speakers share their attitudes and more fundamental 
anti-black ideologies with other whites, that is, as a legitimation of their dominance. 
This also explains why in similar situations other white missionaries may engage in 
similar behaviour, and how through repeated instances in various contexts Africans 
may learn to interpret specific discourse forms as being racist.‖503 The text here in 
analysis describes the people in the Vicariate both leaders and dependent alike as 
―…pagan hordes.‖504 And the text defines the route from Mombasa as ―….a wild 
and varying country, peopled with hostile tribes who lived in the most primitive 
fashion, with no signs of civilisation to be met with and where the only human 
guides along that unknown way were strange native men, who scarcely knew one 
word of English or French.‖505 Some of these descriptions of the people lead to the 
fact that language and conceptual ideas can be dramatic sites of violent imperial 
activities in which the humanity of others‘ is violated. 
 
The text describes the Ugandan society as a society of conflicts both from within 
and from without the country. It talks of the Ugandan society having a despot King 
and the people were in abject servility. And they were not helped by the coming of 
the religious teachers because the text reports of the conflicts that sprung from 
religious differences and the confusion that ensued thereafter. It describes the 
conflicts that were brought by the differences between the Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries as ―…unaccountable in the land, which had only known the power of 
a despot King… and since Protestant English and Catholic French missionaries 
both (were) striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant the Standard of 
Christianity as opposed to the teaching of the Arabs...‖506 The text talks of another 
conflict which was bred by the practices which the King introduced into his court 
and was discountenanced by members of any faith and this brought him into 
collision with them. The executions which are described in the great Ugandan 
holocaust are attributed to the evil practices of the King since they brought him 
into an open conflict with believers. The text narrates that: ―…several cruel 
executions followed, and the persecutions of both Christians and Mohamedans 
became so vehement, that…a strong feeling grew up for the deposition of Mwanga 
and he knew it.‖507 The text presents the King as the cause of his own deposition 
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because of his unbecoming practices for he is branded as a ―…vicious youth.‖508 
The text stratifies the society into three substrata. There are the local people called 
the natives, the European missionaries, both Catholic French and English 
Protestant Missionaries and Arabs with their Mohamedan religion. These three 
groups have come to form the major discourses in the Ugandan society and their 
eventual competition for hegemony has influenced the history and social relations 
in Uganda up to this day. 
 
In chapter two which discusses the founding of the new Vicariate, the text does not 
mention at all the details about the size and borders of this new ecclesiastical zone. 
There is an intended silence which portrays the ignorance about the geographical 
coverage of this territory. This explains why the text applies an imagination to give 
a faint glimpse of what this new Vicariate looks like. ―We can imagine the Fathers 
standing on the hill and picturing to themselves the natural wonders, the Vicariate 
would one day reveal to them and their successors, and seeing in imagination the 
hundreds of distinct tribes, - Pastoral, agricultural, and hunting tribes they were 
eventually to meet with in this huge Vicariate that began where they stood and 
stretched on and on, covering an area of forty thousand square miles.‖509 It is not 
clear whether the figure given here, forty thousand square miles, is actual or 
imaginary. This is so, because the text refers to the Decree of Foundation of 1894 
and another decree of 1895 that defines the size of the Vicariate as ―…all those 
regions which were under British rule and which formerly looked to the Vicariate 
of Unyanyembe for spiritual protection.‖510 Also, it goes on in a sort of rigmarole 
to describe the Vicariate in such uncertain terms using the physical natural features 
prevalent in this region to attempt describe its scope.  
 
It mentions ―…the edge of the mighty lake, half of which was in the Vicariate. The 
text indicates also as borders ―…the huge islands of the lake, some of which are as 
large as an English county; in the country of Bukedi, again a country of great lakes, 
chief of which is Lake Kioga, then the unexplored country through the wastes of 
Turkana as far as Lake Rudolph in the north. The Eastern boundary runs from 
Lake Rudolph to the west of Mount Kenia across the Masai Reserves and over the 
rolling plains of Nakuru. Among the natural wonders embraced by the Vicariate 
boundaries are the great lakes, Nyanza, Kioga, Nakuru, Naivasha and Sutoga, the 
rivers Nile, Sezibwa and Mporagoma in Uganda and the Nzoia, Yala and Lusumu 
Rivers in Kavirondo. So far as mountains are concerned at least three huge extinct 
volcanoes are worthy of mention – Mount Elgon on the borders of Bukedi and 
Kavirondo, Longonot near Naivasha and Mount Menengai at Nakuru. Such was 
the country that opened itself before the first Mill Hill men as they stood on the 
crest of Nsambya Hill and peered into the future.511 This mode of description is 
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still prevalent in the Ugandan society today as people using natural features like 
trees, swamps, hills, stones and other noticeable natural features as signpost of their 
address to their homes, businesses and stages for bus stops. It is indicative that the 
country is not yet fully explored and scientifically demarcated even after a hundred 
years of contact with the external world. This is an area that is not yet conversable 
with the external world.  
 
In analysing the various African peoples, the text carries a scientific discourse of 
objectivity of observation where the author presents himself as a detached 
observer. Looking at the world impersonally, neutrally and indifferently, which is 
the view of a detached objective observer, is a way of relating it from a certain 
perspective.512 This is expressed in the way the text looks at the various African 
peoples and the description made of the developments realised in their social and 
cultural setting and the place of the missionary among them. In talking about the 
natives of Uganda, the text describes them as ―…centuries ahead of any other tribe 
of Central and East Africa and had already loomed large in history long before the 
existence of other East African races had been made known to an outer world.‖513 
They are described as ―…intellectually superior to all the surrounding peoples, 
whom they despise, and while their inferior neighbours are governed by petty 
chiefs, who were always warring one against another, the Baganda acknowledged 
the supreme sovereignty of one king over all the country. The Baganda were always 
a perfectly clothed people while even the full-dress of the less advanced tribes 
consisted only of a spare covering of animal skins or a fibre kilt.‖514 The text 
describes the districts of Bukedi and Kavirondo as ―…inhabited by the people 
referred to as the kilted tribes and as the countries of the Great Unclad.‖515 And in 
an apparent detached, indifferent, disinterested, neutral, impartial and privileged 
mode the text portrays the work of the missionary among such people with 
glowing self-flattery. ―Only the missionary who opens up a station among the more 
primitive and ignorant tribes can realise what a happiness it is to see the baptised 
children of Christian marriages coming for daily religious instructions. When he 
compares the childhood of these little creatures with the childhood of their parents 
and considers what the grace of baptism has done these people, his heart overflows 
with gratitude to God for having deigned to call him to share in the work of His 
Apostles.‖516 
 
The text is deeply rooted in the traditional perception of mission as an outside 
activity organised from outside and accomplished by outside missionary agents. 
The text here in analysis presents, implicitly, this contrast between the Christian 
society and the mission field when it states the ―…arrival and reception of the Mill 
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Hill priests in Uganda.‖517 And it describes the gradual springing up of new mission 
stations in the Vicariate and what they are now as a result of the work of the 
successors of these very same men, who bring out forcibly the powerful influence 
of missionary endeavour.‖518 The text portrays the work in the Vicariate as the 
work of the Missionaries for it states that ―….there are whole regions still untrod 
by missionary feet, and generations of missionaries in a still unreckoned future will 
come and open up new stations in much the same way as the first men from Mill 
Hill opened up Nsambya and Nagalama.‖519 In discussing the subject of 
maintaining the vigour of the missionary work in the Vicariate, the text confirms 
that ―… a request was sent to Mill Hill for more men,‖520 and that ―…as many 
priests as possible were selected from the annual ordination groups.‖521 While 
talking about the health condition of priests in the Vicariate, the author talks of 
sending home those who are sick and weakened by missionary work to recuperate 
but gives a condition that he gets ―…other priests to take their places first...‖522 
This practice of mission could be understood in the dominant paradigm of mission 
at the time which considered mission in terms of social contrast. In this approach, 
Christian mission was conceived of mainly in geographical terms. Mission consisted 
in crossing geographic frontiers for the purpose of taking the gospel from the 
‗Christian West‘ to the mission fields of the ‗non-Christian world,‘ the heathen. 
 
However, despite the above developments, there are some subliminal discourses in 
the text which are very critical to the understanding of the success of Christian 
mission in the Ugandan Church. These are not so pronounced but they could be 
considered the protagonists of mission history in Uganda. In giving, for instance, 
the origins of Nagalama mission, the text outlines the work already done by the 
catechists: ―For some months three native catechists had been teaching there. Four 
hundred catechumens living in the midst of Protestants gave every evidence of 
their good-will and desire to become Catholics.‖523 In recounting the events 
surrounding the opening of new mission stations in some districts, the text 
observes that ―All the chiefs were very friendly.‖524 In the following pages, it 
continues to register the position and the contribution of the Catechists in the 
success of the mission when it states that: Helping these fathers is a regiment of 
native catechists through whom the work is spread further afield.‖525 And it gives 
evidence when it states that ―…and in the most out of the way places (one) will 
meet natives wearing medals of Our Lady, which they got from some catechists.‖526 
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The text gives a universal presence of this institution of Catechists when it claims 
that, ―…Catechists are at work in all the countries between Nsambya, the capital, 
and Fovera, the most northerly point of the vicariate, and in many an isolated 
village of the beaten track….a continual droning may be heard where children are 
gathered round a catechist who is teaching them their prayers and the words of the 
catechism.‖527 Evidence in the text of the local agency in the success of mission in 
Uganda is reported in the work of the native nuns as well. The text reports that 
―Four of these nuns have been at work in the Nkokonjeru mission for the past six 
months. They do the school work, visit the nearest catechumenates and villages, to 
find out the children of school age, visit those who are inclined to be slack, etc. 
Being themselves Baganda, they have a marked influence on the people, who really 
respect them, and their quiet control over noisy groups of school children is 
wonderful.‖528 The text goes on to recognise the work of the sisters when it claims 
that ―…preparations are being made in other Uganda missions, for the reception of 
more and more members of the native sisterhood.‖529 This observation resonates 
well with the texts from the White Fathers which gives the details of the emergence 
of the local mission agents as it notes that ―The missionaries began withdrawing 
from certain regions where the Church had enough indigenous personnel.‖530 
 
Conclusion 
 
The mission texts that we have described (section 1) and analysed (section 2) in this 
chapter constitute and are constituted by the early missionary period in Uganda. 
These texts are rooted in a missionary paradigm that was informed by the 
philosophical and anthropological distinction between ―civilized‖ and ―primitive‖ 
people of the time. Although the Catholic natives identified themselves saying ―we 
are cured‖, ―we are healed‖, and the missionaries noted ―absence of wildness‖ 
among them, the social relation between the missionaries and the natives was not a 
relation between equals. Native catechists and nuns were identified as ―helpers‖ of 
the fathers, but a dialogue or conversation in the sense of Rorty was not yet within 
the missionaries‘ horizon. 
 
For Richard Rorty conversation is built on anti-foundationalist principles where 
―the good kind of prophet thinks of herself as just someone who has a better idea, 
on an epistemological par with the people... Good prophets say that if we all got 
together and did such and such, we would probably like the results. They paint 
pictures of what this brighter future would look like, and write scenarios about how 
it might be brought about.‖531 This is the basis of conversation. He contrasts this 
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with the other ―...prophet, the kind who thinks herself the voice of something 
bigger and more authoritative than the possible consequences of the application of 
her ideas.‖532 This is the foundationalist claim where prophets think of themselves 
as not just one more voice in the conversation, but as the representative of 
something that is somehow more than another such voice.533  
 
This is what formed the early mission paradigm in Uganda with its sharp categories 
and differences that considered the people in Uganda as subjects of mission work 
and civilisation rather than as active participants in their own process of missionary 
practice. However, there was a growing appreciation of ―Catholic natives‖ who 
―manifested intelligence‖ and ―native catechists‖ who were considered to be 
―helpers of the missionaries‖ in propagating the true faith. 
 
We have conducted the analysis in this chapter with conversation as our sensitizing 
concept. At this stage we cannot adequately describe what conversation as mission 
model would entail. But certainly we would draw upon the notion of conversation 
as Rorty used it in his ideal of ‗keeping the conversation going.‘534 In the next 
chapter, we shall describe and analyse pastoral documents of Kampala Archdiocese 
yet again with conversation as the sensitizing concept. 
 
 
  
                                                          
532 Ibid., 722. 
533 Ibid., 724. 
534 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 377, 378. 
141 
  Chapter Four: 
  Mission Concepts in the present: A Discourse Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the main emphasis is placed on describing and analysing mission 
practice in Kampala Archdiocese as reflected in the official church texts. This 
covers the contemporary period when the Church is under the stewardship of the 
indigenous episcopate and clergy as the foremost mission agents. The texts in our 
analysis are basically from Kampala Archdiocese because it represents the earliest 
missionary movements in Uganda as far back as the 19th century. But the present 
Kampala Archdiocese was erected in 1966 after the merger of the former 
Archdiocese of Lubaga which was being administered by the Missionaries of Africa 
(White Fathers), and a part of the former Kampala diocese which was under the 
administration of the Mill Hill Missionaries.535 The Archdiocese boasts of this 
double heritage which forms and informs the basis of her mission practice today.  
 
The present Kampala Archdiocese has had three Archbishops since its inception. 
These are: His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga (1966-1990), His Eminence 
Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala (1990-2006) and His Grace Cyprian Kizito Lwanga 
(2006- to date). As any bishop in the Church, the Archbishop of Kampala is bound 
by the laws of the Church as stipulated in the Code of Canon Law which states 
that: ―A diocesan bishop in the diocese entrusted to him has all ordinary, proper, 
and immediate power which is required for the exercise of his pastoral function 
except for cases which the law or a decree of the Supreme Pontiff reserves to the 
supreme authority or to another ecclesiastical authority.‖536 In order to exercise well 
the pastoral office and fulfil her mission, the archdiocese has held two major 
diocesan synods in 1989 and 2006537 and the archbishops past and present have 
published some pastoral letters to guide the Christians on matters of great concern 
to their life as Christians. In this chapter therefore, we shall concentrate on reading 
and analysing these texts focusing on the vocabulary used and the social identities 
and social relations therein. Furthermore, in this chapter, we shall apply the method 
of critical discourse analysis, as proposed by Norman Fairclough, in reading and 
analysing these texts under consideration. The texts that are described in the first 
section are: (1) A Catholic‟s Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006: Grassroots 
Evangelization, (2) A Pastoral letter: You are the Salt of the earth, the light of the world, by 
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Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, (3) Archdiocese of Kampala: The five year Pastoral Strategic 
Plan 2010-2014, and (4) The Pastoral Letter: Partnership for the Gospel of Archbishop 
Cyprian Kizito Lwanga. In the second section the Five Year Strategic Plan is 
analysed in detail. 
 
1. Description of pastoral documents 
 
In this section, I will describe Kampala Archdiocesan pastoral documents written 
either as pastoral letters of bishops or as synodal resolutions or as pastoral strategic 
plans. These documents outline the policies and pastoral programs of the 
Archdiocese and they may be correctly referred to as the policy-reference-
documents of the Archdiocese as far as pastoral practice and programs and actions 
are concerned. These documents are designed and addressed particularly to the 
local church of Kampala Archdiocese as the main audience of their consumption. 
The texts described here are written mainly in English which, together with 
Luganda, are the two languages officially adopted for use in the archdiocese. The 
choice of these languages reflects the interaction between the national language 
policy that adopted English as the official language and Luganda as the language of 
the region in which the archdiocese is found. And the two languages are spoken 
widely in the area under consideration. 
 
A Catholic’s Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006 
In 2006, Kampala Archdiocese convened the 6th synod in its 40 years of existence 
and the synodal resolutions were promulgated on August 15, 2006. Unlike the 
previous synods, the 2006 synod had a different arrangement of the synodal 
resolutions, into three parts each with subparts under it. The major divisions are: 
(a) the Sanctifying Office of the Church, (b) the Teaching Office of the Church and 
(c) the Governing Office of the church. This division is rooted in the 
understanding of the baptismal grace which incorporates the baptised person in the 
threefold ministry of Christ as Priest (Sanctifier), King (Leader) and Prophet 
(Teacher). The 2006 synod wanted to go back to the basics of Christian life as 
founded in baptism and this explains why the main theme was Grassroots 
Evangelisation. This implied going back to baptism, that primordial sacrament that 
initiates one in the Christian life in which one is grafted in the godhead of Christ. 
The synodal resolutions were all written, primarily, in English with a glossary of 
Luganda words used in the text. The document has a brief introduction by 
Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala who was the Archbishop by then. He presents to the 
Christians the resolutions of the synod with a call on all to hold the responsibility 
of working on deepening the faith in oneself and in others.  
 
The first part is titled ―The sanctifying office of the Church‖ and has nine sections. 
The first section describes the liturgy because it is considered as ―the summit 
toward which the activity of the Church is directed; at the same time it is the 
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fountain from which all the Church‘s power flows.‖538 The second section outlines 
the work and role of Catechists. The third section illustrates the apostolate of 
Catholic health facilities and the policy to guide them. The fourth section gives 
details about the role and work of Caritas in the Church and its biblical foundation. 
The fifth section deals with the Pontifical Missionary Societies and their 
contribution in the work of evangelisation. The sixth section deals with Lay 
Apostolate Movements in the work of deepening religion and directing Christians 
travelling on the theme of the word of God in their daily lives. The seventh section 
talks about Ecumenism in the effort of cooperation with Christians of other 
denominations. The eighth section talks about Marriage and Family life as the basis 
of the church and human society. The ninth section is about the mass media 
communication as a means of the church to fulfil her mission by proclaiming the 
gospel, to build and spread the kingdom of God. 
 
In the second part, ―The Teaching Office of the Church‖ the stress is laid on the 
prophetic ministry of the church and how to realise the same in the concrete 
pastoral practices. It is divided into four parts. The first section is about the 
teaching of Catechism where this duty is given to every baptised person but 
primarily starting with parents since the family is described as the primordial 
church. Others named in this duty are bishops, priests, the religious, catechists and 
teachers. The second section is about Christian education and this is contextualised 
in schools and as a consequence a teacher is considered the right hand of the 
church in matters pertaining to education. The third section sketches out the 
priestly and religious vocations. It maintains that the priestly vocation stems out of 
the Christian vocation in the sacrament of baptism and a Catholic is chosen to 
share in the priesthood of Christ the head, to feed the church with the word and 
sacraments. Whereas a religious is a man or woman determined to follow Christ 
and to be his witness in the world in obedience, poverty, and evangelical chastity. 
The fourth section outlines the relationship between the youth and the church. 
This section looks different from the rest because the title seems to suggest a 
rupture as in the text it says that young people are asserting themselves very 
strongly and are also exerting a lot of influence. The church therefore cannot 
ignore their importance. The document proposes an engagement with the youth in 
a friendly dialogue so that they may assist them through sound advice and guidance 
to develop them and to participate in apostolic work.539 
 
The third part titled ―The governing Office of the Church‖ with eight sections 
intends to develop the common vision of leadership in the church without 
distinction between laity and clergy. The first section outlines the roles of pastoral 
councils. It highlights the developments that came up with the merger of the lay 
apostolate councils and the parish and archdiocesan councils to form one pastoral 
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council comprising the clergy and laity so as to carry out pastoral activities 
smoothly. The second section deals with politics and it exhorts and encourages all 
the citizens to be mindful of their rights and duty to work hard and actively by 
participating in the service of their nation without claiming that politics is none of 
my concern. The third section deals with finances because the church as the body 
of Christ needs money to be able to fulfil her apostolate. The fourth section is 
about land which is considered to fall within the church‘s inherent right and full 
authority to acquire, retain, administer and sell temporal goods independently 
aiming at fulfilling her mission.540 And land as a temporal good of the church must 
be strictly preserved and properly used. The text gives the four categories of land in 
the archdiocese: 1. Freehold, 2. Mailoland, 3. Leaseland and 4. Plots. It goes into 
the details of the challenges about land, the policy to guide land matters and the 
strategies to develop the land available. Section five is about cemeteries and places 
where our friends are buried. It gives the teaching of the church about cemeteries, 
the challenges and the policy that would guide the use of cemeteries in the 
archdiocese. Section six is about construction as a very important aspect of the life 
of the church for it gives the church a visible presence in society. The types of 
buildings mentioned that must be taken care of in this department are: The Church, 
the Priests House, Houses for the religious, parish hall, health centre and schools. 
All these buildings must be approved by the archbishop before they are put up. 
Section seven gives the synodal resolutions and recommendations from each of the 
fourteen departments. Section eight is the appendix indicating the delegates to the 
synod and their different backgrounds. 
 
You are the Salt of the Earth, the light of the World 
This is a pastoral letter written by His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala in 
preparation for the February 2001 general elections. It opens with a greeting in the 
name of Our Lord Jesus Christ and addressed to ―all of you my brothers and 
sisters: Priests, Religious men and women, lay people in the Catholic Church.‖541 
Then he equally greets all peace loving Ugandans with whom we share faith in 
God, the Creator of us all.  
 
It is divided into four sections. The first section is titled: A challenging moment in 
the history of our country. He opens this section with an apparent general 
consensus that ―we all agree that we are living through a challenging time both in 
the world and in Uganda.‖542 And with this fact, he detaches himself from all the 
rest and considers it his responsibility to ―help the Christian faithful and the people 
of goodwill to reflect upon various issues and trends which are relevant to us today 
as citizens of this country.‖543 Although he indicates that he is to reflect on various 
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issues and trends, he highlights only ―the forthcoming Presidential and 
parliamentary elections‖544 and he observes that there is already rising interest 
among the electorate and the candidates.  
 
Section two is titled: Recalling Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka‘s Pastoral Letter on 
―Church and State.‖545 In this section, he likens the period in which he is writing 
this letter with the period preceding Uganda‘s independence in 1962. Archbishop 
Joseph Kiwanuka wrote a pastoral letter on ―Church and State‖ as the guiding 
principle for the people of that time. He states that it left a deep impression in him 
and hence suggests that 40 years later it may offer good guidance. He points out 
that the Archbishop was a prophet because he announced that our country would 
go through many types of governments. He laments that we have lost so much 
time and energies for development and have roamed in darkness; he questioned if 
it is not that we have thrown our faith in God and our religious values out of 
political endeavours? He notes that to realise the development of the people and to 
serve the common good there is a need for a deep sense of justice which is one of 
the fruits in our life of our faith in God. And so to prepare a better society, there 
must be a spirit of conversion and renewal. In light of the above, he mentions a 
number of actors in Uganda‘s political life. First, he mentions the political 
candidates and what it means to be a candidate for a political office. Secondly, the 
electorate with whom he identifies by saying that ―our lack of sufficient and 
objective civic education leads us to be unaware of our role and power through our 
vote.‖546 But he also speaks away from them when he says that ―the electorate 
should be educated to be responsible and to ask constantly accountability from 
their representatives.‖547 Thirdly, he talks about the participation of the people 
when he calls upon each voter to remind himself or herself that it is an inalienable 
right to participate responsibly in the life of our country. He mentions the qualities 
of good, honest, courageous politicians and also committed people who know their 
rights and duty to participate actively in the life of the nation.‖548 
 
On the relationship between religion and politics, Church and State, he recalls the 
age-old song sung by some people claiming with such catchphrases ―keep religion 
out of politics;‖ ―take religion out of our schools;‖ ―religious leaders should leave 
politicians alone‖; as religion is seen as a factor of division, limit it to the private 
sphere of the life of the people.‖ In an apparent reply to the above with what he 
has called a song, he provides a few guidelines about the relationship between 
religion and politics. First, he outlines the main task of the government as enabling 
people to live in peace, in harmony and to enjoy their rights. He describes the 
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government as ‗good‘ when it does whatever to build a society where there is peace, 
where the rights of everyone and of all are respected and promoted, where all are 
given opportunity to participate and exercise their responsibilities, with an economy 
serving the whole community regardless of status. As for the Church, it actualises 
the constitutional mandate of the freedom of worship which he says Ugandans 
would take advantage of to serve well their God and their countrymen as true 
believers in God. As a consequence, faith should be reflected in society when true 
believers will promote the gospel values through their practical contribution to the 
betterment of the society. So, the relationship between Church and State should be 
guided by mutual respect and a fruitful collaboration, as both are serving the same 
human person and society as a whole. The Church and State have distinct services 
to offer and a particular mission to fulfil in society and therefore he calls on each 
institution to value and acknowledge each other‘s distinct role.  
 
He contends that as the church does her work motivated by her faith in God, so 
also the civil rulers must do fulfil their obligations. He thinks that because civil 
rulers serve human beings made in the image of God, so they must feel bound by 
the laws of God, so relate all their activities to God. This has consequences for if a 
ruler even when engaged in state duties and neglect to concern himself with 
religion, he would be openly violating God‘s law and would not achieve the end for 
which he was created as well as that for which the country he governs was created. 
Then faith and religion have an obvious role to play in strengthening good morals 
among peoples including rulers. So, no politician could dissociate himself/herself 
from religion or its principles without incurring guilt or committing a scandal. He 
indicates that the country needs leaders who could set themselves as examples for 
the people they lead, with the courage to show their faith and to witness its values. 
The values that he seems to propose are reported in the negative: not condoning 
immorality such as corruption, abortion, homosexuality, or any other forms of 
behaviour which he considers contrary and offensive to both God‘s law and to our 
own culture.  
 
In section three, he highlights the kind of government needed in Uganda today. But 
before that, he provides as a background to achieve this kind of government, the 
people‘s knowledge about their rights and duties regarding elections, and their 
responsibility to promote and choose the government they want. Here, he takes a 
position to speak with authority and makes an urgent appeal to all to register and to 
promote and participate in the civic education, so that every person may cast 
his/her vote being properly enlightened about such responsibilities.549 In his view, 
he mentions some of the features of a good government which he considers very 
important. He mentions these features as exemplary leadership to society, general 
economic empowerment of the community, integral development of individuals, 
improving on the quality of life of the people, promoting justice based on social 
                                                          
549 Ibid., 11. 
147 
equity and harmony, work for peace within and outside Uganda‘s borders, 
committed to advocate for laws that advance moral rehabilitation and instil a sense 
of unity in order to achieve the common good.  
 
In the fourth and last section, he suggests practical proposals on how to prepare 
for the elections. The following are the practical guidelines he suggested to the 
country in order to prepare for the 2001 elections: First, there is need for proper 
civic education given by well-intentioned, committed and competent people; the 
people have to go for registration; potential leaders must be identified and 
encouraged to offer themselves to stand for election; and finally the right to vote 
for any candidate must be guided by principles. The underlines the following 
principles in voting for any candidate: One who is God-fearing; one with high 
moral character and record; one who has a good understanding of what is right; 
one who is unselfish and committed to promote the Common Good; and finally 
one who is firm and objective with ability to judge with the criteria of justice and 
truth. 
 
In conclusion, he makes reference to the 1994 African Synod when the African 
Bishops identified the urgency to improve the administration of public affairs in 
the key areas of politics and economy in order to respond to the challenge of 
bringing peace and justice in Africa. He reinstates the appeal made earlier that 
Africa generally and Uganda in particular, needs politicians who are guided by a 
rightly formed conscience, politicians, who love their country and its people, 
politicians who like Christ are willing to serve rather than being served. In an 
apparent invitation to the people of Uganda to be free and make independent 
decisions, he ends with a quote from 1Peter 2:16 which states: ―You are slaves of 
no one except God, so behave like free people and never use your freedom as a 
cover for wickedness.‖ 
 
The pastoral Strategic Plan for Kampala Archdiocese (2010 - 2014) 
This is a document prepared to implement the synodal resolutions of both 
Kampala Archdiocese of 2006 and the Second Synod of Bishops for Africa 2009 
with the purpose of fostering Grassroots Evangelisation for the Church to be at 
the service of reconciliation, justice and peace. Further, according to the text, this is 
to help the church realise her identity of being the salt of the earth and light of the 
world (Matt. 15:13-14). It is specifically prepared for use in Kampala Archdiocese 
for a period of five years 2010-2014. It is divided into four parts with four 
appendices attached. 
 
Part one is divided into 3 sections with other numerous smaller subsections. 
Section one gives the heritage of the present Kampala Archdiocese. It outlines the 
history of the Archdiocese and gives the line of succession to the former 
Archdiocese of Rubaga and Kampala diocese, the two which were merged to form 
the present Kampala archdiocese. It narrates in brief the history of the archdiocese 
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with the names of the former and present archbishops and their contribution to the 
growth of the church in Kampala. Section two is devoted to the Uganda Martyrs 
singling out their contribution in creating a positive image about Uganda in Africa 
and all over the world. The martyr are given special mention and inclusion in this 
section of our heritage because they were not clerics but their faith is talked about 
as has having set a formidable example which is may be taken as the basis for 
grassroots evangelization as the theme which was adapted by the 2006 synod of the 
archdiocese. The martyrs are presented as having a prominent role to play in the 
life of the Ugandan church and hence the text goes on to outline the contributions 
of the past Bishops in promoting the devotion to the Ugandan Martyrs. The text 
recalls the 2006 synod and the need ―to bring the Martyrs in the life of the faithful, 
to promote their devotion especially through an amended Uganda Martyrs Guild 
which shall be the umbrella organ for the Catholic lay apostolate as a strategy for 
Grassroots Evangelization.‖550 In the last section, the text gives a cursory look at 
the archdiocesan synod of 2006 whose theme ―Grassroots Evangelisation‖ rhymes 
with the second synod for Africa whose theme: The Church in Africa in service to 
Reconciliation, Justice and peace is equivalent to Grassroots Evangelisation. The 
text sees the two synods as having in common an urgent need, at this historic 
moment, of an on-going in-depth Grassroots Evangelization.  
 
In section two, special mention is made of the challenges faced today especially the 
accelerating pace of change, the numbers and complexity of mushrooming sects, 
poverty, superstitions and witchcraft. With this background, a suggestion is made 
to develop a renewed sense of direction for the future, ―....we need therefore to 
revise our methods of evangelisation if we are to remain relevant and faithful to the 
church‘s mission in this changing world.‖551 The Pastoral strategic plan as outlined 
in part two, gives concrete steps in realising the synodal acts and resolutions which 
would be accompanied by a process of transformation for the whole archdiocese of 
Kampala, its staff, its structures, its systems and its management and this plan has 
as its goal to attempt to address all these mentioned issues and respond to them.552 
 
The last section gives, in a summary form, six challenges and their proposed 
responses. The mentioned challenges end part one and their direct solution is to be 
found in the Pastoral Strategic Plan which opens the following part and it is noted 
that in order to face these challenges, the pastoral strategic plan must be effected. 
 
Part two presents the Pastoral Strategic Plan with three sections. In section one; the 
text gives the pastoral framework which provides the guidelines for all the work of 
evangelisation in the archdiocese. It provides a common vision for Grassroots 
Evangelisation in Kampala archdiocese and this vision is found in the motto of the 
archbishop of Kampala: Ora et Labora (St. Benedict) Ut Habeant Vitam (Jn.10:10) 
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and it is explained as: Pray and work so that they may have life in its fullness. This 
implies that all activities done in the Kampala Archdiocese must reflect a spiritual 
and social development of the people, having in minded what Christ said in 
reference to being a good shepherd.553 So, the vision of the archdiocese is set by the 
archbishop as presented in his motto. However, at this point a distinction is made 
between the mission of Kampala archdiocese and its vision. The mission statement 
of Kampala archdiocese is identified with the mission of the entire church as 
explicated in the gospel text of Mark: Go into the whole world and preach the 
gospel to the whole world (Mk 16:15). The text goes into details of fulfilling this 
mission with pledges to play a leading role in the socio-pastoral mission of the 
Catholic Church through the spreading of the gospel in its entirety of solidarity and 
social justice. Four ways are suggested in carrying out this mission: (a) providing a 
forum for dialogue and exchange of ideas among all agents of evangelisation; (b) 
helping the faithful at all levels to build their capacity through education and on-
going formation; (c) acting as a voice or advocate for the cause of the poor at the 
local council levels and enable them to be their own advocates; (d) facilitating both 
pastoral and social cooperation within the parishes and archdiocesan departments. 
In all this, the understanding is that the mission statement should capture the 
essence and purpose of the Catholic Church in accordance with the vision.  
 
In order to realise grassroots evangelisation, there is a need for affirming the 
identity, values and principles of the Catholic Church. As for the identity of the 
Catholic Church, the emphasis is placed on the symbol of the crucified Lord and of 
his resurrection which gives strength and hope for the future.554 As a consequence 
all church buildings, schools, health units, presbyteries, religious houses and 
families shall have crucifixes, photos of the Pope and that of the diocesan ordinary. 
The archdiocese as a conference of families, small Christian communities, parishes, 
schools and health units shall draw inspiration from the Holy Scriptures, tradition 
and social teaching of the church as well as the lived experiences of those served. 
Also mentioned as important is being receptive to the signs of the times and adapt 
new working methods, structures, actions so as to meet challenges of the new 
millennium and also striving to be a befitting family of God working in a united 
way to transform the world. Intrinsically, the objective is expressed in the wish 
―...to position ourselves strategically so that we have an impact on society, in our 
present times and in the years to come.‖555 In working as a Church, there are some 
guiding principles and values which are noted as important and hence to be 
followed strictly. These are listed as (a) dignity of the human person, (b) Option for 
the poor, (c) the universal destination of the earth‘s good, (d) solidarity and (e) 
stewardship.  
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But above all there are three basic guiding principles for Grassroots Evangelisation. 
These basic guiding principles described here, are an attempt to theorise the 
pastoral approach of Grassroots Evangelisation as envisioned in the archdiocesan 
synod of 2006. First is the Sanctifying Principle. There are three elements here 
described. One, that the Church will make use of the already provided deposit of 
Holy Scriptures, Tradition, the Catechism of the Catholic Church and Church law. 
And agents of evangelisation must be an example to all believers in their way of 
speaking and behaving and expressing their love, faith and purity. They should as 
well, take great care about what they do and what teach (2Tim 4:12-16). Two, the 
potential of Grassroots Evangelisation comes as a result of ―...the ability to identify 
issues at the grassroots level, to organise reflection and analysis at all levels and 
then initiate action simultaneously at the small Christian Community level, Sub-
Parish, Parish, Deanery, Pastoral zones and archdiocesan levels.‖556 And three, 
subsidiarity as the principle of respect for local autonomy for all activities at local 
level while pursuing the common vision and mission.  
 
Second is the Teaching Principle. This principle is scantily developed but it only 
notes in passing that ―....as we teach others, we should as well learn from our 
weaknesses, from new trends and promote development. And that as ever learners, 
greater emphasis be placed on becoming a learning church local church in terms of 
deepening the faith, sharing experiences and ideas and on transforming what is 
learnt into action.‖557 
 
Third is the Governing Principle which is demonstrated with five aspects for its 
proper realisation. One is development: The understanding of development is 
modelled on Paul VI‘s encyclical “Populorum Progressio” where development is 
interpreted as the new name for peace. This understanding implies that 
development must encompass integral development in its political, economic and 
cultural aspects. The pursuit of development goals is to promote the dignity of the 
human person. And in the archdiocese of Kampala these would involve initiating 
Caritas activities and programmes at parish level and seek increasingly to integrate 
evangelisation, development, reconciliation, peace building, human rights activities, 
disaster preparedness and emergency response. However, the omission of spiritual 
values in the understanding of development remains unaccounted for and it could 
imply that either development could not be guided by spiritual values or that 
culture could embody what is spiritual as well. Two is partnership. This is 
understood as a long term commitment to agreed objectives based on shared 
values, strategies and information. Partnership is motivated by the fact that the 
Catholic Church is a big family of local churches spread all over the world. This 
reality suggests that there must be relationships based on mutual respect, trust and 
good will. The pastoral plan makes a firm resolve that ―we shall strengthen the 
existing partnerships between the Archdiocese of Kampala with the Pontifical 
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Missionary Societies, with other dioceses in the world, with the Caritas 
confederation, with Catholic and non-Catholic organisation that promote 
development, justice and peace, education, social and pastoral activities.‖558 
 
However, on a local level, the pastoral plan urges only developing close working 
relations, not partnerships, with Catholic and Christian Churches under the Uganda 
Joint Christian Council and the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda. The rationale is 
that these two bodies share in the vision of peaceful co-existence and combating 
HIV/AIDS. Three: stewardship of resources. This derives from the fact that those 
engaged in the work of Grassroots evangelisation, have the resources at their 
disposal which have been entrusted to their care. So, there is an obligation at all 
times to be transparent and accountable, to the people, the church and to one 
another. Four, is strengthening capacity of the local communities from the 
grassroots to the Archdiocesan levels so as to deliver effective programs and 
services to all members of the faithful. This is to be achieved by improving 
stewardship of resources, strengthen management and leadership skills at all levels 
and use new technology in administration. Five: witnessing the faith not only in 
words but also in deeds especially in the area of visible faith, openness, 
transparency and accountability.  
 
Section two of the pastoral strategic plan spells out the pastoral roles and goals for 
the commissions. It states that in the work of Grassroots evangelisation, six central 
roles will be assumed. These roles as enumerated are to form the essential content 
of the work of the commissions and their end as well. Role one: forum for 
Grassroots Evangelisation. This intends to provide a forum for Grassroots 
Evangelisation at various levels so that all become the salt and light of the world 
(Mt.5:13-14) with the objective of enabling local communities to deepen their faith, 
promote dialogue, share ideas, learn from each other and support their efforts. To 
achieve this, there would be a forum for each of the agents of evangelisation 
namely the clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the seminarians, the 
novices and the laity under various categories. This forum will address the 
challenge of fidelity and relevancy to the church‘s Mission and People‘s ownership 
of the church.559 Role two, Organisational development from the grassroots to the 
archdiocesan level: With the resources based upon the Holy scriptures, the Catholic 
Social teaching and canon law, there would be capacity building of the archdiocesan 
leadership at all levels streamlining the various roles each category plays in the 
various communities.560 This is to confirm continuity and harmony in the process 
of evangelisation. The third role: education, particularly promoting the education 
project of the Uganda Episcopal Conference. This role is based on the fact that the 
Church has Christ‘s mandate who commissioned his Apostles to go to the world 
and teach all Nations (Mt. 28:18-20) and also an epistemological allusion that 
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knowledge is power. These two facts would be the motivation to strengthen the 
education system in all church schools so as to form the children into good leaders 
both in the church and in civil society taking into consideration religious education, 
formal education and vocational skills. The fourth role, advocacy and capacity 
building sketches ways to fight various forms of poverty from the grassroots. It 
specifies the resolve to build commitment among the agents of evangelisation and 
among policy makers with the objective of eliminating poverty and injustice. It 
names those to be trained in advocacy action as those at Archdiocesan and District 
levels, Parish and L.C. levels. And the content of training would involve advocacy 
skills, organise people in Basic Christian Communities or Community Based 
Organisations to promote Grassroots evangelisation, food security, savings and 
credit scheme. It includes promoting Home Improvement Scheme in collaboration 
with organisations that offer this service. The fifth role is Health Issues and there is 
a particular stress laid on HIV/AIDS and other killer diseases. The main 
programmes outlined here is organise diocesan, zonal, deanery and parish levels to 
fight the spread of HIV/AIDS and other killer diseases at the grassroots. And the 
sixth role is Construction, Maintenance and rehabilitation of all church institutions. 
The primary concern here is that all church institutions are well maintained and 
rehabilitated whenever and wherever it is necessary. For construction plans for new 
churches, presbyteries, schools, and health units, approval for such undertaking 
must be sought first from archdiocesan authorities. The main objective is to have a 
common standard and policy on all construction; maintenance and rehabilitation 
work on all church buildings. 
 
Section three of the pastoral strategic plan aims at achieving the pastoral goals for 
the commissions to strengthen the faith as per the baseline survey 
recommendation. Between May-October 2007 Kampala Archdiocese 
commissioned a baseline survey whose report was released in December 2007. It 
was conducted by Winsor Consult Ltd, a Development Consultants company 
based in Kampala. The survey was part of the process for the preparation of the 
Archdiocese Strategic Plan spearheaded by the Archbishop of Kampala the Most 
Rev. Cyprian Kizito Lwanga. The survey covered, inter alia, basic data on all 
parishes in the Diocese, Government of Uganda key statistics on the local 
governments that form the diocese, and findings resulting from primary and 
secondary data. Other findings of the Survey such as those relating on 
understanding the Catholic Doctrine, traditional religiosity of paganism, Liturgy 
and Spirituality, and Pentecostalism. The general objective of the baseline survey 
was to establish baseline data within the framework of the three operating 
commissions; Teaching Office, Governing Office, and sanctifying office. The 
survey aimed at taking stock of the existing situation/modes of service delivery in 
each of the three pastoral zones of the Archdiocese namely; Kampala, Mitala Maria, 
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and Wakiso, with the overall purpose of contributing to the realization of the goals 
of Kampala Archdiocese Strategic Plan.561 
 
The survey recommendations have been grouped according to the six goals as 
pursued by the archdiocese in the five-year pastoral strategic plan. Each 
recommendation has achievable objectives with the actions required to realise 
them. The first recommendation: Forum for Grassroots Evangelisation of the three 
commissions. This has four objectives. (a) It aims at organising forums for the 
pastoral and social development activities such as teaching catechesis and liturgy at 
households, basic Christian community, schools and institutional levels. Also 
included are SACCOS, Micro-credit schemes, and Good Samaritan groups. (b) 
Guide children and youth to effectively undertake their apostolate since they hold 
the future. (c) Educate Catholics on Church Marriage; mixed marriage (interfaith) 
and customary marriages and explore options for strengthening married couples in 
each parish. (d) Promoting regular orientation and training of catechists. The 
second recommendations: Organisational development from the grassroots to the 
archdiocesan level. It states six goals to achieve. (a) Develop a five-year strategic 
plan that is well costed with clear directions, goals and objectives. (b) Create 
avenues for professional development and motivation of the clergy, the religious 
and Catechists to facilitate them perform beyond their clerical mandate. (c)Insist in 
hiring technically trained and competent personnel to manage specific archdiocesan 
departments and projects. (d) Develop an elaborate monitoring and evaluation 
framework for the archdiocese to effectively capture progress. (e) Develop an 
effective Management Information System for the archdiocese. (f) Develop key 
policy and administrative manuals to streamline organisational development at all 
level. The third recommendation is: Education and Promotion of the Catholic 
formation in the archdiocese. This outlines five goals to achieve: (a) strengthen the 
coordination and partnerships with both central and local governments as a 
mechanism for maintaining adequate and positive influence in all Catholic founded 
Educational institutions. (b)Put in place or strengthen the Catholic founded Head 
Teachers‘ Association in the entire archdiocese. (c) Increase the Catholic Church‘s 
visibility in all Catholic Founded educational institutions. (d)Develop a sector based 
strategic plan for education to align its priorities and focus on the Ugandan 
Government education strategic investment plan and policy. (e) Review the 
composition and suitability of the Catholic Church‘s representation on all the 
current School Management committees and Board of Governors. The fourth 
recommendation: Advocacy and capacity building to fight various forms of poverty 
from the Grassroots. There are two things to note here, one, that advocacy is done 
at various levels and each level may require unique approaches and two, that 
capacity to fight poverty should also be understood within the framework of 
mobilising, encouraging and training all Agents of Evangelisation, Catholic 
structures, organisations to refocus energies, strategies and efforts towards poverty 
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eradication. The fifth recommendation is: Improved Health vis-a-vis HIV/AIDS 
and other killer diseases. Caritas Kampala is particularly singled out in this venture 
to step up its mandate to sensitize and mobilize all Catholics about the killer 
diseases using the media and available opportunities such as Sunday services, Radio 
Maria, Radio Sapientia. And the sixth recommendation is: Land Management, 
Construction, Maintenance and Rehabilitation of all Church structures. To achieve 
this goal there are two objectives: (a) Create an Archdiocesan Investment Advisory 
Board to guide investment thinking for the entire archdiocese and (b) Adopt and 
cascade the strategic planning culture. 
 
Part four is titled: Strengthening the Archdiocesan Grassroots Evangelisation. It 
has six sections in all. Section one titled ‗Strengthening the Pastoral Governance 
Structures‘ opens with a reference to the sentiments expressed in the synodal 
assembly related to the archdiocesan governance structures calling on them to be 
more accountable, better known to people and more streamlined.562 In order to 
improve upon the governance structures to be more streamlined and efficient, the 
following are proposed: the number of commissions is reduced to three, an 
Episcopal executive council is established, annual retreats and monthly 
recollections are be organised, hold weekly management meetings for departments, 
parishes, Schools and health units, equip archdiocesan commissions and other 
institutions with competent staff and modern equipment.563 
 
Section two is titled ‗building the image of the Catholic Church‘. This section is 
concerned with the image of the Church in the modern society where Radio, 
Television, the Internet and other means of electronic communication reach all 
corners of the earth and exert such influence on people‘s minds. In this situation, 
the pastoral plan calls for a coherent communication strategy which reflects the 
vision and mission, the guiding values and principles so as to witness and uphold 
the highest ethical standards while proclaiming to the people the gospel, work for 
justice and peace and social development.564 This is, first of all, to be achieved by 
recognising the identity of the leadership in the archdiocese as embedded in the 
motto and coat of arms of the archbishop of Kampala, which currently is: Ora et 
Labora: Ut habeant vitam (Jn.10:10). Secondly, there will be on-going formation or 
capacity building to focus on responding rapidly to the pastoral challenges posed by 
mushrooming sects, the media and African Traditional Religions. Thirdly, each 
department is to have a communications secretary, who, on a monthly basis will 
produce reports summarising key areas of work in each department.565 And there 
would be concerted efforts to strengthen the social communications group to 
promote IT, Print media, TV and other media outlets.  
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Section three dwells on the implementation of the synodal resolutions and the 
pastoral strategic plan. To correspond with the synodal theme ―grassroots 
evangelisation‖ of which the pastoral plan is its practical and concrete realisation, it 
is determined that its contents are made known and owned by the entire 
membership of the faithful within the Archdiocese.566 And for implementing these 
resolutions, the Pastoral cycle is suggested as a tool for use in this process. This is 
because the pastoral cycle was adopted by the 15th AMECEA Plenary Assembly in 
Dar-es-Salam as a way forward in the pastoral approach in handling and analysing 
issues. And the pastoral cycle recommended for use by all agents of evangelisation 
is one with three classic steps: See – Judge – Act. However, a clarification is made 
that the application of the pastoral cycle is for planning purposes only.567 
 
In the concluding section, there are some challenges pointed out about strategic 
planning. These are some people who recognised it as irrelevant, or related to 
government policy planning while others are put off by the complicated 
terminology used.568 But despite all the challenges, the strategic plan is considered 
as a guide in implementing the resolutions of the synod so that all may participate 
in the Grassroots Evangelisation for the better glory of God and for the apostolate 
which is the salvation of souls.569 There are four appendices attached to this 
Pastoral Strategic Plan. The first appendix is a table illustrating the Kampala 
Archdiocesan Administration570; the second illustrates the communication strategy 
in Kampala Archdiocese571; the third illustrates the Communication strategy in 
Kampala Archdiocesan Episcopal Zones572 and the fourth details the relevant 
agenda for commissions and department meetings, reports, activities and those 
responsible for their implementation.573 
 
Partnership for the Gospel 
This Pastoral letter was written on the occasion of the closing of the year of the 
priests in the Archdiocese of Kampala. It is a short letter written in English and 
Luganda with just 5 A5 pages of five sections running from A to E. At the 
beginning of the letter, there are identities of the people to whom the letter is 
addressed and these are the Priests, Religious and all people of God. However, in 
the body of the letter, the author abandons the schema of these identities and turns 
to a collective identity when he says: ―I dedicate this, my third Pastoral letter, to 
you all the People of God in the Archdiocese of Kampala.‖574 In order to place this 
letter in the perspective of continuity with the theme of the past year, he notes in 
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passing that the entire church has dedicated this past year as a Year of Prayer for 
Priests. The verb dedicate is used in two different ways: first, he uses it in reference 
to this particular letter as dedicated to all the people of God in Kampala 
Archdiocese and secondly, it is used in reference to the entire Church having 
dedicated the past year as a ―Year of Prayer for priests.‖ He highlights the 
importance of priests in the church noting that they represent Christ in the faith 
community of believers; they are ordained for others and act as mediators between 
mankind and God. Though he lauds the position of the priest as important, he 
cautions seriously against the failure to appreciate the presence of the people that 
the priest serves. As a consequence of that caution, he highlights the fact that 
―while the laity needs the priests, priests in their turn also needs the laity‖575 and so 
calling for mutual cooperation to exist between the two, he introduces the theme of 
the letter: Partnership for the Gospel. 
 
In the section B, he talks more of the experience from his personal priesthood in 
the first person with some identification with the people. He says: ―As a priest...i 
have felt something within me every time we concluded with the prayer for the 
priests at Holy Mass. I felt your prayers...‖576 He applies an ―I – You‖ relationship 
in addressing the people and in other instances he seems to speak for the priests as 
well in the I – We approach when he addresses the people as you. He said: ―I felt 
your prayers and love for me as you prayed for me and my fellow priests.‖577 He 
points at sickness as the lowest moment of a priest‘s life that the religious and laity 
have showed them love, care and support. He appreciates the encouraging 
collaboration that exists between the religious and laity and the priests in the 
pastoral ministry and social development initiatives.578 He makes his own the words 
of St. Paul to pray for the people for their partnership for the gospel.  
 
Section C dwells mainly on partnership for the gospel and he thanks God for the 
cooperation that exists between the priests and in a nominal mode he refers to 
those whom they work with in what St. Paul calls the Partnership for the Gospel.579 
He makes some observation about this partnership. First, he insists that 
cooperation between priests, religious and laity is not an option but a basic 
requirement as it is rooted in the Trinity. Second, cooperation improves unity and 
once united the purpose is surer and the impact more pronounced. Third, 
cooperation becomes a partnership for the gospel and fourth, cooperation is co-
responsibility in the cause of the gospel. He highlights the challenges that may 
come up since the church is a hierarchy, but he clarifies that the hierarchy 
emphasises responsibility for all categories for it is intended for the sanctification, 
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stability, and progress of the church since everyone is held responsible and hence 
partners for the sake of the gospel.580 
 
Section D is a prayer of trust to God who is the source of all good. He observes 
that as priests lead the community in prayer, celebrate mass and the sacraments and 
hence lead the people to a personal encounter with Jesus Christ,581 may the people 
reciprocate by continually lifting up the priests to God, affirming the partnership 
for the gospel. He makes a personal appeal to the laity to continually pray for 
priests whom he calls ―these men your brothers and mediators to God our 
Father.‖582 
 
Section E is the conclusion wishing God‘s choicest blessings and entrusting the 
people to the Blessed Virgin Mary our Mother and the Uganda Martyrs. He ends 
with his motto „ora et labora ut habeant vitam.‟583 
 
2. Analysis of Pastoral Documents 
 
In this section, I will analyse the ―Five Year Pastoral Strategic Plan: 2010-2014‖ 
using Norman Fairclough‘s three dimensional framework for analysing discourse. 
As we saw in Chapter two, in this framework, the first stage analyses discourse as 
linguistic practice (‗text‘)584 focussing on linguistic features and organisation of 
concrete instances of discourse. Other considerations would be choices and 
patterns in vocabulary, grammar, and cohesion and text structure. The second stage 
analyses discourse as discursive practice (‗interaction‘)585 that is discourse as 
something that is produced, circulated, distributed and consumed in society with 
particular attention given to speech acts, coherence and intertextuality, the three 
aspects that link a text to its context. The third stage analyses discourse as social 
practice (‗context‘)586 where the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in 
which discourse is a feature.  
 
The choice of this text is that it is more concrete and well adapted to the Kampala 
Archdiocesan pastoral context than the synodal resolutions of 1989 and 2006 
which are more generalised with less concrete contextual references. Therefore it is 
supposed to be more representative of the Archdiocesan pastoral context, mission 
practice, actions and programs and needs. The 2009 baseline survey findings as 
included in the strategic plan makes it a document that is designed to address actual 
context of Kampala Archdiocese and its mission objectives and goals. The other 
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pastoral documents described above are used in making an analysis of the 
discursive practice. 
 
Analysis of Linguistic Practice 
At the outset, the document was published in English and there has been no 
translation so far though the region in which it is used is predominantly a Luganda 
speaking area. A particular critical look at the title on the front cover page written 
in the upper case: Archdiocese of Kampala is in the genitive where the noun 
archdiocese modifies the noun Kampala587 to form one partitive noun as a 
mechanism of individuation. Since in Christianity, the term archdiocese indicates a 
juridical area in the structure of Church governance under the charge of the 
archbishop, the use of the possessive case is an implicit reference to the universality 
of the Church which transcends any local context but only understood and 
interpreted in the local context. So, it indicates interplay between the global and the 
local contexts. The choice of word arrangement may be motivated by ‗Grassroots 
Evangelisation‘ which is the centre-piece of the pastoral strategic plan. Again, as we 
stare critically at the title, the choice of words used suggests an encounter of two 
contexts and this carries several interpretations. First, it may imply the work of the 
Church in the evangelisation of Kampala. Two, it may imply that Kampala is a 
passive recipient of that evangelising activity. Three, it may suggest the pre-
eminence given to the norms, values, creeds and confessions that the term 
archdiocese, as an ecclesial term, represents over those of Kampala as the local 
context may suggest. The use of English as the main language of the text other 
than Luganda which is the mother language of the area in discussion suggests a 
linguistic encounter in the text with concepts drawn from both languages being 
used side by side.  
 
The second part of the title on the cover page, ―The five year pastoral strategic 
plan‖, indicates the limits this document imposes on its content. As for the time 
frame, it is specifically limited to five years (2010-2014) and for the activities; it is 
restricted to regulating pastoral activities. The pastoral strategic plan is best 
understood in the context of the term ‗pastoral‘. In ecclesiastical vocabulary, which 
is used in this document, the term ‗pastoral‘ refers to the image of the good 
shepherd who cares for his flock. This image is used for ministers or clerics, priests 
and bishops. In this text, the term ‗pastoral‘ is qualified by ‗strategic plan‘ which is a 
process by which guiding members of an organisation envisions its future and 
develop necessary procedures and operations to achieve that future.588 So the title 
on the cover page communicates the objective of the text which is the planning of 
pastoral activities in the Archdiocese of Kampala in the five year time frame. And 
the term Archdiocese of Kampala represents institutional power and structure or 
simply: the territory in which this takes place? ―In‖ would refer to place; ―of‖ 
would refer to actor.   
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On the title page, the strategic plan considers implementing the synodal resolutions 
of both Kampala Archdiocesan Synod of 2006 and the Second Synod of Bishops 
for Africa 2009. ‗Both‘ can be used in sentences as a pronoun, a conjunction or as 
an adjective. In this sentence it is used more as a pronoun because it ―talks of the 
synodal resolutions of both Kampala Archdiocesan synod of 2006 and the second 
African synod of 2009.‖589 The text also uses the compound noun ―grassroots 
evangelisation‖ as the theme of both synods. In this text, the use of the noun 
grassroots is qualified by another noun evangelisation. In most instances, this noun 
grassroots appears in plural and compound form as in grassroots mobilisation, 
grassroots communities, grassroots institutions, grassroots democracy, grassroots 
marketing, grassroots lobbying or grassroots campaigning. The noun grassroots has 
generally a rural-agricultural connotation, but it is a relative one. Since it is qualified 
by the noun evangelisation, its alternative in the context of Kampala Archdiocese 
would be ‗Basic Christian Community Evangelisation.‘590 In this instance, 
grassroots is alternative word for basic 
 
In the introduction while describing the beginnings of the Church in Uganda as 
owed to the Missionaries of Africa, the text uses the passive past participle verb 
‗was founded‘ by two Missionaries of Africa namely Fr. Simon Lourdel and Bro. 
Amans. And these are the only proper nouns given; moreover for the other 
missionaries who joined them, the text just notes in a disinterested passive voice 
phrase that, ―...four months later they were joined by three colleagues.‖591 The use 
of the noun missionaries in plural is in relation to the founding of the present 
Archdiocese of Kampala where the first group arrived on 17th February 1879. The 
noun archdiocese and the adjective archdiocesan are used commonly in the text 
and appear a total of 69 and 54 times respectively. It seems there is more 
institutional concern in the text than the individual persons. The text does not 
mention the recipients of the missionary activity it rather states ―....despite the 
difficulties they went through, the missionaries never gave up but got committed to 
Grassroots Evangelisation.‖592 This is what Faircough refers to as ―nominalisations 
that involve the omission of participants other than agents.‖593 This is so because 
nominalisation turns processes and activities into states and objects, and concretes 
into abstracts.  
 
In discussing the history of the present archdiocese, the text again uses a passive 
verb ―was erected‖ in 1966, and there is a consistent use of the noun archbishop in 
its singular form in relation to the noun archdiocese. The noun archbishop is used 
38 times in the text. It is used mainly in reference to the past and present 
archbishops and their contribution and work in the archdiocese of Kampala. But 
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again it could be noticed that the use of the noun archbishop is mostly used in the 
text in relation to the deep social nuances as those related to the identity of 
leadership of the archdiocese. The text gives ―the Motto and Coat of arms of the 
reigning archbishop‖594 as the definitive symbols of the identity of the leadership in 
the archdiocese.  
 
While discussing the beginning of the archdiocese the document speaks about the 
role of the Martyrs of Uganda. The text names the different archbishops in whose 
tenure; the devotion to the Uganda Martyrs has been greatly promoted and put as 
an important element in the life of the archdiocese. In this text, the Martyrs of 
Uganda can only be understood in relation to the archbishops of Kampala. The 
text describes in general how all the former archbishops promoted the devotion to 
the Martyrs of Uganda. The devotees of this devotion and the place in which this 
devotion took place are not mentioned. It is noticed that the text makes a reference 
to a practice and a process. In the first instance, when talking about the first 
Archbishop of Rubaga, Louis Joseph Cabana, the text uses an active verb in the 
past tense ―promoted‖ to refer to the practice of the devotion of the Uganda 
Martyrs. Secondly, when in this phrase the text makes a particular reference to ―the 
cause for the Canonisation of the Martyrs was intensified,‖595 this is used in 
reference to a process with particular events. Among the events mentioned, ―the 
Martyrs performed one of the miracles,‖596 after this affirmative the text goes into a 
narrative that archbishop Cabana ―called upon the faithful in the archdiocese to 
conduct a novena through the blessed martyrs of Uganda.‖597 The following 
sentence gives the purpose of the novenas as ―...seeking God‘s intervention for the 
miraculous cure of the two sisters,‖ and also the cause implied in the use of the 
noun cure ―...the sisters contracted bubonic plague from patients they were treating 
at Lubaga hospital.‖598 The following events are all reported in the active and 
passive voices: ―God answered their prayers....‖ and ―...the sisters got cured 
miraculously,‖ and after the cure ―....the good news was sent to Rome‖ ―....and 
Rome asked a Muslim medical doctor‖, the doctor examined the sisters and 
testified....and finally to end the process Pope Paul VI canonised the 22 Uganda 
Martyrs.‖599 
 
The text uses the phrase ―...he too promoted the devotion of the Uganda 
Martyrs‖600 in reference to two Archbishops: Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka and 
Archbishop Emmanuel Wamala. But he uses a different description when referring 
to Archbishop Emmanuel Nsubuga. The text says of him: ―Cardinal Nsubuga 
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contributed a lot to the promotion of the Uganda Martyrs.‖601 Whereas for the 
other Archbishops, the verb ―promoted‖ was used in the past tense, for archbishop 
Nsubuga, the noun ―promotion‖ preceded by a past tense verb ...contributed‖ and 
qualified by the noun ―lot‖ with article ―a‖ is used. This difference in the 
description of the same practice is not accounted for in the text. Again, there is a 
self-invitation ―let us promote their devotion...‖602 which looks vague because it 
does not indicate the ―us‖ to mean any social category. It raises some pertinent 
questions! Could it be the successors of the archbishops so as to perpetuate a 
tradition? Could it be the Christian community of the archdiocese of Kampala? Or 
could it be the readers of the strategic plan? 
 
In talking about the Martyrs‘ death, there are two passive verbs used in the text to 
describe this event. The text says ―...the first 22 Martyrs...were killed by King 
Mwanga (1885-1887). The two new ones David Okello and Gildo Irwa were 
martyred in Paimol in Gulu Archdiocese.‖603 The motive for the use of the two 
verbs to describe the same event though at different times, is not clear. In this text, 
the use of two different verbs to describe the death of the martyrs of Uganda may 
represent a data vacuum on some historical events related to the two sets of 
martyrs. The text indicates an agent in the martyrdom of the 22 martyrs ―...were 
killed by King Mwanga 1885-1887,604 that‘s why the verb kill is used because it is 
agentive. As for the two new Uganda Martyrs, there is no agent mentioned apart 
from the location of their martyrdom, ―...were martyred in Paimol.‖605 The text 
would also have said: ―The martyrs gave their lives for the faith.‖606 
 
In talking about the Church, the text uses ―We....‖ which is not qualified to map 
out a specific identity ―...are parts of...‖ an institution ―...the Universal Catholic 
Church....‖ And this Church has recognised leadership as the text highlights all the 
titles to portray the leader describing him as: Holy Father, His Holiness, Pope, 
Vicar of Christ and Successor of Peter.607 The use of these titles in the text seem 
only to serve a social purpose and are employed chiefly to indicate the Pope‘s social 
or hierarchical rank. Again, the use of these titles in general implies varying degrees 
of social dignity and social significance as well as social exclusiveness for the Pope. 
This is so because the text does not dwell on the person of the Pope. It rather goes 
on to say ―...we derive our inspiration from the Holy Scriptures, Tradition, the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church and Church Law.‖608 The text seems to 
presuppose a rupture between the leadership of the Pope, and that which offers 
inspiration as listed above and what is called the ‗doctrine of the Catholic Church‘ 
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as a separate deposit. For the text makes a strong resolve expressed in this 
commitment ―...we shall make efforts to promote what the doctrine of the Catholic 
Church teaches without any compromise.‖609 The use of this phrase ‗...without any 
compromise‘ is difficult to contextualise as the following paragraph appeals to the 
agents of evangelisation ―to be an example to all the believers in the ways we speak 
and behave and in our love, our faith and purity.‖610 And since the text has applied 
the term ‗believer‘ in unqualified terms, it may suggest any believer and as we have 
charity as a virtue that makes all the other virtues redundant, the text would have 
read ―...we shall make efforts to promote what the doctrine of the Catholic Church 
teaches with love.‖ 
 
In talking about agents of evangelisation the text uses a pluralis majestatis (―we‖) 
when it is suggested that, ―we shall therefore have a forum for each of the agents of 
evangelisation namely the clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the 
seminarians, the novices and the laity under their various categories.‖611 The use of 
the majestic plural in this text and context suggests a previous named institutional 
power and the offices attached to this institution. The usage of the first person 
plural pronouns here may appear problematic because it consists of at least three 
important operations. Firstly, the speaker refers to a set of human individuals 
which were introduced in some way or other in the previous discourse. Secondly, 
he determines this set of people as a group or institution, and thirdly, he explicitly 
states that he is a member of this group excluding others from membership in this 
group at the same time. The first two operations constitute the anaphoric side of 
first person plural. And this generally poses some challenges because it is generally 
not possible to start some conversation with ‗we‘ without a previous introduction 
of the members of this group. But on the cover page of the strategic plan, the very 
first text in the upper case reads: Archdiocese of Kampala. This presupposes that 
the ―we‖ in the subsequent texts is representative of that institutional structure. 
This ―we‖ comes out vividly in the proposal expressed in the following sentence: 
―Each forum will also be encouraged to use modern communication technology in 
order to comprehend our traditional ways of facilitating dialogue.‖612 It suggests 
that there is an institutional program to be realised by agents of evangelisation.  
 
In section two which describes pastoral roles, the text uses a compound noun 
‗agents of evangelisation‘ which names all the identities of the agents under that 
category: Clergy, Religious, Catechists, Teachers, Seminarians, Novices and Laity. A 
compound noun consists of more than one word, but count as only one noun. The 
use of the compound noun in this text is suggested in the background of 
‗promoting dialogue, share ideas, learns from each other and supports each other‘s 
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efforts.‘613 Compound nouns are different from collective nouns which may be 
regarded as the collective claim of our notice because some of them are 
occasionally so employed as to give rise to certain peculiarities of construction. 
They are called collectives, because they express an assemblage of objects 
contemplated by the mind as forming a single conception and capable of being 
embraced collectively under the same assertion. The individual objects which form 
such assemblages are contemplated as united together by some common bond, or 
for some common purpose, and we appropriate to them, as thus united, a 
collective name.614 In one instance, this compound noun ‗agents of evangelisation,‘ 
is used in relation to contemporary developments in technology and intercultural 
encounter. The agents of evangelisation are called upon to ‗use modern 
communication technology‘ to complement what the text calls ―our traditional 
ways of facilitating dialogue.‖615 But there is no mention of the third parties with 
whom dialogue could be exercised and the nature of the traditional ways of 
dialogue is not explicated. In applying a compound noun, agents of evangelisation, 
and including the laity among them, the text looks inclusive as if avoiding the 
historical dichotomies between clergy and laity or evangeliser – evangelised. 
Although it makes reference to a contrast social category, ‗the faithful‘ but it is only 
in a different context altogether unconnected with this event where its use is related 
to another event, ―...Archbishop Cabana, with deep faith called upon the faithful in 
the Archdiocese....‖616 
 
The use of the noun ―agents of evangelisation‖ other than the traditional 
dichotomies of clergy – laity, brothers – sisters, religious priests – secular priest has 
a wider impact on the whole text. By having one single category with all the active 
agents named therein, this compound noun ―agents of evangelisation‖ is used in 
contrast to the historical past and ushers in a new development of looking at social 
categories. In the text other social categories are used autonomously without 
contrasts. The use of the noun sisters is in reference to the religiously professed 
Sisters and not as a contrast to brothers. The use of the common noun Muslim is 
in reference to an individual medical doctor, Dr. Ahmed, an Egyptian.617 The use of 
the noun father is qualified with ―Synod Fathers‖ and ―Holy Father‖618 and not as a 
contrast to son in a biological or adoption relationship. The use of the noun 
―leaders‖ is in reference to them as ―...caretakers of God‘s creation and Church 
property‖619 and not as contrasted to the masses. Other categories such as 
―secretary‖, ―auditor‖, ―married couples,‖ ―youth,‖ ―children,‖ ―stakeholders,‖ 
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―office-bearers,‖ ―chaplains,‖ ―consultant‖620 are used independently and not as 
contrasted to their opposites. With this new development when there is less 
importance attached to dichotomies in the social identities, the text takes into 
consideration having common activities for agents of evangelisation in the 
Archdiocese. The texts suggest it in this sentence: ―we shall organise annual retreats 
and monthly recollections for the Clergy and Religious at zonal levels.... and for the 
other agents of evangelisation.‖621 The use of the adjective ‗other‘ as a pronoun in 
the phrase ―others shall also be organised for the other agents of evangelisation....‖ 
provides the possibility that anyone in the Christian community could be 
mentioned as an agent of evangelisation.  
 
In general, the text uses a multiplicity of discourses as suggested by the prevailing 
proposals and programs to be followed. It recommends cooperation with many 
government entities at district levels, parish and local council levels, and 
community based organisations so that pastoral and social activities like health, 
education, development, roads, water and sanitation, agriculture and many others 
can be better streamlined and linked to those of the district.622 It considers food 
security and savings and credit schemes (SACCOS) Good Samaritan groups, and 
nutrition programs, business skills nurturing, information dissemination on 
markets, cooperatives, taking up farming as a business both at small scale and large 
scale levels, educating communities on when and when not to borrow funds from 
the mushrooming Micro-Finance Institutions and Banks.623 It validates the laws of 
the country concerning marriage when it argues that, ―...when a man was previously 
involved in a customary marriage (kwanjula) he should not be allowed to pursue 
church marriage and wed a different woman as this contradicts the laws of Uganda 
( Marriage Act) ....when this happens the church marriage becomes null and 
void.‖624 The text uses an inclusive way of speaking when addressing issues that 
impact human quality of life as it makes a suggestion this sentence: ―All agents of 
evangelisation have full understanding either through workshops or other avenues, 
of government programs like Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), National 
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), Universal Primary Education (UPE) and 
PMA to create an opportunity for effective Policy Monitoring and influence.‖625 
The document considers two important basic principles to be followed. It names 
subsidiarity considered as ―action at the appropriate level, mindful of the good and 
the involvement of Christ‘s faithful at the right level and participation of leaders at 
both the parish and archdiocesan levels.‖626 
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The text proposes the pastoral cycle as the tool to apply in implementing the 
resolutions of the archdiocesan synod and in planning. In the text of the strategic 
plan, the term pastoral cycle is used in different ways. It is described in the passive 
voice as, ―an approach used by.....Parish and Diocesan Councils, Justice and Peace 
groups, developments, and others engaged in social action.‖627 And in the context 
which is not named explicitly but only referred to in the majestic plural ―us‖ the 
purpose of the pastoral cycle is expressed with an infinitive verb ―to provide.....‖ 
which is used with a preposition ―with....‖ to indicate a related fact or situation ―....a 
comprehensive overview of a problem, situation or challenge that we want to take 
up.‖628 In another instance, the pastoral cycle is referred to as ―a way forward.....‖629 
However, the text states that: ―The pastoral cycle that can be used by all agents of 
evangelisation is one which many are familiar with....‖ The use of the phrase ―...that 
can be used...‖ with the stress on the modal verb ―....can‖ and the use of the 
countable noun ―...one‖ expresses the possibility that the pastoral cycle has a 
multiplicity of interpretations of which only one is applicable in the context of the 
pastoral strategic plan. 
 
Using conversation as a sensitizing concept and summarizing the findings of this 
subsection we note that the Pastoral Plan speaks in terms of ―partnerships‖, 
―working relationships‖, ―promoting dialogue‖, ―sharing ideas‖, a ―forum‖ (for 
―each of the agents of evangelisation‖ separately) and ―cooperating‖. But by using a 
majestic ―we‖, referring to the author himself, and using imperative language, ―We 
must improve‖, ―We must strengthen‖, ―We must use‖, the vocabulary suggests a 
monologue, rather than a dialogue with the intended readers. The text speaks about 
the ―Challenges‖ which the Church faces today. And because of these the Church 
needs to revise its mission. But the challenges are formulated in terms of 
―complexities‖ to be overcome, ―mushrooming sects‖, ―poverty‖, ―superstitions‖ 
and witchcraft‖, not in terms of opportunities to be used. 
 
Analysis of Discursive Practice 
In this stage of analysis we shall analyse the discursive practice which, according to 
Fairclough, ―involves processes of text production, distribution and consumption,‖ 
although he notes that ―the nature of these processes varies between different types 
of discourse according to social factors.‖630 According to Fairclough, there are 
specifically ‗sociocognitive‘ dimensions of text production and interpretation, 
which centre upon the interplay between the members‘ resources which discourse 
participants have internalised and bring with them to text processing, and the text 
itself, as a set of traces of the production process, or a set of cues for the 
interpretation process.631  
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The Strategic Plan explicitly draws upon and puts into actual pastoral practice the 
resolutions of the Archdiocesan synod of 2006. These are given in the text ―A 
Catholic‟s Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006” which we described in the first 
section. So, intertextually, the Strategic Plan builds on the discourses in the texts 
above,‖ particularly on the notion of ―Grassroots Evangelisation.‖ 
 
According to a snippet view in the archdiocese, this text has not been widely read 
and thus has not been adequately applied in the mission strategy of the archdiocese. 
This has been anticipated in the text as it is echoed that ―...There is a lot of 
unnecessary mystique over strategic Planning.‖632 The term ―unnecessary 
mystique,‖ is used in the text to point to the objections which are presumed to be 
raised in the method of applying strategic planning in the archdiocesan pastoral 
program. The objections that are raised against the strategic plan are that, ―Some 
see it as an irrelevant import from commercial organisations. Others think of the 
Government‘s Five Year Plan. Many people are put off by the complicated 
terminology used.‖633 By using the noun ‗mystique and qualify it with the adjective 
‗unnecessary‘ expresses sentiments which may impact on the consumption of the 
text and hence its overall purpose may fall short of success.  
 
In the introduction, the Strategic Plan starts by highlighting the original 
personalities to whom the archdiocese and indeed the whole country, Uganda, 
owes its Christian heritage. The text applies a categorical historical narrative in this 
regard when it states that, ―The Catholic Church in Uganda was founded by two 
Missionaries of Africa namely Fr. Simon Lourdel, popularly known as Pere 
Mapeera and Bro. Amans who arrived in the present Archdiocese of Kampala on 
17th February 1879.‖634 There is a robust historical discourse when the text goes 
into details to discuss the foundation of the present Archdiocese of Kampala. In 
the text it is written, ―The present Archdiocese of Kampala was erected in 1966, 
made up of the former Archdiocese of Rubaga which was being administered by 
the Missionaries of Africa or ‗White Fathers‘ and second, there was part of 
Kampala Diocese which was under the ‗Mill Hill Missionaries.‘635 This is indicative 
that the present Kampala Archdiocese came into being after the merger of two 
missionary traditions as outlined in the strategic plan by the ―lines of succession 
both to the See of Rubaga and to the See of the former Kampala Diocese.‖636 The 
following is the line of succession to the See of former Rubaga Archdiocese:  
The Rt. Rev. Leon Livinhac, W.F.  (1883-1890) 
Rt. Rev. Jean Hirth, W.F.    (1890-1894) 
Rt. Rev. Guillermain, W.F.   (1895-1897) 
Rt. Rev. Henry Streicher, W.F.   (1897-1933) 
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Rt. Rev. John Forbes, W.F.   (1918-1926) (Co-Adjutor) 
Rt. Rev. Edward Michaud, W.F.   (1933-1945) 
Rt. Rev. James Smith, W.F.   (1945-1947) (Pro-Vicar) 
His Grace Louis J. Cabana, W.F.  (1947-1960) 
His Grace Joseph Kiwanuka, W.F.  (1961-1966)637 
 
And the line of succession to the See of former Kampala diocese with its Cathedral 
at Nsambya: 
The Rt. Rev. Henry Hanlon, MHM  (1883-1890) 
The Rt. Rev. John Biermans, MHM  (1912-1924) 
The Rt. Rev. John W. Campling, MHM (1925-1937) 
The Rt. Rev. John Reesinck, MHM  (1938-1947) 
The Rt. Rev. Vincent Billington, MHM (1947-1966)638 
 
By citing ―the line of succession of the two former dioceses‖ that constitutes the 
present archdiocese of Kampala, the text, interdiscursively, brings in an important 
doctrine of the apostolic succession in the Christian Churches. It is after listing the 
two lines of succession of the two former dioceses that the text names the first 
Archbishop of Kampala, Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga and his successors. These 
lines of succession are consistent with the doctrine of Apostolic succession held by 
some Christian denominations which asserts that the chosen successors (properly 
ordained bishops) of the Twelve Apostles, from the first century to the present day, 
have inherited the spiritual, ecclesiastical and sacramental authority, power, and 
responsibility that were conferred upon them by the Apostles, who in turn received 
their spiritual authority from Jesus Christ.639 More to interdiscursivity, apart from 
the lines of succession, there is much reference to former archbishops in the 
pastoral documents which we described. Particularly to note is Cardinal Wamala‘s 
pastoral letter ―You are the Salt of the earth, the light of the world‖ which was 
written relying on Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka‘s pastoral letter ―Church and 
State.‖640 So this places the archdiocese and its leadership in the line that goes down 
into history of the archdiocese and down to Jesus and hence affirms the orthodoxy 
of faith.  
 
With regard to the theme of ―The Uganda Martyrs‖ there‘s reference to Tertullian, 
a second-century Christian apologist from whom this text ―the blood of the 
Martyrs is the seed of Christianity‖ is adapted. This text is used to place the Uganda 
Martyrs in the general discourse on martyrology in Christian history. It is argued by 
A.D. Nock that there are three historical events in the history of the Church but all 
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woven around an important Christian principle spread throughout the history of 
Christianity, that the death of the Martyrs has powerfully confirmed the truth of the 
gospel. That is why it is not without reason that the strategic plan quotes from 
Tertullian who said, ―The blood of Christians is seed.‖641 But apart from this 
historical reference to the martyrs, we find that in the archbishop‘s pastoral letter, 
the theme of martyrs is applied in reference to liturgy. This is expressed because it 
is used as a prayer when he says: ―I wish you God‘s choicest blessings and 
entrusting you to the Blessed Virgin Mary and ‗the Uganda Martyrs.‘‖642  
 
From the perspective of its production it seems a text with thorough planning and 
preparation. This is evident from the stages of preparation as stated in the text in 
universalistic terms although passively: ―All Agents of Evangelisation were 
consulted. Leaders at the parish and archdiocesan levels, in turn, were encouraged 
to carry out as wide and representative a consultation as possible.‖643 And to prove 
a still wider consultation the text notes that, ―His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal 
Wamala, His successor Archbishop Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, the Synodal 
preparatory committee, the Archdiocesan Pastoral Council, the Forum for Parish 
Priests and Heads of the Archdiocesan Departments, the forum for Assistant 
Parish Priests, Chaplains and Teachers in Seminaries‖644 were all involved in its 
compilation. From the perspective of its distribution and consumption it is 
noteworthy that the text was written in the English language and was not 
translated. Maybe this is because Kampala archdiocese is constituted of a 
multilingual, multicultural and expatriate population. Kampala city is both the 
political and commercial capital city of Uganda and hosts the headquarters of 
almost all the religious and non-governmental organisations, foreign missions, 
multinationals, as well as the intellectual centre of Uganda. So, this document could 
easily be available and intelligible to a wider population. This could be contested by 
the fact that the pastoral letter ―Partnership for the Gospel‖ whose mode of 
production and consumption was directed to the priests, religious and laity was 
written in two languages: English and Luganda,645 so may be the Strategic Plan had 
a different intended audience. 
 
This variable context carries serious ramifications for the language used in the text 
and the various programs and activities proposed. The text talks of ‗Good 
Governance through partnerships, Stewardship of resources, strengthening capacity 
and witnessing to Christ,‘ where it highlights a plethora of activities and 
programmes that it states ―seek to increasingly integrate evangelisation, 
development, reconciliation, peace-building, human rights activities, disaster 
preparedness, and emergency response.‖ The text calls for strengthening of 
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partnerships with Catholic and Non-Catholic Organisations that promote 
development, Justice and Peace, Education, Social and Pastoral activities with a 
commitment to agreed objectives based on shared values, strategies and 
information, characterised by feedback and joint planning, a display of transparency 
and accountability on both sides and a genuine openness and sensitising to the 
other‘s needs, feelings, expertise, experience and wisdom. For ecumenical 
objectives it seeks close working relations with the Uganda Joint Christian Council 
(UJCC) and for interfaith partnership, it seeks cooperation with The Interreligious 
Council of Uganda. 
 
The discourse on partnerships is expounded further in the pastoral letter of 
Archbishop Cyprian Kizito Lwanga ―Partnership for the Gospel‖ albeit with a 
particular emphasis. The partnerships in the Strategic Plan are broad and extended 
to Catholic and non-Catholic organisations. However, the partnerships in the 
pastoral letters are limited to the priests, religious and laity in the Catholic Church 
who are described as partners for the sake of the gospel.646 
 
The text is produced in the post-synodal context of both Kampala Archdiocesan 
synod of 2006 and the 2nd Synod of Bishops for Africa, 2009. The 1994 African 
Synod of Bishops also constitutes the background for the production of the 
archdiocesan pastoral texts. This could be interdiscursively suggested by Cardinal 
Wamala in his pastoral letter when he noted that: ―the synod of bishops identified 
the urgency to improve the administration of public affairs…in order to respond to 
the challenge of bringing peace and justice in Africa.‖647 Another significant context 
that forms the background for the production of the pastoral texts is the 15th 
Plenary Assembly of the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences of Eastern 
Africa which adopted the Pastoral Cycle as a way forward in the pastoral approach 
in handling and analysing issues.648 The texts therefore carry post-synod discourses 
because it recalls the theme of the Archdiocesan synod of 2006 ―...Grassroots 
Evangelisation‖ and the theme of the Second Special Assembly for the Synod of 
Bishops for Africa of October 2009 ―...The Church in Africa in service to 
Reconciliation, Justice and Peace: You are the Salt and light of the world.‖ 
(Matt.5:13-14).649 The text considers these two synods as having in common an 
urgent need of an on-going in-depth Grassroots Evangelisation. In the context of 
Kampala Archdiocese this Grassroots Evangelisation is reflected in the 
concretisation of baptismal promises in the Archdiocesan structures considering: 
(a) the Sanctifying Office of the Church, (b) the Teaching Office of the Church and 
(c) the Governing Office of the church. This division as rooted in the 
understanding of the baptismal grace incorporates the baptised person in the 
threefold ministry of Christ as Priest (Sanctifier), King (Leader) and Prophet 
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(Teacher).650 In the 2006 synod theme ‗Grassroots Evangelisation‘ the Archdiocese 
wanted to go back to the foundations of Christian life as rooted in baptism to be 
the basis of evangelisation. True grassroots evangelisation, therefore, implies going 
back to baptism, the primordial sacrament which initiates one in the Christian life 
and is grafted in the godhead of Christ.  
 
The above, however, does not imply that the text carries a sense of discontinuity 
with the pastoral strategies already suggested in the earlier Archdiocesan and 
AMECEA region documents. Among the approaches suggested was the pastoral 
program of the ―basic Christian communities.‖ In their 1973 Study Conference on 
―Planning for the Church in Eastern Africa in the 1980‘s:‖ AMECEA Bishops 
issued a key statement: ―We have to insist on building church life and work on 
Basic Christian Communities in both rural and urban areas. Church life must be 
based on the communities in which everyday life and work take place: those basic 
and manageable social groups whose members can experience real inter-personal 
relationships and feel a sense of communal belonging, both in living and 
working.‖651 In the 1976 study session, the AMECEA bishops made it categorically 
clear that: formation of Small Christian Communities should be the key pastoral 
priority in the years to come in Eastern Africa.652 And in the Archdiocesan 
quinquennial report of 1991-1995 it is clearly stated that: ―The Basic Small 
Christian Communities are the grass-root level of Catholic Apostolate.‖653 This 
therefore, proves that the text is heavily interdiscursive as it brings into life other 
discourses.  
 
Still on interdiscursivity, the text relies on numerous discourses for instance, 
mission history discourse, traditional theological discourse, socio-economic 
discourse, post-modern discourse and other discourses as is apparent in the text 
The document makes references to several sources from Vatican II documents, 
Code of canon law, Papal encyclicals, the African Synod, documents from the 
Uganda Episcopal conference, Theological treatise especially, the Pastoral Circle 
though in the text, the ―Pastoral Cycle is preferred,‖ and the various manuals 
published by the archdiocese like: The Priests‘ Directory – Kampala Archdiocese 
2006, The Statutes of the Archdiocesan pastoral council, the pastoral guide and 
Human Resource Manual, The Episcopal Council Manual, Educational policy 
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handbook, Caritas Activities guide, land board policy, the archdiocesan curia 
operational manual, family life ministry and the Archdiocesan financial manual.654 
There is no explicit reference to post-modern management discourse but the charts 
showing ―Kampala Archdiocesan policy‖655 and the ―Kampala Archdiocesan 
Administration‖656 as well as charts in the appendices II, III and IV657 heavily 
depend on this discourse given that it considers ―organisations as 
structures...systems...‖658 In the text the critique of a church document that relies 
heavily on modernist discourses is anticipated with these apparent objections: 
―There is a lot of unnecessary mystique over Strategic Planning. Some see it as an 
irrelevant import from commercial organisations. Others think of the 
Government‘s Five Year Plan. Many people are put off by the complicated 
terminology used.‖659 The uneasiness expressed about the strategic plan suggests 
that it is still a new form of management strategy applied in the pastoral ministry 
but still foreign to many and hence may impact on its consumption.  
 
While drawing attention to the challenges faced by the Church today, the text 
presents them as particular to this contemporary era and as completely 
disconnected from the past. The text uses the sentence ―The challenges we face to-
day are not the same as those we have known in the past....‖660 to highlight the 
challenges of the contemporary society. With this assertion, there is a complete 
rupture of the present from the past which would demand new approaches and 
solutions as have never known before since even the problems being tackled are 
new and never known before. The challenges presented in this section are 
profoundly of two types. Firstly, we have social challenges, those which seem to 
affect everybody in society and secondly, we have institutional challenges, those 
which affect the church particularly in her mission and apostolate. In the text, there 
is a worry expressed about the changes that are taking place in the world today and 
their mode of acceleration is discomforting.  
 
In the examples presented to explain the present pastoral challenges, but apart 
from the emphasis, it does not show anything new in contrast to what has been 
happening before. The text talks of ―The numbers and complexity of 
mushrooming sects, poverty, superstition and witchcraft.‖661 There are several 
discourses that form this section. The first is that mankind is always scared of 
changes whereas changes define our existence. Changes bring unrest in humanity 
and hence always seek those stable unchanging realities. It is formed by a certain 
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philosophical discourse. The named challenges stand as challenges because they are 
a stark contrast to the primary mission of the church. There is a repeated theme of 
change when the text says ―...the Church and our society are experiencing profound 
changes.‖662 There is no precise solution presented to counter these challenges and 
changes apart from a pragmatic approach proposed as the text says: ―We have 
learned that if the world is to change, we too must change.‖663 In a deeper analysis 
of this text, it is realised that among the challenges named in this changing society, 
three are religiously oriented: mushrooming sects, superstition and witchcraft and 
one is anthropological in nature: poverty.  
 
The above suggests that there must be a multi-pronged approach in facing these 
challenges as they look different and hence demand different solutions. In other 
words, there are three possible ways to face the religiously inclined challenges. 
Either one faces the adherents of these beliefs for conversion to the Catholic faith 
which is confrontational and may bear bad consequents; or just ignore them and 
leave them with their business and work and hence become competitors in the 
religious field and then remain as permanently scorned for their unbecoming beliefs 
or just engage them in a fruitful conversation and then they become conversation 
partners on the way searching for the truth. As for the anthropological challenges 
of poverty which is not qualified in this sense, but in most instances reference is 
made of material poverty and total deprivation of opportunities for growth and 
development, the answer is for the church to be ―...the voice of the voiceless poor 
and lobby for them government funding for their projects and development in 
their neighbourhood.‖664 
 
On the institutional level the text summarises in a tabular form the challenges and 
their possible responses. In this section six challenges motivated by a multiplicity of 
discourses are presented: the first challenge motivated by an ecclesiological 
discourse for it talks of a ―lack of a sense of ownership of the church by the Clergy, 
Religious and Laity and the response is to make use of the social teaching of the 
Church using the Bible, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the Vatican II 
documents, the Papal encyclicals and other local Ugandan writings particularly 
‗Unveiling Witchcraft‘ by Bro. Fr. Anatoli Wasswa and „Amagezi g‟Ab‟Edda‟ by Msgr. 
William Mpuuga.‖665 This ecclesiological discourse could adequately explain the title 
and content and purpose of the pastoral letter ―Partnership for the Gospel‖ of 
Archbishop Cyprian Lwanga which we described above.666 The second is motivated 
by a modern management discourse for it highlights a ―lack of improved 
organisational development of the Church at all levels and the response is evaluate 
the current situation of the organisation of our parishes, schools, hospitals, health 
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units and the top Archdiocesan structures and plan accordingly for the future.‖667 
The third which deals with ―the increasing poverty vis-à-vis financial sustainability 
of the families, local communities, parishes and other Archdiocesan structures‖ 
falls within the ambit of developmentalist discourse. The response is to ―draw up 
poverty eradication programmes that will fully empower people so that they 
become self-reliant and are able to make long term investments to support their 
families and the Church‘s activities and structures.‖668 
 
In the same vein, the fourth challenge is more informed by anthropological 
discourses in its quest for ―Integral human development‖ and the response 
proposed is ―provide effective technical expertise and coordination to parishes, 
schools, hospitals, health units and to the people so as to empower the poor to 
become agents of their own development.‖669 Fifth, the family and marriage are 
weakened by lack of faith, hope and charity, domestic violence and poverty. The 
response to this challenge is to ―promote faith, hope, charity and sustainable peace 
in the families, in small Christian Communities, in schools, hospitals, health centres 
and in all our parishes. It shall also coordinate processes aimed at transforming 
parishes into Christian Caring Communities that promote faith, hope and charity, 
peace-building and transform unjust structures and conflict non-violently through 
dialogue and building the local Church as a family of God.‖670 Sixth, lack of proper 
land management at the family, sub-parish, parish and archdiocesan levels plus lack 
of a maintenance culture at all levels. The response to this challenge is that the 
―archdiocese shall organise workshops at all levels to assist people manage better 
their land, construct well their homes, sub-parishes and parish infrastructure.‖671 
There are other discourses such as humanist, legal justice, peace and reconciliation 
which are heavily implied in the text especially in the argument for peace-building, 
dialogue, land management and transforming unjust structures as well as having 
decent and well-constructed homes. 
 
In the section on the vision of the Archdiocese of Kampala for its grassroots 
evangelisation, the text provides it all as summarised in the motto of the reigning 
archbishop ―Ora et Labora (St. Benedict) Ut Habeant Vitam (John10:10).672 This 
motto has two pieces put together to form one meaningful phrase. First, it carries 
the spirituality of St. Benedict which is rooted in work as a basic human 
component to cater for his physiological and material needs generally. The second 
part is derived from the gospel of St. John 10:10 a text in which Jesus talks to his 
disciples that he came that they may have life and have it to the full. It is rooted in 
the Old Catholic dual consideration of the human nature as having the body 
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satisfied by material needs and the soul that is catered for with spiritual needs. That 
the vision of the archdiocese is set by the archbishop‘s motto is motivated by 
historical discourses of the church which affirm the hierarchical status of the 
church as noticed with the relationship between the archbishop and the 
archdiocese. This discourse carries deep historical nuances as those mostly related 
to a treatise attributed to St. Cyprian on the preservation of unity in the Church 
written around 260AD. For St. Cyprian‘s conception of the Church, the minister is 
more important than the message.673 This explains why in the text ―...the Motto and 
Coat of arms of the reigning archbishop‖674 are the definitive symbols of the 
identity of the leadership in the archdiocese.  
 
The text provides the understanding of the mission of the archdiocese of Kampala 
and its vision. Whereas the vision is founded in the motto and coat of arms of the 
archbishop, the mission is identified with the entire Church, namely: Go into all the 
World and Preach the Gospel to the whole World‖ (Mk. 16:15).675 The text 
considers the task of evangelising all people as constituting the essential mission of 
the Church. It then provides four ways in which this mission will be approached: 
One, providing a forum for dialogue and exchange of ideas among all agents of 
evangelisation, to share ideas, learn from each and support each other‘s efforts. 
Two, helping the faithful at all levels, to build their capacity through education and 
on-going formation in order to evangelise more effectively in their respective 
communities. Three: acting as a voice or advocate for the cause of the poor at the 
local council levels and enabling the faithful to become their own advocates 
through empowering them to take up leadership roles at all levels. And four: 
facilitating both pastoral and social cooperation within parishes and the 
archdiocesan departments.676 The ways suggested here carry various nuances 
because they place the archdiocese as an institution in the position of a facilitator 
for the various institutions and individuals to realise their potential. This 
institutional prominence overshadows the main social category of ‗priests‘ who are 
the major actors behind this institution. This detail is made more manifest in the 
pastoral letter where there is an overconcentration of this social category as it 
appears more than 21 times.677 
 
While highlighting the guiding principles of the strategic plan, the text borrows 
heavily from the Catholic Church‘s social teaching as expounded in the official 
magisterial documents. Such documents as ―The Universal destination of the 
earth‘s good‖ (Centesimus Annus), Ecclesia in Africa, Solicitudo Rei Socialis, Evangelium 
Vitae of John Paul II; Apostolicum Actuositatem, Populorum Progressio, of Paul VI, Deus 
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caritas est, Spe Salvi of Benedict XVI are cited in the text. And the main traditional 
Catholic theological themes such as the dignity of the human person, option for the 
poor, solidarity, stewardship, universal destination of the earth‘s good678 are 
developed and incorporated well in the text. The text perpetuates the discourse on 
human dignity which has been the church‘s fundamental teaching for centuries.679 
This theological consideration is carried by the Strategic plan which considers 
―human dignity as the foundational moral value.‖680 
 
In terms of distributions, the Strategic Plan as a text did not appear in bookshops 
as a for-sale-article. Rather its mode of distribution has been the annual seminars 
and workshops for the various agents of evangelisation conducted at the beginning 
of each calendar year. This is consonant with what Fairclough refers to as 
transformation. By transformation he refers to ―a major text being transformed 
into other texts of various forms like reports, analyses, and commentaries, 
academic books and articles, into speeches which paraphrase it, elaborate it, answer 
it, and so on.‖681 The various transformations that this text would undergo would 
be various pastoral activities proposed in parishes, schools, hospitals and health 
units as outlined in appendix II of the strategic plan.682 These same activities are the 
means as well for its consumption. This implies that the text fulfils its plan of 
facilitating pastoral practice in the various contexts in which the agents of 
evangelisation do exercise their ministry. So the text has a systematic strategy of 
distribution as well as consumption with an audience for which it has been drafted. 
From the perspective of this research, this text is distributed and consumed in a 
conversational model because its author and supposed audience meet regularly for 
discussions in retreats and annual pastoral meetings. So its significance is 
measurable because it is designed to be a daily reference guide for the entire 
pastoral practice in the archdiocese.  
 
In its conclusion, the text suggests the pastoral cycle as the tool to apply in the 
implementation of the strategic plan. The pastoral cycle is described as ―...an 
approach used by parish and diocesan councils, justice and peace groups, 
development teams, and others engaged in social action.‖683 The use of the pastoral 
cycle here is in the context of pastoral practice and not theological discussion. This 
is evident from the consideration of the three classic steps of this cycle: See – Judge 
– Act or Discern – Evaluate – Respond or Look – Love – Live of which it‘s 
opposite is See – Judge – File.684 Without explicit reference to its source, the text 
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goes into describing the four moments of the pastoral cycle685 which closely rhyme 
exactly with what Peter Henriot presents in the four dimensions of the pastoral 
circle as: First, Contact or Immersion: ―When contact is made, a privileged 
question to be asked is: What is happening to the poor in this situation?‖ This 
option for the poor ―places a priority on the experiences, views, needs, feelings, 
and stance of the poor and most vulnerable in a community.‖686 Second, Analysis 
or Social Analysis: ―The question of why such conditions exist will be guided by 
those whose rights are being violated and whose responsibilities are called upon to 
change the situation.  
 
The language of rights and responsibilities--rooted in the human dignity of each 
person in community--pushes analytical approaches beyond economic and political 
causes to social and cultural causes.‖687 Third, Reflection or Theological Reflection: 
―When we come to ask what it means to our faith to evaluate this situation and 
what is really most at stake in this situation, we can be guided by the church's social 
teaching about human dignity and solidarity. Every person is made in the image of 
God. Dignity is not earned; it is a gift.‖688 What is fundamental to this dimension of 
the pastoral circle is the Bible. Fourth, Response or Pastoral Planning goes with 
―What to do is an inevitable question in the movement around the pastoral circle. 
Two principles of the church‘s social teaching orient the threefold response of 
planning, action, and evaluation. The first is the principle that places action at the 
lowest level possible--subsidiarity. The second is the principle that reckons the 
most efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of resources, stewardship.‖ Each of 
these four moments or dimensions is fundamental for real discernment among 
pastoral teams, social activists, development workers, instructors, and especially the 
laity. Effective movement around the pastoral circle must be grounded in 
experience, not books or the experience of others. Analysis must ―pay attention to 
the many structures of reality.‖ Theological reflection must be ―cognitive or beliefs, 
affective or trusts, and effective or deeds.‖ The strategic plan as well in its 
conclusion on the pastoral cycle states the argument that ―Response should always 
be the aim of going around the pastoral circle.‖689 
 
As noted above, apart from the production of this text and its distribution, and 
consumption is yet to be achieved. It appears that the whole process of text 
production was done extensively with wide consultations as noted that ―all agents 
of evangelisation were consulted...... Leaders (...) were encouraged to carry out as 
wide and representative a consultation as possible.‖690 But its consumption is still to 
be realised because the text says: ―what remains for everybody in the Archdiocese 
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of Kampala is to see to it that we own this Pastoral Strategic Plan......so that we all 
participate in the Grassroots evangelisation.691 Although all agents of evangelisation 
have the basic knowledge of the English language in which the text is written, the 
question of ownership of the text could impact its consumption. 
 
Summarising the findings in this subsection, we note that the strategic plan is fairly 
interdiscursive with references drawn from the Church documents especially the 
Scriptures, the social teaching of the Church, the Code of Canon Law, some 
modern management discourse texts and the pastoral cycle. With respect to its 
production, the text says that ―All agents of evangelization were consulted‖, but 
when it proves evidence of this, it only mentions the clergy explicitly, not the laity. 
Combined with the facts that the text was not translated in Luganda, and not for 
sale in bookshops, the text neither gives the impression to be product of 
conversation nor to promote conversation. This is confirmed by a comparison with 
the Pastoral Letter ‗Partnership for the Gospel‘ which seems more conversational 
in the sense that it promotes ―mutual cooperation‖ and states that ―the laity needs 
the priests‖ and the priests ―need the laity‖. 
 
Analysis of Social Practice 
In this section on social practice, the analysis focuses on the dialectical relationship 
between texts/language and social structure692 in terms of reproduction and 
transformation. 
 
The text applies the term ―Grassroots Evangelisation‖ as the theme of the two 
synods of which the strategic plan is to implement. By using the term grassroots, 
the text considers the Ugandan society which is generally regarded as a people of 
the grass-roots communities as reflected in their struggle for life, the effort to be a 
community built in the strict hierarchical structure ending in the Kabaka of 
Buganda. This community aspect has traditionally the whole society organised by a 
strong clan system which in the Buganda region culminates in the Kabaka (King) 
who is the head of all the clans. These small units therefore have become the basis 
for evangelisation, the equivalent of which is the Basic Christian Community. And 
this applies even for economic activities as witnessed in the many Saving and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCO) and Solidarity Groups and Village Savings and 
Loans Associations.693 Using the term grassroots is indicative of the benefits which 
the text suggests in the approach to evangelisation.694 The strategic plan does not 
owe credit by direct reference to the political origins of the term ‗grassroots.‘ But 
its origins from the political sphere as a method of mobilisation and bringing 
together people of different backgrounds for a common cause is more expressed in 
the title page. In its phrasing, the term grassroots qualified here with evangelisation 
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mobilises the church ―to be at the service of reconciliation, justice and peace so as 
to be the salt and light of the world in the Archdiocese of Kampala.‖695 
 
In describing the Ugandan society, the text identified it as changing rapidly and that 
the pace of change is constantly accelerating. There are no specific areas of society 
in which these changes have been noted. The challenges which are noted are 
mainly three: the complexity of mushrooming sects, poverty, superstition and 
witchcraft which are reported to be increasing. The text expresses a general 
uneasiness about a growing multi-religious nature of the Ugandan society and the 
challenge to the Catholic numerical dominance. Uganda, we could say is 
increasingly becoming a multicultural and multi-religious society. According to the 
2002 population and housing census analytical report, Uganda‘s religious affiliation 
were put at the following statistics: Roman Catholic 41.6%, Anglican Protestant 
36.7%, Moslems 12.4%, Pentecostals 4.7%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.5%), 
Orthodox Christians 0.1%, Other Christians 1.2% Traditional Religions 0.4%, 
Others 1.3%.696 In a similar manner, according to the World Refugee Survey 2008, 
published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Uganda hosted a 
population of refugees and asylum seekers numbering 235,800 in 2007. The 
majority of this population came from Sudan (162,100 persons), but also included 
refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (41,800), 
Rwanda (21,200), Somalia (5,700) and Burundi (3,100). Indian nationals are the 
most significant immigrant population; members of this community are primarily 
Ismaili (Shi‘a Muslim followers of the Aga Khan) or Hindu. Today there are about 
15,000 compared to 80.000 who were present 40 years ago before Idi Amin 
expelled them. The strategic plan, evaluates these developments in relation to the 
family and marriage which are the basic units of society and claims that there are 
weakened by lack of faith, hope, charity, domestic violence and poverty.697 So, the 
strategic plan does not look at these events in isolation but rather in the confines of 
its main objective of grassroots evangelisation.  
 
The Ugandan society generally is experiencing profound changes. This is evidenced 
from the specifics of the human development theory which has created a standard 
to which all countries make every effort to attain and to work for the establishment 
of the minimum basics for the well-being of the human person. As for the 
increasing poverty, it is reported that the country has seen the incidence of poverty 
at the national level decline from 56 percent in 1992 to 37.3 percent in 2003. This 
has been achieved by ―structural strategies for translating the macroeconomic 
successes into real improvements in people‘s standards of living were developed 
into the main policy framework, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The 
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PEAP is the policy vehicle for translating the country‘s long-term development 
aspirations, some of which are expressed in the Uganda Vision 2025, into specific 
and achievable goals.‖698 With these details, there is a parallel with what the 
strategic plan suggests that ―the Church and our society are experiencing profound 
changes.‖699 This statement assumes that there are a lot of social changes which 
have come to destabilise the cultural and societal norms and hence the focus of the 
church in her ministry. But in this situation the text of the strategic plan has been 
quite pragmatic in its approach to the circumstances as it has been suggested from 
a silenced source that ―we have learned that if the world is to change, we too must 
change.‖700 And in another instance, the strategic plan observes the same reality as 
it calls for ―a need to be receptive to the signs of the times and to adapt our 
working methods, structures and actions to meet the challenges of the New 
Millenium.‖701 Change as a phenomenon is not alien to man for he grapples with it 
each day. However, the text does not tell from which point is the change to begin 
and up to what point.  
 
Without allusions to globalisation, there is a general lingering and marginal African 
discourse that ‗we are experiencing wide and sweeping changes.‘ And that these 
have come as a result of the sweeping changes in the traditional structures of local 
communities – family, clan, tribe, village groups and social relationships.702 
Industrialization is on the increase and has radically transfigured ideas and social 
practices hallowed by centuries. Urbanization too is on the increase, both on 
account of the expanding number of city dwellers and the spread of an urban way 
of life into rural settings. Recent more efficient mass media703 are contributing to 
the spread of knowledge and the speedy diffusion for and wide variety of habits of 
thought and feelings, setting off chain reactions in their wake. A change in attitudes 
and structures frequently calls accepted values into questions.704 This is not a 
statement of despair but rather of hope and courage to face-off this challenging 
situation. The text calls for an approach that will meet the changes in the society 
and church since the two institutions are partners for growth and development. 
Although the text has spoken about the rapid changes witnessed everywhere, it has 
not made any reference to the good olden days as a kind of mimicry or reminiscing 
the good old past. So there is an air of optimism to go with the changes and hence 
avoid the irrelevance that may come up with complacent clinging to the past 
without any reference to the new developments.   
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In the section on development, the strategic plan considers social development as 
convertible with peace. This development discourse is linked to the theories of 
social analysis where the society is considered governed by two major institutions: 
The political and the economic. And that once these two are not adequately 
addressed, they are likely to cause social unrest. Any unequal distribution of goods 
as in distributive justice is likely to affect the stability of a community. This 
development discourse is deeply rooted in the social teaching of the Church. The 
strategic plan states that, ―Where there is lack of development peace is missing too 
and the unhappy consequences of disease, unhappiness, anger and envy‖705 and not 
only peace is missing in the underdeveloped areas, but the text goes on to narrate 
other consequences such conflicts, superstition, sorcery and witchcraft.706 In its 
consideration of development, the text goes a step further and qualifies 
development as integral which implies ―...initiating activities and seek increasingly 
to integrate evangelisation, development, reconciliation, peace building, human 
rights activities, disaster preparedness and emergency response.707 This 
development discourse is specific to Ugandan society which has been torn apart by 
a series of conflicts and spiralling violence over time. In the strategic plan, there is 
no reference to Uganda‘s turbulent historical past, but the emphasis on peace 
building and reconciliation just suggests that reality.  
 
Slight considerations of the post-independence period suppose that Ugandans have 
been exposed to a level of violence that far exceeds that of any other people in 
eastern Africa. Well a million Ugandans have been killed through violence that is 
invoked for political purposes. Many people have been murdered with the approval 
or complicity of political leaders whose main duty is the protection of life708. 
Hundreds of others were slain by powerful persons who are always shielded by 
state authorities. It is estimated that the number of people slain for political 
motives during the first Obote administration (1962-71) ranged between four 
hundred and one thousand709. The number of people killed for similar reasons 
during the Amin regime (1971-79) was not less than 50.000 and could have been as 
high as 300.000.710 In the second Obote period (1980-85), the estimated number of 
those killed ranged between 300.000 and one million.711 In 1984 it was estimated 
that the Ugandan army had killed between 100.000 and 200.000 people most of 
whom were non-combatants, since 1980. It is this background that makes the 
themes of peace building, reconciliation, human rights activities, disaster 
preparedness and emergency response to be prominent in this strategic plan.  
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When it comes to the guiding principles, the strategic plan has placed a particular 
emphasis on the two concepts of dignity of the human person and option for the 
poor. The text states ―that our first emphasis is on the dignity of the human 
person....and...the preferential option for the poor and marginalised.‖712 The 
preferential option for the poor is convertible with human dignity as well since 
both affirm the integrity of the human person. By emphasising human dignity the 
text situates itself in the long tradition of protecting human dignity which has been 
developing over the course of time right from antiquity. And this is an ever valid 
concept because it is related with the main subject of history, and in the context of 
strategic plan, the main subject of evangelisation who is man himself. Subsequently, 
it grows with man himself and its understanding reflects man‘s understanding of 
oneself. It is a concept which is completely woven in the very fabric of human 
nature and society, related with human history and the focus of man‘s self-
perception. With this thought the text proposes to empower the poor so that they 
may retain their dignity. It makes a resolute assertion though stated in the negative 
that, ―we should not look down upon the poor but rather seek to make them 
subjects of their own development and not objects of our pity.‖713 Taking poverty 
as a humiliating situation the text makes a strong resolve to combat the 
dehumanizing poverty which robs people of their dignity and humanity.714 Among 
the categories named the texts considers ―...the position of women particularly 
widows, people with disabilities, orphans and vulnerable children.‖715 Since the text 
has considered dehumanizing poverty, it gives poverty wider consideration since 
every situation that dehumanises is linked to poverty. This would impel the church 
to intervene in other human situations other than economic for instance politics, 
cultural practices, and science and technology even biomedical research. This is so 
because if we consider the progress so far achieved in the biomedical field, it is 
understandable that serious concerns about the protection of individuals and 
humanity are raised and given that other arguments fail or found insufficient, 
human dignity appears as a last resource for such a protection  
 
On the other hand, when it comes to partnerships, the Strategic Plan positions the 
Catholic Church as a big family of local churches all over the world. By 
reproducing this image of the Church as a family may be used to reinforce the 
community‘s highly stratified hierarchy of power and privilege. But the text makes 
use of this family metaphor in complementary terms in view of the beneficiaries of 
the partnerships who are the poor, the hungry, the enslaved, the imprisoned, the 
orphans and the widows. This is a reproduction of the image of the church as 
Hellerman thinks that ―those who had the most to gain from the image of the 
church as a family were the poor, the hungry, the enslaved, the imprisoned, the 
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orphans and the widows.‖716 The text pleads thus ―All of us make up the body of 
Christ and we need each other to supplement each other.‖717 It lists three qualities 
on which the relationship in a partnership must be based: mutual respect, trust, and 
good will.718 At the beginning of this section, the text looks like it proposes forging 
partnerships with only Catholic organisations. But it goes a step further and 
suggests that ―we shall strengthen the existing partnerships...with Catholic and 
Non-Catholic Organisations that promote development, justice and peace, 
education, social and pastoral activities.‖719 It even suggests developing close 
working relationships with...other Christian Churches under the Uganda Joint 
Christian Council which is described as ―sharing our vision in the work of 
evangelisation.‖720 It goes on to include working with the interfaith organisations, 
for instance, the Uganda Inter-Religious Council which is taken as sharing our 
vision in peaceful co-existence and combating HIV/AIDS. The text proposes that 
the Church is willing to cooperate with anyone in a fruitful partnership as long as 
we share common values, strategies and information for the benefit of the whole 
society. So the text confirms the fact that Church is open towards society and other 
confessions for the furtherance of the common good.  
 
In the section on grassroots evangelisation, the text talks about the forum for 
grassroots evangelisation at various levels with the purpose of enabling the local 
communities to deepen their faith, promote dialogue, share ideas, learn from each 
other and to support each other‘s efforts.721 By proposing a forum which suggests 
public meetings open for discussion, the main idea is to provide a place where 
people can meet and interact and discuss specific topics. By using the term local 
communities without qualification whether Christian or not, the text goes beyond 
the old paradigms and just considers human needs as the basis for her activities. 
Apart from the forum for the local communities, there is a forum for the agents of 
evangelisation. The category agents of evangelisation include clergy, the religious, 
the catechists, the teachers, the seminarians, the novices and the laity under their 
various categories.722 To be at par with the developments in society, each forum 
will be encouraged to use the modern communication technology with the purpose 
of complementing our traditional ways of facilitating dialogue.723 In this proposal of 
a forum the text suggests that it is open to dialogue and communication with the 
wider society. The text also assumes that the forum for grassroots evangelisation 
will address the challenge of fidelity and relevancy to the Church‘s mission and 
people‘s ownership of the Church. The social identities cited in the text, that is, 
Pope, the Bishops, Clergy and the Religious is a reminder of an ecclesiological 
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structure where the Church was considered as consisting of mainly those in the 
hierarchy. The text deconstructs this old ecclesiological model and proposes a new 
one where the church from below meeting in a forum is placed at the centre and 
hence the suggestion of grassroots evangelisation.  
 
The above model is achieved in the actions proposed where by opportunities for 
the children and youth to understand catechesis and liturgy are suggested. Such 
opportunities follow the structure whereby those youth in schools are supported by 
chaplains and others outside the schools are assisted by the parish priests. There is 
also mention of guiding the children and youth to effectively undertake their 
apostolate. This suggestion for self-evangelisation or mutual evangelisation is a shift 
from the old hierarchical top-down structure where all the mission work was 
presumed done by the Pope, bishops, priests and religious to a representative 
approach that considers other members of the church. The text notes a 
disconnected relationship between youth coordinators or chaplains because of 
applying ad-hoc and inconsistent approaches. These approaches are not mentioned, 
but this is suggestive that there is an apparent disconnection between the leaders 
and the youths. So, the text proposes locally instituted or formed organisations like 
the Bannakizito Children Association for children and the Karolines youth 
association to cater for the youth.724 It also calls on the training of the catechists 
insisting that their formation is vital and need to be promoted. These identities as 
outlined in this section are an eye opener to the strategy of evangelisation which is 
in harmony with the local needs. The text observes a reality which is meaningful 
that the gospel to be meaningful must be promoted by people who are rooted in 
their contexts applying the common categories that they are familiar with. 
 
In describing organisational development, the text calls for ―views from all 
stakeholders in the Archdiocese.‖725 In the actions recommended, it calls for 
identifying a competent consultant and participatory planning with all stakeholders 
and make efforts to ensure that all stakeholders are involved. The text calls as well 
for the professional development and motivation of the clergy, the religious and 
catechists to enable them perform beyond their clerical mandates.726 The idea in the 
strategic plan which aims at diversifying the competencies of the clergy beyond 
their clerical roles is timely. It aims to correct an out-of-date vision of the 
priesthood which has reduced it to the sacramental function only. Whereas the 
priesthood is such a productive force, the text takes into account their social 
position as means for more interaction with people of different fields of 
competency and social relations. Since the archdiocesan juridical division is done to 
match the civic districts,727 so the competencies of the priests in other fields of 
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work brings them in interactions with other people qualified in education, health, 
development and socio-economic development. 
 
The strategic plan outlines ways of strengthening the coordination and partnerships 
with the central and local government so as to maintain adequate and positive 
influence. By calling for more close collaboration this section intends and proposes 
to perpetuate the long-held belief in the centrality of the human person and in a 
way it forwards this objective: ―To educate the people on the reflections and 
guidelines on the education of the human person and contribute to the nutrition 
for all programmes at each parish.‖728 The text goes into the details concerning 
economic development when it talks of ―...enabling teachers accessing loans at a 
lower interest rate.‖729 It discusses forums where education officials from the 
district and the ministry could be invited to share ideas on a harmonious and 
productive working relationship with the archdiocese. The text carries wider plans 
for the collaboration with all kinds of associations such as the Head teachers‘ 
Association, the School Management Committee and Board of Governors of 
schools. The strategic plan has the idea of aligning its priorities and focus on the 
Government of Uganda‘s Education Strategic investment plan and policy.730 This 
particular consideration for social relations in the education sector is aimed at 
―...the performance and ability to promote the interests of the Archdiocese.‖731 
When the text talks about the ‗interests of the archdiocese,‘ it remains ambiguous 
without giving any explanation of what is included in these interests. Nevertheless, 
the document suggests a robust interactive model with most of society‘s key social 
identities and social relations732 in the provision of educational services since 
education cut across the boundaries of faith or any other human social category.  
 
The strategic plan adopts developmentalist strategies in community mobilisation as 
it proposes advocacy and capacity building to fight various forms of poverty from 
the grassroots. By adopting such measures, it intends to mobilise the people at 
various levels of society with what it describes as ―unique approaches, efforts and 
resources.‖733 With a concern that income inequalities between the rich and the 
poor continues to widen in the Archdiocese, the strategic plan suggests plans to 
fight poverty by mobilising, encouraging, training or orienting all agents of 
evangelisation, Catholic structures and organisations to refocus energies, strategies 
and efforts towards poverty eradication. This call to refocus almost all the 
resources towards poverty eradication is indicative of the dangers and threats that 
poverty poses to human dignity which is regarded as ―our foundational moral 
value‖734 and the central subject and end of evangelisation or any human 
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endeavour. It goes into the detail of the actions required to achieve this objective. 
In the area of advocacy and capacity building it suggests developing Savings Credit 
and Cooperative Organisations in parishes and encourages communities to engage 
in savings, mobilisations through Solidarity Groups and Village Savings and Loans 
Associations. This is borrowed from Care International as practiced in Niger and 
Northern Uganda. It also seeks to empower Catholic Communities to demand for 
accountability in governance and fight corruption and other forms of injustices in 
their respective local governments so as to improve on service delivery in such 
critical areas as roads, water and sanitation, health, education, agriculture and many 
others.735 Because of the technical nature of some of these government policies and 
programmes, it only seeks to ensure that all agents of evangelisation have full 
understanding of these programmes and policies like PEAP, NAADS, PMA, 
UPE736 so as to create an opportunity for effective policy monitoring and 
influence.737 The text however notes the challenges of inadequate knowledge and 
ignorance which may characterise those involved in advocacy and capacity building 
in relation to the government sponsored programmes.  
 
Because of the above the strategic plan suggests setting up an advocacy unit or 
research centre in the diocese to study government programmes and projects that 
focus on poverty in the districts and at the national level for it admits that without 
proper knowledge ―...it becomes difficult to influence policies.‖738 With this fact as 
stated the text adopts a pragmatic approach and make an observation to the 
archdiocese itself that ―...this demands that the archdiocese remains strong and 
committed to research and preparation of research and position papers.‖739 The 
strategic plan suggests organising targeted poverty eradication workshops at parish 
level for youth, women and men. And it draws the agenda for the same workshops 
as well with its focus on: prayer, business skills nurturing, information 
dissemination on markets, cooperatives, taking up farming as a business both at 
small scale and large scale levels, educating communities on when and when not to 
borrow funds from the mushrooming micro-finance institutions and banks. 
Identify, form and strengthen community based organisations at sub-parish and 
basic small Christian community on issues of mutual concern such as poor 
sanitation, food security and etc...740 In order to utilise well its basic structures, the 
strategic plan suggests creating a model parish or community which would be 
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evaluated on such areas: farming, business skills and enterprise development, 
infrastructure development through self-help, school enrolments and grades, health 
improvements, vocations, Sunday collections and payments of title, church 
marriages, youth mobilisation for participation in economic activities and Catholic 
Church activities.741 This approach makes the church more visible in people‘s 
experiences and lives. 
 
In the section on improved health the text only mandates Caritas Kampala to 
sensitize and mobilise Catholics using the media and other available opportunities 
to fight other killer diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria. It is silent about the 
foremost points on which the Catholics are to be sensitised before naming what 
has been called ‗other killer diseases like Aids and malaria.‘ But according to the 
health and morbidity report on Uganda, Aids and Malaria claim 60% of total 
admissions in health centres countrywide and malaria alone kills 1000 people per 
day in Africa. So, this document fell short of the fact that in Uganda the major 
health hazards are Malaria and Hiv/Aids, but the text just seem to consider them 
secondary and referred to them as ―other diseases.‖ 
 
In part four where the questions of governance are streamlined, the strategic plan 
points to dialogue qualified as ‗quality‘ and decision-making as the main end. And 
to achieve this end with efficiency, it gives only three commissions configured to 
the three ministries of Christ: The Sanctifying Office; The Teaching Office; and the 
Governing Office.742 There are a series of activities suggested for instance, having 
annual retreats and monthly recollections for the agents of evangelisation rotating 
from parish to parish. Weekly management meetings for all departments, parishes, 
schools and health units with minutes noted down. Also suggested is having 
quarterly management meetings for Episcopal councils and the respective heads of 
zonal departments and quarterly meetings of the pastoral Coordinator with the 
deans in the company of the zonal Episcopal vicars. Commissions and departments 
be equipped with competent staff and modern information technology. Apostolate 
of the laity be organised under the Uganda Martyrs Guild; Children Apostolate 
under the Banakizito Association, Youth Apostolate under the Karolines 
Asociations and the Major seminarians Apostolate under the Carolines Association. 
There is a new distinction between the different forms of apostolate. This structure 
looks particular to Kampala Archdiocese because it does not consider the laity as a 
huge segment but rather a small segment among others whose apostolate is unique.  
 
In an implicit reference to the developments that have come with globalisation, the 
strategic plan expresses a need ―to be open and visible especially in the modern 
society where the radio, television, the internet and other forms of electronic 
communication reach all corners of the globe and exert such influence on people‘s 
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minds.‖743 These are transborder and transnational systems of communication that 
are available to anyone who wishes to access them from any locality on the globe. 
Their use has not been regulated because there is no single legal or moral code to 
bring them to accountability. This explains why they have been referred to as 
instruments of empowerment for the grassroots because anyone with whichever 
motive can post any message in any form whether visual or audio and it spread 
through the global in an instant. With such background the text highlights the 
dangers and threats such means of communication could pose for a Church 
institution and calls for a strict code of conduct in the process of using them for 
the better. The text considers it ―vital for the archdiocese to promote a coherent 
communication strategy which reflects our vision, mission, guiding values and 
principles as part of witnessing and which upholds the highest ethical standards 
while proclaiming to the people the work of evangelisation, social development, 
justice and peace.‖744 In fact the text confines the main areas in which these means 
of communication could only be used since they have the potential of damaging 
the relations between the individuals and institutions. So, the text reserves the work 
of regulating any access to information to the Communications Working Group 
which is to develop a clear system of handling communications in all situations in 
the departments of each commission.745 With all the problems that may revolve 
around the wrong use of the media, should we consider this a form of self-
censorship? And if the whole issue is about building the image of the church, then 
should this be considered as ideological spin within the archdiocesan structure? 
 
The process of implementing the pastoral strategic plan is rooted in the process 
which brought it into being. It is claimed that the strategic plan came into being 
―...as a result of a large consultative exercise which involved the various agents of 
evangelisation.‖746 By suggesting that ―some of the elements of this plan may have 
to be endorsed by the Council of priests and the archdiocesan pastoral council‖747 
implies that there are some unfamiliar and new suggestions that need to be 
incorporated in the system and become part of the policy framework. The idea that 
―the plan will be disseminated in all parishes to ensure that its contents are known 
and owned by the entire membership of the faithful within the archdiocese of 
Kampala‖748 implies an interactive mode of idea when ideas came from below and 
so formulation into a plan, they have to go back to the grassroots. And the two 
basic principles of subsidiarity and participation as recorded in the text invoke that 
reality. So, the text names His Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala and Archbishop 
Cyprian as being involved and all the agents of evangelisation. So it is a document 
that grew from the grassroots and back to the grassroots.   
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By suggesting the use of the pastoral cycle as a tool in pastoral planning, the text 
intends to not only deal effectively with the local issues arising in the context of the 
pastoral ministry but also improve on the relationships between the agents of 
evangelisation and the faithful. Among the local issues noted are: ―...high rate of 
unemployment among the youth in the Parish; spread of AIDS among school 
children; low wages paid to church workers and grave issues.‖749 By employing the 
method of the pastoral cycle with its three classic steps of See – Judge – Act or put 
the other way Discern – Evaluate – Respond or simply Look – Love – Live, there 
is an assumption expressed in the text that the pastoral cycle will ―offer more 
effective and understanding responses‖750 to the people‘s experiences. 
Incorporating the pastoral cycle in the strategic plan is motivated by its use by other 
parish and diocesan councils, justice and peace groups, development teams and 
others engaged in pastoral action.‖751 And it is purposed to provide a 
comprehensive overview of a problem, situation or challenge that is to be taken up 
effectively. But apart from its effectiveness as a method, it is considered as a 
pastoral policy adopted by the AMECEA Bishops in 2001 to help in handling and 
analysing issues. So, the strategic plan is in a way implementing a regional Bishop‘s 
resolution in a local context. Perhaps the questions would have been that had it not 
been that resolution, would the strategic plan have founded reason to include it?  
 
The strategic plan has not adequately applied and made use of the traditional and 
cultural symbols and systems of the Baganda who form the majority of the 
Archdiocesan catchment area. The cultural institution of the Kabaka (Kingship) is 
mentioned singularly in reference to Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda (1885-1887) who 
killed the martyrs.752 Other elements of culture are evaluated in the background of 
superstition and witchcraft753 and African Traditional Religions754 which are posed 
as challenges to prevail over. However, there is use of some Luganda concepts that 
describe key social identities and social relations in the archdiocesan structure, for 
instance, Kwanjula, Wekembe, Ssabakristu, Ssabasomesa, Ssabayigisa, 
Ssabatetenkanya, and Bannakizito.755 These concepts as deeply founded on the 
Buganda culture make a rich representation of a repressed cultural tradition which 
keeps questioning the hegemony of another culture in a society that has a rich 
tradition and culture! But despite all the dynamics within, the text does not lose 
sight of its ultimate purpose which is all summarised as ―the salvation of souls‖756 
which rightly places it in the conversion of souls approach. In all ways, this strategic 
plan keeps a steady focus on the social set-up of the archdiocese and it almost 
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engages all the dimensions of society though the intensity differs as it is rooted in a 
particular discourse which motivates its language, structure and authority. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we described and analysed Kampala Archdiocesan documents 
published either as pastoral letters of the Archbishops, the Archdiocesan Synodal 
resolutions or as Pastoral Strategic Plans. In the analysis section the main emphasis 
has been placed on the Pastoral Strategic Plan (2010-2014). This document calls for 
collaboration among the agents of evangelisation in the exchange of ideas in 
mission practice for the purpose of mutual evangelisation. In a world jam-packed 
by the plurality of ideas and beliefs, characterised by multiculturalism and 
migrations, and driven by the forces of globalisation, the Strategic Plan seems to 
suggest that there is an answer to these ―complexities‖ which calls for facilitating 
each other‘s efforts or just to say building capacity.757 It seems a timely document 
which is in line with today‘s society which requires theology to be increasingly done 
in conversation with other disciplines. The terminology suggests that conversation 
is practiced more with agencies outside the Church than within the Church. Unlike 
the Pastoral Letter ―You are the Salt of the Earth‖, which uses egalitarian 
discourse, greeting ―all of you my brothers and sisters‖, including the ―lay people in 
the Catholic Church‖, the ―Pastoral Strategic Plan‖ uses quite hierarchical 
discourse, culminating in the use of the pluralis majestatic, ―we‖, despite the fact 
that the texts speaks a lot about ―partnership‖. 
 
Most of the issues raised in the strategic plan revolve around grassroots 
evangelisation as the end of all the pastoral programs, practices, and actions in the 
archdiocese. And to bring all these proposed pastoral projects, practices and 
actions to their fulfilment the text mention ―all agents of evangelisation‖ as the 
executing group. More than the earlier mission documents published in the 
missionary period the Strategic Plan fosters a collaborative approach to mission 
practice in Kampala Archdiocese. But, unlike the Pastoral Letter ‗Partnership for 
the Gospel‘, this seems to be primarily a collaboration or partnership between the 
agents of evangelization among themselves, and between them and outside 
agencies (government officials, other denominations and religions). 
 
The meaning of conversation as understood by Rorty is not developed in the texts 
that we have analysed. Our reference to conversation here is limited to the 
collaboration of the agents of evangelisation and their call to grassroots 
evangelisation. We could say that there are sources, suggestions and approaches 
offered in the exercise of mission practice and the new social categories developed, 
like agents of evangelisation. Grassroots evangelisation marks a shift towards a 
mission practice that is built on Conversation in human relations and identities in 
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the mission of the Church. But this understanding is limited to the members of the 
church only and it is still rooted in the mission model and practice that is 
traditionally associated with the identity of the church. We have seen from the 
analysis of Archdiocesan texts, that there are allusions to conversation. But this 
conversation falls short of the Rortian ideal of ―keeping the conversation going.‖ 
Therefore the task in chapter five is to attempt to develop this Rortian 
conversation in full as a mission theory. 
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  Chapter Five: 
  Mission Concepts in the Future: Mission as Conversation 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the task that is set before us is to elaborate conversation as the new 
model of mission in the Ugandan Church in the 21st century, characterised by 
globalisation, multiculturalism and migration. The use of the concept conversation 
in this research is rooted in the work of Richard Rorty ‗Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature‘ which brought him to prominence at its publication in 1979. As it was 
observed in Chapter two, Rorty‘s own understanding of conversation is in reality 
drawn from his own notion of language and thought as well as an appropriation of 
Oakshott‘s famous work, ―The Voice of Poetry in the conversation of Mankind.‖ This 
philosophical understanding of the concept conversation as adopted and illustrated 
by Rorty forms the theoretical basis of its use and application in the present study. 
Elizabeth Cook observed that ―One of Richard Rorty‘s most famous and 
controversial philosophical positions has been his replacement of knowledge with 
conversation, whereby the old goals of progress, truth, and consensus under ideal 
conditions are replaced with Rorty‘s ideal of ―keeping the conversation going.‖758 
As it was stated in the introduction, this thesis uses conversation as a sensitising 
concept and is intended to develop further what conversation could mean in the 
context of mission theory and practice. After studying Rorty‘s concept of 
conversation (chapter one and two) and analysing mission theory and practice in 
the Archdiocese of Kampala in past and present (chapter three and four) we came 
to understand that people‘s grasping of the truth is always progressing and partial. 
There is no single tradition, system or worldview that could claim to hold the 
fullness of truth. All that people have are partial and imperfect acquisitions of truth. 
Therefore, as people strive to grasp the fullness of truth, they must be open to the 
reality of plurality and allow a healthy interaction imbued in our intersubjective 
nature for a consistent conversation. In other words, the reality of plurality here 
suggests that despite people‘s particular disagreements, they are usually quite able to 
talk to each other and discuss matters.759 
 
In Chapter One, by reading Rorty‘s famous work, „Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature‟ 
it was demonstrated that, part of Rorty‘s point in giving historical accounts of 
philosophy is to urge listeners to realize that traditional epistemological projects 
have failed. In light of the above, he contends that we must stop asking questions 
motivated by such projects, and get back to vital questions. He reasons that we 
must embrace a more pragmatist view to philosophy and accept the social 
dimensions of inquiry, thought, and action. In doing this, Rorty believes it is 
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helpful to speak in terms of conversations and vocabularies rather than truth, 
representation, and foundations of knowledge. And this is part of his overall 
rejection of grounding as transcendental or universal. Such a conclusion from 
Rorty brings to the fore some difficulties in putting to use the concept conversation 
in Christian mission. Now that epistemology no longer counts, whereas we noted 
in Chapter two that theology has always developed her vocabulary from 
epistemology, it looks incompatible to apply the Rortian ‗conversation‘ in Christian 
mission practice. This is so because Rorty removed the foundations on which the 
Christian base is built and his views negated Christianity as an organised religion 
and labelled ―religion as a conversation stopper.‖760 From a missiological 
perspective the main question is, how do you put to use a concept whose origins 
and proponents negate the very idea it is intending to serve? In other words, how 
could theology canonise the concept conversation despite its tainted background 
and promoters? In this research, our concern lies with the concept conversation 
and its usability in mission studies and theology generally. And that is what we are 
set to demonstrate in this chapter. 
 
It was observed in Chapter Two, that Rorty‘s concept of conversation and the 
claims of Christian mission are close in the sense that both deal with truth. As was 
noted in chapter two, the key concept of Christian mission is Truth and 
Christianity is boldly proclaimed as true and its truth is in some sense universal. 
This is due to the fact that Christian truth claims are said to be based on events 
having taken place in history, that is, the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. It was noted in that chapter that Christ is considered the Truth because he 
referred everything back to God the father, perceived things and acted in the 
context of a proper relation to God. Christian truth, therefore, is not primarily 
propositional, rather it is relational. It concerns the proper relationship of 
humanity, creation and God, a relationship which is promised as the future 
fulfilment of the whole of reality before God. According to Richard Rorty, ―…If 
we see knowing not as having an essence, but rather as a right, by current 
standards, to believe then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the 
ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood.‖761 The question of 
truth has pre-occupied the human mind throughout history but none has provided 
an adequate interpretation and meaning of it. Even Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now 
emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) observed that ―… at the centre of theology lies the 
question of truth.‖762 By using the noun question in reference to truth, Cardinal 
Ratzinger expressed an interminable exploration that the noun truth offers in 
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theology. And as we have all along stated, that certainly the question of truth was 
so central to Rorty as well. 
 
We again, followed Rorty‘s argument when he claimed that we need to make a 
distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is 
out there. He thinks that to say that the world is out there, that it is not our 
creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the 
effects of causes which do not include human mental states. He affirmatively 
maintains that ―truth cannot be out there, cannot exist independently of the human 
mind, and because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out 
there, but descriptions of the world are not. The world on its own unaided by the 
describing activities of human beings cannot. So, he attaches the notion of ‗truth 
making‘ to human capacity for language or communication at that. Rorty disputes 
the thinking that the goal of enquiry is truth. He argues that one cannot say this 
without misleading the public. He considers that ‗Truth‘ only sounds like the name 
of a goal if it is thought to name a fixed goal, that is, if progress towards truth is 
explicated by reference to a metaphysical picture, that of getting closer or getting 
there anyway. Without that picture, to say that truth is our goal is merely to say 
something like ‗we hope to justify our belief to as many and as large audiences as 
possible. But to say that is to offer only an ever-retreating goal, one which fades 
forever and forever when we move. It is not what common sense would call a goal. 
He concedes that truth is not even something to which we might get closer; much 
less something we might realize we had finally reached. To try to make truth 
approachable and reachable is to do what is deplorable, to humanise truth.763 
 
In chapters Three and Four, by applying the tools of critical discourse analysis, we 
have described and analysed mission history in Uganda following Fairclough‘s 
three-dimensional analytic framework. As we saw in Chapter Two, this framework 
involves linguistic description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between 
discursive processes (production and interpretation) and the text, and explanation 
of the relationship between the discursive process and social phenomena.764 The 
use of critical discourse analysis is motivated by the fact that mission is basically 
founded on ‗proclamation‘ which implies the use of language as a medium. And 
since the noun ‗proclamation‘ means the act of saying something in a public, 
official, or definite way or the act of proclaiming something, then CDA is 
applicable to establish how missionaries in the past and present, used language in 
the proclamation of truth. Another important element that was set to consider in 
the use of critical discourse analysis is to find out the model of mission that the 
missionaries applied in their strategy. The findings that we have developed from 
the missionary texts and the pastoral documents of the archdiocese of Kampala 
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bring to light the fact that mission has maintained a consistent method and practice 
that has a deep foundations in the Catholic self-understanding and in the Catholic 
theology of religions.  
 
In discussing the above subject, James Fredericks locates this problem in the pre-
Vatican II Catholic theology of religions as represented by Karl Rahner and Jean 
Daniélou. He considers principally Daniélou‘s approach to the question as 
governed by a theology of history. In his view, history is the progressive 
manifestation of the divine to humankind. Within this general history of creation, 
salvation history proper begins with Abraham and reaches its apex in Jesus Christ 
whose saving presence within time is now continued by the Church. Daniélou 
locates religious traditions other than Judaism and Christianity within this theology 
of history by means of a Scholastic distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural orders. Although the natural order has its own proper autonomy and 
intelligibility, it has been ordained by God to find its ultimate fulfilment in the 
supernatural. This fulfilment of the natural order in its supernatural destiny and 
finality is manifest in the progressive unfolding of the divine within history. 
Therefore, Christians may speak not only of two orders, the natural and the 
supernatural, but also of two covenants, the cosmic, which includes the entire 
natural order, and the historical covenant, which begins in the Jewish people and 
continues today in the Church.765 
 
Based on this distinction, Daniélou concludes that the other religious paths are 
human expressions of a real knowledge of God available to human beings through 
the proper use of natural reason that has a supernatural finality. This natural 
knowledge of God, however, should not be confused with a supernatural faith 
which comes only from God‘s active intervention into the unfolding of a history of 
salvation beginning with Abraham and culminating in Christ. He claims that: ―The 
essential difference between Catholicism and all other religions is that the others 
start from man. They are touching and often very beautiful attempts, rising very 
high in their search for God. But in Catholicism there is a contrary movement, the 
descent of God towards the world, in order to communicate his life to it.‖766 But 
however ―touching‖ and ―beautiful,‖ the other religious paths are located within 
the natural order and have no power to provide human beings with the salvation 
that God has made available only in the Church, and indeed, the Catholic 
Church.767 This concludes that Christian mission is founded on a theological 
tradition which shapes its practice regardless of the time and context. And placed in 
the confines of this research, Christian mission has foundations which inform its 
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truth claims and is heavily contrasted to the non-foundationalism of Rorty which 
surrenders the rational quest for truth. 
 
The dilemma above draws attention to two contrasting positions prevailing in 
philosophy that is foundationalism and non-foundationalism as we have presented 
it in Chapter One. If we consider it from the epistemological standpoint, 
foundationalism at all times implies the holding of a position in an inflexible and 
infallible manner; invoking ultimate foundations on which to construct the 
evidential support system of various convictional beliefs. Foundationalism as a 
thesis holds that all our beliefs can be justified by appealing to some item of 
knowledge that is self-evident or indubitable.768 And for Calvin Schrag, 
foundationalism finds its mission in a quest for certainty. Unimpeachable 
knowledge claims is what it is after. These foundational systems of knowledge are 
called ‗first principles‘ or ‗aristocratic beliefs‘, which are intrinsically credible. Such 
basic givens can be anything from sense data to universals, essences, and 
experiences, including religious experiences.769 And for Christian theology, the 
given is God himself who makes his revelation known to humans through Jesus 
Christ. Faith in Christ therefore grasps the promise that we shall be led into all 
truth. In receiving the gift of faith the proclamation of Christ confirms itself to 
people, in which people, touched by its truth, themselves become its bearers, and in 
which the knowledge of God becomes real. In order to avoid the possibility of 
reversing this order, which would result in knowledge of human invention, 
theology consequently must assert that it does have a foundation.770 This confirms 
that Christian mission is rooted in an inflexible and secure foundationalist tradition 
as we have noted it above. 
 
These explanations present positions which are necessary for understanding 
conversation as our sensitising concept. We have all along maintained that the 
concept ‗conversation‘ as applied in this thesis has been understood in the Rortian 
sense as propounded in his book ‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.‘ But this 
Rortian conversation as rooted in a non-foundationalism which informed his works 
raises some difficulties in applying it adequately in Christian mission. This is so 
because Christian mission begins with the given of revelation which forms its 
foundation and legitimacy as we have seen above. In order to achieve this 
objective, we shall have to assume the via media between foundationalism and non-
foundationalism. 
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Rorty, Religion and Conversation 
 
Because we use Rorty‘s notion of conversation to construct a mission method, we 
have to prove that it is plausible for use in theology and particularly in mission 
studies. It was mentioned in Chapter Two, that religion had a significant place in 
the works of prominent pragmatists such as Dewey, Peirce and James. They 
contributed a lot to the development and intellectual respectability of religion as a 
human endeavour. Richard Rorty following his pragmatist mentor John Dewey 
believes that we might usefully substitute faith in human potential for retrograde 
faith in a benevolent God. This is a reversal of his hardliner views on religion and 
the beginning of flip-flopping on this theme. As it was noted in Chapter One of 
this research, Rorty is such an accomplished and nuanced writer. It is nearly 
impossible to know where to begin a discussion of his views on any topic, let alone 
religion, a topic on which he writes so elliptically and separately. For most of the 
1980‘s and well into the 1990‘s Rorty wrote very little about religion, and when he 
did, he came across as a relatively sharp critic of any agenda that pertains to defend 
religion. It was assumed that Rorty would think that he would be better off without 
religion altogether. This is very clear in his essay with a provocative title “Religion as 
a conversation stopper” where he refers to himself and like-minded intellectuals as ―we 
atheists.‖771 The following debate here below accentuates the difficulties that 
pertain to the convergence of two social systems motivated by different truth 
claims with diverse epistemological backgrounds. This debate sets religion against 
politics and the arguments between the two traditions gives way to a conversation 
that shapes their relationship without discounting their differences.  
 
We have seen above that Rorty considered religion a conversation stopper. This 
remark was prompted by the publication of Stephen‘s Carter‘s religious apology in 
the book The Culture of Disbelief. This book is written on the premise that the 
principalities of government and religion, when not producing oppression from 
their merger, are necessarily generating friction from their separation. Likewise, it is 
no secret of contemporary society that unresolved tensions between religion and 
the state continue to surface and that there is yet any satisfactory concordance on 
the proper role of religion in public life. In this book, Carter ―….argues that there 
has emerged a legal and political culture of disbelief, one that prompts us to belittle 
religious devotion, to humiliate believers and even if indirectly, to discourage 
religion as a serious activity, one that presses the religiously faithful to be other than 
themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though their faith 
does not matter to them.‖772 Carter‘s words represent a view that contemporary 
society must begin taking religion seriously as a central source of understanding and 
moral reasoning for majority citizens and as a necessary and beneficial component 
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of the socio-political system. In particular Carter insists that religion be allowed to 
fulfil its historic and functionally optimal role of checking the power and policies of 
the states. According to Carter, religion is at its best, and thus the state and society 
derive the most from it, when it serves as a mediating institution between state and 
citizen, never in substantial alliance with the former and always a potential source 
of moral dissent for the latter.773 
 
The most provocative and useful part of Carter‘s book is his normative conception 
of the proper relationship between government and religion which are entities with 
varied truth claims. In his understanding of religion which is fairly traditional, he 
claims that, ―Although many thoughtful sociologists and historians have defined 
religion in other ways, the belief in the supernatural intervention in human affairs is 
a useful divider for our present purposes, because that is where the culture seems 
to draw the line between that which is suspect and that which is not.‖774 This 
conception is premised on the idea that religious involvement in politics and law 
can be indispensably beneficial for the state, even if, and perhaps especially if, the 
former is in vigorous dissent from the latter. Carter draws this theory from the 
observations of Alexis de Tocqueville: ―Translating Tocqueville‘s observation to 
the present day and removing his pro-Christian bias, one sees two chief functions 
that religions can serve in a democracy. First, they can serve as the sources of moral 
understanding without which any majoritarian system can deteriorate into simple 
tyranny. And second, they can mediate between the citizens and the apparatus of 
government, providing an independent moral voice. Indeed, from Tocqueville‘s day 
to contemporary theories of pluralism, the need for independent mediating 
institutions has been a staple of political science. Like other intermediate 
institutions, religions that command the devotion of their members actually 
promote freedom and reduce the likelihood of democratic tyranny by splitting the 
allegiance of citizens and pressing on their members‘ points of view that are often 
radically different from the preferences of the state.‖775 
 
Basing on this understanding, Carter insists that the religious presence in politics 
and society should generally be welcomed, not feared. This to be sure, is one of the 
great ironies in contemporary perceptions of religion: ―The very aspect of religions 
that many of their critics most fear, the religiously devout, in the name of their 
faith, take positions that differ from approved state policy, is one of their strengths. 
Taking an independent path, exercising what is termed as the power of resistance, 
is part of what religions are for.776 Although this kind of perspective on the political 
value of religion is not universally held, either as a normative goal or as an empirical 
norm, but rather derives from Carter‘s particular view of religiosity. According to 
Carter, ―…religion…is not simply a means for understanding one‘s self, or even of 
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contemplating the nature of the universe, or existence, or of anything else. A 
religion is, at its heart, a way of denying the authority of the rest of the world; it is a 
way of saying to fellow human beings and to the state those fellow human beings 
have erected, ―No, I will not accede to your will.‖777 In the context of his theory of 
religion and government, the paradigmatic illustration of religion as a mediating 
source of resistance would thus be the religious citizen who, when confronted with 
a government action antithetical to his/her faith, must profess to the state Luther‘s 
“Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich” (I cannot do otherwise, here I stand‖).778 We 
should not assume, however, that this dissentient function of religion, this power 
of resistance, is limited to the sphere of the individual or that, as its name implies, it 
is concerned only with resistance and not with the transformation of the political 
and social order. To the contrary, Carter contends that we must properly attribute 
to it the moral determination of such transformative figures as Martin Luther King 
and Joseph Rummel, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New Orleans who, in 
1956, threatened Roman Catholic legislators with excommunication if they 
supported de jure segregation of private schools.779 
 
The central point of Carter‘s theory, then, is that a vigorous religious presence is a 
necessary part of a vigorous democratic order and that we stand to lose when 
religion is excluded from the public square, even if such exclusion seems expedient 
in the short run. In turn, it is precisely because of this institutional or structural 
relationship that the culture of disbelief, as a paradigm of religion in politics, is so 
inherently problematic. For just as the excessive entanglement of government and 
religion ―tends to destroy government and degrade religion,‖ the excessive 
detachment of religion from government, in this case through the related 
phenomena of trivialisation, privatisation, and secularisation, may either emasculate 
religion and thus unduly empower government, or alienate religion and thus 
threaten government. But the question is: How should we deal with the 
overzealous religious movement that purposefully seeks either to use the state as a 
conduit for its entire agenda, thus offending a liberal conception of the state or 
effectively to become the state? After all, a simple exposition on the virtues of 
separation and robust democracy would likely do little to dissuade such a 
movement from pursuing its goals, particularly when each side defines a healthy 
constitutional order in starkly different terms. Aware of this possibility, especially 
given the recent rise of the Christian Coalition, Carter argues that the proper 
response is not to single out religion from exclusion from the political process, but 
to confront such attempts within that process. ―The error, as a matter of secular 
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politics, is to suppose that it is the Christian Coalition‘s religiosity rather than its 
platform that is the enemy.‖780 If it is the religious right‘s conservatism that is 
problematic, he contends, rather than using religion as an overbroad proxy for 
conservatism and banish it judicially by calling it an establishment, the conservatism 
should be confronted directly in the polls and on the legislative floor. It is these for 
the political market, and not the courts, he says that ―will always check on potential 
oppressors.‖781 And those opponents of the new Christian right who see this as too 
much work – Why can‘t we just litigate? Won‘t a press conference do just as much? 
– simply are less serious than the Christian Coalition itself about winning.‖782 Such 
an approach, he suggests, would be fairer both to religion or religious citizens, 
many of whom harbour no such agendas and often have a great deal to contribute, 
and to our basic commitment to participatory politics, a commitment that is 
potentially undermined when citizens attempt to defeat or exclude one another 
through non-political channels.783 
 
By and large, Carter appears to provide a viable theoretical framework to explain 
and justify the relationship between government and religion, or at least some 
aspects of that relationship. Carter is certainly correct that religions may serve 
society through their ethical and prophetic functions. As a practical matter, 
moreover, his model works because it would apparently encompass any religion 
that chooses to participate in the political and legal processes, for when a religion 
engages in such participation, it would presumably be fulfilling one of its functions 
as a mediating institution by serving to counterbalance the excesses and errors of 
the state. At the same time, any religion choosing to forego the benefits and 
burdens of political participation could do so and would not be obviously penalised 
for its choice. In short, if society is to benefit from the unique contributions that 
religions can make, then at least as a non-constitutional matter, religions need to 
have full and equal access to the political and legal realms. 
 
I wish to conclude this part of Carter‘s ideas by highlighting the catalogues of the 
various conceptual paradigms which I think might lead to describe and understand 
his Culture of disbelief. Specifically, there are six interrelated theses proposed by 
various scholars which are in turn raised by Carter in his book, that either describe 
a phenomenon or state a perspective relating to the relationship between religion 
and the political culture. These are: (1) the trivialisation thesis,784 (2) the double 
standard thesis,785 (3) the privatisation thesis,786 (4) the false neutrality thesis,787 (5) 
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the hostility thesis,788 and (6) the secularisation thesis.789 These theses are meant to 
offer a more refined way of examining the phenomenon that lead Carter, for one, 
to conclude that a full-fledged culture of disbelief certainly exists. And if it exists it 
negates and stifles the human quest to search for truth, a notion which cannot be 
confined in a single interpretation.  
 
In his strident critique, Rorty takes on Carter and his work „The Culture of Disbelief.‟ 
He rebukes Carter for putting in question what, to atheists like him, seems the 
happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with religion. This 
compromise consists in privatising religion, keeping it out of the public square, 
making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.790 Rorty 
assumes the position of a speaker for the atheists by charging that: ―We atheists, 
doing our best to enforce Jefferson‘s compromise, think it bad enough that we 
cannot run for public office without being disingenuous about our disbelief in 
God; ….We also resent the suggestion that you have to be religious to have a 
conscience, a suggestion implicit in the fact that only religious conscientious 
objectors to military service go unpunished.‖791 He makes some bewildering 
remarks about religion when he proposes that, ―Such facts suggest to us that the 
claims of religion need, if anything, to be pushed back still further, and that 
religious believers have no business asking for more public respect than they now 
receive.‖792 He tries to debunk Carter‘s arguments to render them vague when he 
claims that, ―Carter, however, thinks that privatising religion trivialises it.‖793 He 
does not agree with Carter who says that ―the legal culture that guards the public 
square still seems most comfortable thinking of religion as a hobby, something 
done in privacy, something mature, public-spirited adults do not use as the basis for 
politics.‖794 He appropriates Carter‘s term ―trivialisation of religion‖ to 
―privatisation of religion.‖ Rorty is firm in insisting that religion is a private affair 
that does not have any significance in the public affairs. He compares religion to 
family and love lives which are private, non-political and nontrivial. In doing this he 
refutes the trivialisation thesis of Carter. 
 
Rorty gives the basis for his exclusion thesis by refuting the idea of Carter who 
thinks that any exclusion of religion from the public square is unjust and limits the 
conversation. But Rorty responds that such exclusion is at the heart of the 
Jeffersonian compromise and that it is hard to see what more just arrangement 
might take the place of that compromise.795 He presents the conviction of the 
contemporary liberal philosophers who think that to keep a democratic political 
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community going, religious believers must remain willing to trade privatisation for a 
guarantee of religious liberty.796 In order to galvanise his privatisation argument he 
declares that: ―The main reason religion needs to be privatised is that, in political 
discussion with those outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation-
stopper.‖797 However, Rorty appreciates and agrees entirely with Carter on two 
thoughtful and persuasive parts of his book where Rorty, in unpretentiousness, 
acknowledges that it ―…points up the inconsistency of our behaviour, and the 
hypocrisy involved in saying that believers somehow have no right to base their 
political views on their religious faith, whereas we atheists have every right to base 
ours on Enlightenment philosophy. The claim that in doing so we are appealing to 
reason, whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum.‖798 He as well accepts 
that, ―Carter is also right to say that the liberal theory has not shown that the will of 
any of the brilliant philosophers of the liberal tradition, or, for that matter, the will 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, is more relevant to moral decisions 
than the will of God.‖799 We end this response of Rorty to Carter by his message to 
religious citizens that they should restructure their arguments in purely secular 
terms by dropping reference to the source of the premises of their arguments and 
that this omission seems a reasonable price to pay for religious liberty.  
 
Rorty‘s distrustful reaction to Carter drew a furore of replies from authors who 
criticised him for promoting an uncoordinated pragmatic tradition with a blind 
secularism. For the purpose of the argument in this section, we shall limit these 
responses to two because of their close affinity to Rorty and his philosophical 
tradition. In his article, “An Engagement with Rorty‖, Nicholas Wolterstorff finds it 
difficult to reconcile the incongruence in Rorty‘s thought when he assumes that 
Rorty ―…hopes for what he calls ‗universal intersubjective agreement,‘ but 
agreement achieved by the social practice of what he regularly calls justification.‖800 
Also, he chides Rorty for being inconsistent in his self-description for at one time 
calling himself an atheist and another moment referring to himself as anticlericalist. 
And in doing this, he runs away from epistemological and metaphysical 
controversies which the word ‗atheist‘ evokes and he does want to get into and uses 
a political term ‗anticlericalist‘ to describe a location in the controversies that he 
does want to enter.801 Wolterstorff also finds it difficult to account for the 
public/private dualisms in Rorty‘s privatisation of religion. He is surprised to see 
Rorty, an implacable enemy of dualisms, placing so much weight on this particular 
dualism.802 Again, he charges that Rorty, in his use of the phrase ‗Religion as 
Conversation-Stopper‘ he was merely tweaking a comment of Stephen Carter 
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which went like this: ―One good way to end a conversation…is to tell a group of 
well-educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a 
controversial one, such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is 
required by your understanding of God‘s will;‖803 when he offered an unusually 
flat-footed example of a religious argument for a political position. So, Rorty 
appropriated Carter‘s words and coined a new phrase which in fact was only a re-
statement of the same words in another form. 
 
In addition to the above, Wolterstorff finds it conflicting that Rorty‘s comments 
about the role of religion in the democratic polity breathe a very different spirit 
from that of his comments on every other topic that he has developed. In his other 
passages Rorty praises imagination, openness, re-description, and self-creation 
whereas here, the talk is all about limits. Religion is to limit itself to the private; the 
conversation is to be limited to the premises held in common.804 He also wonders 
why Rorty who bases his arguments and social positions on Darwinian pragmatism, 
does not base the same on premises held in common! And that all Rorty‘s books 
are addressed to the public in general and not just to his fellow Darwinian 
pragmatist.805 But in a surprising U-turn, Rorty points it out that ―…moral 
decisions that are to be enforced by a pluralist and democratic state‘s monopoly of 
violence are best made by public discussion in which voices claiming to be God‘s, 
or reason‘s or science‘s, are put at par which everybody‘s else.806 This he argues that 
it is allowance that constitutes a social policy and not limitation. But claiming that 
religion must be privatised, Rorty wants to forestall the conversation even before it 
is there. He brings to the attention of Rorty that conversation-stopping is not some 
appalling evil perpetrated upon an otherwise endlessly talkative public by religious 
people. Stopped conversation is an all-pervading feature of political debate in a 
democracy; and voting is provided as a procedure for arriving at a decision of the 
body when conversation is stopped. So for Rorty to call on the religious people to 
shape up in order to be in a democracy, implies that also the pragmatists with their 
philosophical reasons must shape up to fit well in a democracy.  
 
We end Wolterstorff‘s rejoinder with this rather long observation: ―It belongs to 
the religious convictions of a good many religious people in our society that they 
ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of Justice on their 
religious convictions. They do not view as an option whether or not to do so. It is 
their conviction that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, and integration in 
their lives: that they ought to allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, 
the command and example of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a 
whole, including, then their social and political existence. Their religion is not, for 
them, about something other than their social and political existence; it is also 
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about their social and political existence. Accordingly, to require of them that they 
do not base their decisions and discussions concerning political issues on their 
religion are to infringe, inequitably, on the free exercise of their religion.‖807 
 
Another response to Rorty‘s essay, „Religion as Conversation-Stopper‟ came from Jeffrey 
Stout whose differences with Rorty fall into two main categories. On the one hand 
they pertain to the rhetoric of objectivity and, on the other, to what pragmatism 
implies concerning the role of religion in democratic politics.808 He invokes a point 
of unanimity with Rorty that both of them have been persuaded by their pragmatist 
forebears to treat rationality as a more permissive and context-sensitive notion than 
Victorian critics of religious superstition took it to be. Also both are inclined to 
agree with William James that some theists might well be rationally entitled to their 
religious commitments. However, he expresses his differences with Rorty because 
he considers that Rorty‘s writings on the role of religion in politics often retain the 
spirit, if not the letter, of militant secularism. He recognises that in many of those 
writings he treats religion per se as an unwelcome intruder in the political sphere, 
and is looking for ways, consistent with his own pragmatic philosophical 
commitments, to mobilise opposition to its influence.809 Stout takes a different path 
from Rorty and sees religion, in its public as well as its private manifestations, as an 
ever-changing mixture of life-giving and malignant tendencies. He thinks that any 
citizen who shares the desire for justice and freedom, be they religious or not, is 
welcome into the public conversation. Far from embracing Rorty‘s vision of the 
future which is a perfectly secular utopia, Stout dreams of reviving the sort of 
coalition between religious groups and secular intellectuals that characterised the 
civil rights movements. 
 
Stout articulates a stark reality as a counsel to Rorty that there is no reason to think 
that human beings are going to stop being religious in the foreseeable future. He 
maintains that: ―If we are not at all likely to enter an age in which religion ceases to 
have public influence; it seems unlikely that pursuing a secularist political agenda is 
going to have beneficial consequences on the whole.‖810 To support his assertion, 
he recalls the historical events of the 1960s when de-divinization was widely 
thought to be an essential component of modernization; when it was thought, 
religious belief and practice were in the process of withering away. He states that all 
this proved a myth when the death of the secularisation thesis was announced in 
the early 1980‘s by Mary Douglas when she declared that events have taken 
religious studies by surprise. She explained that scholars had had their eyes 
―…glued to those conditions of modern life identified by Weber as antipathetic to 
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religion. Perhaps, also, their inclinations misled them….. Certain religious form 
might have a natural appeal to intellectuals if they are going to be religious at all. 
People whose occupations do not require submission to authority or conformity to 
outward forms, and who are paid to ask searching questions and to take an 
independent stance, are likely to be more drawn to a personal style of religious 
worship than to a publicly conforming one. Their own religious preferences could 
conceivably dim their perception of what other people like.‖811 Stout further 
reminds Rorty about another historical detail that as a consequence of the 
declaration of the demise of the secularisation thesis, even one of its leading 
proponents, Peter Berger, abandoned it.812 
 
In the same vein, Stout points out that there is tension within most of Rorty‘s 
writings on the topic of religion and politics. He charges at Rorty for the way he 
makes objections to the use of scriptural authority in public discussions as 
something more than an arbitrary expression of his own preferences. Stout is 
astonished at Rorty‘s reasoning that citing a biblical passage aligned with his liberal 
sympathies is permissible, while citing a biblical passage that he dislikes is not 
permissible. Also that citing any biblical passage in support of a conclusion Rorty 
agrees with would be permissible, while citing any passages in support of contrary 
conclusions would not be. And in either of those interpretations, Rorty would be 
proposing himself as the arbiter of discursive legitimacy. Again Stout points to 
Rorty that it is not justifiable to claim that all ecclesiastical organisations are seeking 
economic and political clout, it is reasonable enough to evaluate them one by one 
and offer encouragement to the good ones and expose the wrong ones as well.  
 
These responses had a remarkable impact on Rorty and he softened his stance 
against religion. This is most evident in some aspects of his writings in which he, in 
the last decade of his life, became an enthusiastic promoter of reconcilability of 
pragmatism and religion. This led to an intellectual respectability of religious 
convictions and attitudes generally. In fact, he insisted on the individual‘s right to 
believe what they will and for the rights of the private, the unshared, and the 
imaginative vis-à-vis the public, the objective and the universal.813 Although, he was 
generally committed to his pluralist and anti-foundationalist agenda, he created the 
possibility of productive conversation between the believers and non-believers. It 
was observed earlier on, that Rorty had all identified himself as an atheist and his 
labelling of ―religion as a conversation stopper‖ proves this point. But he confesses 
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that, ―…it was a hasty and insufficiently thoughtful response.‖814 He further 
confessed that ―Although I have indeed used atheist as a self-description, I have 
never felt very comfortable with the word. It has a distinctly old-fashioned flavour. 
It has come to seem a relic of the quarrel between religion and science. That 
quarrel was far more central to intellectual life at the end of the 19th century than 
at the end of the 20th century.‖815 This was a turning point in Rorty‘s attitude 
towards religion for he concedes his snobbery and ―…rejects the possibility of 
dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds.‖816 But then he was determined to 
treat it, instead, as a matter of politics.  
 
He worked to achieve his objective by reconsidering his position and attitude 
towards religion and religious beliefs. So, he preferred to label his views ‗anti-
clerical‘ a term with political inclinations. With this he considers religion as a matter 
of politics other than atheism, which carries religious overtones. These views 
encouraged him to suggest that anti-clericalism might be a better term for his 
outlook than atheism. He begins by making a distinction between congregations of 
religious believers ministered to by pastors and what he called ecclesiastical 
institutions, organisations that accredit pastors and claim to offer authoritative 
guidance to believers.817 In his reconsideration of religion, he shuns what he calls 
religious professionals who devote themselves not to pastoral care but to 
promulgating orthodoxy and acquiring economic and political clout. He argues that 
it is mostly religion above the parish level that does the damage. He claims that 
ecclesiastical organisations typically maintain their existence by deliberately creating 
ill-will toward people who belong to other such organisations, and toward people 
whose behaviour they presume immoral. They thereby create unnecessary human 
misery. However, he also challenges his fellow atheists that ―…there is hypocrisy, 
in saying that believers somehow have no right to base their political views on their 
religious faith, whereas we atheists have every right to base ours on Enlightenment 
philosophy. The claim that in doing so we are appealing to reason, whereas the 
religious are being irrational, is hokum.‖818 He therefore urged a shifting of the 
ground in arguments for secularism away from the question of religion‘s Objective 
Truth, a concept he regarded as fictional and one we could be better off if we 
dropped. And so the principal concern of secularists must be the extent to which 
the actions of religious believers frustrate the needs of other human beings, rather 
than the extent to which religion gets something right or wrong.  
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In his swipe against ecclesiastical organisations, he places his hopes that they will 
eventually wither away. He recalls the feeling that militant atheism is as unattractive 
as militant religious proselytising and therefore there is a need to distinguish 
between atheism and anti-clericalism. Although he recognises that the 
disappearance of ecclesiastical institutions would leave a gap in the lives of religious 
believers, for they will no longer have a sense of being part of a great and powerful 
worldly institution. But he thinks that that gap will be filled by an increased sense 
of participation in the advance of humanity, theists and atheists together, shoulder 
to shoulder, toward the fulfilment of social ideals. As social justice increases there is 
hope there will be less temptation for the poor to murder the rich and consequently 
less need for religion as a device for diminishing social unrest. So, the only role left 
for religious belief will be to help individuals find meaning in their lives and to 
serve as a help to individuals in their times of trouble. In the secularist utopia, 
religion will be pruned back to the parish level. 
 
Rorty with time assumed a comfortable relationship with religion and religious 
beliefs to the extent of becoming a religious apologist but again developed a bitter 
hostility against ecclesiastical institutions which he considered political. He 
contends that ―…religious belief is not irrational, or intrinsically wrong-headed.‖819 
He objects that those opposed to the idea of God and claim that: ―To say that talk 
about God should be dropped because it impedes the search for human happiness 
is to take a pragmatic attitude toward religion that many religious believers find 
offensive and that some theologians think beside the point.‖820 He argues that 
although religion no longer possesses the power it once did, we remain firmly 
under the spell of foundationalism every bit as fantastic as its supernatural 
predecessor. He thinks that the beliefs and truth-claims, however secular, are 
corresponding to and grounded upon a reality existing beyond the language games 
invented to get on in the world. So rather than attacking religion, most of Rorty‘s 
intellectual energies in his later years were devoted to popping these foundationalist 
elements and imagining what it might be like to live without them.  
 
Another important element to note in Rorty is the way he considers religious 
language use. Rorty has a style of writing that apparently position him as a 
spokesperson for a group. He uses a lot of ‗we‘ as when he claims that the social 
ideals ‗we‘ secular humanists champion are often cast in religious terms. He 
expresses an optimistic hope that such ideals will eventually cease to be so stated. 
This, he maintains, does not imply that there is something intrinsically wrong with 
religious language. His only assumption is that putting political convictions in 
religious terms gives aid and comfort to ecclesiastical organisations, and thus to 
religious exclusivism and contempt for people who should be accorded the same 
respect as the rest of their fellow-citizens. This leads him to argue that religious 
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people who claim a right to express their views in public because it is a result of 
their religious conviction should be ashamed of themselves and should be made to 
feel ashamed. He proposes that such citation should count as hate speech, and 
treated as such. He states that religious people with their convictions should not 
use religious language as an excuse for inflicting the suffering on their fellow 
citizens. He believes that religious people should trim their utterances to suit the 
utilitarian views and their citing of the sacred texts should not be a way of finding a 
vent for their own sadistic impulses.821 In this aspect of language use, Rorty does 
not fear that it could generate into a full scale religious war, but the sort of everyday 
peacetime sadism that uses religion to excuse cruelty. By cruelty he meant the 
steady barrage of contempt from the religious people which provide the recipe for 
violence against others. Among those he mentioned as enemies are the ministers of 
the Christian religion who recite Leviticus 18:22 and gay bashers.822 In this example 
he continues to disentangle clearly the distinctiveness of religious beliefs from the 
people who use religion for political and social recognition.  
 
Rorty thinks that religious believers should not base their opinions and utterances 
on authority and tradition only. He argues that religious believers should not base 
their support of or opposition to a legislation simply by saying that ―scripture says‖ 
or ―Rome has spoken; the matter is closed‖ or ―My Church teaches…‖ he assumes 
that it is one thing to explain how a given political stance is bound up with one‘s 
religious belief, and another to think that it is enough, when defending a political 
view, simply to cite authority, scriptural or otherwise. He thinks that if Christian 
believers have Christian reasons to an issue of public policy, they should not simply 
quote the Bible or papal encyclicals while discussing issues, these passages should 
only be used to help one articulate the views held. There should not be any mere 
appeal to authority. Rorty makes his problem with authority appear when he 
prefers Protestantism as more congenial to liberal democracy than Catholicism.823 
This is motivated by the priesthood of all believers which encourages the believer 
to interpret Scripture, theology and devotional literature on his own, rather than 
simply waiting to be informed by church officials about what is required to be a 
member in good standing of a given denomination. The Catholic attitude, he 
confesses, does seem to be the sort of thing democratic societies have a right to 
discourage. In this he highlights what he means by saying that there is a dichotomy 
between a believer and the institution of faith to which one belongs. He makes his 
recommitment that religion should be pruned back to the parish level. He said: ―we 
should continue to view with alarm every attempt by ecclesiastical authorities to tell 
individual parishes or individual believers how to conduct themselves, or to limit 
the freedom of congregations to agree among themselves on the form of worship 
to be conducted.‖824  
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823 Ibid., 147. 
824 Ibid., 148. 
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Rorty back-pedals as he concludes his essay “Religion as Conversation Stopper” which 
was a response to Steven Carter‘s book. He corrects that impression when he says 
that it is false that religion is ―essentially a conversation-stopper, because it is not 
essentially anything. He however continues to say that, ―…it is true that one variety 
of expressions of religious beliefs does indeed stop the conversation, as when 
somebody says, ―Do not ask me for reasons. I do not have any. It is a matter of 
faith.‖825 So, Rorty corrects the above impression as he adopts a new position when 
he says that ―…instead of saying that religion was a conversation stopper, I should 
have simply said that citizens of a democracy should try to put off invoking 
conversation stoppers as long as possible. We should do our best ―to keep the 
conversation going‖ without citing unarguable first principles, either philosophical 
or religious.‖826 From the above, we note that religion in itself was indeed not a 
conversation stopper as Rorty had claimed from the beginning. What is mostly at 
stake is the way that people use religion and apply religious language that seems to 
stop the conversation. Also, we have to note, that Rorty‘s take on religion was 
more informed by his jealousy concern for his liberal democratic principles and not 
religious mission as such. So, his treatise on religion was more about the position of 
religion in the public square where a multiplicity of voices converge and contribute 
to the conversation of mankind. Rorty‘s presupposition was that religion should 
not assume a controlling posture if it is to contribute effectively to the conversation 
of mankind, otherwise it becomes a conversation stopper. This debate over religion 
has generated some useful insights in the understanding of mission in 
contemporary society which is characterised by globalisation, multiculturalism and 
migration. It provides Christian mission with clues of positioning the Christian 
faith in its encounter, and its relationship with the various traditions and voices that 
seem to inhabit the public square.  
 
In this section, we have seen how Rorty suggested that religion is a conversation-
stopper. Jeffrey Stout has questioned this claim, gently chiding Rorty for his 
hostility toward increasing assertiveness on the part of religiously committed 
individuals in their address of public issues. Stout concludes that conversation is 
the very thing that is not stopped when religious premises are introduced in a 
political argument. He is convinced that Rorty is overly sensitive on this matter and 
believes, with Nicholas Wolterstoff and others, that religious people in a pluralistic 
democracy have not only the right but also the responsibility to share their 
convictions and the reasoning that leads to their opinions on vital moral and social 
issues. This observation then implies that religion can as well be a conversation 
starter other than a conversation-stopper which Rorty took it to be. The conclusion 
on this section leads us to some interesting developments. Firstly, the Church 
existing and exercising her mission in a pluralistic society cannot abandon its 
foundations which constitute her identity, her religious language and vocabulary. 
Secondly, Christianity in her mission must use her resources in the furtherance and 
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maintenance of the conversation with other departments of human society. 
Thirdly, Christian mission can enter into meaningful conversation as her mission 
and ministry and thus remain faithful to her history and traditions but also relevant 
in her service to mankind. In the following section, the main task is to articulate 
mission as conversation. 
 
Mission as Conversation 
 
Mission as conversation presupposes that the experience which characterises 
human existence is never single but always a plurality. By plurality I refer to 
varieties in beliefs, opinions, interests, world views, culture, political inclinations, 
religious and faith commitments, educational attainments, social status and all that 
which entails human life. David Tracy having indicated that there is no intellectual, 
cultural, political or religious tradition (of interpretation) that does not ultimately 
live by the quality of its conversation, puts it bluntly that ―…there is also no 
tradition that does not eventually have to acknowledge its own plurality and 
ambiguity.‖827 This plurality of human experience was at the core of the pragmatic 
tradition which shaped Rorty‘s thinking and the articulation of his metaphor of 
―keeping the conversation going.‖828 This on-going conversation meant to renew 
the sense of community and that what matters in life ―…is our loyalty to other 
human beings clinging together against the dark.‖829 But despite the afore-
mentioned plurality, people also find themselves engaged in a communication that 
binds them as a community with common things to share. Dewey observes that, 
―There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and 
communication. What they must have in common in order to form a community 
or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge, a common understanding.... 
Such things cannot be passed physically from one to another, like bricks; they 
cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces. 
The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one 
which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions like ways of 
responding to expectations and requirements.‖830 There is always a kind of tension 
in political and social theories that stress the centrality of what is shared, held in 
common, and universal to the detriment of the integrity of what is different and 
genuinely plural among individuals. Given the plurality of society, we have a basis 
for conversation as the mission theory in the Church in Uganda.  
 
The model of mission as conversation is based on the understanding of 
conversation and indeed of the essentially conversational nature of the theological 
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enterprise itself.831 We apply the concept Conversation in mission studies following 
its primary form as an exploration of possibilities in the search for truth.832 This 
reality is concomitant with the observations we made in Chapter Two that truth is 
at the centre of Rorty‘s conversation and similarly truth is at the centre in the 
understanding of Christian mission. In Chapter One we indicated that Rorty claims 
that we cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to 
achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring consensus on 
the end to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends. Rorty 
contended that inquiry that does not achieve co-ordination of behaviour is not 
inquiry but simply wordplay. Further, it was observed in Chapter Two that for 
Rorty truth cannot be out there, it cannot exist independently of the human mind, 
because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. He maintained that the world is 
out there, but descriptions of the world are not. The world on its own, unaided by 
the describing activities of human beings, cannot. Rorty attaches the question of 
truth to the capacity of human beings to interrelate in conversation and as people 
come to the truth. So, Rorty‘s conversation disdains the western tradition which 
centres on the notion of the search for Truth for its own sake, that is, not because 
it will be good for oneself or for one‘s real or imaginary community, but because 
such a notion attempts to give sense to one‘s existence by turning away from 
solidarity to objectivity.  
 
Mission can be understood in terms of Rorty‘s conversation. This is the possibility 
which is arrived at by the fact that no particular conception of the truth can be 
imposed on any individual person. In fact this is what led Benedict XVI to contend 
that in this way: ―Truth is controversial, and the attempt to impose on all persons 
what one part of the citizenry holds to be true looks like the enslavement of 
people‘s consciences.‖833 He further argues that the concept of ―truth‖ has in fact 
moved into the zone of antidemocratic intolerance. It is not now a public good, but 
something private. It may perhaps be the good of specific groups, but it is not the 
truth of society as a whole.834 If we consider actual mission practice, this reality 
rhymes with the observation of Boyd that ―…older churches and younger churches 
are no longer thought of as patrons and beneficiaries respectively, or even as 
senders and receivers, but as partners not merely in a contractual sense, but set by 
God in that relationship.‖835 What we may find as fascinating here is that the search 
for truth that characterises human life both in its vertical dimension (in relation to 
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God) and its horizontal dimension (in relation to fellow human beings and all 
creation) involves a multiplicity of voices. The successful collaboration of the 
voices constitutes a conversation that leads the participants to seek the truth about 
their identities and to work for a concern greater than all. And this point marks a 
shift in vocabulary and language use in mission practice whereby binary oppositions 
of saved-pagan will give way to a new identity of seekers of the truth. This reality 
improves on the earlier mission history and the present mission practice as 
evidence suggests in the mission texts we have read, described and analysed. And 
according to the goal of this research, this is our objective for mission practice in 
the Church in Uganda. 
 
In the description and analysis of mission practice in Chapter Three it was admitted 
that the beginning of mission practice in Uganda was rooted in the traditional 
understanding of mission. This traditional view is motivated by the imperative: ―Go 
you therefore, and teach all nations‖ (Matthew 28:19). This imperative inclines 
mission to the propositional understanding of truth which was the motivation for 
the White Fathers Mission to Uganda. Many were convinced that Christianity had a 
duty to bring civilisation to the pagan world of Africa. They thought that Africans 
had to be evangelised to save them from the fires of hell. They received 
instructions which defined Africans thus: ―It is doubtful if the blacks of the interior 
have any ideas at all about the afterlife or about the immortality of the soul. In any 
case they do not seem to have any religion, but only gross superstitions, without 
any form of worship, which resemble witchcraft. Their idea of God is so vague that 
certain explorers have been able to say they had none. As for morality, since their 
foundation is absolutely lacking, it can be said that it does not exist. All vices are 
found among them, and the scanty notions which they possess concerning right 
and wrong are nothing more than the dying rays of that light which God gave 
humanity at its origins.‖836 These same representations of Africa were evident in 
Lavigerie‘s personal communications, as he wrote in this letter: Apart from physical 
sufferings a missionary has other trials which are perhaps harder to endure, and this 
is the case especially in recently founded missions. It takes a very long time to lead 
a whole race from error and barbarism to truth, virtue and civilisation, and the task 
is even more difficult when God‘s curse has rested on that race for centuries.‖837 
 
In the third chapter, we described the texts where the missionaries set themselves 
as the standard with the normative validity claims while describing their mission 
work and encounter with the people in Uganda. They reserved a right to 
themselves to construct the identities of the people and their social environment. 
In their evaluation they reported that ―…there were difficulties in the region as 
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paganism with its foul rites, its witchdoctors and polygamy; the tropical jungle with 
malaria, the scourge of the Whites; sleeping sickness, the scourge of the natives; the 
compendium of all evils, slave trade; the hostility of Mohammedan and 
Protestants.‖ In some sections of the Chronicles, they described the Baganda 
representing them as natives and men in rugged character. And they talked of 
people who had died of sleeping sickness that ―...they are in paradise next to the 
good thief, who during their lives had only the appetite for crimes.‖838 Again they 
continue to name the people as ‗these unfortunate people.‘ What we have gathered 
from the evidence of the texts that we have read, described and analysed is that the 
perception of some missionaries towards the people was low and almost negative 
though not hostile.  
 
The mission texts in the two previous chapters, speak about the work of the 
missionaries as singularly directed to the people of Uganda. And the natives are 
almost constructed as passive recipients of the gospel. Narrating about their 
missionary work, the missionaries reported that: ―We preach several times a day: 
the neophytes, catechumens, children who are preparing for First Communion. 
Every Sunday, in addition to the homily in Church, we also preach to novices who 
are preparing themselves at the Sisters place to become catechists, and also to the 
sponsored children who are divided into two groups, one for girls and another for 
boys.‖ Also in Chapter Three in the Chronicles outlines the number of baptisms 
for one year was put at 266 though lower than the previous year of 367. The 
number of marriages fellow from 69 to 49. There are two reasons given in the text. 
One, the state of health of the two fathers at Bujuni explains partly. But the first 
and main reason is given thus in the Chronicles: ―The change of spirit among 
blacks; they have the spirit of their age, and today this spirit is a dream of well-
being, of wealth and pre-mature civilisation. There are slow in getting instructed, 
they marry with difficult, because they see in religion and marriage obstacles to get 
this ideal of well-being and of that wealth which is always elusive.‖ Other factors 
cited for the failure of religious enthusiasm in this mission station is the people‘s 
anxiety for becoming rich and how they have become traffickers of goat skins, 
others drive herds of goats and sheep on the Nile route hoping to get large profits 
and others go to Congo to trade in ivory and rubber.  
 
However, a cursory look at the context of Uganda‘s mission history gives the 
impression that the missionaries employed a number of strategies. After their 
arrival, they recognised that they had to respond to the demands of the local 
context and throw away the idealism filled in the mission manuals and instructions. 
According to the ‗Les Chroniques‘, the White Fathers rejected the ‗Christian village‘ 
method of evangelisation in Buganda. This meant that candidates for the 
priesthood were neither freed slaves nor members of the lowest class. But there 
were some dramatic developments as well. The Baganda converts, having learned 
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self-reliance early, were always ready to work with the Fathers in the strengthening 
of their Church. This apparent local ownership of the church was motivated by the 
view to compete with the Protestants. Buddu the Catholic province par excellence 
provided a highly suitable atmosphere for the recruitment and training of local 
priests. The incorporation of several aspects of Baganda culture and mentality 
within Catholicism helped to give a popular support to the work of the 
missionaries, not only from the Catholic chiefs and ordinary Catholics but also 
from many traditionalist clansmen.839 This collaboration as it was illustrated in 
chapter three boosted the work of the missionaries. 
 
Again chapter three revealed that missionaries who came to Uganda had a number 
of ideas about the strategy to follow for the evangelisation of the country. They 
wanted to convert the country from above by first converting the king of Buganda 
(Kabaka) and that did not work. It was a typical approach of the White Fathers to 
win the masses through conversion of the elites. In his instructions to his 
missionaries, Cardinal Lavigerie had said: It is better to convert one chief than to 
win a hundred blacks. In his evaluation of this approach, Wijsen considers that by 
converting the chiefs to Christianity the missionaries tried to get a warrant for their 
activities. Moreover, the loss of trust in the indigenous religion was their aim, and 
they found that the shortest route towards it was the conversion of indigenous 
authority. But this policy of winning through conversion of the chiefs was not very 
successful. Most chiefs were not interested or were furious and against the first 
missionaries.840 But, in the course of their evangelising work at the king‘s court, 
they won over the future leaders of the country so that, in an unexpected way, the 
method of conversion from above became a success a few years later. Buganda was 
converted by its aristocrats, who adhered to the new religion, and not, as in other 
parts of Africa by the schools – nor, for that matter, by ransoming slaves and 
creating Christians villages, a common enough method among late 19th century 
missionaries. It is true that at the very beginning some slaves were ransomed in 
Uganda and orphanages opened, but this was connected with the idea of founding 
a corps of doctor-catechists, another strategy which had little impact in Uganda. 
The missionaries practiced what Mudimbe refers to as ―Africanisation of 
Christianity‖841 but the goal remained to introduce Africans into the Church. 
 
We have, in the general introduction, said that conversion and implantation of the 
church were the main models of classical missiology. In these models, mission was 
understood to be that of faithfully producing a replica of the missionary‘s sending 
church and culture. This is evident in the early missionary period when mission 
writings indicated a glimmer of pride at the realisation that the Christians of 
Uganda had reached the level of European Christians in such things as the 
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sacramental life, devotions, and respect for the discipline of the Church. They had 
reason to be proud, because the theology and pastoral practice at the time were 
completely framed by what we might call Roman uniformity whereby the 
missionaries attempted to create new churches which were daughters of the 
western version of the Roman Church, begotten practically by cloning. But two 
important local factors to be appreciated and whose contribution brought about 
this phenomenal change: the catechumenate and the role of the residential 
catechists in the outstations. In Chapter Three, we saw that a number of texts 
testified to this fact. In the history of the Mill Hill Fathers, Bishop Biermans says: 
―…Catechumenates were established and catechists installed in various parts, to 
give the people, who were too far away from the missions, a chance of becoming 
acquainted with the teachings of our holy faith.‖842 Many people in Uganda learned 
their faith from their fellow Ugandan catechists and not directly from the 
missionaries. But despite this apparent positive development, the content retained 
its European essence.  
 
The development of events as noted above has indicated that the missionaries 
appropriated a locally groomed institution of the catechists and placed it under 
their own control and organisation. However, apart from appropriating some local 
Ugandan language categories and terms and having Ugandans participating in the 
mission practice alongside the missionaries, the fundamental strategy remained 
conversion. Conversation as it was noted above is built on the premise of 
appreciating the truth claims of the other and having their voices heard. 
Conversation is about having competing traditions with their truth claims raising 
their voices, describing themselves in their own categories and seeking to exhibit 
their uniqueness and differences. This scenario is what we attested to in Chapter 
Two that ―…properly speaking, conversation is impossible in the absence of a 
diversity of voices, because in it different universes of discourse meet, acknowledge 
each other and enjoy an oblique relationship which neither requires nor forecasts 
their being assimilated to one another.‖843 A keen observation of the conditions in 
the early Ugandan mission context show a missionary discourse whose purpose was 
the proclamation of a truth which conquers the other presumed truth claims to 
submit them to the one absolute truth and level their voices into one particular 
voice. 
 
It was noted in Chapter Four that the Archdiocese of Kampala was re-organised 
following the political administrative structure of the central government. The text 
of the Pastoral Strategic Plan outlines that the Archdiocese of Kampala will 
―Organise deaneries in each Civic District into a Pastoral Zone so that our pastoral 
and social activities can be better streamlined and linked to those of the District, 
e.g., Education, Health and Development.‖844 Again, it was observed that Kampala 
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Archdiocese recognises that her mission can only be successful after working with 
government agencies as the strategic plan suggests to ―Create forums where 
education officials from the district and the Ministry as appropriate can be invited 
to share ideas on a harmonious and productive working relationship with the 
Archdiocese; and develop a sector based strategic plan for education and align its 
priorities and focus on the Government of Uganda‘s education strategic investment 
plan and policy.‖845 With these plan and programs, the Church recognises that the 
efficacy of her mission lies in aligning all her programs with those of other sectors 
in society.  
 
The above strategy takes into account cooperation with many entities such as the 
government leaders at district levels, parish and local council levels, community 
based organisations so that pastoral and social activities like health, education, 
development, roads, water and sanitation, agriculture and many others can be better 
streamlined and linked to those of the district846 and considers food security and 
savings and credit schemes (SACCOS) Good Samaritan groups, and nutrition 
programs, business skills nurturing, information dissemination on markets, 
cooperatives, taking up farming as a business both at small scale and large scale 
levels, educating communities on when and when not to borrow funds from the 
mushrooming Micro-Finance Institutions and Banks.847 It takes into account the 
laws of the country concerning marriage when it argues that, ―...when a man was 
previously involved in a customary marriage (kwanjula) he should not be allowed to 
pursue church marriage and wed a different woman as this contradicts the laws of 
Uganda (Marriage Act) ....when this happens the church marriage becomes null and 
void.‖848 In further streamlining her mission strategy with the social context, the 
Archdiocese suggests that ―all agents of evangelisation have full understanding 
either through workshops or other avenues, of government programs like Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), National Agricultural Advisory Services 
(NAADS), Universal Primary Education (UPE) and PMA to create an opportunity 
for effective Policy Monitoring and influence.‖849 
 
Kampala Archdiocese adopted the inclusive and compound nouns that describe the 
major social identities in mission practice. Among these we have ―Agents of 
Evangelisation, People of God and Grassroots evangelisation.‖ The use of these 
compound nouns marks a major shift in the language of mission practice. The 
common feature of all these nouns is that they imply a relational mission practice. 
In Chapter Four we indicated that by using the noun ‗agents of evangelisation‘ 
where the texts names the clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the 
seminarians, the novices, and the laity under their various categories, it reduces the 
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gap that existed in the traditional understanding of mission agents with the clergy as 
senders and the laity as the receivers of mission. Also by using the common name 
‗People of God‘ the text goes back to God as the author of mission and that all the 
other human agents are participants in the one missionary endeavour of God. This 
is what we noted in the introduction of this research that God is a missionary God 
and that Christian mission has that Trinitarian origins. However, at the end of 
Chapter Four we also indicated that the collaboration and partnership was mainly 
between the ‗agents of evangelization‘ between themselves, and between them and 
‗outside agencies‘, less between the clergy and the laity, although theoretically 
speaking the laity is included among the ‗agents of evangelization‘. 
 
With the use of such nouns as grassroots evangelisation as we saw in Chapter Four, 
we realise that mission is evolving with the application of terms from other areas of 
study like politics and economics. These basic terms that describe the social 
identities and social relationships in the archdiocese have that relational dimension 
whose foundation is located in the gospel and mission of Christian faith. So, 
although these terms remain open to the new developments in society but still are 
used in an exclusive way as a means for the church‘s mission and at the service of 
the church‘s truth claim. Therefore, mission as expressed in the archdiocesan 
pastoral programmes, is still foundational given that it is rooted in the exclusive 
Christian proclamation of truth and salvation as rooted in Jesus Christ. 
 
Mission practice was further realigned in the resolutions of the 2006 Archdiocesan 
synod and their arrangement suggests that the church‘s self-understanding is rooted 
in the sacrament of baptism where a neophyte participates in the threefold ministry 
of Christ. These ministries are reflected in the way all the synod outcomes were 
divided into these three ministries: First, The Sanctifying office of the Church 
which presents the whole Christian community of Kampala Archdiocese as one 
worshipping community with the obligation to sanctify the world with their 
activities. The second part is the Teaching office of the church which stresses the 
prophetic ministry of the church and how to realise the same in the concrete 
pastoral practice. The third is the Governing office of the Church which develops a 
common vision of leadership in the church without distinctions between laity and 
clergy. More than the missionary era (Chapter Three), the present document and 
other contemporary documents of the Archdiocese (Chapter Four) speak in terms 
of ―partnership‖, ―collaboration‖, ―sharing ideas‖, ―promoting dialogue‖, ―working 
relations‖, ―cooperation‖, and so on. However, despite this kind of remodelling, 
the underlying thinking behind all these changes remains foundational. It remains 
rooted in the deep Christian tradition which influences all the changes and in a 
nutshell it cannot influence mission practice to have mission as conversation. The 
Rortian conversation which is non-foundational negates the whole idea of 
foundations because it goes against his ideal of keeping the conversation going.  
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The pastoral document ―You are the Salt of the Earth, You are the Light of the 
World, has in its opening paragraph the audiences to which it is addressed. It is 
addressed to: ―all of you my brothers and sisters: Priests, Religious men and 
women, lay people in the Catholic Church.‖ It is then addressed to ―all peace 
loving Ugandans with whom we share faith in God, the Creator of us all.‖ In using 
the pronoun ―all‖ it opens with a universalistic tinge which gets limited when 
mention of those who are included in the ―all‖ is made. The text opens with ―….all 
of you my brothers and sisters‖ but the mentioning of priests, religious men and 
women, and lay people in the Catholic Church in Uganda‖ the texts limits its 
audience to only the Catholics. And in another category of those greeted, the text 
limits those to only the peace loving Ugandans and only those with whom we share 
faith in God, the Creator of us all. So, the text opens and limits its audience. It has 
no consideration of those who claim to be atheists and those belligerents who may 
be working against peace and stability in the country. So, the text has a particular 
audience which is well mapped out. It is rooted in a distinctively Christian 
discourse given the categories of people mentioned and the dominance of the 
Christian theme of peace. 
 
At the beginning of this research it was asked if there must be a new model of 
mission in the Ugandan Church today. I proposed the Rortian notion of 
conversation as a sensitising concept to study mission theory and practice in past 
(Chapter 3) and present (chapter 4) in view of answering the question: what is an 
adequate model for mission in the 21st century? Can conversation be that mission 
model? The conversation referred to in this context is the Rortian ideal of 
conversation without foundations. With this understanding for Rorty, the term 
conversation offers a useful way to talk about the production of knowledge as a 
social process without reference to metaphysical foundations. Rorty‘s notion of 
conversation describes a discourse that has no beginning or end, but no crisis or 
contradiction, either. Cut loose from metaphysical moorings and transcendental 
backups, the conversation keeps rolling of its own accord, reproducing itself 
effortlessly. It is responsible only to itself, sanctioned by what Rorty sees as the 
only sanction credible: our loyalty to the conversation and our solidarity with its 
practices. All we can do is to continue the conversation initiated before we 
appeared on the scene. ―We do not know,‖ Rorty says, ―what ‗success‘ would mean 
except simply ‗continuance.‖850 Rorty‘s non-foundationalist view of things 
considers that not merely the aspiration for a context-neutral perspective must be 
given up as unachievable but the very notion of there being an objective reality to 
be engaged with must also be relinquished as an unhelpful distraction from the 
particularity of things.851 Accordingly he calls for the replacement of the 
correspondence notion of truth, truth as an accurate depiction of things, with the 
much reduced notion of truth as a merely honorific title which communities 
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bestow upon their favoured ideas and courses of action. In short, for Rorty, truth 
equates with whatever is considered socially helpful.  
 
If we critically consider Rorty‘s conversation, it could be suspected that it impedes 
Christian mission. Therefore we have to acknowledge some difficulties which need 
to be addressed to make it an effective tool of mission practice. Firstly, Rorty‘s 
relinquishing of truth as the articulation of reality in favour of localised agreement 
is held to provoke the very sceptical concerns he seeks to quash. This difficulty is 
stretched more by Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI who chastised Rorty for 
formulating the new utopia of banality. He rebukes Rorty‘s ideal of a liberal society 
in which absolute values and criteria will no longer exist and a sense of well-being 
as the only goal worth striving for.852 Secondly, the aspiration to know the reality is 
held to be essential to certain transformative praxis concerned to change the world 
and not simply our words about it. Thirdly, Rorty‘s abandonment of any concern to 
check conversation with the concern to know in words the world without words is 
held to offer insufficient resources to counter the tendency to limit access to 
conversation to the most powerful.853 But above all as we have noted it already: 
how a non-foundational concept could serve adequately a foundational tradition? 
 
Rorty acknowledges the tendency of discourse to normalize itself and to block the 
flow of conversation by posing as a canonical vocabulary. The conversation, as 
Rorty starts to acknowledge, is perpetually materializing itself in institutional forms, 
allotting the opportunity to speak and arbitrating the terms of the discussion. But 
Rorty backs away from the full consequences of conversation‘s normative force. At 
just the point where we could name the conversation and its underlying consensus 
as a technology of power and ask how its practices enable and constrain the 
production of knowledge, privilege and exclude forms of discourse, set its agenda 
by ignoring or suppressing others, Rorty builds a self-correcting mechanism into 
the conversation, an invisible hand to keep the discourse circulating and things 
from going stale. This is abnormal discourse or as Rorty puts it that is: ―what 
happens when someone joins in the discourse that is ignorant of conventions or 
who sets them aside.‖854 Rorty admitted that religions are not essentially nothing. It 
is both philosophically legitimate and theologically right for Christian mission to 
start with its own discourse and practice and to proceed to interpret the World in 
those terms rather than vice versa. The Rortian conversation downplays its own 
social force and the conflict it generates, the discourses silenced or unheard in the 
conversation and its representation of itself. They suspect there are other voices to 
take into account, voices constituted as otherness outside the conversation.  
 
It has been presented above that Rorty following his pragmatist mentor John 
Dewey, believes that we can usefully substitute faith in human potential for 
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retrograde faith in a benevolent God. This Rortian position falls within the ambit 
of prominent pragmatists who contributed a lot to the development and intellectual 
respectability of religion as a human endeavour. This implies that though Rorty is 
rooted in a non-foundationalist tradition, he at the same time appreciates 
foundationalism. The question we asked above, “how do you put to use a concept whose 
origins and proponents negate the very idea it is intending to serve?” props up again for a 
response. We have stated it clearly that Christian mission is foundational, that is, it 
has the Christ-event as the foundation from which its existence and practice is 
rooted, but the Rortian conversation is non-foundational. It is a free-fleeting 
endeavour. We need to find a way out of this dilemma. We have already maintained 
that in foundationalism, there is an underlying conviction that there is a rock 
bottom foundation to build and legitimize our knowledge claims. And in the 
foundation metaphor, what is right is that all cognition starts with pre-existent 
knowledge. This is so because it is presumed that ―…each religion contains 
something that belongs to it alone, separately, distinctively, decisively: its particular 
grasp of divine truth. The truth it contains is uniquely important which must not be 
lost.‖855 
 
In an attempt to overcome the above difficulty we may follow the position 
promoted by authors of post-foundationalism.856 Post-foundationalism has mainly 
emerged from the work of Wentzel van Huyssteen who sought ‗to move beyond 
the epistemological dichotomy of foundationalist objectivism and non-
foundationalist relativism.‘857 In other words, it positions itself as an alternative to 
the modernist foundationalist claim to universal truths and to postmodern non-
foundationalist relativism. It seeks to utilise the strengths of both in order to 
facilitate meaningful conversation between different disciplines, without having any 
discipline claiming dominant knowledge. Huyssteen further suggests that: ―A post-
foundationalist approach helps us realize ―…that we are not the intellectual 
prisoners of our contexts or traditions, but that we are epistemically empowered to 
cross contextual, cultural, and disciplinary borders to explore critically the theories, 
meanings, and beliefs through which we and others construct our worlds.‖858 
 
It is thought that having found both foundationalism and non-foundationalism 
inadequate for theological discourse, Van Huyssteen proposes a post-foundational 
theology that fully acknowledges the role of context, the epistemically crucial role 
of interpreted experience, and the role of tradition in shaping religious values.859 
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Theological reflection in post-foundationalism also points creatively beyond the 
confines of the local community or culture toward a plausible form of cross-
contextual and interdisciplinary conversation. Over against the alleged objectivism 
of foundationalism and the extreme relativism of most forms of non-
foundationalism, post-foundationalism emerges as a viable third option that allows 
cross-disciplinary conversations with our beliefs intact, and the shared resources of 
human rationality in different modes of reflection. Müller calls this ‗a third way‘, a 
way out of the ‗stuckness‘ of modernistic or foundationalist science and theology, 
on the one hand, and the fatalism of some post-modernistic approaches, on the 
other.860 A post-foundational space is then created between modernity and 
postmodernity as we reconsider postmodernity‘s farewell to reason, the 
disparagement of logos, and the celebration of difference, plurality and 
multiplicity.861 
 
The above argument brings us to some stark realities that the foundationalism of 
the modernists and the non-foundationalism of the postmodernists are not 
applicable to theology anymore. Therefore we have to integrate both to yield a 
post-foundationalism of which the tension generated is what characterises the 
nature of conversation. This is so because in post-foundationalism conversation 
retains a foothold in tradition while at the same time recognises the liabilities of 
getting trapped in that position. This understanding then brings us to three major 
considerations to take into account. 
 
Firstly, all knowledge is local in the sense that it depends on a language that has 
been learned in and through participation in communal practices. This local 
knowledge implies conceptual schemes and the know-how of using them in 
specific contexts. On a traditionalist reading, people are born into languages, 
frameworks of thought and communities and except on very special occasions, as 
in sudden conversions, this is not normally a matter of choice.862 This does not 
reject the idea that people can become acquainted with other frameworks, and even 
can reflect on their own ideas from these frameworks. But this process of reflection 
is always caught up in the conceptual schemes that belong to the practices of the 
community in which they live: both within the theological level, and the level of the 
religious communities. In reference to Wittgenstein, one can rightly claim ―that 
many beliefs are such that we would not know how to justify them in a noncircular 
and informative way even if we tried.‖863 
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Secondly, ‗…conversation begins by bringing our fallible views and judgments to 
those who traditionally make up our epistemic communities.‘864 Each judgment 
takes place within the context of a specific community, and is based on arguments 
and ideas which are accepted in this community. We cannot abstract from a 
conversational context in the justification of beliefs, ideas and viewpoints. 
According to Stout, this implies three things. (a) The conversational context 
determines what sort of information is being requested in order to count as a 
justification; (b) The conversational context determines the audience of the 
justification process; and (c) The success of the justification can only be appraised 
in relation to this audience.865 All justification is bound to a conversational context, 
and the audience which accepts or rejects the justification of certain beliefs or ideas. 
This audience is always limited to the class of people who understand the 
vocabulary in which this justification is cast and who have mastered the patterns of 
reasoning which are required to follow it. We need to broaden this limited 
audience, because of the fact that we are aware of the fact that our knowledge is 
fallible.  
 
Therefore, this prompts us to extend our individual judgment or evaluation to 
communal evaluation to trans-communal evaluation.866 But this does not imply the 
demand that we should include all rational agents in all contexts, regardless of time 
and place. If we would demand this, it would make the success of our justifications 
impossible to determine. Our justifications are fallible, and we should not require 
them to be infallible, because they are not. It is believed that: ―Justifications are 
successful if they eliminate relevant reasons for doubting. The reasons future 
generations might have for doubting, being necessarily unknown to us, hardly 
count as relevant in out context.‖867 We also do not know the epistemic context in 
which future generations have to make their judgments. Therefore we should not 
demand to judge from this perspective in actuality. In fact a God‘s eye view is not 
ours. This is consonant with what we observed in chapter one that Rorty rejected 
the Archimedean point or view from nowhere or God‘s eye view. With this, 
therefore, we need to seek ever wider audience for justification of our claims, but 
this will always be bound to the discursive practices of traditions which we have 
learned to understand and are committed to. 
 
Thirdly, the combination of fallibilism and traditionalism implies recognition of 
diversity and plurality, and the rejection of a consensus approach. A contextual 
approach of human rationality gives room to epistemic tolerance. To strengthen 
this argument, Andy F. Sanders proposes the phrase ―traditional fallibilism‖ as a 
middle way between relativism and foundationalism. He traces briefly the failure of 
foundationalism and the well-known self-defeating nature of relativism. He then 
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emphasises that fallibilism avoids self-defeat, because it is aware that even the belief 
in fallibilism may be mistaken. But since it does not deny we can have true beliefs, 
it may consistently offer reasons for accepting fallibilism.868 This is proved by the 
fact that people live in different contexts and different traditions, and based on 
these differences make different evaluations of situations. It is claimed that: 
―Constructive interaction should therefore be possible as we learn to acquiescence 
in difference, that is, come to term with the fact that others will not only differ 
from us in their opinions, customs, evaluations, and modes of action, but that it is 
perfectly rational for them to do so.‖869 A traditionalist fallibalism gives room to a 
legitimate diversity in conversation, where cooperation and coordination would still 
be possible and rational.870 According to the above, conversation gives room to be 
faithful to one‘s own tradition while at the same time admits the fallible nature of 
humanity which fails to grasp the fullness of truth and recognise the validity of 
truth claims in other religious traditions.  
 
All in all, the application of the term conversation in mission then comes to mean 
that knowledge and teaching and learning are social and not cognitive acts. 
Knowledge, in this account, is not the result of the confrontation of the individual 
mind with reality but of the conversation that organizes the available means we 
have at any given time to talk about reality. Mission, therefore, cannot be 
understood strictly on cognitive grounds; it means rather joining new communities 
and taking part in new conversations. Mission becomes a shift in a person‘s 
relations with others, not a shift inside the person that now suits him to enter new 
relationships.871 The consensus that keeps things rolling is no longer based on 
higher purposes but instead on the recognition that if we cannot discover the truth 
in any final sense, what we can do is to keep on talking to each other: we can tell 
stories, give accounts, state reasons, negotiate differences, and so on. The 
conversation, that is, gives up teleological ends to reaffirm the sociability of 
intellectual exchange not as an end in itself but as a means to the end, the truth. 
 
Towards a mission theory of conversation beyond dialogue 
 
In this section the main thrust is to demonstrate why this research proposes 
conversation other than dialogue. There has been a disconcerting question posed to 
me: What is it in conversation that has not been offered by dialogue? In the general 
introduction, we pointed out that dialogue has been studied, used, and applied by 
many theologians, scholars and experts in the area of interreligious relations with 
startling results. My argument is that we have to recognize that despite the apparent 
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success in research and the volumes of published works done in the area of 
dialogue, it all looks like an external obligation imposed on the religious traditions. 
Secondly, the hypothesis of theologians of dialogue concerning an alleged common 
ground and convergence of religious traditions, has been one of its most contested 
ideals.  
 
I make these claims because it is argued that for the possibility of dialogue, there 
must be an epistemic priority for believers of faith and revelation over any external 
demands or expectations. This reason presupposes that if dialogue is to be possible, 
it must find its deepest reasons and motivations within the self-understanding of 
religious traditions themselves, and only thus will dialogue become an internal 
necessity rather than an external obligation.872 This view is similar to the 
observation made about the challenges facing dialogue from within as the lurking 
sense of incompatibility between firm commitment to a particular religious 
tradition and openness to other religions. This is so because the history of religions 
seems to indicate that, exceptions notwithstanding, strong religious commitment 
coincides with religious intolerance, while attitudes of openness toward the truth of 
other religions somehow go together with a looser relationship to the truth of one‘s 
own tradition. 
 
That‘s why it could be easily established that dialogue and especially interreligious 
dialogue has often come to be conducted by individuals who find themselves on 
the margins of their respective traditions, whether by necessity or by choice. This 
marginality may impose itself upon individuals as a result of attitudes of self-
sufficiency and superiority that often characterize the mainstream self-
understanding within religious traditions.873 Insofar as religions lay claim to possess 
the absolute truth or the ultimate means to salvation, dialogue can but be regarded 
as a form of redundancy or a threat. While a certain degree of collaboration and 
mutual understanding has been allowed, the more radical forms of dialogue 
oriented toward the possibility of transformation and growth are rarely conducted 
by individuals who find themselves in the centre of institutional hierarchies. 
Religions are indeed not always ready for what transpires in dialogue.874 
 
Also, it is worth noting that there are no monolithic singular religious traditions. It 
is evident that no single individual can ever claim to represent the whole of a 
particular religious tradition. Every participant in dialogue belongs to a specific 
school or tradition, favours particular forms of religious practice, and is influenced 
by the thought of a certain scholar or theologian. Dialogue between a Shi‘ite and 
Methodist looks very different from a dialogue between a Sunni Muslim and an 
Orthodox Christian. Perhaps this is forgotten or obscured by the talk of the Hindu 
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– Christian Dialogue or the Muslim – Jewish dialogue. General religious traditions 
such as Christian or Buddhist have often obscured the reality of internal diversity 
and dissonance within religions, while at times setting unnecessary limits on our 
understanding of ―sameness‖ and ―difference‖ across religious traditions.875 
 
Another complexity with dialogue is about traditions, which tend to be regarded as 
immobile institutions, concerned primarily with the preservation of established 
teachings, practices and hierarchical structures. Consequently, commitment to a 
particular tradition while in dialogue with another may be regarded as an undue 
limitation of religious options or as a hopeless attempt to transform a structure that 
is defined by its resistance to change. This view leads many to engage in dialogue 
from a position of freedom from all defined forms of religious conviction and 
religious identity. Some even claim a sense of belonging to two or more religious 
commitment and belonging. This is most evident in New age Movement which is 
characterized by a radical rejection of all forms of traditional religious authority and 
by a focus on the subject as the ultimate measure of religious truth. This concept of 
religious autonomy appears as one evident outcome of the modern shift to the 
subject and the development of notions of freedom and undetermined will. In this 
absence of objective or natural meaning, individuals have the liberty and the 
responsibility to constitute their own conception of truth. This defines what 
sociologists of religion describe as ―disembedded, desituated, or detraditionalised 
selves‖ who consider themselves to be self-directional, authorial agents, relying on 
their own inner sources of authority, control and responsibility.‖876 Within the 
domain of religion, it manifests itself in aversion to any form of religious 
commitment or in an attitude of believing without belonging.877 Undoubtedly, such 
a loosening of commitment to a particular religious tradition renders dialogue less 
encumbered. Yet it also involves the loss of any firm religious foundation from 
which to engage other religious traditions.878 
 
In addition to the above, we have to contend that some people have become 
suspicious about the manner in which some of the scholars use the term dialogue. 
According to Pim Valkenberg it is used so often in certain circles that it seems to 
be a magic word: every right-minded person must agree with it, because it seems to 
imply a certain basic kind of liberal politeness that is almost equivalent to being 
human. He thinks that in this sense, the word dialogue normally implies a kind of 
equality, par cum pari, as the Second Vatican Council called it, while the context of 
dialogue is usually such that there can be no such equality. Therefore, the word 
dialogue can easily be exploited to cover up a situation where equality is absent and 
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even unwelcome.879 This suspicion about dialogue made Valkenberg to think that a 
real dialogue should uncover the elements of inequality, so that dialogue gets a 
polemic ring to it. He considers that it is not a word that means that we leave 
things as they are, but it means that we should uncover the differences, whether 
they are of a theological, a cultural or a political nature.880 
 
The suspicion that Valkenberg has of dialogue is similar to that of Cardinal 
Ratzinger (now emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) who looks at dialogue as an offshoot 
of relativism. He says that relativism has become the central problem for the faith 
at the present time. He is less surprised with relativism that ―…No doubt it is not 
presented only with its aspects of resignation before the immensity of the truth.‖881 
He sees it presented as a position defined positively by the concepts of tolerance 
and knowledge through dialogue and freedom, concepts which would be limited if 
the existence of one valid truth for all were affirmed. In his analysis of the notion 
of dialogue, which he thinks that has maintained a position of significant 
importance in the Platonic and Christian tradition; it changes meaning and 
becomes both quintessence of the relativist creed and the antithesis of conversion 
and the mission. Ratzinger considers that in the relativist meaning ‗to dialogue‘ 
means to put one‘s own position, that is, one‘s faith, on the same level as the 
convictions of others without recognising in principle more truth in it than that 
which is attributed to the opinion of the others.882 Only if I suppose in principle 
that the other can be as right, or more right that I, can an authentic dialogue take 
place. He concludes that according to this concept, dialogue must be an exchange 
between positions which have fundamentally the same rank and therefore mutually 
relative. Only this way will the maximum cooperation and integration between the 
different religions be achieved. It could be deduced from Ratzinger‘s view that this 
is unacceptable scenario to subject all truth claims to the same scale for the sake of 
maximum cooperation. 
 
The position of Cardinal Ratzinger (emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) expresses an 
underlying insecurity and fear that characterise most participants in dialogue which 
jeopardises its goal. It seems many dialogue partners have private misgivings and a 
sense of mistrust to the very meaning and purpose of dialogue which portrays it in 
the negative. A mention of the term dialogue evokes fear and revulsion against the 
very activity that the term implies. Liyakatali Takim in his article: From Conversion 
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to Conversation highlights these challenges when he states that, ―Muslims have yet 
to be convinced that dialogue is a way for reconciliation or expressing their beliefs. 
Given the history of Christian missionary work in Muslim countries, many Muslims 
see dialogue as a subtle form of evangelisation.‖883 This reality is further 
exacerbated by the fact that most religious traditions fail to appreciate that religious 
space is contested by many factions and that there are many perspectives within 
each religious tradition. This constitutes an assembly of diverse actors and agents, 
interests, beliefs, values, and ideas that often differ and are in conflict with each 
other. However, although this imposes limits on the very objectives and ends of 
dialogue, it presents a paradigm shift, a shift from attempts at ‗conversion of‘ to 
those of ‗Conversation with‘ the other.884 
 
As we have seen above, in dialogue there is a hope or desire for universality, unity, 
understanding et cetera; whereas in conversation lost is the hope in a universality, 
unity, and understanding. And moreover we don‘t need that hope as long as we can 
keep the conversation going: here it is not the outcome but the process that 
matters. Theological legitimation for this argument can be found in the doctrine of 
eschatology: truth is ―already here‖ but (also) ―yet to come.‖ Rorty helps 
theologians to re-discover this ―yet to come‖ dimension, which according to 
Schillebeeckx is the ―eschatological reservation.‖885 There is a rediscovery of the 
eschatological dimension of truth. Openness and receptivity toward the truth of the 
other religion presupposes humble recognition of the constant limitation and 
therefore endless perfectibility of one‘s own religious understanding of the truth. 
This also includes recognition of the partial and finite nature of the ways in which 
ultimate truth has been grasped and expressed in the teaching and practices of 
one‘s own tradition. Most religious traditions regard themselves as the ultimate if 
not the sole repository of truth, as the highest path to salvation or the most 
efficacious means to liberation. It is this belief in the absolute and final truth of 
one‘s own teachings and practices that prevents one from listening to, let alone 
learning from other religious traditions. If the fullness of truth is already expressed 
within one‘s own beliefs and practices, then the other traditions can only be 
regarded as deficient and wrong, or at best as a partial and pale reflection of what 
one already knows.886 
 
Of all Christian teachings, belief in the eschatological fulfilment of all goodness and 
truth at the end of times offer the most natural and compelling foundation for the 
development of doctrinal humility. The Christian notion of eschatology expresses 
on the one hand the Christian hope in the ultimate fulfilment of the kingdom of 
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God while it points, on the other hand, the humble awareness of the partial and 
imperfect nature of any historical realization of the kingdom. The latter has been 
rendered in terms of the notion of ―eschatological proviso‖ representing a 
permanent reminder of the conditioned and provisional nature of all historical 
understanding and realization. The notion of the temporality and imperfection of 
historical realities may be applied to personal accomplishment, human reason, as 
well as historical institutions.887 
 
An eschatological understanding of the realization of truth is clearly expressed in 
various official documents of the Catholic Church. The Vatican II Dogmatic 
Constitution Dei Verbum, on Divine Revelation stipulates that: ―This tradition 
which comes from the Apostles develops in the Church with the help of the Holy 
Spirit. This is so for there is growth in the understanding of the realities and the 
words which have been handed down to us. This happens through the 
contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure these things in their 
hearts (Luke, 2:19, 51) through a penetrating understanding of the spiritual realities 
which they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received 
through Episcopal succession the sure gift of truth. For as the centuries succeed 
one another, the Church constantly moves forward toward the fullness of divine 
truth until the words of God reach their complete fulfilment in her.‖888 In this text, 
the church itself humbly recognizes the historicity of its own understanding of the 
truth and embraces the possibility of continuous growth. 
 
The implications of this view are evident in the Vatican document ‗Dialogue and 
Proclamation‘ which states: ―Moreover, the fullness of truth received in Jesus 
Christ does not give individual Christians the guarantee that they have grasped that 
truth fully. In the last analysis truth is not a thing we possess, but a person by 
whom we must allow ourselves to be possessed. This is an unending process. While 
keeping their identity intact, Christians must be prepared to learn and to receive 
from and through others the positive values of their traditions.‖889 The humility 
derived from the eschatological orientation of Christianity expresses itself not only 
as a principle of critique and vigilance against claiming absolute truth for historical 
categories of understanding, but also as a dynamic power of change and growth.890 
 
The Christian belief in the Holy Spirit as the power and presence of God in the 
world, guiding humanity towards its fulfilment in the kingdom, that both reminds 
Christians of the partial or limited nature of their understanding or realization of 
the fullness of truth. Because of its eschatological nature, the kingdom of God is to 
be actively pursued by Christians in history. Taking all of this together, eschatology 
saves Christianity from simple resignation to the relativity of all truth and from 
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indifference toward the truth of other religious traditions. While an understanding 
of the provisional relative and historical nature of truth provides a necessary 
condition for conversation, it is faith and hope in the possibility of growth and of 
the progressive understanding of the truth that constitutes the dynamic impulse to 
engage the world and other religions.891 This understanding that the fullness of 
truth is to be fully revealed at the end of times obliges Christian mission to assume 
conversation as its primary model. This, as we have seen throughout the thesis, 
makes all people participants in a process of working and searching together 
towards the fullness of truth. The major church metaphor of pilgrim then applies 
to all humankind as a people on the way to the fullness of truth where we shall be 
free from all wrong perceptions and understanding of the truth. St. Paul says: ―For 
the present we see things as if in a mirror, and are puzzled; but then we shall see 
them face to face. For the present the knowledge I gain is imperfect; but then I 
shall know fully, even as I am fully known‖ (I Corinthians 13:12 Weymouth 
Translation). 
 
 
  
                                                          
891 Ibid., 40. 
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  Afterword 
 
Must there be a new model of mission in the 21st century? Most scholars would say, 
―Yes of course.‖ But then the more challenging question would be, ―what is it‖? 
The answer is conversation! Then another question could be posed: ―why is this 
so‖? As we have seen above, the answer is that mission now is not what it should 
be. This is what, in the first place, prompted me to start this PhD research thesis. It 
all started while attending a PhD defence for Fr. Dr. Cornelius Ssempala at 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 2004. I was fascinated by one term in his work 
on Rorty. The term was conversation and I resolved to work hard to make that 
concept a usable one in theology. However, when I heard of conversation I did not 
know what conversation really mean. I took it to be this social chatter in a 
communal gathering without knowing its philosophical and especially 
epistemological nuances. My earlier consideration was for conversation in its social 
dimension as: a communication by two or more people, often on a particular topic. 
I had less idea about what the Rortian conversation is all about. It was a privilege to 
have Prof. Frans Wijsen who kept reminding me of the meaning of ‗conversation‘ 
in the Rortian sense. It was a difficult thing to find out because for Rorty 
conversation has no foundations. One of the biggest challenges that I faced was 
that anyone who had read about Rorty had concluded that Rorty was an atheist. 
How comes that a Catholic priest, a teacher in a religious formation house is 
working on Rorty and trying to use his ideas in the mission practice of the church? 
It was difficult to comprehend as some people already used labels to describe me as 
a relativist and an atheist in the making! However, with much reading, I had to 
situate Rorty in his non-foundationalist tradition but his concept conversation; I 
had to conclude by placing it in the postfoundationalist tradition so as to use it well 
in mission. Another biggest challenge was to make a distinction between 
conversation and dialogue. The two are different although at face-value they look 
similar. But dialogue is too narrow and limited to the so called great world religions. 
As a fact dialogue is practically limited to the religious traditions of Asia and 
Europe. There is little regard for dialogue with African religions. And Laurent 
Magesa raised this issue in his seminal work: Christianity in dialogue with African 
traditional religions. Peter K. Sarpong says that: ―For Africa, the role of traditional 
religion in determining the modus vivendi has been vital. African cultures are 
known for their religious orientation. In fact, African cultures are religious cultures. 
It is not possible to study African culture in isolation from religion. Religion 
permeates the ideal African from cradle to grave. African traditional religion, 
therefore, comes into play in the shaping of the African‘s future.‖892 In Africa, the 
main thrust has been inculturation of the Christian faith in African cultures and 
there has been no open communication with these rather rich religious traditions. 
And for Laurent Magesa he claims that: ―for most Christians for a long time, and 
                                                          
892 Peter K. Sarpong, ―Can Christianity dialogue with African Traditional Religions?‖ Available at 
http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/sarpong.html accessed (August 20, 2012). 
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indeed for many up to now, the question of interfaith or interreligious dialogue is a 
non-issue. For them the issue was and is rather conversion, making everyone as far 
as that is possible, Christian.‖893 
 
I think, better than Friedrich Stenger, I have used the method of Critical Discourse 
Analysis to read and analyse mission texts in the past and the present as a means of 
generating the data for the proposal of a mission theory in the future. Applying the 
method of discourse analysis has not been easy as it was all new to me. However, it 
has broadened my mind and provided me a special position in missiology because I 
have not used the narrative-descriptive method of reading mission history. This 
method of narrative-descriptive style is common in many studies and it has 
generated enough data that at the moment we need to apply another method to 
generate more data for the development of scholarship in theology. So, discourse 
analysis has offered me a new way of reading and analysing mission history in the 
church. As a teacher in the seminary which has both faculties of philosophy and 
theology merged, this research project has helped me to develop both fields in one. 
It is noted in Catholic scholarship that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. 
Studying the philosopher Rorty has a great advantage that since Rorty has a heavy 
interdiscursive style in his writings, almost all the history of continental Europe as 
well as the Anglo-American tradition is all covered by reading and studying the 
works of Rorty. So, the concept conversation is very much apparent in Rorty 
himself as he engages different schools of thought challenging them and discussing 
with them and this discussion yields a great resource for philosophy and other 
districts of human knowledge. 
 
Reading and describing mission history in the light of the Rortian conversation has 
widened my mind about the complexity of mission and the tasks ahead. Then the 
bitter arguments between foundationalism and non-foundationalism and its 
eventual resolve in post-foundationalism have helped me to give conversation a 
good footing in the most contemporary philosophical thought. As a lecturer in 
missiology at a catholic seminary, I have found that I must ground my students in 
the teaching of the church and its doctrine but also let them open their eyes about 
the need for reaching out to the other traditions. Since this research is 
philosophically grounded, I am planning to have an empirical study and see how to 
make the concept work in actual contexts in Uganda. This thesis only gives way to 
a new project and that is how to make conversation work in actual pastoral and 
mission contexts. 
 
In the very beginning of this study I referred to Max Warren who wrote the well-
known introduction to The Primal Vision, written by John Taylor, Anglican 
missionary to Uganda and later secretary general of the Church Missionary Society. 
In the very beginning of that book John Taylor describes the missionaries‘ presence 
                                                          
893 Laurenti Magesa, African Religion in the Dialogue Debate: From Intolerance to Coexistence (Münster: LIT, 2010), 
89. 
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among Africans as follows: ―one can enjoy the other‘s presence without fuss or 
pressure, in conversation or in silence as the mood dictates‖.894 Maybe Taylor 
formulated in an intuitive way what Rorty meant by ―keeping the conversation 
going‖.895 
 
  
                                                          
894 Taylor, The Primal Vision: Christian Presence amid African Religion 17. 
895 Cf. Wijsen, There is Only One God, 272-273. 
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  Summary 
 
The thesis Mission from Conversion to Conversation opens with a probing question: Must 
there be a new model of Mission in the Church? This question is prompted by the 
phenomena of multiculturalism and globalisation which have come to impact 
Christianity today. It is noted that in its history the Church has felt the obligation of 
executing the mission mandate which, in mission theology, was advocated by the 
Muenster school. This school has considered ―conversion of individual souls‖ as 
the ultimate aim of mission. 
 
In the course of mission history, however, the school of Louvain has suggested the 
model ―implantation of the Church.‖ The Louvain model is also based on the 
concept of conversion, but conversion that is not individual but institutional. The 
main aim in this mission model is to extend the borders of the visible church.  
 
After the end of World War II, another mission method developed. Its aim was to 
bring the non-Christians to Christ and the Church. With this method Church could 
meet the potential converts half way by adaptating or accommodating Christianity 
to local cultures.  
 
Even though Vatican II stressed incarnation as foundation for mission, 
inculturation became the dominant mission model. Inculturation as a process 
involves the proclamation of the gospel that calls people to conversion. This 
movement of process and call leads to a change of mentality that itself leads to a 
cultural change and to a response that builds a new community of love of God and 
neighbour.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, two alternatives to the inculturation model emerged. 
The first model of liberation stresses the problems of social justice more or less in 
harmony with the social teaching of the Church. The second model of dialogue 
addresses mainly the issues of religious pluralism. Dialogue has been favoured as 
the most viable method of addressing religious pluralism. But the euphoria and 
enthusiasm that has characterised dialogue has slowly waned. In its place this thesis 
suggests conversation as the worthwhile alternative method of mission practice in 
the church today.  
 
The conversation as discussed in this thesis is based on the work of Richard Rorty. 
For Rorty conversation is linked to the concept of truth, and in Christianity, truth is 
the primary content of mission. However, interpretations of this truth differ. For 
Rorty Truth is an outcome of an open, non-imposing way of communication to 
reach consensus; whereas in Christianity, Truth is revealed and proclaimed and 
discovered by those seeking it.  
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As a philosopher Rorty‘s actual concerns were philosophical problems. He blames 
René Descartes for distorting the philosophical development by creating the idea of 
the mind that from the beginning of philosophy was not considered at all. Rorty‘s 
views are akin to those of Dewey who claims that problems should be evaluated 
according to their relevance to contemporary life. For Dewey, all problems 
originate in some sort of social need, but they tend to outlive their usefulness and 
this is what he thought had happened with all the traditional problems of 
philosophy.  
 
Given this background Rorty focused his perceived views on the biggest themes 
available to a philosopher: Philosophy itself and Truth. These two themes are 
deeply connected within Rorty but also very central to Christian mission theory and 
practice.  
 
Rorty claims that we cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. He thinks that the 
purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, 
to bring consensus on the end to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve 
those ends.  
 
These issues are contained in his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature published 
in 1979. In this work, Rorty set himself the task to deconstruct the whole 
continental philosophical edifice as previously known. By doing this, he renders 
philosophy scrawny and the understanding and explication of truth as lacking any 
foundation. The two ideas are considered together because for Rorty philosophy is 
the guardian of objective truth. 
 
This strategy ushers in what is characterised as the post-philosophical culture, a 
culture without foundations, but which is built on the ideal of keeping the 
conversation going. This Rortian project has consequences for Christian mission 
especially if we consider the philosophia ancilla theologiae motif that has informed 
much of western Christian and philosophical thought. This is so because the 
foundations upon which Christian theology was established to articulate her claims 
for universal truth have been cracked. There is, therefore, a need to address the 
new mission situation with an applicable and related mission strategy.  
 
Another observation in this thesis is that Rortian conception of conversation is 
related to the concept of discourse as it is developed by Michel Foucault and 
critical discourse analysts. The concepts conversation and discourse are concerned 
with language and truth - more particularly with the rejection of objective truth - 
and with intersubjective truth as constituted through discourse. For Foucault, 
people do not have access to absolute truth as they cannot speak from a position 
outside discourse. Truth therefore is not something that exists outside conversation 
or discourse. Both Rorty and Foucault assume that truth is constituted 
intersubjectively through language use.   
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From this Foucauldian inspiration, there have been a number of analyses of 
mission practice in the past by Mudimbe, Stenger, Nehring, Asad and Chidester. 
This thesis follows the same tradition and uses Fairclough‘s critical discourse 
analysis. The discourse analysis of past and present mission practice in Uganda has 
conversation as its background concept. It follows a three dimensional model: 
analysis of linguistic practice (text), of discursive practice (interaction) and of social 
practice (context). 
 
The thesis used the method of discourse analysis to uncover the discourses that 
have shaped mission and pastoral practice in Uganda. Missionary texts in the past 
and pastoral texts in the present were described and analysed. The main purpose 
was to generate data to develop and apply conversation as the new mission method 
in the Church in Uganda. In these analyses, it is found that in the early mission 
practice, missionaries were steeped in a mission paradigm that was informed by the 
philosophical and anthropological distinctions between civilised and primitive. In 
this approach, native catechists and native nuns had an auxiliary role to the 
missionaries. However, there is a development in the present pastoral documents. 
They make reference to conversation, but it is only limited to the collaboration of 
the agents of evangelisation and their call to grassroots evangelisation. It falls short 
of the Rortian ideal of keeping the conversation going. 
 
The thesis concludes by elaborating conversation as the new model of mission 
practice in the Church in Uganda. In order to apply this concept conversation to 
mission adequately, the thesis concedes that the extremism of both 
foundationalism and non-foundationalism are inadequate for theological discourse. 
Instead the present work adopts a third option, where post-foundationalism allows 
for cross-disciplinary conversations that leave human beliefs intact while accepting 
the shared resources of human rationality in different modes of reflection. The 
application of the term conversation in Christian mission, then, comes to mean that 
mission cannot be understood strictly on cognitive grounds. Rather, it means 
joining new communities and taking part in new conversations. Mission becomes a 
shift in a person‘s relations with others, not a shift inside the person that now suits 
him to enter new relationships. Mission as conversation helps to discover, disclose 
and unveil God‘s initiative and help turn human existence into human coexistence. 
In a world in which people go their own way, mission meets them at crossroads, 
where they discover the grace of becoming co-travelers on the way to the truth. 
Thus, truth in its fullness is an eschatological pursuit (cf. 1Cor. 13:12). 
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